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International Criminal Law and the Macro-Micro
Problem*
Anthony D'Amato**
Prior to 1960, textbooks on international public law hardly made
mention of international criminal law, except in brief references to sub-
jects such as extradition, asylum, and jurisdiction over aliens. But by
1991, global consciousness in a shrinking, interdependent and increas-
ingly criminally violent world, has seen international criminal law
emerge as a generally accepted subject of international law. Prominent
among scholars who have contributed to the rising consciousness about
international criminal law are M. Cherif Bassiouni, Ved Nanda,2 John
Murphy,s Robert Friedlander,4 Christine van den Wijngaert,5 Alfred
Rubin,' and Jordan Paust.7 The contributors to this Symposium carry
on the tradition.
As with most academic subjects, the real world tends to outpace
theoreticians' efforts to conceptualize and understand it., Professor
Bassiouni has listed twenty-two distinct international crimes;9 each of
* Copyright 1991 Anthony D'Amato.
** Judd & Mary Morris Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986-87).
2. See, e.g., M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW (1973); V.P. NANDA & M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1987).
3. See, e.g., J.F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
(1989).
4. See, e.g., R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE (1983).
5. See, e.g., C.V. WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION AND EXTRA-
DITION (1980).
6. See, e.g., A.P. RUBIN, PIRACY, PARAMOUNTCY AND PROTECTORATES (1974).
7. See, e.g., J.J. PAUST & A. BLAUSTEIN, WAR CRIMES JURISDICTION AND DUE
PROCESS (1974).
8. See, e.g., D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1983). A notable
and persistent exception is mathematics. Mathematical discoveries that have appeared
totally academic when discovered have often been employed years later to explain real-
world phenomena. Matrix algebra, for example, was invented in the mid-nineteenth
century as a totally impractical and rather weird form of combinational function. In
the mid 1920s, Werner Hbisenberg utilized it to depict the behavior of the newly dis-
covered quantum mechanics.
9. 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Nova Law Review
them has been the topic of discrete analysis. But we are still short on
unifying explanations. How do these subjects cohere with the general
theory of public international law? Does public international law throw
any light on the specific subjects of criminal law? Can the generaliza-
tions of the one serve as heuristics for the generalizations of the other?
One fundamental line of theoretical inquiry highlighted by the
study of international criminal law concerns what might be termed the
macro-micro problem. It is the question of how the macro world of
international law can cope with variations in the micro world of state
law. What gives rise to the problem is the fact that there are many
individual differences in state substantive law. One of the clearest ex-
amples of variations is the aftermath of the publication of Salman
Rushdie's book, The Satanic Verses. The government of Iran con-
demned it as blasphemous and ordered its author executed for the
crime of writing it. Indeed, Iran proclaims it to be a religious obligation
of all its people to seek out and execute Mr. Rushdie. Western nations
regard the notion of executing an author for writing a book as outra-
geous ° and have taken positive steps (Rushdie is in hiding in London
under the protection of the government of Great Britain) to frustrate
Iran's attempt to track Rushdie down and execute him. Thus, what is
criminal in Iran is highly safeguarded in other states." It would be
hard to imagine what general international law could say about the
Rushdie problem. No matter what the proffered substantive rule of law
might be, that rule would either favor Iran or Great Britain. Hence,
Rushdie's case suggests, perhaps in an extreme way, the complexity
entailed by examining international criminal law through the macro-
micro perspective.
The macro-micro problem is not necessarily confined -to the field of
criminal law. In the nineteenth century the problem was addressed
with respect to variations in state constitutional and tort law under the
general rubric of "denial of justice." But whatever the subject matter,
classic international law generally has had a hard time dealing with
substantive rules that vary from state to state. Indeed, most rules of
international law define what a state is,'2 and since states enter the
10. But not 500 years ago at the height of the Inquisition!
11. The macro-micro problem does not apply to all international criminal law.
There are some clearly universal crimes: genocide, enslavement, torture, war crimes,
counterfeiting. Others are universal by some accounts and almost universal by others:
terrorism, air piracy, hijacking, kidnapping.
12. As I have put it elsewhere, a "state" is simply a bundle of entitlements. See
[Vol. 15
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international community with equal entitlements, it is hard for interna-
tional law to say that any one state has an international entitlement
that another state lacks."3
The nineteenth century evolved an ingenious solution to the
macro-micro problem in matters concerning denial of justice. Interna-
tional law recognized the varying treatment of aliens in different states
by evolving through the customary-law process two standards: an inter-
national non-discriminatory treatment standard and an international
minimum treatment standard. 4 These standards were imposed upon all
states; that is, each state had the same entitlement. But the two stan-
dards had different functions. The first one denied states the right to
accord aliens a lesser standard of justice than that accorded to its na-
tionals. The second standard applied even if there was no discrimina-
tion between the treatment accorded to aliens and citizens in those
cases where the treatment was abysmally low for either category. Inter-
national law provided that no state could accord aliens less than the
threshold of the "international minimum standard," thus resulting in
what today we would view as a human-rights anomaly that aliens in
certain situations may enjoy more rights than citizens.
While the "responsibility of states" standards were customary
law's attempt to solve the macro-micro problem, in the criminal law
area a similar problem was addressed in the nineteenth century
through bilateral treaties. Various extradition treaties confronted the
problem at the bilateral micro level. These treaties incorporated provi-
sions that have defined two emerging customary standards: the stan-
dard of double criminality and the doctrine of specialty. 15 But many
difficulties remain because the problem of extradition continues to be
addressed at the micro level and not at the more appropriate level of a
A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW - PROCESS AND PROSPECT 21 (1987).
13. There may be physical differences among states; e.g., Switzerland does not
border on an ocean and Japan does not have a continental shelf. But their rights re-
main the same. For instance, if by some geophysical convulsion Japan were to acquire
a continental shelf, then it would have the same continental shelf rights that all other
nations enjoy.
14. For an account of these two standards and how they interacted, see D'Amato
& Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation of Nuclear Power Technology, 74
VA. L. Rnv. 1011 (1988).
15. In my view, these doctrines have entered into customary international law.
For a general account of the treaty-into-custom process, see A. D'AMATO, THE CON-
CEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-66 (1971); D'Amato, Custom and
Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. INT'L L. 459 (1988).
1991]
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global standard. Some of the difficulties are brought out in Professor
Sharon Williams' contribution to this Symposium."6
Three other ways for international law to cope with substantive
legal differences are to urge "cooperation" among states, to set up an
international criminal court, and to promote codification of substantive
law. The "cooperation" approach is discussed in the Symposium papers
by Roger S. Clark17 and by Scott Carlson and Bruce Zagaris.18 The
international criminal court approach is discussed by John B. Ander-
son.19 Professor Bassiouni has long been an advocate of international
codification of substantive crimes, as evidenced by his contribution to
this Symposium.2 ° In a practical way, these approaches may lead to
resolutions of the macro-micro problem. I am somewhat skeptical; I
fear that conceptually they may merely recapitulate it. If I am right,
efforts favoring cooperation, courts, and codification face itheir biggest
challenges when the time comes to get specific about just what rules
about just what crimes are to be included or excluded.
The intractability of at least two international criminal law issues
transcends the difficulty of the nineteenth century resolution of the
macro-micro problems of state responsibility and extradition. The first
of these is the issue of terrorism. The cliche, "one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter," only hints at the difficulty because this
aspect of the difficulty was at least addressed by classic international
law. Customary international law traditionally has viewed any insur-
gency against a state as an outlaw criminal movement unless and until
the point at which the insurgency takes control of the state. Then sud-
denly all is legalized, all is forgiven. This classic rule is hardly a solu-
tion to present complexities, which involve not only transboundary ter-
rorist activities but include affirmative transboundary support of such
activities.
16. Williams, The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition. A Comparative
Analysis, 15 NOVA L. REV. 581 (1991).
17. Clark, Crime: The UN Agenda on International Cooperation in the Criminal
Process, 15 NOVA L. REv. 475 (1991).
18. Carlson and Zagaris, International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: West-
ern Europe's International Approach to International Crime, 15 NovA L. REv. 551
(1991).
19. Anderson, An International Criminal Court - An Emerging Idea, 15 NOVA
L. lv. 433 (1991).
20. Bassiouni, Draft Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal, 15 NovA
L. REV. 373 (1991). See also M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A
DRAFr INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE (1980).
[Vol. 15
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At the heart of the present problem of terrorism is how to concep-
tualize its illegality under present international law without implicating
the majority of states which apparently practice it.21 Anthony Chase's
contribution to this Symposium22 sharply raises the question of candor:
Can United States' spokespersons and scholars ignore United States
sponsored terrorist acts as they condemn the terrorist acts of others?
His skepticism is generalizable; it applies to all scholars when their own
nations' terrorism is implicated.
The second difficult macro-micro issue, perhaps the most complex,
is narcotic drugs. At the most elementary level, this is a product that
many people desire or crave, but one that is denied to many by virtue
of the law of their own countries. The gap between demand and illegal-
ity (whether it be drugs, coffee, or alcohol) has historically been filled
by organized crime. In the prohibition era in the United States begin-
ning in 1921, bootleg alcohol was manufactured and distributed to
"speakeasies," distilled liquor was imported from Canada; "rum-run-
ners" challenged the coast guard at the 3-mile and 12-mile limits.
Moreover, organized crime gained its foothold in the United States;
once organized, it transferred its activities to other spheres when the
Twenty-First Amendment was adopted in 1933 ending the federal pro-
hibition of intoxicating liquor. We are still paying the price for the
"grand experiment" of prohibition.
It is sometimes argued that narcotic drugs are far more dangerous
substances than intoxicating liquor, and so the historical analogy does
not hold up. In fact, there are undoubtedly more automobile accident
fatalities due to drunken driving than all the deaths attributed to drugs.
But the price now being paid to fight the war against drugs by the
United States government vastly exceeds anything seen in the prohibi-
tion era.
The price has to be measured in terms of the number of criminal
organizations spawned by the demand for drugs, the extent of corrup-
tion of the police, judges, and other officials, the strains placed upon
international law by the aggressive actions of United States officials in
interdicting ships on the high seas or even in pursuing and arresting
21. This is, of course, a classic conundrum of customary international law. If
most states engage in an activity and at least on occasion admit that they are doing so,
how could that activity be illegal under customary international law? See, e.g.,
D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. INT'L
L. 459 (1988).
22. Chase, Book Review: Ministries of Terror, 15 NovA L. Rnv. 771 (1991).
1991]
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foreign drug exporters within their own countries, and the opportunity
costs associated with this vast police effort that could be diverted to
other matters. Yet it is the very extent of the corruption associated
with the war on drugs that may be the greatest political factor that
insures its continued illegality. If the use of drugs were legalized, the
high prices and profits associated with drug dissemination would plum-
met. Officials who have become accustomed to rake-offs from this vast
profit system will suddenly be denied their major source of income, as
would crime cartels.2 3 Bruce Zagaris' contribution to this Symposium
describes the situation as follows without indicating whether his com-
ments apply chiefly to the United States or to other countries or both:
National law has been under attack by narco-terrorists and organ-
ized crime. By intimidating and killing judges, prosecutors, police,
and the media, narco-terrorists and organized criminals ensure that
the rule of law and a democracy cannot function properly. Simi-
larly, by financing the campaigns of national and local politicians
and running for office themselves, narco-terrorists and organized
criminals also influence and control even the law-making and the
entire electoral process. Indeed, the distribution of money, jobs,
and other forms of wealth of largess by narco-terrorists and organ-
ized crime provide the donors with an inordinate amount of politi-
cal power.24
The fact is that Professor Zagaris' words do apply both to the United
States and to supplying countries such as Colombia, and for the same
basic reason. The immensely valuable demand situation in the United
States gives rise to drug corruption at home as well as abroad. Once a
large number of politicians, police officers, judges and other govern-
23. For example, eight police officers raid a hotel room where they had been
tipped that a drug exchange was taking place. The criminals escape but leave behind
twenty million dollars in cash and twenty million dollars worth of crack. Who will ever
know if the police report back that they confiscated twelve million dollars cash and
twelve million dollars worth of crack? Each police officer will be richer to the tune of
one million dollars cash and one million dollars of street-value worth of narcotics. This
is more money than any of them can accumulate in a lifetime's work. Does this scena-
rio, with variations, take place? From all the media accounts, there is reason to believe
that it takes place quite often.
What about judges who are paid off to acquit narcotics defendants? See generally
M. MERMELSTEIN, THE MAN WHO MADE IT SNOW (1990).
24. Zagaris, Protecting the Rule of Law From Assault in te War Against
Drugs and Narco-Terrorism, 15 NOVA L. Rnv. 703 (1991).
348 [Vol. 15
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ment officials, are drawn into the lucrative drug trade, they gain a new
incentive to call out for increasing criminal enforcement and penalties.
The higher the rate of enforcement and the higher the punishment for
offenders, the higher the price for drugs will go and hence the more
room for profit-sharing and corruption.
Thus, a nation such as Colombia is in a basically self-inconsistent
position. Since so much of its GNP derives from the lucrative drug-
export trade, it may want to cooperate with the United States in sup-
pressing local drug manufacture because it has an interest in keeping
prices high by keeping drugs illegal. These officials want to make the
drug business harder but not stamp it out altogether. At the same time,
there may be many honest Colombian officials - as there are many
honest United States officials - who genuinely want to win the war
against drugs. Both the corrupt and honest officials share common
ground in maintaining the regime of drug illegality in the United
States. Some of the vast enforcement problems associated with the re-
lationship between the United States and Colombia are depicted in
Mark Sherman's contribution to this Symposium.2 5 His paper should
be read against the self-contradictory policy of government officials in
wanting to maintain as well as eliminate the drug problem.
Countries who do not make illegal the use of narcotic drugs find it
hard to sympathize with the efforts of the United States to strain or
bend international oceanic law in order to search and interdict ships
that may be carrying prohibited substances. Countries such as Mexico
and Colombia which themselves have laws against drug manufacture
and export - but at the same time derive a significant portion of their
GNP from that trade - are of course more ambivalent toward United
States policies. But even they resent actual physical intrusion by the
United States, such as the apprehension within their countries of per-
sons who are engaged in drug traffic or the spraying of their fields by
American planes trying to destroy poppy and marijuana plants. The
United States, in turn, ends up "bribing" such countries with massive
foreign aid packages - thus expending taxpayer money in the effort to
eradicate the drug problem, but only succeeding in driving up prices
and profits.
In my personal view, the effort has not worked and will not work.
We are unwilling to learn the lessons of prohibition, and thus are fated
to repeat a historical mistake. This time it will be vastly more expen-
25. Sherman, United States International Drug Control Policy, Extradition, and
the Rule of Law in Columbia, 15 NOVA L. REv. 661 (1991).
1991]
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Nova Law Review
sive and harmful.
In the meantime, international lawyers should make an attempt to
grapple with the macro-micro problem in all the aspects of the interna-
tional drug problem. Extradition, searches and seizures on the high
seas, forcible intervention in other countries, and a host of related
problems all strain against general norms of customary international
law. Although I have never believed that solving a legal problem will
necessarily solve a real-world problem, I think that real-world solutions
can be remarkably wasteful and inconsistent if we fail to address possi-
ble inconsistencies in the network of applicable legal norms. The
macro-micro problem with respect to international drug control can be
a productive source of useful international legal scholarship as long as
the criminalization of drugs remains the policy of the United States.
International investment fraud, though less visible and far more
"white-collar" a problem than thd traffic in drugs, raises many of the
same macro-micro issues. The article by Lisa Davis and Bruce Zagaris
suggests that, on the practical level, the macro-micro problem is ad-
dressed in the form of "international cooperation. '26 Discussion among
the relevant national law-enforcement officers of their different national
perspectives in the light of their potential common purposes may be the
best that can be done to harmonize discordant national voices. Interna-
tional cooperation, on the entirely different subject of deporting Nazi
war criminals, is similarly highlighted in the article Jeffrey Mausner2
In contrast, the seizure of Panama's Manuel Noriega, recounted in the
article by Richard Gregorie, is a kind of test case of the limits of such
international cooperation. If the target state were Great Britain or
France, instead of Panama, would "cooperation" play a more signifi-
cant or a less significant role?
Although treaties, at first blush, appear to be a way of harmoniz-
ing certain kinds of discord, the article by David Stewart on the U.S.
ratification of the Torture Convention reminds us that reservations,
declarations, and understandings that are often appended to such docu-
ments tend to recapitulate particularistic national viewpoints.2 9
26. Davis and Zagaris, International Cooperation in a World Marketplace:
Preventing & Prosecuting Commodity Futures Fraud & Abuses, 15 NOVA L. Rnv. 507
(1991).
27. Mausner, Apprehending and Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in the United
States 15 NOVA L. REv 747 (1991).
28. Gregorie, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Its Use, Its Roots and Its Viability,
15 NOVA L. REv. 625 (1991).
29. Stewart, The Torture Convention and The Reception of International Crimi-
[Vol. 15
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The Symposium is rounded out by a description of Fordham Uni-
versity's new International Criminal Law Center.30 More and more law
schools-finally!-are discovering that there is a world out there be-
yond the borders of the United States. The incredible insularity of
American legal study is at last under attack, and much of the challenge
comes from the demand of students to be educated in legal systems
other than the Anglo-American common law system. Not only should
law professors introduce their students to different legal systems, but
more importantly, in my view, they should use an external systemic
perspective as a critical device in examining the fundamental postulates
of our own common law.31
nal Law within the United States, 15 NOVA L. REv. 449 (1991).
30. Abramovsky and Frank, The Development, Objectives and Planned Activi-
ties of the International Criminal Law Center of Fordham University School of Law,
15 NovA L. REv. 501 (1991).
31. See D'Amato, International Law in the Curriculum, 2 PAcE Y.B. INT'L L. 83
(1990).
1991]
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A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC APPROACH ON INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION FOR THE PREVENTION, CONTROL AND SUPPRESSION
OF INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINALITY, INCLUDING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
By
M. Cherif Bassiouni
Professor of Law, DePaul University;
President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences;
President, International Association of Penal Law
INTRODUCTION
1. The various forms and manifestations of international and transna-
tional criminality require a comprehensive approach by the interna-
tional community from which effective strategies of prevention, control,
and suppression can follow.
2. At present, the lack of an overall comprehensive approach has led to
occasional, unrelated, uncoordinated, and ineffective international ac-
tion as may be evidenced by the increased forms, manifestations, and
volume of international and transnational criminality. National strate-
gies have also proven ineffective in the face of such forms of
criminality.
3. In addition, national forms and manifestations of crime and delin-
quency have also increased, as have their volume. And, in a world
where interstate mobility has become both- easy and rapid, national law
enforcement, as well as prosecutorial and judicial efforts, can no longer
be effective without international cooperation.
4. The need to undertake a comprehensive codification of international
crimes, and some types of transnational crimes, and also to develop
some direct enforcement mechanisms, including but not limited to the
establishment of a universal international criminal court and regional
international criminal courts, appears to have gained ground with gov-
ernment policy-makers.
5. The need to develop an integrated codified or conventional approach
[Vol. 15
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to the various modalities of interstate cooperation in penal matters has
also become more evident. Such an approach is also particularly appro-
priate in furtherance of the existing approach: the "indirect enforce-
ment scheme," whereby states obligate themselves under conventional
international law to undertake national enforcement and interstate co-
operation for the prosecution and punishment of certain types of of-
fenses. Moreover, it is necessary to any "direct enforcement scheme."
6. The modalities of interstate cooperation in penal matters are, how-
ever, the same whether the conduct for which an individual is sought
(either prosecution or punishment) constitutes an international, trans-
national, or purely domestic crime. Consequently, the integrated com-
prehensive approach to the various modalities of interstate cooperation
in penal matters enhances the effectiveness of crime prevention and
control irrespective of the type or manifestation of criminal activity.
7. To undertake effective implementation of any international strategy
of crime prevention and control with respect to international and trans-
national criminality requires first an overall strategic approach.
This report contains two parts. Part A covers the overall strategic ap-
proach and Part B contains a model for the establishment of a univer-
sal (international) criminal court and a model for regional international
criminal courts.
1991]
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PART A
A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC APPROACH
ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR
THE PREVENTION, CONTROL AND
SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINALITY
I. General Considerations on Defining and Codifying Interna-
tional Crimes and Developing an International Criminal Jus-
tice Policy Concerning International and Transnational
Crimes
1. Modern international criminal law can be said to have commenced
in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna with efforts to abolish slavery.
Since then 315 international instruments on substantive
international criminal law have been elaborated covering the
following international crimes: Aggression, War Crimes, Unlawful
Use of Weapons, Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide,
Apartheid, Slavery and Slave-Related Practices, Unlawful Human
Experimentation, Torture, Piracy and Crimes on Board
Commercial Vessels, Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage. of
Aircrafts, Kidnapping of Diplomats and Other Internationally
Protected Persons, Taking of Civilian Hostages, Mailing of
Explosives and Dangerous Objects, Illicit Drug Cultivation and
Trafficking, Destruction and Theft of National and Archaeological
Treasures, Environmental Damage, Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials, International Traffic in Obscene Materials, Interference
with Submarine Cables, Falsification and Counterfeiting, Theft of
Nuclear Weapons and Materials.'
1. See M.C. Bassiouni, International Crimes: Digest/Index of International In-
struments 1815-1985 (2 vols. 1986). See also for other writings on the subject, A.
Hegler, Prinzipen Der Internationalen Straafrechts (1906); F. Melli, Lehrbuch Des
Internationalen Strafrechts und Strafprossrechts (1910); M. Travers, Le Droit Pbnal
[Vol. 15
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2. These offenses are designed to protect the following internationally
recognized values and interests of the world community:2
(i) Protection of Peace
(ii) -Humanitarian Protection During Armed Conflicts
(iii) Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Weapons
Susceptible of Inflicting Unnecessary Human Suffering
(iv) Protection of Fundamental and Basic Human Rights
(v) Prevention of Terror-Violence
(vi) Protection of Social Interests
(vii) Protection of Cultural Heritage
(viii) Protection of the Environment
(ix) Protection of Means of International Communications
(x) Protection of International Economic Interests
3. While all these international crimes are often committed by
individuals, some of them can be the product of state action, or
the product of favoring state policy. But while responsibility for
International et sa Mise en Oeuvre en Temps De Paix et en Temps De Guerre (5 vols.
1920-1922); H. Donnedieu De Vabres Introduction A l'Etude Du Droit Penal Interna-
tional (1922); H. Donnedieu De Vabres, Les Principes Modernes Du Droit Interna-
tional (1928); N. Levi, Diritto Penal Internazionale Volckferstrafrecht (1952); V.
Pella, La Codification du Droit Penal International (1952); S. Glaser, Introduction a
L'Etude du Droit International Penal (1954); A. Quintano-Ripolles, Tratado De Der-
echo Penal Internacional e International Penal (2 vols. 1955-1957); S. Glaser, Les
Infractions Internationales (1957); International Criminal Law (G.O.W. Mueller &
E.M. Wise eds. 1965); 0. Triffterer, Domatische Untersuchungen Zur Entwicklung
Des Materiellen Volkerstrafrechre Seit Nurnberg (1966); S. Plawski, Etude Des
Principes Fondamentaux Du Droit International P~nal (1972); 1 M.C. Bassiouni &
V.P. Nanda, A Treatise on International Criminal Law (2 vols. 1973); La Belgique Et
Le Droit International Penal (B. DeSchutter ed. 1975); S. Glaser, Le Droit Penal In-
ternational (2 vols 1979); H. Ebeid. Algarima Al-Dawalia (The International Crime)
(1979); D. Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht (2nd ed. 1983); I. Karpetz, Delitos de
Caracter Internacional (1983); Radin, "INTERNATIONAL CRIMEs," 32 Iowa L. Rev. 33
(1946); Dinstein, "INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW," 5 Israel 55 (1975); Wright, "THE
SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK," 15 Val J.
Int'l L. 562 (1975); Green, "AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE Now?" 3 Dalhousie
L.J. 560 (1976); Mueller, "INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CIViTAS MAxI AS," 15
Case W. Res J. Int'l L. 1 (1983); Friedlander, "THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A PRESENT DAY INQUIRY," 15 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. (1983); Wise,
"INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND DOMESTIC CRIMINAL LAW," 38 DePaul L. Rev. 923
(1989).
2. See M.C. Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and a Draft Statue
for an International Criminal Tribunal, pp. 21-52 (1987) [hereinafter referred to as
Draft Code].
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such crimes has universally been recognized to apply to individual
actors, there is little consensus in contemporary international
criminal law doctrine as to state criminal responsibility, though
the international law of state responsibility has been recognized
under customary international law for compensatory purposes.3
4. International crimes as evidenced by conventional and customary
international law invariably contain one or both of the following
elements:4
(i) An international element which evidences that the violative
conduct effects world peace and security or significantly
offends the basic values of humanity; and
(ii) A transnational element whereby the offense affects more
than one state, or the citizens of more than one state, or is
committed by means involving more than one state.
But while some crimes are truly international in their scope, effect
or consequences, others are essentially transnational and may only
partly or incidentally be deemed international within the meaning
stated above. Thus a distinction between such crimes needs to be
made.5
5. Notwithstanding the diversity in nature, scope, and effect of these
violations, there are no recognized criteria for distinguishing
among these offenses which are indiscriminately referred to as
international crimes. Some scholars have sought to distinguish
them by referring to them as on the basis of international crimes
stricto sensu and lato sensu. But even such labels hardly
distinguish them in a way that can lead to the eventual precise
definition of what constitutes an international crime, the definition
of which is indispensable for the codification of international
crimes and which is necessary to serve as a guiding policy for the
development of future international crimes.6
6. Efforts by the United Nations since 1947 to develop a Code of
3. On the Principles of State Responsibility see the work of the International
Law Commission between 1976 and 1989, published annually in the Yearbook of In-
ternational Law Commission (ILC). For the latest ILC position see the Report of the
International Law Commission, on the work of its forty-first session, 2 May - 21 July
1989, (GAOR XLIV), Supp No, 10 (A/44/10). See also I Brownie, State Responsi-
bility (1983).
4. Bassiouni, "CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVEN-
TIONS," in 1 International Criminal Law Crimes, p. 1 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
5. Id.
6. DRAFr CODE supra note 2, at pp. 1-20.
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Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind7 have
faltered because of a lack of clear perception of what constitutes
an international crime, and thus what crimes should be included
in the proposed Code. As a result, the present on-going efforts of
the International Law Commission have included new categories
of offenses not embodied in international conventions while
excluding others which are covered by a number of conventions
because they do not affect the "Peace and Security of Mankind." 8
7. Contemporaneously, the International Law Commission, in its
elaboration of Draft Principles on State Responsibility has sought,
without defining them, to distinguish between international crimes
and international delicts,9 thus further evidencing the need for
more precise definitions which would satisfy the "principles of
legality."
8. The Rationae Materiae and Rationae Personae of international
crimes needs to be clearly identified. Categories of violations need
to be established to distinguish between the more serious offenses
and the lesser ones. This effort must additionally focus on the
choice of labels for these categories of offenses, such as: crimes,
delicts, offenses, violations or others, such as "grave breaches" and
"breaches" enunciated in the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
194910 and Protocols I and II of 1977.11 Such labels must be
7. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted
at Paris 38 July 1954, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), at 11, U.N. Doc. A. 2693 (1954).
See Johnson, "Tim DRAFT CODE OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF
MANKIND," 4 Int. & Comp.L.Q. 445 (1955). This Draft has been on the agenda of the
U.N. Sixth Committee since 1979. See also Williams, "THm DRAFT CODE OF OF-
FENCES AGAINST PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND," in 1 International Criminal
Law: Crimes, p. 109 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986); Proceedings, Eightieth Annual Meet-
ing, The American Society of International Law, "DRAFT CODE OF OFFENCES AGAINST
THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND," remarks of Bassiouni p. 120, pp. 123-124;
McCaffrey, pp. 120-123; Williams, pp. 124-127; Frankowska, pp. 128-130; and Fried-
lander, pp. 130-132.
8. See Report of the International Law Commission (1989), supra note 3, at pp.
127-187.
9. See Draft Articles of State Responsibility, art. 19, Report of the International
Law Commission (1989), supra note 3. See also F. Malekian, International Criminal
Responsibility of States (1985).
10. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded-
and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces atSea, Geneva, 12 Au-
gust 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the
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reflective of an international policy designed to prevent control
and suppress infractions of international criminal law.
9. An international criminal policy needs to be established in light of
the availability and limits of the international sanction, and in
keeping with the capabilities and effectiveness of the existing
systems of international and national enforcement which are based
on the voluntary cooperation of states to prosecute or extradite
accused violators, and to assist states seeking to or engaging in the
prosecution of violators of international criminal norms.1 2
10. A new approach to international criminal justice policy needs to
be developed to make more effective a system of international
criminal justice. Such a policy should include inter alia the
following considerations:
(i) identification of the international or transnational social
interest sought to be protected,
(ii) identification of the international or transnational harm
sought to be averted,
(iii) assessment of the intrinsic seriousness or offensive nature of
the violation to the world community, its fundamental
values and basic interests, including, but not exclusively
limited to, the preservation of peace and security of human
kind and the protection of fundamental human rights,
(iv) appraisal of the inherent dangerousness of the prohibited
conduct and of the perpetrator as manifested by the
violative conduct and the manner in which it was
performed, and
(v) recognition of the degree of general deterrence sought to be
generated by the international criminalization of the
violative conduct in light of the degree of certainty of
eventual prosecution and punishment.
11. International criminal law must also preserve the well-established
principles of legality which include the basic maxims nulla poena
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, T.I.A.S.
No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
11. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Berne,
12 December 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex I; Protocol II Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Berne, 12 December 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144
Annex II.
12. See ANNEX I to Part A at p. 29.
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sine lege, nullum crimin sine lege13 and the requirements that
international crimes must be clearly and unambiguously defined
and carry established penalties, or penalties based on sufficiently
ascertainable parameters and guidelines.
12. The prosecution of international crimes, whether by an
international or national judicial body, must conform to
established international human rights norms in order to assure
justice, fairness, and equality of the law to all accused persons.14
13. The effective enforcement of international criminal law depends
on:
(i) the development of national legislation embodying
international crimes,
(ii) the development of national legislation, multilateral and
bilateral instruments for interstate cooperation in the
prevention, prosecution and punishment of such crimes, and
(iii) the establishment of various modalities of international
investigation, prosecution, adjudication and punishment of
violators of international criminal law, among which would
be an international criminal court.
14. An international criminal code should be developed by the United
Nations which should include:15
13. Ancel, "LA RGLE Nulla poena sine lege DANS LES LEGISLATIONS
MODERNES," in Annales de l'Institut de Droit Compar 245 (1936); Vassalli, Nullum
Crimen Sine Lege, (1939) reprinted from 91 GIURISPIUDENZA ITALIANA; Nuvolone,
"LE PMINCIPE DE LEGALITE ET LES PRINCIPES DE LA DEFENCE SOCIALE" in Revue de
Science Criminelle et de Droit Compar 231 (1956). For a survey of these principles
see Glaser, "LE PRINCIPE DE LA LtGALITt EN MATIbRE PANALE, NOTAMMENT EN
DROIT CODIFIt ET EN DROIT COUTUMIER," 46 Revue de Droit Pnal et de Crimino-
logie 889 (1966). For national approaches see R. Merle & A. Vitu, Traitg de Droit
Criminal p. 108 et seq. (1967) which documents the historical right of the judge in the
French criminal justice system to interpret principles of law, and which at p. 113 ac-
knowledges the decline in the 20th century of the rigid positivist approach to "princi-
ples of legality;" J. de la Morandifre, De la Rbgle "Nulla poena sine Lege" (1910);
Soler, "LA FORMULATION ACTUELLE DU PRINCIPE Nullum Crimen," Revue de Sciences
Criminelles, p. 11 et seq. (1952); Vassalli, "Nullum Crimen Sine Lege," in Novissimo
Digesto Italiano, p. 3 (1984); and Vassali, "ANALOGIA NEL DiriTTo PENALE," in
Novissimo Digesto Italiano, p. 3 (1987).
14. See inter alia, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 De-
cember 1966, G.A. Res./2200 A (XXI); United National Convention Against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17 December 1984,
A/Res/39/146; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 31 July
1957, ECOSOC Res/663 C (XXIV); and 13 May 1977, ECOSOC Res/2076 (LXII).
15. See DnFr CODE, supra note 2.
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(i) a general part containing principles of responsibility,
(ii) a special part containing substantive crimes, and
(iii) a procedural part containing modalities of international
cooperation.
II. Technical Legal Considerations Pertaining to the Definition
and Codification of International and Transnational Offenses
The enforcement of international criminal law would be advanced by
defining and codifying international offenses, on the basis of the criteria
stated above. The following definitions and criteria are recommended
for consideration by the United Nations, governments and the scholarly
community.1"
1. An international offense is conduct, internationally proscribed, for
which states have an international duty to criminalize, prosecute
or extradite, and eventually to punish the transgressor, and to
cooperate with other states and international o:rgans for the
effective and good faith implementation of these duties in order to
attain the purposes of prevention, control and suppression of the
violative conduct.
2. International offenses should be categorized in light of their
international seriousness.
(i) The term "International Crimes" should be limited only to
the more serious offenses, which are usually the product of
state action or state policy and which affect the peace and
security of humankind or which significantly offend basic
fundamental international values. They are:
1. Aggression,
2. War Crimes,
3. Unlawful Use of Weapons,
4. Crimes Against Humanity,
5. Genocide, and
6. Apartheid.
(ii) International Delicts are those offenses which offend basic
human values, but which do not affect the peace and
security of humankind, and which are not the product of
state action or state policy. They are:
1. Slavery and slave-related practices,
2. Torture,
16. Id., at pp. 21-66.
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3. Unlawful human experimentation,
4. Piracy,
5. Aircraft hijacking,
6. Threat and use of force against internationally
protected persons,
7. Taking of civilian hostages,
8. Drug offenses,
9. Destruction and/or theft of national treasures,
10. Environmental protection,
11. Unlawful use of the mails for violence,
12. Theft of nuclear weapons and materials.
(iii) International infractions are offenses not includable in the
categories of "International Crimes" and "International
Delicts." They are:
1. International traffic in obscene materials,
2. Interference with submarine cables,
3. Falsification and counterfeiting,
4. Bribery of foreign public officials.
The Natioiis should undertake the codification of conventional
and customary international crimes in order to further their
enforcement by national legal systems and by an eventual
international criminal court. Such a codification would also serve
as a model for national legislation and the embodiment of such
norms in their internal laws. This effort has never been
undertaken because of the perception by ILC that the Draft Code
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind is limited
to offenses which affect peace and security. Thus, it does not
encompass all international crimes.1
III. Principles and Legal Bases of International Criminal
Responsibility
Recognizing that conventional and customary international criminal
law establishes individual criminal responsibility for international
crimes irrespective of whether national legislation also does", and that
17. See supra note 7.
18. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal (annexed to the London
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis), London, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, E.A.S. No. 472; Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (part of the Special Proclamation:
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the responsibility of states exists under customary international law,"9
but acknowledging the need for further specifications to both bases of
responsibility reaffirms that:
1. Individuals are the subjects of international criminal
responsibility.
2. No individual can avail himself of the defense of "obedience to
superior orders" for the commission of international offenses
unless with respect to each and every act such a person was
compelled by immediate threat commensurate with or greater
than the actual harm committed.
3. Heads of State and Diplomats should not be immune from
individual criminal responsibility for the commission of an
international offense.
4. Standards of state responsibility should be established whenever
agents of a state engage in the commission of such offences, or act
on behalf or for the benefit of a state in committing the violation.
Such responsibility, in keeping with existing standards of
customary international law, should, in keeping with the needs of
that state's economic viability, include restitution, compensation,
and reparation to the victims of such violations and to the victim
state.
5. National and eventual international prosecution and punishment
of violators of international criminal law should not derogate the
basic principles of justice and fairness as enunciated in
international instruments on the -protection of human rights,
including, but not limited to: fair trial before an impartial
tribunal; opportunity to be heard and to defend; confrontation of
witnesses; obtaining witnesses; the right to counsel of one's choice;
including self-representation and the appointment of counsel in
case of indigency; the right to appear before a fair and impartial
judicial body other than the one before which the accused was
tried; the application of the principle of ne bis in idem; and the
infliction of penalties and treatment which are not cruel, inhuman
Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East), Tokyo, 19 Janu-
ary 1946 (General Order No. 1), as amended 26 April 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589. See
also Kelsen, "COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTE11NATIONAL LAW
WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS," 31 Calif. L.
Rev. 530 (1943).
19. See supra note 3.
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or degrading.20
IV. Principles and Policies on Increasing Effectiveness of Na-
tional Enforcement (The "Indirect Enforcement Scheme")
In order to render the international system of prevention, control and
suppression of international offenses more effective, the following rec-
ommendations need to be taken into account:
1. Application of the rule aut dedere aut iudicare;
2. Recognition of state's duty to prosecute effectively and in good
faith or to extradite effectively and in good faith;
3. Embodiment of international crimes in the national legislation of
all countries;
4. Establishment of a xanking of jurisdictional theories: territoriality,
nationality, passive personality, and universality;
5. Granting individual victims the right to initiate prosecution and to
participate in prosecution as partie civile;
6. Developing means by which to detect abuses of power by those
public officials who may commit international offenses or who
may prevent their effective and good faith prosecution;
7. Inclusion in the national legislation of states' integrated
modalities for interstate cooperation in the prosecution of
international offenses including, but not limited to: extradition,
mutual judicial assistance 'in securing tangible evidence and
witnesses, recognition of foreign penal judgments, transfer of
proceedings, and transfer of prisoners;
8. Application by states of these modalities of interstate applicability
cooperation with respect to international offenses irrespective of
the existence of bilateral or multilateral treaties;
9. Consistent of these modalities in all international criminal law
conventions; and
10. Development by the United Nations of an integrated code of
international modalities of interstate cooperation as is in the
course of consideration by the Council of Europe and as has been
developed as a model by the League of Arab States. Such an
integrated code could be used by an eventual criminal court and
could also serve as a model for inclusion in national legislation (as
discussed in paragraph five).
20. See supra note 14.
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V. Integrating the Modalities of International Cooperation for
the Prevention, Control and Suppression of International and
Transnational Criminality
1. International modalities of cooperation are essentially the same
with respect to all forms of international and transnational
criminality. 21 The formal modalities relied upon are extradition,
legal assistance in securing tangible evidence and witnesses,
recognition of foreign penal judgments, transfer of proceedings
and prisoners, and law enforcement and prosecutorial cooperation
under some recent instruments.22 Most international criminal law
conventions contain provisions on extradition and mutual judicial
assistance.23 Most countries in the world recognize and utilize one
or more of the modalities described above.
2. A number of regional and sub-regional arrangements have
developed at the multilateral level.24 They are: Latin America and
21. See E. Muller-Rappard and M.C. Bassiouni, European Inte'-State Coopera-
tion in Criminal Matters, La Cooperation Inter-Etatique Europenne en Mati~re
P~nale (3 Vols. 1987) [hereinafter referred to as European Inter-State Cooperation].
For international cooperation in penal matters, see Muller-Rappard, Schutte, Epp,
Poncet, Zagaris, et al, in M.C. Bassiouni, International Criminal Law (Vol. 2, 1986).
22. Id., and also Grutzner, "INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND COOP-
ERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS," in M.C. Bassiouni and V.P. Nanda, eds. A Treatise
on International Law, 189 (1973). For a survey of recent Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties between the United States an other countries see Nadelman, "NEGOTIATIONS
IN CRIMINAL LAW ASSISTANCE TREATIES," p. 33 Am. J. Comp. L. 467 (1985) and
Zagaris and Simonetti, "JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE UNDER U.S. BILATERAL TREATIES" in
Legal Responses to International Terrorism, M.C. Bassiouni ed. (1989) at p. 219. For
the latest of such bilateral treaties see Agreement between the United Mexican States
and the United States of America on Cooperation in Combating Narcotics Trafficking
and Drug Dependency, signed in Mexico City on February 23, 1989. See also Mutual
Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty with Mexico, Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Treaty Doc. 100-13 (Feb. 16, 1988); for a .discussion of the proposed U.S.-Mexico
MLAT, See Zagaris, "U.S. and Mexico Sign Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty," 2 Int'l
Enforcement Law Rptr. 44 (Feb. 1989). For a Socialist perspective see Krapac, "AN
OUTLINE OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS" 34 Netherlands In-
ternational Law Review 324 (1987); Gardocki, "THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE AND MUTUAL COOPERATION IN PENAL MATTERS" in 2 M.C. Bassiouni,
International Criminal Law 133 (1987); Shupilov, "LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES ON SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF EXTRADITION [IN THE USSR]," 15 Case
Western Reserve Journal of Int'l L. 127 (1983).
23. See ANNEX I to Part A, p. 29.
24. See M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition in United States Law and
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the United States,25 the Arab states,26 the Benelux countries,27
the Scandinavian countries, 28 an agreement involving some
African countries and France,29  and the Commonwealth
countries.30 However, piecemeal negotiation and complicated
historical and political considerations have resulted in a situation
wherein none of these multinational and regional or sub- regional
agreements integrate the various modalities into a comprehensive
codified form of interstate cooperation in penal matters.3 1 Such an
approach would permit better alternative utilization of the most
appropriate modalities and reduce the loopholes or gaps left by
the accidents of historical development.
Practice, (Vol. I, 1987) p. 25 and I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (1971).
See also V.E.H. Booth, British Extradition Law and Procedure (1980); B.P. Borgo-
fi6n, Aspectos Procesales de la Extradicion en Derecho Espahol (1984); H.A. Bouk-
hriss, La Coopgration P~nale Internationale par Voie d'Extradition au Maroc (1986);
M.T. Lupacchini, L'Estradizione dall'Estero per L'Italia (1989), 0. Lagodny, Die
Rechtsstellung des Auszuliefernden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1987); M.A.
Vieira, "L'EvOLUTION RICENTB DE L'EXTRADITION DANS LE CoNTINENT AMERICAIN,"
185 Recueil des Cours, Academie de Droit International 155 (1989); T. Vogler, Aus-
lieferungsrecht und Grundgesetz (1970); and Legal Aspects of Extradition Among Eu-
ropean States (Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Prevention, 1970).
25. See OAS Treaty Series No. 36.
26. September 14, 1952, League of Arab States Collection of Treaties and
Agreements 95 (1978), reprinted in 8 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 328
(1952). See also A.Y. Khadr, "EXTRADITION LAW AND PRACTICE IN EGYPT AND
OTHER ARAB STATES," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, School of Oriental and Afri-
can Studies, University of London, 1977).
27. See Tractanblad No. 97 (1962). See also B. de Schutter, "INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW IN EVOLUTION: MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS BETWEEN
THE BENELUX COUNTRIES," 14 Netherlands J. Int'l L. 382 (1967).
28. See e.g., the Swedish Law of June 5, 1959, No. 254. See also Shearer, supra
note 46, at p. 332.
29. The parties are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazza-
ville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,
and Upper Volta. See I. Shearer, supra note 24, at p. 333. Concerning other treaties of
these countries, see D.P. O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and Interna-
tional Law 58 (1967).
30. For the scheme relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offences within the
Commonwealth, 1966, Cmnd. 2008 at 1, see V.E. Hartley Booth, British Extradition
Law and Procedure (Vol. I, 1980).
31. See European Inter-State Cooperation, supra note 21, vol. III appendix pp.
1-30 in English and pp. 1-32 in French, supporting the approach see Rec. No. R/87/1
of the Committee of Ministers of Justice to the Member States on Inter-State Co-
operation in Penal Matters among Member States, (adopted by Committee of Minis-
ters of Justice, Council of Europe 19/1/87).
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3. The desirability of this integrated codification has, however, been
recognized by a number of states which have developed such
codes in their national legislation. These states include Austria, 2
the Federal Republic of Germany,3  and Switzerland. 4 Other
countries, however, have under consideration the integrated
approach, e.g., the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, which are presently reviewing :heir criminal
codes and codes of criminal procedure.
4. At the regional level, the Council of Arab Ministries of Justice in
1988 developed such a model code, but it has not yet been
ratified. 5 The Council of Europe has been considering such an
integrated approach since 1987 on the basis of a project developed
by an ad hoc Committee of Experts which convened twice at the
International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in
Siracusa. 6 Other than the three countries mentioned above,
national legislatures have not yet accepted the importance and
effectiveness of an integrated approach. As a result, the
modalities of international cooperation are still dealt with on a
piecemeal basis.
32. Austrian Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Bundesgesetz yom
4. Dezember 1979 fiber die Auslieferung und die Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Aus-
lieferungs - und Rechtshilfegesetz - ARHG), BGBI. Nr. 529/1979. See also K.
Schwaighofer, Auslieferung und Internationionales Strafrecht (1988); R. Linke, H.
Epp, G. Dokoupil, G. Felsenstein, Internationales Strafrecht (1981).
33. F.R. Germany (Act Concerning International Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters) "GESET f)BER DIE INTERNATIONALE'RECHTSHILFE IN STRAFRECHT" of De-
cember 31, 1982, entered into force January 7, 1983, BUNDESGESATZBLATT 1982, Tel
I, No. 2071. (Federal Official Gazette 1982, part I, p. 2071. The act replaced the
German Extradition Act of 1929 and provides for comprehensive measures of extradi-
tion and other forms of mutual assistance in penal matters, including execution of for-
eign sentences. See also 0. Lagodny, Die Rechtestellung des Auszuliefernden in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (1987); T. Vogler, Auslieferungsrecht and Gundgesetz,
(1970); Vogler, "THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
AND COOPERATION IN LEGAL MATTERS," Di Friedens-Warte, p. 287, Band p. 66, Heft
pp. 3-4, (1986).
34. See Swiss Federal Law on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Entraide Internationale en Mati6re P6nale of 20 March 1981.
35. See COUNCIL OF ARAB MINISTERS OF JUSTICE: A COLLECTION OF THE
COUNCIL'S DOCUMENTS, No. 2, January 1988, pp. 96-148.
36. Committee of Ministers of Justice to the member states of the Council of
Europe, recommendation number, R/87/1, Committee of Ministers cf Justice, 19 June
1987, reprinted in European Inter-State Cooperation, supra note 21, vol. 3, appendix,
pp. 1-30 in English, and pp. 1-32 in French.
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5. The relatively slow pace with which the integrated approach has
been accepted within international and regional organizations
stems from the familiarity and comfort which government
representatives feel with the bilateral approach and with the
process of gradually strengthening modalities by a piecemeal
approach.3 7 Efforts by a few scholars and government experts to
spur the multinational integrated approach met with some
reluctance in international conferences and negotiations because
of the perception by some government representatives that such
an approach may not be politically acceptable. This reaction does
not, however, reflect the positive possibilities of international
criminal law. Partially as a result of diplomatic timidity, the
world community has not advanced beyond existing modalities,
which are not even sufficient to cope with ordinary transnational
crime, let alone with the new international manifestations of
organized crime, drug traffic, and terrorism.
6. These international and transnational criminal phenomena are not
hampered by the political and diplomatic considerations which
limit states in their international penal cooperation. Furthermore,
they do not suffer from the impediments created by
administrative and bureaucratic divisions which exist among the
national organs of law enforcement and prosecution which impair
effectiveness. The international response to phenomena which
know no national boundaries is piecemeal, divided, and is more
frequently than not divisive of any effective efforts of international
cooperation. This leaves little opportunity for the development of
new modalities of cooperation in other fields, such as:
i. sharing law enforcement intelligence;
Ii. increasing teamwork in law enforcement cooperation;
iii. tracking the flow of international financial transactions;
and
iv. the development of regional "judicial spaces".
This latter idea was floated within the Council of Europe by
France in the late 1970's, but was discarded within that regional
37. See the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty on Extradition of 1986 and Sofaer,
"THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION AND TERRORISM," 15 Denver J. of Int'l L. and
Policy 125 (1986). For a contrary position, see Bassiouni, "THE POLITICAL OMFFNSE
EXCEPTION REvISITED: EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. - A CHOICE
BETWEEN FRIENDLY COOPERATION AMONG ALLIES AND SOUND LAW AND POLICY,"
15 Denver J. of Int'l L. and Policy 255 (1987).
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context. 8 It has survived in discussions during 1989 among
certain countries within that region, namely the Benelux countries
and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the Andean Region, a
parliamentary Commission is considering that option and is also
working on the elaboration of an integrated code of interregional
cooperation which would include the traditional modalities
described above.
7. A multilateral or regional integrated approach seems an
eminently desirable course of conduct and the United Nations
could significantly contribute to it by elaborating such a model
code, which would also include new approaches to the problems of
jurisdiction. Such an effort has already been undertaken, in a
more modest form, with the Comprehensive International
Convention on Illicit Drug Traffic, adopted by a 1988 United
Nations Conference held in Vienna, which includes multilateral
provisions on extradition, mutual judicial assistance, and on the
control and seizure of proceeds of illicit drug traffic. 9
8. In conclusion, it must be noted that the international and national
legal systems fail to address a number of issues which could
increase their respective effectiveness, they are:
38. See F. Mosconi, "L'AccoRDo DI DUBLINO DEL 4/12/1979, LE COMUNITA
EUROPEE E LA REPRESSIONE DEL TERRORISIMO," La Legislazione Penale (No. 3,
1986) p. 543 referring to the European Judicial Space. See also Consiglio Superiore
Della Magistratura, Estradizione E Spazio Giuridico Europeo, (1979); Van Den
Wijngaert "L'ESPACE JUDICIAIRE EUROPtEN FACE A L'EURO-TERRORISME ET LA
SAUVEGARDE DES DROiTs FONDAMENTAUX," 3 Revue Internationale de Criminologie
et de Police Technique 289 (1980). See also M. Marhetti, Instituzioni Europee e
Lotta al Terrorismo (1986), and Council of Europe, International cooperation in the
prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism: Recommendation No. R(82)1 adopted
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 15 January 1982 and
Explanatory memorandum (Strasbourg 1983). Van den Wijngaert, "L'ESPACE
JUDICIAIRE EUROPtEN: VERS UNE FISSURE AU SEIN DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE. ' 61
Rev. Droit Pbnal et de Crim. 511 (1981).
39. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Drug Traffic, Narcotics, Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances adopted December 19, 1988 (E/Conf. 82/15). For the
history of the Convention see United Nations Economic and Social Counsel, Final Act
of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, United Nations Conference for
the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, Vienna, Austria, Nov. 25, Dec. 20, 1988; see also U.N., Division of
Narcotic Drugs, Extradition for Drug-Related Offences: A study of existing extradi-
tion practices and suggested guidelines for use in concluding extradition treaties,
(ST/Nar/5. November 1985).
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(i) at the international level, the- lack of integrating all
modalities of interstate cooperation in a comprehensive and
integrated code that can also include new modalities of
cooperation while at the same time upholding internationally
protected norms and standards of human rights. Also the
failure to even consider new schemes of direct enforcement
such as the establishment of an international criminal
jurisdiction is a significant weakness in the international
system.
(ii) at the national level, the bureaucratic divisions within the
administration of criminal justice which plague and
sometimes paralyze the system remain unaddressed.
Furthermore, they are aggravated by the addition of new
bureaucracies involved in the prevention and control of these
two forms of criminality such as administrative and banking
agencies and agencies responsible for international relations.
July 2, 1990
Prepared by a Committee of Experts on International Criminal Policy
for the Prevention and Control of Transnational and International
Criminality and for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court. Organized by the International Institute of Higher Studies in
Criminal Sciences under the auspices of the Italian Ministry of Justice
in cooperation with The United Nations Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice Branch. 24-28 June 1990. Based on a report prepared by
M. Cherif Bassiouni, President ISISC; President IAPL; Professor of
Law DePaul University College of Law.
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I. Introduction
The establishment of an international criminal tribunal has long
been a goal, first of the League of Nations1 and then of the United
Nations. It is consistent with this tradition and appropriate that the
United Nations adopt this Draft.
1. This Draft is based on the Draft Statute for the Creation of an
International Criminal Jurisdiction to Implement the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1426 (19 Jan. 1981), which was
prepared at the request of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights and presented by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni to
the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern Africa in the
Final Report on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court for the implementation of the Apartheid Convention and
Other Relevant International Instruments, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
AC/22CRP.19/Rev.1 (10 Dec. 1980, orig. in English), reprinted
in Bassiouni & Derby, Final Report on the Establishment of An
International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the
Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International
Instruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1981).
It also reflects some of the modifications incorporated in the draft
presented in M.C. Bassiouni, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL 213 (1987).Modifications were made by members of the
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON CONTROL OF TRANSNATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALITY AND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, organized by the
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HIGHER STUDIES IN CRIMINAL
SCIENCES, under the auspices of the ITALIAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
in cooperation with the UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE BRANCH, meeting in Siracusa, Italy, 24-28 June
1. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY (TREATY OF VERSAILLES) signed at Ver-
sailles, 28 June 1919, 11 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 323, (entered into force 10
January 1920). See also, CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DISPUTES (FIRsT HAGUE, I), signed at The Hague, 19 July 1899, 26 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (2d) 720, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. No. 342 (entered into force 4 Septem-
ber 1900). CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
PRIZE COURT (SECOND HAGUE, XII), signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, 3 Mar-
tens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 88 (never entered into force).
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1990. The list of members of the COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS is
attached at APPENDIX 2.
Modifications made by the Committee of Experts were recorded
and formulated by the RAPPORTEUR for the WORKING GROUP ON
MODELS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND FOR A
REGIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Professor Christopher L. Blakesley.
Professors Ved Nanda and Daniel Derby assisted Professor
Blakesley. The Working Group on Models for an International
Criminal Tribunal Convention was chaired by the Honorable
Arthur Napoleon Raymond Robinson, Prime Minister, Trinidad
and Tobago.
2. The past efforts include: the League of Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism containing a proposal for
the establishment of an international criminal court,2 the
precedents of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg3
and Tokyo,4 the efforts of the United Nations in their 1951
(revised in 1953) Draft Statute for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court,5 and the 1980 Draft Statute for the
Establishment of an International Criminal Jurisdiction to
Implement the International Convention on the Suppression and
2. CONVENTION FOR THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
opened for signature at Geneva, 16 November 1937, League of Nations O.J. Spec. in
Supp. No. 156 (1938), League of Nations Doc. C.547 (I).M.384(I).1937.v(1938)
(never entered into force).
3. AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS (LONDON AGREEMENT), signed at London, August
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472 (entered into force, 8 August
1945), CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (NUREMBERG) (an-
nexed to the London Agreement); and CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (Punishment
of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity),
adopted at Berlin, 20 December 1945, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL
FOR GERMANY, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946.
4. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST PROCLAIMED AT
TOKYO, 19 January 1946, and amended 26 April 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (entered
into force 19 January 1946), CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST (TOKYO).
5. DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Annex to the Re-
port of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 31 August 1951), 7
GAOR Supp. 11, U.N. Doe. A2136 (1952) at 23. REVISED DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL COURT (Annex to the Report of the Committee on International
Criminal Jurisdiction, 20 August 1953), 9 GAOR Supp. 12, U.N. Doc.A/2645 (1954),
at p. 21.
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Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,6 and other proposals by
various organizations, such as the International Law Association,7
the International Association of Penal Law" and the works of
individual scholars.9
3. The establishment of an international criminal tribunal could
admittedly be based on various models, including, but not limited
to:
i. Expanding the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
to include questions of interpretation and application of
conventional and customary international criminal law, and
providing for compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice for disputes
6. DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURIS-
DICTION TO IMPLEMENT THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF APARTHEID, 19 January 1980, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1416 (prepared by Professor M.Cherif Bassiouni).
7. See, DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL IN-
QUIRY AND A DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Interna-
tional Law Association, 60th Conference, Montreal, August 29 - September 4, 1982,
in Report of the 60th Conference of the International Law Association (1983).
8. See, REPORT ON THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDIC-
TION, by V.V. Pella, to the Interparliamentary Union, XXII Conference, held in Berne
and Geneva, 1924, in l'Union Interparlementaire. Compt Rendu de la XXII Confer-
ence tenue a Berne et a Geneve en 1924, publig par le Bureau Interparlementaire,
1925. See also, l'Union Interparlementaire, Compt Rendu de la ).XII Conference
Tenue a Washington et a Ottawa en 1925 (1925). Project of the International Associa-
tion of Penal Law, in Actes du Premier Congrks International de Droit Pknal, Brux-
elles, 26-29 June 1926 (1927) and PROJET DE STATUT POUR LA CRtATION D'UNE
CHAMDRE CRIMINELLE AU SEIN DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIO-
NALE, presented by the International Association of Penal Law to the League of Na-
tions in 1927, 5 Revue International de Droit Pknal (1928). DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE, presented by the AIDP to the VIth U.N. Congress on Crime Preven-
tion and the Treatment of Offenders (Caracas, 1980) (U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/NGO 213)
[Updated in M.C. Bassiouni, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987)]. See also, 45 Revue
International de Droit Pknal Nos. 3-4 (1974); 52 Revue International de Droit P~nal
Nos. 1-4 (1981).
9. See, DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, in J.Stone &
R. Woetzel, Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court (1970); DRAFT STATUTE
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (Foundation for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court - Wingspread Conference, September 1971); DRAFT
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Work Paper, Abidjan World Con-
ference on World Peace Through Law August 26-31 (1973).
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between states arising out of these questions;
ii. Establishing an international commission of inquiry, either as
an independent organism, as part of the international criminal
court or as an organ of the United Nations. Such a commission
would investigate and report on violations of international
criminal law, taking into account the proposal of the
International Law Association and existing United Nations
experiences with fact finding and inquiry bodies which have
developed over the years;
iii. Establishing an international (universal) criminal jurisdiction
along the lines of the 1953 United Nations Revised Draft
Statute for Establishment of an International Criminal Court 0
or the 1980 Draft Statute for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Jurisdiction to Implement the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of Apartheid Convention;
iv. Establishing Regional International Criminal Tribunals as
described below.
4. The United Nations should adopt this Draft and submit it to the
General Assembly.
II. Background
1. Initiatives on the establishment of an International Criminal
Tribunal' 2 have been developed since the failure to establish an
International Tribunal pursuant to Articles 227-229, Treaty of
Versailles (1919) to prosecute: Kaiser Wilhelm II for "Crimes
Against Peace;" German Military Personnel for "War Crimes;"
and Turkish Officials for "Crimes Against Humanity."
2. More particularly, there are two projects developed by the United
.Nations 1953 Draft Statute for the Creation of an International
Criminal Court, which was tabled by the General Assembly in
1953,13 and the 1980 Draft Statute for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Jurisdiction to Enforce the Apartheid
10. Supra note 5.
11. Supra note 6.
12. These initiatives are listed in the Appendix to this Draft.
13. Supra note 5.
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Convention, which has been before the Commission on Human
Rights without action since 1980.14 Non-governmental
organizations have also produced noteworthey projects such as
those of the International Law Association (see Appendix).
I. The Need for Establishing an International Criminal
Tribunal
1. Increased international and transnational crimes.
2. The existence of 22 categories of international crimes's
representing 315 international instruments between '1815-1988.
3. The internationally perceived dangers of drug-trafficking and
recycling of illicit proceeds of drug-trafficking, and their harmful
effects on many societies of the world irrespective of whether they
are producing or consuming countries, and the increased
manifestations of organized criminality.
4. The continued manifestation throughout the world of terror-
violence which threatens inter-alia: civilian aviation; civilian
maritime navigation; diplomats and other internationally protected
persons; and innocent civilians.
5. The inability of states and their national legal systems to act
unilaterally to control and suppress these and other dangers arising
from international and transnational criminality.
IV. Alternative Models
1. The Universal Model - See, 1953 United Nations Draft Statute 6
and 1980 Draft Statute.17
2. The non-adjudicative Inquiry Model - See, Model proposed by
the ILA.18
14. Supra note 6.
15. See, M.C. Bassiouni, International Crimes: Digest/Index of International In-
struments 1815-1985 (Vo. I & II, 1986).
16. Supra note 5.
17. Supra note 6.
18. Supra note 7; C. Blakesley, DRAFT MODEL FOR PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION [OR BOARD] OF CRIMINAL INQUIRY, part of DRAFT MODEL INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, adapted, with analysis from earlier Draft Models by
M.C. Bassiouni and that cited in note 8, supra, for the Instituto Superiore Internazion-
380 [Vol. 15
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3. The Regional Model. The universal model may be adapted for
regional use. See, C. Blakesley, DRAFT MODEL INTERNATIONAL
[REGIONAL] CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, adapted, with analysis from
earlier Draft Models by M.C. Bassiouni and that cited in note 7,
supra, reprinted in, 136 THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, No. 77, pp.
S 8080 - S 8089 (Washington, D.C. June 18, 1990).
A Model for A Proposed
International Criminal
Tribunal
GENERAL
1. Establishment of the Tribunal
i. The Tribunal will be established pursuant to a multilateral
convention [hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"] open
to all States-Parties.
ii. The States-Parties to the Convention will agree on the
establishment of the Tribunal whose location will be
determined by agreement.
iii. The established Tribunal will have an international legal
personality and will sign a host-country agreement with the
host state. The Tribunal will thus have extra-territoriality for
its location and immunity for its personnel.
iv. The Tribunal's costs and facilities, including detentional
facilities will be paid on a pro-rata basis by the States-Parties
to the Convention.
v. The Tribunal as an international organization will be granted
jurisdiction by the States-Parties to prosecute certain specified
offenses embodied in the annex, as codified by the States-
Parties, and in international conventions and the authority to
ale de Scienze Criminali, Committee of Experts on International Criminal Policy for
the Prevention and Control of Transnational and International Criminality for the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court, Siracusa, Italy, 24-28 June 1990.
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detain those accused, and those convicted of the charges. [The
merits of such a detentional scheme is that it removes pressures
on the affected states, particularly in "terrorism" cases, and in
cases involving major drug offenders].
2. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal and Applicable Law
i. The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal will be universal for offenses
provided and defined in the annex to this Convention to be
enacted by the authority of the Standing Committee. For other
crimes, not listed in the Annexed Code of Offenses, jurisdiction
also exists by virtue of a provision (or series of provisions) in
the Convention, which will be in the nature of a "transfer of
criminal proceedings" agreement. 19 [Thus, each State-Party
that has original jurisdiction based on territoriality, active or
passive personality, would not lose jurisdiction, but merely
transfer the criminal proceedings to the Court. This approach
will alleviate some major jurisdictional and sovereignty
problems.]
ii. In the cases where it is called for, the intended consequence of
this approach of "transfer of procee dings," the Tribunal will
use the substantive law of the transferring state and its own
procedural rules which will be part of the Convention and
promulgated prior to the Tribunal's entry into function.20
iii. In the transfer of proceedings context, the Procurator-General
of the Tribunal will act as the Chief Prosecutor, but will be
assisted by a prosecuting official of the transferring state whose
law is to be applied.
3. Prosecution
i. Prosecution may commence on the basis of a criminal
19. See, e.g., the EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (E.T.S. No. 73).
20. The procedural rules will be consistent with and based on general principles
of international law and in in accordance with internationally protected human rights,
particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Res. 2200 (XXI),
16 December 1966; 21 GAOR, Suppl. No. 16 (A/6316), at 45-52; and the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights. OAS T.S. No. 36, at 1-21 (OAS Official
Records, OEA/SER. A/16) 22 November 1969.
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complaint brought by a State-Party. In addition, a State-Party
that does not have subject matter or in personam jurisdiction,
or that does not wish to bring a criminal complaint within its
own jurisdiction, may petition the Procurator-General of the
Tribunal to inquire the potential direct prosecution by the
Court. In such cases, the request by a State-Party will be
confidential, and only after the Procurator-General of the
Tribunal has deemed the evidence sufficient will the case for
prosecution be presented to the Court in camera for the Court's
action. In such a situation, the Tribunal's Procuracy acts as a
Judicial Board of Inquiry.21 Once the Procuracy (sitting as the
Judicial Board of Inquiry) has decided whether to prosecute,
the Procurator-General will issue an Indictment and request
the surrender of the accused by the State-Party where the
accused may be found.
ii. The Convention includes provisions on surrendering the
accused to the Tribunal and providing the Tribunal with legal
assistance (including administrative and judicial assistance) for
the procurement of evidence (both tangible and testimonial). 2
4. Conviction
i. Upon conviction the individual may be returned to the
surrendering state, which will carry out the sentence on the
basis of provisions in the Convention, in the nature of "transfer
of prisoners' agreements.12 3 Alternatively, the convicted person
can be transferred to any other State-Party on the same legal
basis, or the Tribunal may place the convicted person in its own
detentional facilities which will be established by the
21. See, supra note 18.
22. See, e.g., THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
(E.T.S. No. 30), and the various bilateral Conventions between various states. See, e.g.,
A. Ellis and R. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, in 2 M.C. Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 151 (1986).
23. See, e.g, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PER-
SONS (E.T.S. No. 112) and the bilateral treaties on Transfer of Prisoners between the
United States and Canada, the United States and Mexico and other countries. See,
Bassiouni, TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, MEXICO AND CAN-
ADA 239; and H. Epp, The European Convention on Transfer of Prisoners in 2 M.C.
Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL CRImiNAL LAW 253 (1986).
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Convention in accordance with a host-state agreement between
the Tribunal and the State wherein the detentional facility will
be established.
ii. By virtue of the Convention, an indictment by the Procuracy,
sitting as a Judicial Board of Inquiry, will be recognized by all
States-Parties.
5. Composition of the Court
The Court will consist of as many judges as there are States-
Parties to the Convention, but not less than twelve. There will
be four Chambers of three Judges each and a Pres;iding Judge.
The judges will be drawn by lot to sit in rotation on the four
Chambers (one of which will be the Judicial Inquiry Board).
6. Appeal
To provide for the right of appeal, the Tribunal will be divided
into Chambers and the Judges drawn by lot. One Chamber will
be the Judicial Inquiry Board and one or more other Chambers
will be adjudicating chambers. Three judges will form a panel
for hearing cases. The Tribunal sitting en banc will hear
appeals. The three judges who heard the case will not sit with
the en banc for that appeal.
7. Selection of Judges
Each State-Party will appoint a Judge from the ranks of its
judiciary or from distinguished members of the Bar or from
Academia. The judges will be persons of high competence,
knowlegdeable in International Criminal Law, and of high
moral character. Appointment of Judges and their tenure is to
be established by the Convention.
[Vol. 15
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Part IV - Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal*
Chapter 1. Definitions
Article I. The Statute
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal which is the legal
authority and basis for the functioning of the Tribunal and its Organs.
Article I1. The International Criminal Tribunal
All the Organs created by the Statute, which include the Court, the
Procuracy, the Secretariat, and the Standing Committee of States-
Parties.
Article m. The International Criminal Court
The judicial organ of the Tribunal, which adjudicates matters consti-
tuting an alleged violation of the International Criminal Code, deter-
mines guilt or innocence, and meets out penalties in accordance with
the provisions of the Statute.
Article IV. The Procuracy
That Organ of the Tribunal that investigates, prosecutes, and oversees
the application of the decisions of the Court.
Article V. The Secretariat
The clerical and administrative organ of the Tribunal.
Article VI. The Standing Committee
That body consisting of the States-Parties to the Convention that
adopted the Statute.
Article VII. The Procurator
The person elected by the Standing Committee to head the Procuracy.
* This text relies in part on the 1953 United Nations Revised Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court (9 GAOR Supp. XII, U.N. Doc. A/2645 1954), pre-
pared by the International Law Commission, hereinafter referred to as 1953 ILC Draft
and the Draft Statute of an InternationalCriminal Court of the International Law
Association of May 1979 in proceedings of the International Law Associations' Bel-
grade Conference, 1980, P. 11, hereinafter referred to as 1979 ILA Draft, and the
Final Report on the Draft Statute for the Creation of an iNternational Criminal Juris-
diction to Implement the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid, 19 January 1980, E/CN.4/1426 (1980).
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Article VIII. The Judge or Judges
The judicial person or persons who sit on the Court.
Article IX. The Secretary
The person elected by the Standing Committee to head the Secretariat.
Article X. The Convention
The instrument by virtue of which the Statute for the Tribunal is
adopted.
Chapter 2. General Provisions
Article XI. Purpose of the International Criminal Tribunal
The purpose of this International Criminal Tribunal is to enforce
the provisions of those international crimes which shall be included in
the annex, as codified by the States-Parties and other international of-
fenses which may be established by means of Supplemental Agree-
ments to this list.
Commentary
This article establishes an International Criminal Tribunal which
is to be a new international legal institution consisting of several organs
discussed in Article III below. This Draft Convention provides States-
Parties with the opportunity to-include Supplemental Agreement to the
International Criminal Code, within the jurisdiction of the Court, other
international offenses than those ntained in the International Criminal
Code.
With some 22 categories of international crimes, representing
some 315 international instruments enacted between 1815 and 1989,
none of which properly defines in criminal law terms the offenses pro-
scribed or provides their elements, it is necessary that the Standing
Committee properly codify, or assign another organ of the Tribunal to
codify, the offenses to be covered by the Convention.
388 [Vol. 15
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Article XII. Nature of the Tribunal
The Tribunal shall be a permanent body, occupying facilities and per-
forming its chief functions at the Palace of Justice in The Hague, and
utilizing as its official languages those of the United Nations.
Commentary
This article considers the Tribunal a newly created institution,
and, in order to minimize logistical problems, the suggested location is
the Palace of Justice in The Hague; it is already established and
equipped as an international judicial body. The official languages are
those of the U.N., which represents a recognized world consensus.
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Article XIII. Organs of the Tribunal
1. The Tribunal shall consist of the following organs:
a. The Court;
b. The Procuracy;
c. The Secretariat; and
d. The Standing Committee of States-Parties to the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal.
2. The functions and competence of the above organs shall be as
designed in Chapter 4 of this Convention.
Commentary
This article establishes four bodies with separate functions and pur-
poses which are described throughout this Statute.
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Article XIV. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
The Tribunal shall have universal jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute,
adjudicate and punish persons and legal entities accused or found
guilty of any of the crimes contained in the International Criminal
Code and any other international offenses which may be embodied in a
Supplemental Agreement.
Commentary
The Tribunal's jurisdiction is universal in that there are no territo-
rial or geographic limits to the offenses or offenders which would deny
the Tribunal subject-matter or in personam jurisdiction with respect to
those offenses contained in the International Criminal Code and any
Supplemental Agreement thereto. Within the competence of the Tribu-
nal, there are no geographical or territorial limits to the Tribunal's ju-
risdiction. See, art. XV, infra.
The 1953 ILC Draft does not define crimes to be dealt with be-
yond the phrase "crimes generally recognized under international law."
whereas the 1979 ILA Draft incorporates by reference definitions of
crimes in sixteen international conventions, but notably omitting the
Apartheid Convention.
19911
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Article XV. Competence of the Tribunal
1. The Tribunal shall, subject to the provisions of the present Statute,
exercise its competence in accordance with international law whose
sources are stated in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice.
2. The competence of the Organs of the Tribunal shall be interpreted
and exercised in light of the purposes of the Tribunal as set forth in
this Convention.
Commentary
While penal theoreticians may argue the merits of a distinction
between jurisdiction and competence, it is suggested that jurisdiction
establishes the Tribunal's geographic and subject-matter authority, and
in personam authority, while competence determines the specific pow-
ers of the Court with respect to its jurisdiction and provides the legal
framework of reference for the Tribunal's exercise of its jurisdictional
authority. This includes the theory of La Competence de la Compe-
tence in the Statute of the International Court of Justice whereby the
Court can establish its own competence from its recognized compe-
tence. See I. Shihata, The Power of the International Court to Deter-
mine its own Jurisdiction. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965. E3sentially, the
Convention will provide what conduct committed anywhere will fall
within the Tribunal's competence.
[Vol. 15
51
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
1991] Bassiouni 393
Article XVI. Subjects Upon Whom the Tribunal Shall Exercise Its
Jurisdiction
The Tribunal shall exercise its jurisdiction over natural persons.
Commentary
Although Article XIV on jurisdiction refers to the Tribunal's authority
over natural persons, it was deemed of importance to emphasize this
authority under a separate article though it may appear duplicative,
since the International Criminal Code covers natural persons. See M.C.
Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statutue
for an International Criminal Tribunal (1987).
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Article XVII. Sanctions and Penalties
1. The Court as an organ of the Tribunal shall upon entering a
finding of guilty, and in accordance with standards set forth in this
Convention have the power to impose the following penalties and
sanctions:
a. The penalties shall be:
i. Deprivation of liberty or any lesser measures of control
where the person found guilty is a natural person; and,
ii. Fine to be levied against a natural person, organization or
State; and
iii. Confiscation of the proceeds- of proscribed (or criminal)
conduct.
b. The sanctions shall be:
i. Injunctions against natural persons or legal entities
restricting them from engaging in certain conduct or
activities; and
ii. Order restitution and provide for damages.
2. Sanctions shall be established by the rules of the Court and shall
be published before their entry into effect. Such sanctions shall be
based on the criteria set forth in the annexed list.
Commentary
Only the Court upon a finding of guilty, subject to the provisions
of this Convention, the procedures, and rules which would be developed
by the different Organs and the standards of fairness set forth in the
International Criminal Court, can impose a sanction against-a natural
person, organization, or State. Clearly deprivation of liberty applies to
natural persons and not to legal entities, but fines and other sanctions
apply to both natural persons and legal entities. It is to be noted that
there is no schedule of penalties affixed to any specific crime and that
some may raise a question of nulla poena sine lege. To avoid this prob-
lem the Convention recognizes that the Court shall enact appropriate
and specific rules or sanctions to be promulgated prior to the tribunal's
commencement of activities, which could satisfy the element of notice.
Proceeds of confiscation will go to defray costs of the Tribunal.
In keeping with the principle of legality, it is necessary that well
developed sanctions and penalties be developed and promulgated prior
394 [Vol. 15
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to trial. This legislative responsibility will be delegated by the Standing
Committee to some organ of the Tribunal.
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Chapter 3. The Penal Processes of the Tribunal
Article XVIII. Initiation of the Process
1. No criminal process shall be initiated unless a complaint is commu-
nicated to the Procuracy or originated within the Procuracy.
2. The Investigative Division of the Procuracy shall determine whether
such complaints are "manifestly unfounded" or not, and that deter-
mination shall be reported immediately to the source of the commu-
nication, if any.
3. No complaint by a State-Party to the present Statute or an Organ
of the United Nations shall be deemed "manifestly illfounded."
Other States and Intergovernmental Organizations whose com-
plaints are determined to be "manifestly illfounded" may appeal
such determinations to the Court pursuant to Article XII of this
Statute.
4. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, the Procuracy may either
take no further action on "manifestly illfounded" complaints or may
continue further investigation.
5. Communications determined "not manifestly illfounded" shall be
transferred together with the record of investigation to the
Prosecutorial Division of the Procuracy, which shall immediately in-
form the accused and assume responsibility for the development of
the case.
6. When a case is ready for prosecution, the procurator shall submit it
to an appropriate Chamber of-the Court pursuant to this Statute, or
to the Standing Committee pursuant to this Statute, or to both, but
if a case based on a complaint submitted by a State-Party to this
Statute or by an Organ of the United Nations has not been
presented to the Court within one year of submission to the Stand-
ing Committee, the source of the complaint may requist the Court
to examine the case and act pursuant to Article IX of this Statute.
Commentary
The desirability of such a process has substantial support. See G.A.
Res. 1187 (XII) 11 November 1957. See Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral on "International Criminal Jurisdiction," U.N. GAOR (XII)
1957), Doc. A/13649; see also U.N. Historical Survey on the Question
of the International Criminal Jurisdiction Doe. A/C1',.4/7, Rev. 1
(1949). For a documentary history of the various projects for the crea-
tion on an international criminal jurisdiction, see B. Ferencz, The In-
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ternational Criminal Court (1980) 2 vols. See also, J. Stone and R.
Woetzel, Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court (1970); 35
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 102 (1964) devoted to that sub-
ject, and 45 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal No. 3-4 (1974) con-
taining the contributions of the AIDP to V U.N. Congress on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice, Geneva, September 1975 devoted to
the subject of "La Creation d'une Justice Penal Internationale. The
Revue International de Droit Penal contained scholarly writings on this
subject in its issues of 1928, 1935, 1945, and 1952, as well as others.
The AIDP has traditionally supported the creation of an international
criminal court as witnessed by the positions it has taken at its various
International Congresses, and those of its distinguished members
among them: Pella, Donnedieu de Vabres, Saldana, Graven, Jimenez
de Asua, Setille, Cornil, Bouzat, Jescheck, Romoshkiin, Herzog,
Glaser, Dautricourt, Quintano-Rippoles, Arroneau, Mueller, De Schut-
ter, Triffterer, Lombois, Plawski, Ferencz, Oehler, and Zubkowski. As
past Secretary-General and now President of the AIDP, Professor M.
Cherif Bassiouni has consistently supported the proposition. Because of
the numerous writings on the subject by the above mentioned scholars
and others, it would be impossible to cite them all. For three more
initiatives resulting in the submission of a draft statute, see the Interna-
tional Law Association, "Draft Statute for an International Commis-
sion of Criminal Injury" adopted by its International Criminal Law
Committee in Paris, May 1978 Proceedings of the International Law
Association (Belgrade Conference 1980) p. 4; and "Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court," World Peace through Law, Abidjan
World Conference August 1973 (edited by Robert K. Woetzel); and a
"Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court" prepared by the
Foundation for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, see
also K. de Haan, "The Procedural Problems of a Permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Jurisdiction" in De bestraffing van inbreuken tegen het
oorlogs - en het humanitair recht (A. Beirlaen, S. Dockx, K. de Haan,
C. Van den Wijngaert, eds., 1980) p. 91.
The 1953 ILC Draft in Article 29 provides that the penal
processes could commence only by action of a State-Party. The 1979
ILA Draft in Article 23 allows only States to approach the Commis-
sion which at its turn would present a case to the Court. The proce-
dures presented herein differ from the 1953 ILC Draft and the 1979
ILA Draft in that they concentrate the investigation and prosecution of
any case with the Procuracy, but a State-Party, Organ of the U.N.,
Inter-Governmental Organization, Non-Governmental Organization
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and individual may file a complaint with the Procuracy, which shall
accept such communications. The Procuracy then makes an initial de-
termination as towhether the complaint is "not manifestly illfounded"
or "manifestly illfounded." That determination is quite similar to the
one made by the European Convention on Human Rights. However,
the Procuracy is not without controls as to its discretion, in that a
State-Party and an organ of the U.N. are entitled to recognition of
their complaints as being "not manifestly illfounded," while other
States and Inter-Governmental Organizations are entitled to an appeal
to the Court of a determination by the Procuracy that the complaint
has been found "manifestly illfounded." Communications and com-
plaints by individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations are not
entitled to the same status. The Procuracy's decisions are thus review-
able in the case of certain complaints and communications, and a deci-
sion holding a complaint "not manifestly illfounded" will then travel
two alternate channels: (a) the possibility of mediation and conciliation
through the Standing Committee; and (b) adjudication before the
Court. A period of one year is allowed for the conciliation process,
which is the same period allowed for the Procuracy's investigation and
preparation of the case. Thereafter, the case may be presented to the
Court at the request of the complaining State-Party or Organ of the
U.N. if it is the initiator of the complaint. Otherwise that period of one
year is extendable, subject to the Court's review.
[Vol. 15
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Article XIX. Pre-Trial Process
1. The Prosecutorial Division of the Procuracy may request an
appropriate Chamber of the Court pursuant to this Article of the
Statute to issue orders in aid of development of a case, in
particular, orders in the nature of:
a. Arrest warrants;
b. Subpoenas;
c. Injunctions;
d. Search warrants; and
e. Warrants for surrender of an accused so as to enable accused
persons to be brought before the Court and to transit States
without interference.
2. Requests for such orders may be granted with or without prior
notice if opportunity to be heard would jeopardize the effectiveness
of the requested order.
3. All such orders shall be executed pursuant to the relevant laws of
the state in which they are to be executed.
4. The ultimate merits of a case shall not be considered pursuant to
Article X of this Statute until the case has been submitted to an
appropriate Chamber of the Court, sitting in a preliminary
hearing at which the accused is represented by Counsel, and the
Chamber made the following determinations:
a. The case is reasonably founded in fact and law;
b. No prior proceedings before the Tribunal or elsewhere bar the
process in accordance with principle ne bis in idem or
fundamental notions of fairness; and
c. No conditions exist that would render the adjudication unreliable
or unfair.
5. The schedule of proceedings shall be established by the appropriate
Chamber in consultation with the Procuracy and Counsel for the
accused with due regard to the principle of fairness to the parties
and the principle of "speedy trial."
Commentary
A non-exhaustive list of orders that may be issued by the Court in
aid of the preparation of a case is specified. It is expected that the
Rules of the Court will go into the details of the form, content, and
1991]
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other formalities pertaining to these orders. They are among the tradi-
tional powers of either a Court, or a judge of instruction, respectively,
in the Common Law and Romanist-Civilist tradition. Similar provi-
sions may be found in the 1053 ILC Draft, Articles 40, 41, and 42 and
in the 1979 ILA Draft, Articles 36 and 37. It must be noted here that
this Court will in this and other respects rely on the cooperation of the
States-Parties to implement its orders. It must also be noted that where
a State-Party has treaties or relations with a State non-Party on the
subject of extradition and judicial assistance and cooperation, the
Courts' orders and determinations of any sort would have an impact
beyond that State-Party and thus give this Convention a. multiplier ef-
fect with respect to its impact. [See e.g., V.E.H. Booth, British Extra-
dition Law and Procedure (1980); C. Van den Wijngaert, The Politi-
cal Offence Exception to Extradition 1980); M.C. Bassiouni,
International Extradition in United States Law and Practice (2 vols.
1983); I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (19'71); T. Vogler,
Auslieferingsrecht und Grundgesetz (1969); Bedi, International Extra-
dition (1968); A. Billot, Traite de l'Extradition (1874); and M. Pisani
and F. Mosconi, Codice delle Convenzioni di Estradizione E Di Assis-
tenza Giudiziaria in Materia Penale (1979).] The observations made
herein are also relevant to Chapter 6 on the Duties of the States-Par-
ties since such duties will not only extend to the carrying out of the
obligations of this Statute within their own territories but also when-
ever possible in their relations with other States. It is clear that the
carrying out and execution of all such obligations to assist the Tribunal
where required by this Statute, and in particular Chapter 6, but a
State-Party is only requested to act pursuant to its relevant national
laws. It must, however, be noted that a State-Party cannot enact na-
tional laws that will frustrate the carrying out of the obligations arising
under this Statute.
Paragraph 4 establishes a procedure analogous to an indictment,
such as was proposed in Articles 33 to 35 and 31 of the 1953 ILC and
1979 ILA Drafts, respectively, by means of a Committing Chamber in
the former and Commission processes in the latter. Under the present
draft, however, this process is but a step toward determination of guilt,
it being unnecessary to give it special consequences because prior pro-
cedures in the Procuracy have been given appropriate consequences and
progress under the present draft after the initial Procuracy action is
gradual rather than involving thresholds.
The subparagraph a determination is primarily for 'the sake of effi-
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ciency, as a means of detecting any errors by the Procuracy as to the
suitability of the matter for further action. Subparagraph b provides an
opportunity for early consideration whether misconduct in preparation
of the case may have impugned the Tribunal's integrity in such a way
to impair credibility or acceptability of its determinations, as well as
for early consideration of ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) problems.
[See M.C. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law (1978), pp. 499-512].
Subparagraph c is particularly intended to deal with the need to
consider the possibility that non-cooperation of States, particularly non-
Parties, may render evidence of either incriminatory or exculpatory
character unavailable, so that a fair trial of the case may be impossible.
Early detection of problems of this type would not only be more effi-
cient but also would tend to avoid unnecessary and difficult ne bis in
idem questions aborted proceedings.
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Article XX. Adjudication
1. Hearings on the ultimate merits of cases shall be conducted in pub-
lic before a designated Chamber of the Court but deliberations of
the Chamber shall be in camera.
2. A Chamber may at any time dismiss a case and enter appropriately
motivated orders. In case of dismissal for any reason other than on
the merits, the principle ne bis in idem shall not apply.
3. In all proceedings a Chamber shall give equal weight to evidence
and arguments presented by the Procurator and on behalf of the
accused in accordance with the principle of "equality of arms" of
the parties.
4. When all evidence respecting guilt or responsibility for wrongful
acts has been presented, and argued bj the parties, the Chamber
shall close the Hearings and retire for deliberations.
5. The decisions of the Chambers shall be publicly announced orally,
in summary or entirely, accompanied by written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, or entered 30 days from date of pronouncement
of the oral decision, and any judge of that Chambe:r may write a
separate dissenting or concurring opinion.
6. A Determination of guilt shall be deemed entered when recorded by
the Secretariat, which shall communicate it forthwith to the
Procuracy and the accused, but no such Determination shall be re-
garded as effective until 30 days after the date of recording at which
time the deciding Chamber may no longer modify its findings.
7. Each Chamber shall consist of three judges selected by lot, and
cases shall be assigned to each Chamber by lot.
Commentary
Paragraph 1 parallels Article 39 of the 1953 ILC Draft and 35 of
the 1979 ILA Draft conforming more closely to the latter, which
makes no express provision for secret sessions. This treatment appears
appropriate in that any confidential evidence must be submitted in pub-
lic in a form or manner that protects essential matters of confidential-
ity, such as identity of a witness or a particular technique for obtaining
evidence, and the details for such presentations may be treated in rules
of the Court and Procuracy, which may be elaborated at a time when
the actual needs in this regard are clearer.
Paragraph 2 describes the inherent powers of courts to dismiss
cases, particularly in respect of evidentiary problems. Article 38, para-
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graph 4, of the 1953 ILC Draft has a similar dismissal provision. No
express provision is made for withdrawal of a matter, as was done in
Articles 43 and 38 of the ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively, it being
implicit in the nature of the powers of the Procuracy to determine
whether to take such action.
Paragraph 3, it should be noted, relates to the principle of equality
of arms, which has been observed under the European Convention on
Human Rights. [Applications No. 596/59 and 789/60, Franz Pataki
and Johann Dunshim vs. Austria, Report of the Commission of 28
March 1963, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human
Rights, pp. 730, 734 (1963).]
Paragraphs 4 and 5 are self-explanatory.
It is contemplated that rules of the Court will address ne bis in
idem issues.
Paragraph 6 is in part motivated by the availability of appeal and
also the fact that Chambers, being constituted on a rotational basis,
may be unavailable in their prior form for subsequent arguments. De-
tails of the rotational constitution of Chambers are left for elaboration
in the Court rules.
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Article XX. Sanctioning
1. Upon a Determination of guilt or responsibility, a separate hearing
shall be held regarding sanctions to be imposed, at which hearing
evidence of mitigation and aggravation shall be introduced and
argued by the parties.
2. At the conclusion of this hearing the Chamber shall retire for
deliberation and shall issue its Determination in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions as for a Determination of guilt,
as set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article X.
Commentary
These provisions are self-explanatory, but this Article is to be read in
pari materia with Article VII and the Commentary thereto and Arti-
cles XIII and XXIII
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Article XXII. Appeals
1. Appeals to the Court en banc from Determinations of Chambers as
to the guilt or responsibility or as to sanctions may be commenced
by the accused upon written notice filed with the Secretariat and
communicated to the other party within 30 days of the date of entry
of judgement or order appealed.
2. Other appeals from actions of Chambers may be taken before a final
judgement is entered only if such actions are conclusive as to
independent matters.
3. The Procuracy may appeal questions of law in the same manner as
an accused under paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Decisions on Appeals shall be delivered in the same manner as other
decisions of the Court en banc as provided in Article X, paragraphs
5 and 6 of this statute.
5. Decisions of the Court 24 en banc and unappealed Determinations
of orders of Chambers shall be deemed final unless it is shown
that:
a. Evidence unknown at the time of the Determination or order has
been discovered, which have had a material effect on the outcome
of the said Determination or order; or,
b. The Court or Chamber was flagrantly misled as to the nature of
matters affecting the outcome; or'
c. On the face of the record the facts alleged have not been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt; or,
d. The facts proved do not constitute a crime within the jurisdiction
of-the Tribunal; or,
e. Other grounds for which the Court may provide by its Rules.
6. Appealed Determinations may be revised or vacated or remanded
for new Determination, and when vacating a Determination the
Court shall specify what if any ne bis in idem effects shall be given
to the prior proceedings.
Commentary
Appeals from Chambers, Determinations' and Orders, which may be
done only on behalf of an accused or the Procuracy on questions of law,
are permitted including post-conviction orders. This is consonant with
the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
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Rights concerning the dual level of judgement and review.
No appeal is permitted for the accused under Articles 49 and 43
of the ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively. Also interlocutory appeals are
permitted as practical necessity may require them.
Paragraph 5 on revision of judgments parallels Articles 52 and 45
of the ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively, but is broader in scope.
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Article XXIII. Sanctions and Supervision
1. The Court may call upon any State-Party to execute measures im-
posed in respect of guilt, in accordance with the laws of the said
State-Party.
2. With respect to each accused determined to be guilty, a judge of the
Court shall be selected by lot as Supervisor of the sanction imposed.
3. All requests to modify sanctions shall be directed in the first in-
stance to the Sanction Supervising judge who may submit the re-
quest to the Adjudicating Chamber for modification provided such
action in no way increases the sanction or conditions imposed upon
the person or legal entity found guilty.
4. Decisions of the Sanction Supervising judges regarding modification
requests may be appealed to the Chamber which imposed the sanc-
tion, but such appeals in the Chamber's discretion need not be the
subject of full hearings and detailed written decisions.
5. Nothing herein precludes the Court in accordance with its Rules to
suspend its sanctions or place pre-conditions to their application in
accordance with its Rules.
Commentary
Paragraph 1 corresponds to Articles 46 of the 1979 ILA Draft, Article
51 of the 1953 Draft having left such matters to future conventions.
The terminology "sanctions" is capable of including not only punish-
ments of imprisonment of fines but also levies of compensation or in-
junctive orders, thus maintaining the possibility for such broad ranges
of action.
As noted previously, the supervisory mechanism of Paragraph 2
xeplaces the Clemency and Parole Boards provided by the ILC and
ILA Drafts, and appeal is made possible under Paragraph 3.
It should be noted that these provisions govern only the procedures
relating to sanctions. Standards relating to sanctions may be elaborated
further in Court rules but subject to Article XXIV.
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Chapter 4. Organs of the Tribunal
Article XXIV. The Court
1. The Court shall consist of twelve judges, no more than one of whom
shall be of the same nationality, who shall be elected by the Stand-
ing Committee of States-Parties from nominations submitted
thereto.
2. Nominees for positions as judges shall be of distinguished experts in
the fields of international criminal law or human rights and other
jurists qualified to serve on the highest courts of their respective
States who may be of any nationality or have no nationality.
3. Judges shall be elected by secret ballot and the Standing Committee
of States-Parties shall strive to elect persons representing diverse
backgrounds and experience with due regard to representation of the
major legal and cultural systems of the world.
4. Elections shall be coordinated by the Secretariat under the supervi-
sion of the presiding officer of the Standing Committee of States-
Parties and shall be held whenever one or more vacancies exist on
the Court.
5. Judges shall be elected for the following terms: four judges for four-
year terms, four judges for six-year terms, and four judges for eight-
year terms. Judges may be re-elected for any term any time
available.
6. No judge shall perform any public function in any State.
7. Judges shall have no other occupation or business than that of judge
of this Court. However, judges may engage in scholarly activity for
remuneration provided such activity in no way interfcre with their
impartiality and appearance of impartiality.
8. A judge shall perform no function in the Tribunal with respect to
any matter in which he may have had any involvement prior to his
election to this Court.
9. A judge may withdraw from any matter at his discretion, or be ex-
cused by a two-thirds majority of the judges of the Court for reasons
of conflict of interest.
10. Any judge who is unable or unwilling to continue to perform func-
tions under this statute may resign. A judge may be removed for
incapacity to fulfill his functions by a unanimous vote of the other
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judges of the Court.
11. Except with respect to judges who have been removed, judges may
continue in office beyond their term until their replacements are
prepared to assume the office and shall continue in office to com-
plete work on any pending matter in which they were involved even
beyond their term.
12. The judges of the Court shall elect a president, vice-president and
such officers as they deem appropriate. The president should serve
for a term of two years.
13. Judges of the Court shall perform their judicial functions in three
capacities:
a. Sitting with other judges as the Court en banc;
b. Sitting in panels of three on a rotational basis in Chambers; and
c. Sitting individually as Supervisors of sanctions.
14. The Court en banc shall, subject to the provisions of this Statute,
adopt Rules governing procedures before its Chambers and the
Court en banc, and provide for establishment and rotation of
Chambers.
16. The Court en banc shall announce its decisions orally in full or in
summary, accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions
of law at the time of the oral decision or within thirty days thereaf-
ter, and any judge so desiring may issue a concurring or dissenting
opinion.
17. Decisions and orders of the Court en banc are effective upon certi-
fication of the written opinion by the Secretariat, which is to com-
municate such certified opinion to parties forthwith.
18. The Court en banc may within thirty days of the Certification of
the judgement enter its decisions without notice.
19. No actions taken by the Tribunal may be contested in any other
forum than before the Court en banc, and in the vent that any
effort to do so is made, the Procurator shall be competent to appear
on behalf of the Tribunal and in the name of all States-Parties of
this Statute to oppose such action.
20. States-Parties agree to enforce the final judgments of the Court in
accordance with the provisions of this Statute.
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Commentary
Except for mechanical differences, the terms of this Article, as to selec-
tion, tenure and replacement of judges closely parallel those of Articles
4 through 12 and 15 through 20 of the 1953 ILC Draft and 3 through
9 and 12 through 15 of the 1979 ILA Draft, although the latter makes
no provision for removal of judges.
This Article represents an innovation, in that the other drafts deal
with a single court organ and created a separate Clemency and Parole
Board. As discussed below, the provision for separate functions of
Chambers and the Court en banc permits appeal, a right called for in
Article 14, Paragraph 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Rather than create a separate institution to deal with
such matters as clemency and parole, it was deemed more efficient to
have such functions performed by individual judges, subject to possible
appeals from their decisions, as discussed in connection with Article
XII.
Paragraph 5 contemplates that judges will be elected with refer-
ence to specific terms. Accordingly, when a given judge is considered
for re-election, any of the terms that are vacant at that time may be
regarded as available for that judge.
Paragraph 7 addresses the concern that any conduct by a judge
may create an appearance of impropriety, and narrowly circumscribes
permitted non-Court activity.
Paragraph 11 is intended to permit judges to remain. in their offi-
cial capacity for ths sole purpose of completing work on Court action
begun .prior to expiration of their terms.
Paragraph 12, it should be noted, does not bar re-election of the
Court president.
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Article XXV. The Procuracy
1. The Procuracy shall have the Procurator as its chief officer and shall
consist of an administrative division, an investigative division and a
prosecutorial division, each headed by a Deputy Procurator, and em-
ploying appropriate staff.
2. The Procurator shall be elected by the Standing Committee of
States-Parties from a list of at least three nominations submitted by
members of the Standing Committee, and shall serve for a renewa-
ble term of six years, barring resignation or removal by two-thirds
vote of the judges of the Court en banc for incompetence, conflict of
interest, or manifest disregard of the provisions of this Statute or
material Rules of the Tribunal.
3. The Procurator's salary shall be the same as that of judges.
4. The Deputy Procurators. and all other members of the Procurator's
staff shall be named and removed by the Procurator at will.
Commentary
The significance of the three-part division of the Procuracy is ap-
parent in connection with budgets, reports, and transfer of cases from
investigative to prosecutorial divisions, as well as to the rights of the
accused.
Paragraph 2, providing for joint action by the Court and Standing
Committee for selection of a Procurator, appears appropriate because
such an officer should be politically acceptable, and States are in a su-
perior position to become aware of suitable candidates; the court is in a
superior position to judge legal competence and estimate probable de-
votion to impartiality. Removal power is vested in the Court in the be-
lief that deficiencies of the kind the Court would be likely to note
would be the appropriate bases for dismissal.
Deputies are placed under control of the Procurator in Paragraph
4 in the interest of effective management.
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Article XXVI. The Sebretariat
1. The Secretariat shall have as its chief officer the Secretary, who
shall be elected by a majority of the Court sitting en banc and serve
for a renewable term of six years barring resignation or removal by
a majority of the Court sitting en banc for incompetence, concflit of
interest or manifest disregard of the provisions of this Statute or
material Rules of the Tribunal.
2. The Secretary's salary shall be equivalent to that of the judges.
3. The Secretariat shall employ such staff as appropriate to perform its
chancery and administrative functions and such other functions as
may be assigned to it by the Court that are consistent with the pro-
visions of this Statute or material Rules of the Tribunal.
4. In particular, the Secretary shall each year:
a. Prepare budget requests for each of the organs of the Tribunal;
and
b. Make and publish an annual report on the activities of each Or-
gan of the Tribunal.
5. The Secretariat staff shall be appointed and removed by the Secre-
tary at will.
6. An annual summary of investigations undertaken by -the Procuracy
shall be presented to the Secretariat for publication, but certain in-
vestigations may be omitted where secrecy is necessary, provided
that a confidential report of the investigation is made to the Court
and to the Standing Committee and filed separately with the Secre-
tariat. Either the Court or the Standing Committee may order by
majority vote that the report be made public.
Commentary
Although most of the functions of the Secretariat are ministerial in
character, its duties to oversee communications and prepare reports
serve an inspectorate function as well. Accordingly, control over the
Secretariat is vested in the Court, as a neutral body.
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Article XXVII. The Standing Committee
1. The Standing committee shall consist of one representative ap-
pointed by each State-Party.
2. The Standing Committee shall elect by majority vote a presiding
officer and alternate presiding officer and such other officers as it
deems appropriate.
3. The presiding officer shall convene meetings at least twice each year
of at least one week duration, each at the seat of the Tribunal, and
call other meetings at the request of a majority vote of the
Committee.
4. The Standing Committee shall have the power to perform the func-
tions expressly assigned to it under this Convention, plus any other
functions that it determines appropriate in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the Tribunal that are not inconsistent with the convention,
but in no way shall those functions impair the independence and
integrity of the court as a judicial body.
5. In particular, the Standing Committee may:
a. Offer to mediate disputes between State-Parties relating to the
functions of the Tribunal; and
b. Encourage States to accede to the Convention; and,
c. Propose to States-Parties international instruments to enhance
the functions of the Tribunal.
6. The Standing Committee may exclude from participation represent-
atives of States-Parties that have failed to provide financial support
for the Tribunal as required by this Statute or States-Parties that
failed to carry out their obligations under this Statute.
7. Upon request by the Procuracy, or by a party to a case presented for
adjudication to a Chamber of the Court, the Standing Committee
may be seized with a mediation and conciliation petition. In that
case, the Standing Committee shall within 60 days decide on grant-
ing or denying the petition, from which decision there is no appeal.
In the event that the Standing Committee grants the petition, Court
proceedings shall be stayed until such time as the Standing Commit-
tee concludes its mediation and conciliation efforts, but not for more
than one year except by stipulation of the Parties and with the con-
sent of the Court.
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Commentary
The 1953 ILC Draft assumed that the Court created under it
would be a part of the United Nations, and therefore any governing-
body needs or political issues regarding its operations would be ad-
dressed by the political organs of the United Nations, especially the
General Assembly. Under the 1979 ILA Draft, a similar assumption
appears to have been made in that no treaty-type provisions are in-
cluded and, although references are made to "Contracting Parties,"
this term appears to mean only States that have consented to be subject
to operation of the Court. Nevertheless, the Commission contemplated
in the ILA Drafts would have had a somewhat political character, in
that only nationals of States consenting to be subject to operations of
the Commission, could have been members and the Commission's own
statute is referred to as a "Convention" in its Article 3.
The present Statute, in contrast, would be entirely onventional in
character, although there are various express provisions for coordina-
tion of action with the United Nations. Accordingly, the need for an
organ to deal with governance of the Tribunal and political issues relat-
ing to its activities promoted provision for a Standing Committee. It
should be noted that the express functions of the Standing Committee
are of a governing-body nature for the most part, and that its functions
beyond these are largely unspecified. This would permit the representa-
tives of States-Parties who constitute that organ to have wide flexibility
in pursuing non-juridical matters helpful to international criminal jus-
tice. The requirement of meetings twice a year assures that the Stand-
ing Committee will be available for consultation on political questions.
One of the most significant functions of the Standing Committee
may be in Paragraph 6 with respect to proposing action to initiate and
propose new norms of international criminal law or standards for its
application by the Tribunal. In view of the vagueness of existing instru-
ments purporting to define international crimes, such proposals and
adoption may be essential in order that criminal responsibility may be
dealt with without violating the principle of nulla poena sine lege.
It should be noted that this Article does not contemplate depriva-
tion of the status of State-Party in response to non-payment of financial
support, but mere suspension.
No provision has been made for terms of representatives, it being
assumed that their tenure shall be at the pleasure of the appointing
State.
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Article XXVIII. General Institutional Matters
1. Each of the Organs of the Tribunal shall formulate and publish its
own Rules in accordance with the general principles of Internal law
and the Standards set forth in this Convention to regulate its func-
tions under this Statute, but the Rules of the Procuracy and Secre-
tariat shall be subject to approval by a majority of the Court en
banc.
2. The Procurator.shall participate without a vote in formulating the
Rules of the Court and of the Secretariat. The President of the
Court shall participate without a vote in formulating the Rules of
the Procuracy and of the Secretariat.
3. Except to the extent of the adopted Rules, procedures of the Court
shall be those of the International Court of Justice and those of the
Secretariat shall be as for the Registrar of the International Court
of Justice.
4. Each of the Organs of the Tribunal shall cooperate with the Secre-
tariat in formulating its budget request and such budget requests
shall be presented to the Court en banc for modification or approval,
subject to adoption or rejection in their entirety by the Standing
Committee.
5. The Judges, the Procurator, the Deputy Procurators and their assist-
ants, and the Secretary shall be deemed officers of the Court, as well
as Counsels appearing in a given case, and they shall enjoy immu-
nity from legal processes of States with respect to the performance
of their legal duties.
6. No officer of the Court other than Counsel in a given case shall
perform any function under this Statute without having first made a
public, solemn declaration of impartiality and adherence to this
Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal.
Commentary
Paragraph 1 rules, it should be noted, are subject to further provisions
in this Convention. Recognition that flexibility should be provided for
such Rules was expressed in Article 24 of the 1953 ILC Draft and
Article 10 of the 1979 ILA Draft. Court approval of Rules for the
Procuracy and Secretariat appeal appropriate in view of the need to
assure that such rules are fair and conform to legal requirements. Par-
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ticipation by the Procurator in formulation of Court Rules recognizes
the desirability that such Rules interrelate properly with Procuracy
procedures and capabilities.
Paragraph 2 gives the Court, a neutral body, a key role in shaping
the budget of the Tribunal, but leaves a veto power with the Standing
Committee, which represents the States obliged to meet the budget.
Prior draft statues did no deal in detail with budgetary approval. See
1953 ILC Article 23 and 1979 ILA Article 17.
Paragraph 5 parallels Article 14 of the 1953 ILC Draft, which has
no counterpart in the 1979 ILA Draft, as to judges. Expansion to other
Tribunal officers is clearly appropriate. Expansion to other parties
before the Court is necessary in the interest of fairness. [See, e.g., the
European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings
of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights (Council of
Europe, May 1969; E.T.S. No. 69).
Paragraph 6's requirement of a solemn declaration parallels Arti-
cle 13 of the 1953 ILC Draft and Article 11 of the 1979 ILA Draft,
but is expanded to include officers of the Tribunal.
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Chapter 5. Tribunal Standards
Article XXIX. Standards for Rules and Procedures
1. In all proceedings of the Tribunal and in the formulation of any
of its organs, the accused shall be entitled to those fundamental
human rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which for these purposes are:
a. The presumption of innocence
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of
criminal justice. It includes inter alia:
1. No one may be convicted or formally declared guilty unless
he has been tried according to law in a fair trail:
2. No criminal punishment or any equivalent sanction may be
imposed upon a person unless he has been proven guilty in
accordance with the law;
3. No person shall be required to prove his innocence; and
4. In case of doubt the decision must be in favor of the accused.
b. Procedural rights
The accused shall be given effective ways to challenge any and
all evidence produced by the prosection and to present evidence
in defense of the accusation.
The defendant has the right to present at all judicial
proceedings and to confront his accusers. The right to confront
includes the right to examine opposing witnesses.
c. Speedy trial
Criminal proceedings shall be speedily conducted without,
however, interfering with the right of the defense to adequately
prepare for trial. To this effect:
1. Time limitations should be established for each stage of the
proceedings and should not be extended without reason by
the appropriate Chamber of the Court.
2. Complex cases involving multiple defendants or charges may
be severed by the appropriate Chamber of the Court when it
is deemed in the interest of fairness to the parties and justice
to the case.
3. Administrative or disciplinary measures shall be taken
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against officials of the Tribunal who deliberately or by
negligence violate the provisions of this Statute and the rules
of this Tribunal.
d. Evidentiary questions
1. All procedures and methods for securing evidence shall be in
accordance with internationally guaranteed Human Rights,
the standards of justice set forth in this Statute, and in the
rules of the Tribunal.
2. The admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings must
take into account the integrity of the judicial system, the
rights of the defense, the interests of the victim, and the
interests of the world community.
3. Evidence obtained directly or indirectly by illegal means
which constitute a serious violation of internationally
protected human rights, violate the provisions of this
Convention, and Rules of this Tribunal shall hold them
inadmissible.
e. The right to remain silent
Anyone accused of a criminal violation has the right to remain
silent and must be informed of this right.
f. Assistance of counsel
1. Anyone suspected of a criminal violation has the right to
defend himself and to competent legal assistance of his own
choosing at all stages of the proceedings.
2. Counsel shall be appointed sua sponte whenever the court
deems necessary and in accordance with the Rules of the
Court enacted pursuant to this Convention.
3. Appointed counsel shall receive reasonable compensation
from the Tribunal whenever the accused is financially unable
to do so.
4. Counsel for the accused shall be allowed to be present at all
stages of the proceedings.
5. Counsel for the accused or the accused shall be provided
with all incriminating evidence available to the prosecution
as well as all exculpatory evidence as soon as possible but no
later than at the conclusion of the investigation or before
adjudication and in reasonable time to prepare the defense.
6. Anyone detained shall have the right to access and to
communicate in private with his counsel personally and by
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correspondence, subject only to reasonable security measures
decided by a judge of the Court.
g. Arrest and detention
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
2. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
established by this Statute and Rules of the Tribunal and
only on the basis of a determination by the Court.
3. no one shall be arrested or detained without reasonable
grounds to believe that he committed a criminal violation
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
4. Anyone arrested or detained shall be promptly brought
before a judge of the Court and shall be informed of the
charges against him; after appearance before such judicial
authority he may be returned to the custody of the arresting
authority but he shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the
Court even when in the custody of a State-Party.
5. Preliminary or provisional arrest and detention shall take
place only whenever necessary and as much as possible
should be 'reduced to a minimum of cases and to the
minimum of time.
6. Preliminary or provisional detention shall not be compulsory
but subject to the determination of the Court and in
accordance with its Rules.
7. Alternative measures to detention shall be used whenever
possible and include inter alia:
- limitations of freedom of movement, and
- imposition of other restrictions.
8. No detainee shall be subject to rehabilitative measures prior
to conviction unless he freely consents thereto.
9. No administrative preventive detention shall be permissible
as part of any criminal proceedings.
10. Any period of detention prior to conviction shall be credited
toward the fulfillment of the Sanction imposed by the Court.
11. Anyone who has been the victim of illegal or unjustified
detention shall have the right to compensation. An action for
damages may be brought and damages awarded for
accusations which are vexations or brought in bad faith.
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h. Rights and interests of the victim
The rights and interests of the victim of a crime shall be
protected where appropriate taking into account the United
Nations Declaration on victims of crime.
1. the opportunity to participate in the criminal proceedings;
2. the right to protect his civil interests, and
3. due regard shall be given in formulation of Rules of the
Organs of the Tribunal to the principle of ne bis in idem, but
a seemingly duplicative prosecution shall not be barred
provided that the record in the prior proceeding is taken into
account along with any prior measures in respec-t of the guilt
of the accused.
2. Arrest and detention shall be in conformity with the Standard
Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners and the Principles on
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention of the United
Nations.
3. Maximum flexibility regarding restrictive measures should be
encouraged, including use of such mechanisms as house arrest,
work release and bail, and credit shall be given for a.ny
preconviction restrictions to an accused.
4. The Tribunal shall include all of the above in the formulation of
its Rules of Practice and Procedures which shall be effective upon
promulgation.
5. No proceedings before the Tribunal shall commence :prior to the
promulgation of the Rules of Practice and Procedures of the
Court, the Procuracy, and the Secretariat.
Commentary
The Standards of fairness which are to be guaranteed in all pro-
ceedings before the Organs of the Tribunal and which are to be re-
flected in the Rules to be promulgated by the said Organs embodying
those rights are contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the 1980 Body of Principles on the Protection of Persons from All
Forms of Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, the 1950 European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
and the 1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. These
standards are also embodied in the resolutions of the XIIth Interna-
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tional Congress of Penal Law held in Hamburg 1979 whose draft and
explanatory notes are in 49 Revue Internationale, de Droit Penal vol. 3,
1978. These provisions are particularly consonant with the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and Additional Protocols. [See A. -Robertson, Human
Rights in Europe (1977), and D. Poncet, La Protection de l'Accuse par
la Convention Europeenne des Droits de l'Homme (1977). See also,
e.g., L. Sohn and T. Buergenthal, International Protection of Human
Rights (1973).]
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Chapter 6. Judicial Assistance and Other Forms of Cooperation
Article XXX. Cooperation between the States-Parties and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal
Section 1. Duties of States-Parties
1.1 The States-Parties shall provide the International Criminal Tribu-
nal with all means of legal assistance and cooperation, including,
but not limited to extradition, letters rogatory, service of writs, as-
sistance in securing testimony and evidence, transmittal of records,
transfer of proceedings, and transfer of prisoners.
1.2 The application of 1.1 shall be in accordance with the domestic
legislation of one requested state.
1.3 Where necessary States-Parties shall enact the legislation neces-
sary to implement these provisions.
Comments
Legal assistance includes administrative as well as judicial
assistance.
Section 2. Methods and Procedures
2.1 The methods of judicial assistance and other forms of cooperation
and regulating procedures between the States-Parties and the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal shall be those methods and proce-
dures provided for in Part III, "Procedural Enforcement Part."
2.2 The Rules of Practice of the Tribunal shall supplement the provi-
sion of Part III with respect to ministerial matters.
Section 3. Recognition of the Judgments of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal
3.1 The States-Parties agree to recognize the judgments of the Court
and to execute its provisions. For the purposes of double jeopardy
and evidentiary matters, the International Criminal Tribunal shall
recognize the sanctions of other States in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Convention.
3.2 The Court's Rules of Practice shall govern the recognition of the
judgments of the Court by State-Parties and those of the other
states by the Court.
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Section 4. Transfer of Offenders and Execution of Sentences
4.1 In the event the International Criminal Tribunal does not have
detentional facilities under its direct control, it may request a
State-Party to execute the sentence in accordance with that Party's
correctional system, and in that case, the Tribunal shall continue to
exercise jurisdiction over the offender, including his transfer to an-
other State or facility.
4.2 In the event the International Criminal Tribunal has placed an of-
fender in its own detention facilities, this person may by agreement
be transferred for detention to his country of origin, subject to the
Tribunal's jurisdiction.
4.3 The Tribunal's Rules of Practice shall determine the basis and con-
dition of the transfer of offenders and the execution of sentences.
Commentary
Sections 1 and 2 of this Article refer to the modalities and proce-
dures set forth in Part III, and Section 2 adds the proviso that ministe-
rial matters can be provided for by the Tribunal's Rules of Practice.
The basis of international enforcement and cooperation derives
from the maxim aut dedere aut judicare from Hugo Grotius, De Jure
Belli ac Pacis (1624). It is now recognized as a general principle of
international law to "prosecute or extradite," see Bassiouni, "Interna-
tional Extradition and World Public Order," in Aktuelle Probleme des
Internationalen Strafrechts (1970), pp. 10, 15 (D. Oehler and P.G.
Potz, eds), and it is the conceptual basis of the indirect enforcement
scheme, which international law has relied upon. It is embodied in in-
ternational criminal law conventions. The mechanism by which the in-
direct enforcement scheme operates is that a State obligates itself
under an international convention to include appropriate provisions in
its national laws which would make the internationally proscribed con-
duct a national crime. This approach is found in all international crimi-
nal law conventions establishing such a duty upon its Contracting Par-
ties. See e.g., the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, in their
respective Articles 49-50/50-51/129-130/146-147. It is also the case
with respect to all other international criminal law conventions.
The requested party executes in the manner provided for by its law any
letters rogatory relating to criminal matters and addressed to it by the
judicial authorities of the requesting Party for the purpose of procuring
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evidence or transmitting objects, records or documents to be produced
in evidence.
The requested Party shall effect service of writs and records of judicial
decisions that are transmitted to it for this purpose by the requesting
Party. Service may be effected by simple transmission of the writ or
record to the person to be served. Other formalities shall be established
by the Rules of the Court. See the 1959 European Convention on Mu-
tual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and in part on the 1972 Euro-
pean Convention on Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters. See
also Grutzner, "International Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in
Criminal Matters," in M.C. Bassiouni and V.P. Nanda (eds.), A Trea-
tise on International Criminal Law, vol. 2, pp. 189, 217-218 (1973).
See also Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the
Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (Council of Europe,
1972); Problems Arising from the Practical Application of the Euro-
pean Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Council
of Europe, 1971); de Schutter, "International Criminal Law in Evolu-
tion: Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Benelux
Countries," 14 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 382 (1967); Grutzner, International
Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters; and
Markees, ."The Difference in Concept Between Civil and Common Law
Countries as to Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Mat-
ters," in M.C. Bassiouni and V.P. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on Interna-
tional Criminal Law, vol. 2, pp. 171, 189 (1972). See also Grutzner,
Internationales Rechtshilfeverkehr (1967). For the text of these and
other treaties, see M. Pisani and F. Mosconi, Codice Delle Convenzioni
di Estradizione e di Assistenza Giudiziaria in Materia Penale (1979).
See also e.g., 2 M.C. Bassiouni, International Criminal Law (1986).
Section 3-is applicable to: (1) sanctions involving the deprivation
of liberty, (2) fines or confiscations, and (3) disqualifications. A State-
Party shall under the conditions provided for in this Convention enforce
a sanction imposed by the Court and vice versa. See the 1970 Euro-
pean Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments.
See also Aspects of International Validity of Criminal Judgments
(Council of Europe, 1968), and Explanatory Report on the European
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments
(Council of Europe, 1970). See also Harari, McLean and Silverwood,
"Reciprocal Enforcement of Criminal Judgments," 45 Revue Internati-
onale de Droit Penal 585 (1974) D. Oehler, "Recognition of Foreign
Penal Judgments and their Enforcement," in M.C. Bassiouni and V.P.
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Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on International Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. .261
(1973); Schearer, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Criminal
Judgments," 47 Aust. L.J. 585 (1973); D. Oehler, Internationalen
Strafrecht (1973). For the Benelux Convention, see Convention Con-
cerning Customs and Excise,September 5, 1972, Belgium-Luxem-
bourg-The Netherlands, 247 U.N.T.S. 329 (1956). See also K.
Kraelle, Le Benelux Commente, Textes Officiels 147, 209, 306 (1961);
de Schutter, "International Criminal Cooperation: The Benelux Exam-
ple," in M.C. Bassiouni and V.P. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on Interna-
tional Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 261 (1973). The Scandanavian coun-
tries' arrangement for recognition and enforcement of penal judgments
is reproduced in H. Grutzner, Internationales Rechtshilfeverkehr in
Strafsache, pt. IV (1967). The arrangement between France and cer-
tain African states is reproduced in 52 Rev. Critique de Droit Interna-
tional Prive 863 (1973). See also e.g., 2 M.C. Bassiouni, International
Criminal Law (1986).
Section 3 relies on the concepts embodied in the 1970 European
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, and
on the 1964 European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally
Sentenced or Conditionally Released Offenders. It also relies on the
treaties on the execution of penal sentences between the United States
and Mexico, 5 November 1976, between United States and Canada, 2
March 1977, and between the United States and Bolivia, 10 February
1978, all treaties having entered into force. Furthermore, special reli-
ance was placed on U.S. legislation implementing the above treaties. 18
U.S.C., sections 4100-4115. See Bassiouni, "Perspectives on the Trans-
fer of Prisoners between the United States and Mexico and the United
States and Canada," 11 Vanderbilt J. Transnat'l L. 249 (1978); Bas-
siouni, "A Practitioner's Perspective on Prisoner Transfer," 4 Nat'l J.
Crim. Defense 127 (1978); Abramovsky and Eagle, "A Critical Evalu-
ation on the Newly-Ratified Mexican-American Transfer of Penal
Sanction Treaty," 64 Iowa L. Rev. 325 (1979), and Professor Vagt's
response thereto in the same issue.
A scheme for transfer of offenders can be said to rely in part on the
assumption that a given State will recognize the criminal judgment of
another and of the Court. The manner in which this Article is drafted
makes this assumption. See, in particular, Article 6 of the 1970 Euro-
pean Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments.
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Appendix 1
TO PART B
I. Establishment of an International Criminal Court
A. OFFICIAL TEXTS
1. CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES
(First Hague, I, Signed at The Hague, 19 July 1899, 26 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (2d) 720, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. No. 342 (entered
into force 4 September, 1900).
2. CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT
(Second Hague, XII), signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, 3
Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 688 (never entered into force).
3. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY (Treaty of Versailles), signed
at Versailles, 28 June 1919, 11 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d)
323 (entered into force 10 January 1920).
4. CONVENTION FOR THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, opened for signature at Geneva, 16 November
1927, League of Nations O.J. Spec. in Supp. No. 156 (1938),
League of Nations Doc. C.547 (I).M. 384 (I).1837.v (1938)
(never entered into force).
5. AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN Axis (London Agreement),
signed at London, August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544,
E.A.S. No. 472 (entered into force, 8 August 1945), ANNEX,
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
(Nuremberg).
6. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
PROCLAIMED AT TOKYO, 19 January 1946 and amended 26 April
1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (entered into force 19 January 1946),
ANNEX, CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (Tokyo).
7. CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (Punishment of Persons Guilty
of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity),
adopted at Berlin, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the
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Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946.
8. DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(Annex to the Report of the Committee on International
Criminal Jurisdiction, 31 August 1951), 7 GAOR Supp. 11,
U.N. Doe. A/2136 (1952) at 23.
9. REVISED DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT
(Annex to the Report of the Committee on International
Criminal Jurisdiction, 20 August 1953), 9 GAOR Supp. 12,
U.N. Doe. A/2645 (1954).
10. DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION TO IMPLEMENT THE TO IMPLEMENT THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF APARTHEID, 19 January 1980,
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1416.
B. UNOFFICIAL TEXTS
1. "REPORT ON THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION" by V.V. Pella to the Interparliamentary Union,
XXII Conference, held in Berne and Geneva, 1924, in L'Union
Interparlementaire. Compte Rendu de la XXII Conference tenue
a Berne et a Geneve en 1924, publie par le Bureau
Interparlementaire, 1925; see also, L'Union Interparlementaire.
Compete Rendu de la XXII Conference Tenue a Washington et a
Ottawa en 1925 (1925).
2. "Projet d'une Cour Criminelle Internationale" adopted by the
International Law Association at its 34th Conference in Vienna,
August, 1926, The International Law Association, Report of the
34th Conference, Vienna, August 5-11, 1926) (1927).
3. Project of the International Association of Penal Law, in Actes
du Premier Congres International de Droit Penal, Bruxelles, 26-
29 June 1926 (1927) and "Projet de Statut pour la Creation
d'une Chambre Criminelle au Sein de la Cour Permanente de
Justice Internationale," presented by the International
Association of Penal Law to the League of Nations in 1927, 5
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal (1928).
4. "Constitution et Procedure d'un Tribunal Approprie pour juger
de la Responsabilite des Auteurs des Crimes de Guerre, presente
a la Conference des preliminaires de Paix par la Commission
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des Responsibilites des Auteurs de la Guerre et Sanctions, III,
La Paix de Versailles" (1930).
5. "PROJECT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONVENTION FOR THE
CREATION OF A UNITED NATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR WAR
CRIMEs," established by the United Nations War Crimes
Commission, 1944, see United Nations War Crimes Commission
(Wright ed. 1948).
6. L'Union Interparlementaire. Compte rendu de la XXVII
Conference Tenue a Rome en 1948, (1949).
7. "DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT," in
Stone and R. Woetzel, Toward a Feasible International Criminal
Court (1970).
8. "DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,"
Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court (Wingspread Conference, September 1971).
9. "DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,"
Work Paper, Abidjan World Conference on World Peace through
Law, August 26-31, (1973).
10. "Draft Statute for an International Commission on Criminal
Inquiry and a Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court," International Law Association, 60th Conference,
Montreal, August 29-September 4, 1982, in REPORT OF THE
60TH CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION
(1983).
II. Instruments on the Codification of Substantive International
Criminal Law
A. OFFICIAL TEXTS
1. 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. (9 U.N. 60R Supp. No. 9, UNDOC A/2693).
2. Draft International Criminal Code, Presented by the AIDP to the
VIth U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of
Offenders (Caracas, 1980) (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO 213)
[Updated in M.C. Bassiouni, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987)].
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Appendix 2
Committee of Experts on
International Criminal Policy for the Prevention
and Control of Transnatfonal and International
Criminality and For the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court
Dr. Husain M. Al-Baharna
Minister of Legal Affairs State of Baharain
Ministry of Legal Affairs
Manama, Bahrain
Mr. Christopher Amerasinghe, Q.C.
Senior General Counsel
Department of Justice
Toronto, Ontario Canada
Justice Dr. Jaime Giraldo Angel
Supreme Court of Colombia
Bogota, Colombia
Dr. H.J. Bartsch
Secretariat General
Directorate Legal Affairs
Council of Europe
Strasbourg, France
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni
Professor of Law, DePaul University Faculty
of Law;
President, International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences;
President, International Association of Penal
Law;
Chicago, Illinois
Professor Christopher L. Blakesley
Professor of Law
Louisiana State University Law Center
School of Law
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Mr. Robert Boylan
Office of International Affairs
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
Dr. Hugo Caminos
Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs
Organization of American States
Washington, D.C.
Assissor Dr. Fernando Carrillo
Presidential Advisor
Bogota, Colombia
Magistrat Marie-Anne Chapelle
Bureau de Droit Penal International et
European
Direction des Affaires Criminelles
Ministere de la Justice
Paris, France
Ms. Joan Chester
Administrative Attache
Trinidad and Tobago Mission
Geneve, Switzerland
The Honorable Carmelo Conti
Procuratore Generale, Corte d'Appello
Palermo, Italia
The Honorable Dusan Cotic
Vice President, Supreme Court of Yugoslavia
President, U.N. Committee on Crime
Prevention and Control
Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Mr. Justice U. Cross
High Commissioner Designate to the United
Kingdom
Trinidad and Tobago High Commission
London, United Kingdom
Professor Said EI-Dakkak
Professor of International Law
Head of the Department
International Law
University of Alexandria
Alexandria, Egypt
of Public
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Mr. Siba Kumar Das
United Nations Official
Deputy Director, UNICRI
Roma, Italia
Richard C. Dennis, Jr.
Special Agent FBI
Special Assistant, Associate Deputy Director
Investigations
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
Professor Daniel Derby
Associate Professor of Law
Touro Law School
Huntington, New York
Mrs. Ebuidba Edem Ekpo
Assistant Chief Legal Officer
Federal Ministry of Justice
Marina, Lagos, Nigeria
Mr. Ronald Gainer
Former Deputy Associate Attorney General
Member, U.N. Committee on Crime
Prevention and Control
Washington, D.C.
Professor Olga Lucia Gaitan
Universidad de Los Andes
Facultad de Derecho
Bogota, Colombia
Dr. Iskandar Ghattas
President de la Cour D'Appel
Director of the Legislation et Entraide
Judiciare Internationale
Minister of Justice
Cairo, Egypt
Professor Vasily P. Ignatov
Head, Foreign Relations Departr
Ministry of the Interior;
Member, U.N. Committee
Prevention and Control
Ministry of the Interior
Moscow, USSR
(Mrs. Natalya Goltsova; Int
Professor Ignatov)
Professor Igor Karpetz
Directeur de l'institut de Recherches
Scientifiques sur les Problems deRenforcement
de la legalite
12 3022 Moscow D. 22, USSR
(Mrs. Grenkova Iuni; Interpreter for Professor
Karpetz)
Professor Raimo Lahti
Professor of Criminal Law
The University of Helsinki
Faculty of Law
Helsinki, Finland
Minister Luigi Augusto Lauriola
Diplomatic Assistant to the
Minister of Justice of Italy
Ministry of Justice
Roma, Italia
Professor Ferrando Mantovani
Ordinario de Diritto Penale
Universita di Firenze
Facolta de Gurisprudenza
Firenze, Italia
Mr. Peter-Michael Milller
Chairman, Section on General Practice's
Committee on Criminal Law
International Bar Association
Munich, Germany
Ambassador W.S. Naimool
Office of the Prime Minister
Port-of-Spain
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
Professor Ved P. Nanda
nent Thompson G. Marsh Profe'sor of Law
Director, International Legal Studies ProgramUniversity of Denver
College of Law
Denver, Colorado
erpreter for The Honorable Ramon de a Cruz Ochoa
Presidente Sociedad Cusana Ciencias Penales
Professor Escuela Derecho Universidad de Ia
Hosana
Fiscal General de la Republica
Member, U.N. Committee on Crime
Prevention and Control
Habana, Cuba
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Secretaire-General, AIDP
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Universite de Pau;
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Pau, France
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Magistrato, Ministero de Grazia e Giustizia
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The Honorable Arthur Napoleon Raymond
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Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Residence
Port-of-Spain
Trinidad and Tobago
The Honorable Simone Rozes
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President, Societe Internationale de Defense
Sociale
Paris, France
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Chief of the Section on Legislation &
International Treaties
Federal Ministry of Justice and Police
Bern, Switzerland
Professor Ronald Smith
Professor of Law
The John Marshall Law School
Chicago, Illinois
Mr. Frank Solomon
Senior Counsel
Office of the Prime Minister
Ministry of External Affairs & International
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Port-of-Spain
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Chief Prosecutor of Stockholm
Prosecution Office
Stockholm, Sweden
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Professor Jacob W.F. Sundberg
Professor of Law
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Executive Secretary, Eighth United Nations
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Vienna International Center
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An International Criminal Court-An Emerging Idea
John B. Anderson*
The articulation of a need for an International Criminal Court be-
gan perhaps as long ago as the beginning of the nineteenth century. At
this time, during the Congress of Vienna in 1815, discussions were held
among various nation-states concerning the need to punish those en-
gaged in the slave trade. One might push the date back even further by
tracing its origins to the sixteenth century when the ideas of Bodin
were instrumental in creating the modern concept of state sovereignty.
It was Bodin's construct which in turn led seventeenth century writers
like Huber to assert that the force of all law is territorial. Its extension
beyond the borders of a state, therefore, necessitated a doctrine of in-
ternational comity, a conceptual precursor to modern international re-
lations.' Professor Hessel E. Yntema has pointed out that it was Huber
in his De Jure Civitatis who viewed the problem of confficts law, "not
in the tradition of the statutists but as an aspect of the law governing
the administration of public affairs."2 Having taken this approach to
private international law, he concluded that it then became relevant to
consider the reciprocal obligations owed by those involved in legal dis-
putes who came from different countries.3 This would inevitably involve
a consideration of extra-territorial observance of foreign laws, and it
would become a matter of commercial necessity that nations respect
the obligations imposed upon their citizens by the laws of foreign
States. Their refusal to make this concession would thwart any efforts
to foster necessary forms of actions to ascertain rights and obligations
in matters involving the nationals of two or more states. Laws were
based on a theory of territoriality, and the principle of absolute sover-
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at Nova University Center for the
Study of Law. B.A., University of Illinois, 1942, J.D., University of Illinois College of
Law, 1946, LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1949. In 1960 John B. Anderson was elected
U.S. Representative to Congress from the 16th District of Illinois, and served ten con-
secutive terms until 1980 when he ran as an Independent candidate for the Presidency
of the United States receiving approximately 7 % of the popular vote. Special thanks to
Larry Magill, J.D. Candidate 1991, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See generally E. ScoLEs & P. HAY, CoNiLcr oF LAWS § 2.2, at 8-10 (1982).
2. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MIcH L. Rnv. 1, 25 (1966).
3. Id. at 25, 26.
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eignty applied to all subjects within the territory. These would include
all' persons who are found within its metes and bounds. Also, as men-
tioned above, even "if not required by treaty or by some other reason
requiring subordination, the reason of the common practice among na-
tions" sometimes requires nations to recognize the laws of another, or
commerce would simply cease.4
Joseph Story, who was to become the first important American
expositor of the basic principles of private international law, lent fur-
ther support to Huber's comity doctrine in his Commentaries on the
Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic:
The true foundation on which the administration of international
law must rest is that the rules which are to govern are those that
arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of inconve-
niences which would result from a contrary doctrine,and from a
spirit of moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be
done to us in return."
Although written well over a century and a half ago, Story's Com-
mentaries could well be cited for the predicate that a body of interna-
tional law is needed as a means of insuring its observance and execu-
tion in a way that benefits the international community.
As Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni has pointed out in his monumen-
tal compilation and digest,6 we have seen a vast proliferation of more
than 300 international instruments, conventions, and agreements, some
of which are sufficiently penal in nature to rise to the level of substan-
tive international criminal law.' However, few if any of these conven-
tions, statutes, and treaties are self-6nforcing. Few of them provide for
much more than consultative arrangements.
Thus, the remission of violations to national courts for adjudica-
tion and the infliction of penalties is currently the norm. Although
many of these international treaties and conventions are nominally
under the aegis of the United Nations or one of its specialized agencies,
4. Id. at 26.
5. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC
(1841).
6. See generally M.C. BAssIouNi, INTERNATIONAL CRIME: DIGmEST/INDEX OF IN-
TERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 (1986).
7. See generally Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional Criminal
Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27 (1983).
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powers of enforcement are noticeably lacking. Most proposals to rem-
edy this defect are noteworthy for their extreme generality. For exam-
ple, in a document submitted to the 1988 General Assembly of the
United Nations, the Soviet Union called for a "broad international dia-
logue about ways of insuring comprehensive security in military, politi-
cal, economic, sociological, humanitarian and other fields."8 In calling
for an enhanced role for the United Nations in the solution of global
problems, the Soviet document did make reference to increasing the
authority of the International Court of Justice in the Hague.9 However,
the institutional structure which would be required to deal with inter-
national crimes clearly does not exist at present. There simply is not a
world judicial body with jurisdiction extending to cases involving indi-
viduals. Any attempt to amend the jurisdiction of the present Court
would have the extremely undesirable consequences of distracting it
from what should be its main role of attempting to settle those disputes
between nation-states that present a threat to world peace.
An international criminal tribunal with limited subject matter ju-
risdiction would have sufficient matters before it to justify that it exists
independently of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The
exponential growth of the world drug trade has a clear linkage with
what has come to be called "narco-terrorism."
Huge illicit profits derived from the illegal sale of drugs have been
used to fund revolutionary activities, and to attempt to further the ac-
complishment of political goals and objectives. This is a further dimen-
sion of the drug trafficking problem which makes it an even greater
matter of international concern. There is, of course, the freestanding
problem of international terrorism which would exist, and indeed is on
the sharp rise, quite independently from the world commerce in drugs.
The taking of hostages as a weapon of choice in virtually every interna-
tional dispute has become commonplace. This international anarchy in
defiance of every civilized norm of conduct between and among nations
has led to a growing recognition that this has become a problem which
is raging beyond control. There is the further recognition that it is one
where, unless individual states are willing to risk war or pay tribute,
there is little in the way of either deterrent or retributive justice availa-
8. U.N. Doc. A/43/629 (1988) (emphasis added). The letter, dated September
29, was from Deputy head of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the 43d session of the General Assembly and was addressed to the Secretary-
General.
9. Id.
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ble as a remedy. The problem, in short, is only destined to become
worse.
Counterbalancing this gloomy, if not utterly grim, prognosis has
been the fortuity of a complete transformation of East-West relations.
From the time that Stalin consolidated his vice-like grip over the
U.S.S.R. at the end of the 1920's until Mikhail Gorbachev's accession
to power in March of 1985, law was simply a tool of the state both in a
domestic and international sense. Although there was a facade of a le-
gal regime, "despite its Western Structure, the entire purpose of the
civil law was to harness the energies of the Soviet citizen in service to
the policies of the party.""0 In the arena of world affairs, the spoken
promissory commitment of the Soviet Union to the rule of law masked
its determination to maintain the correlation of forces in a manner that
would preserve and expand the Soviet empire. Although a signatory to
many of the treaties and conventions of the post-war period cited in
Professor Bassiouni's compilation,' 1 the Soviet Union evinced no desire
to have Soviet law supplanted by an international code administered
and implemented by an international tribunal.
There has been a change in Soviet attitude since the term "Per-
estroika" was added to the lexicons of the world. In his address to the
General Assembly of the United Nations in New York on December 7,
1988, General Secretary Gorbachev said:
Our ideal is a world community of States with political systems
and foreign policies based on law. This could be achieved with the
help of an accord within the framework of the UN on a uniform
understanding of the principles and norms of international law;
their codification with new conditions taken into consideration; and
the elaboration of legislation for new areas of cooperation. 12
From this comment, coupled with the domestic reforms that President
Gorbachev has introduced and his willingness to accept the clear loss of
the Soviet empire which was sealed on the third of October, 1990 with
German reunification, it seems clear that the auguries for a new world
order which will witness, if not universal, nevertheless vastly increased
international cooperation undergirded by a regime based on the rule of
10. Thornburgh, The Soviet Union and the Rule of Law, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 17
(Spring 1990).
11. M.C. BAssIouNm, supra note 6.
12. U.N. Doc. A/43/PV.72 (1988) (address at the United Nations before the
General Assembly in New York).
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law are, for the moment at least, bright.
This is not to imply that the dimensions of the foregoing problems
just discussed are only latitudinal. In the areas of narco-terrorism and
the drug trade, in particular, there is a very troublesome and difficult
North-South dimension as well. However, the clearly predictable end of
the Cold War has for a number of reasons created a more beneficent
climate in world opinion for international cooperation on problems and
in areas which were given short shrift when nations were preeminently
preoccupied with an East-West military threat to world peace and
security.
Although supranationalism is not yet ready to supplant a more
Hobbesian view of world affairs, there is a far readier disposition to
acknowledge the growing political and economic interdependence of the
global village as well as the commonality of our social problems in such
areas as the physical, socio-economic, and cultural environment. As
bloc political approaches hopefully disintegrate on both sides of the
East-West relationship, hopefully the North-South dimension of world
problems will also come under the influence of a multilateralism which,
as mentioned above, needs to be extended particularly to such problem
areas as narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. In other words, when the
two superpowers - and the alliances which they have previously led -
undergo the dramatic transformation which began in 1989 and is still
continuing, it is not too much to hope and believe that the rest of the
world will also take note.
Even Iraq's aberrant behavior under the dictatorial leadership of
Saddam Hussein has certainly not detracted from the vastly changed
attitudes of world powers toward cooperation on a broader range of
problems heretofore defined exclusively in nationalistic terms. Indeed,
the converse may well be the final result. The adoption, at the time this
article was being prepared, of no less than thirteen United Nations
Resolutions calling for the imposition of economic sanctions of the most
comprehensive sort and their implementation is activity unparalleled in
the forty-five year history of the organization. It is not irrationally opti-
mistic to express both the hope and belief that this represents one of
the most significant turning points in history since nation-states came
into existence. It does not take a Kierkegaardian "leap of faith" to pos-
tulate that this can be an extremely far-reaching precedent for taking
joint action. It is not unlikely that simply the experience of so many
nations working together (not only the fifteen members of the UN Se-
curity Council, but others as well in the more than score of nations who
are cooperating militarily in the Persian Gulf region) can lay the foun-
1991]
96
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Nova Law Review
dation for international cooperation in quite different areas of mutual
concern. The consultative procedures, rule-making, and general cooper-
ation being employed in this instance can help develop institutional ca-
pabilities for the detailed work that must necessarily precede the draft-
ing, and ultimate passage, of a statute for an international criminal
court.
However, any outlining of a rosy scenario must be -tempered with
the realization that the tradition and the temptation to deal with these
problems unilaterally has not yet been subdued. Witness our own ac-
tions against Colonel Qaddafi in Libya and General Noriega in Pan-
ama as two of the most conspicuous examples. One of these cases in-
volved terrorism, while the other was allegedly based on both
international drug smuggling and money laundering, and incidents di-
rectly involving the safety and well-being of American citizens in the
Canal Zone. These are the very types of offenses which are envisioned
as important subjects of jurisdiction for an international court. Unques-
tionably, these are examples of the most difficult types of cases, i.e.,
those cases involving a dispute which is in part, and perhaps even in
large part, political and the party being charged with the commission
of offenses is a national leader. Under some theory that the greater
offense includes the lesser, there obviously could be a wish and a desire
to pursue the political agenda through direct, unilateral intervention as
the more expeditious route. However, a powerful case can be made that
yielding to the desire for quick satisfaction for transgressions against
national honor will create as many problems as it solves. Surely it is not
difficult for the so-called Great Powers to see that their lack of consis-
tency in following the rule of law when punishing international crimes,
however defined, will only make more difficult the task of inducing the
cooperation among the more than 165 nations of the world which is
needed to deal effectively with transnational offenses.
Borders are becoming increasingly porous. In Eastern Europe it
was the opening of borders which facilitated a flood of refugees and
would-be emigres which in turn brought down governments. Clearly, it
was the opening of the Hungarian border to East Germany in 1989 and
the opening of West German embassies in Warsaw and Prague to East
German nationals which were among the important factors that led to
the downfall of the German Democratic Republic. By analogy, the ease
with which borders can be crossed can also contribute to the collapse of
any effort to contain the effects of criminal law violations to a single
state. Reports of Italian Mafia taking up residence in certain South
American countries to assist in running laboratories and developing
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trade channels for the export and sale of unrefined coca paste to coun-
tries which refine and resell the drug is an example of how thoroughly
internationalized drug trafficking has become.
The effects in the fields of drug trafficking and terrorism clearly
have consequences which are oblivious to national borders. The drugs
which are landed in the Ports of Marseilles and Rotterdam are destined
for the channels of commerce all over the Western hemisphere. Turn-
ing to the field of international terrorism, similarly, the plotting of the
terrorist action that resulted in the mid-air explosion of an airliner over
Lockerbie, Scotland took place in some other country. Those who con-
spire to influence political judgments around the globe through the
pressure of terrorism are heedless of national boundaries. A proper re-
sponse to situations like those described above fairly cries out for action
by a world community acting through institutions specifically created
and chartered for the purpose of effectuating a credible response.
There are, of course, extensive political considerations involved in
the creation of an international criminal court. At the most fundamen-
tal level, the argument can be made that such a court is unnecessary.
The United States Congress has already demonstrated the capacity and
will to deal by specific statute with such matters as terrorism and the
taking of hostages which would provide a significant share of the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction that would be confided to an international
court. The most recent such act was the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Anti-terrorist Act of 1986.13 In this Act, Congress expanded
United States extraterritorial jurisdiction to foreign nationals who com-
mitted acts of international terrorism which caused injury to United
States citizens. 4
The expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was premised on the
use of the passive personality principle and the universal theory as ba-
ses for United States Courts exercising jurisdiction. The passive person-
ality principle can be defined as allowing a state the right to claim
jurisdiction over the defendant in a criminal case because he has com-
mitted an offense harmful to a national of the state asserting the juris-
diction. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
13. Pub. L. No. 99-399 § 1202, 100 Stat. 853, 896-97 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2331) (1986).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 includes within the meaning of "terrorist acts:" (a) homi-
cide, (b) attempt or conspiracy with respect to homicide and, (c) other conduct. The
section provides that section (c) applies to acts of physical violence with the intent or
result of causing serious bodily injury to a United States national.
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United States incorporates this jurisdictional basis by establishing ju-
risdiction over "conduct outside . . [United States] territory that has
or is intdnded to have substantial effect within its territory . . . . "
The Restatement (Third) also recognizes the somewhat less con-
troversial universal theory as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction . 6
Of great relevance here is an observation by the district court in Attor-
ney General of Israel v. Eichmann.'7 The district court expressed its
view that: "[I]n the absence of an International Court the international
law is in need of the judicial and legislative authorities of every coun-
try, to give effect to its penal injunctions and to bring criminals to trial.
The authority and jurisdiction to try cases under international law are
universal.""'
In general terms, the universal theory extends jurisdiction to cover
a variety of different offenses conceived to be so heinous that they give
a state jurisdiction over an offender if apprehended within its territory
or otherwise coming under its control, regardless of any other connect-
ing factor with its judicial system.'9 The potential misuse of this juris-
dictional theory is at the foundation of its weakness as a viable long-
term alternative to the existence of an international criminal court. It is
not difficult to imagine American citizens subjected to the jurisdiction
of foreign venues for allegedly committing offenses in the United States
which violated the law of a country with whom the United States en-
joyed less than cordial relations, although such conduct was not pro-
scribed by domestic law.
There has been a reluctance in the past to embrace the universal
theory which includes within its ambit crimes regarded as so heinous
that all mankind would classify them as outside all conceivable norms
of civilized behavior. It has been suggested that there is a substantial
clue to the difficulty of broadening the list of crimes which would be
15. RESTATEMENT (THnID) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (TmH=)].
16. Id. at § 404. "Universal Jurisdiction to Define and Punish Certain Offenses:"
"A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses ... of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, geno-
cide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases of
jurisdiction indicated in section 402 is present."
17. 36 I.L.R. 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem 1961), affd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup.
Ct. 1962), excerpts reprinted in 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 805.
18. Id. at 26.
19. The Draft Convention on Research in International Law ol the Harvard Law
School, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 467 (Supp. 1935).
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included under the universal theory of jurisdiction by looking to the
Restatement (Third).20 The Restatement (Third) lists only the follow-
ing offenses as coming within the scope of United States universal ju-
risdiction: piracy, slave trading, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, ge-
nocide, and war crimes.2" Thus, it has been asserted that this shows the
inherent difficulty that would be involved in broadening the list through
international negotiations and an agreement to include additional of-
fenses within the presently accepted definition of the universal theory.22
However, I do not find that argument altogether persuasive. Al-
though it is true that at the time this opinion was offered there was
only one international agreement that dealt specifically with terrorism
to which the United States was a party. Along with twelve Latin
American nations, the United States had adopted the Convention to
Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Signif-
icance.23 However, the growth of the threat of terrorism, not just to the
United States but to nations in virtually every quarter of the world, has
increased exponentially in the almost two decades that have passed
since that treaty was adopted. In the current situation in the Persian
Gulf, a fear of terrorist reprisals has been one shared in common by the
broad grouping of nations who have joined in the coalition of opposition
to Saddam Hussein's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Voices have
been heard not just from the United States, but from other quarters as
well, suggesting that Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, should be held
personally responsible and accountable for acts of terrorism that may
occur.
2 4
The question of a precise legal definition of terrorism admittedly
20. See generally Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism
Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security an Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72
CORNELL L. Rnv. 599 (1987) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Jurisdiction].
21. RESTATEMENT (TmRD), supra note 15, at § 404.
22. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 20,* at 602.
23. O.A.S. Doc. AG/doc.88, reprinted in 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413
(Feb. 2, 1971). The 12 Latin American countries to join the United States in the Con-
vention were Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela
(Chile voted against the Convention while Bolivia and Peru abstained).
24. Balz, President Warns Iraq of War Crimes Trials; Bush Calls Invader's
Acts 'Hitler Revisited, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1990, at A19. The article reported that
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had joined President Bush in his belief that
Saddam Hussein should face war crimes charges for the taking of civilian hostages.
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remains a difficult one. However, the chastening experiences that many
nations have undergone through suffering the tremendous consequences
of terrorist attacks have presumably sharpened their definitional skills.
It seems difficult, in light of that history of events, to accept the verdict
of some commentators that simply because a universally acceptable
definition has not previously been formulated, it is an impossible task. I
concur in the conclusion reached by Professor Kenneth C. Randall. 25
After studying the jurisdictional provisions of the various hijacking,
terrorism, apartheid, and torture conventions adopted in the modem,
and particularly the post-war era, he concludes they should be inter-
preted together with other developments in the general field of interna-
tional criminal law and the ergo omnes and jus cogens doctrines.26
They comprise the synergy for an emerging world legal order capable
of defining the jurisdictional terms and bases for prosecuting a variety
of extraterritorial offenses.
From this same perspective, it makes equally questionable the pes-
simistic assertion that "[a]lthough many nations condemn terrorism,
never will a significant number of states reach such a consensus on a
satisfactory definition of the term. ' 27 Recent events in other areas of
the criminal law with international aspects lend genuine credence to
the notion that the time is right politically both within the United
States and in many other nations whose cooperation would be vitally
necessary, for the creation of an international criminal court.
On November 11, 1990, a new international agreement, the
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, became effective.28 It has already been
accepted as binding by the United States and twenty-six other nations,
and sixty-two additional nations as well as the European Economic
Community have given strong indications that they too will accept the
Convention. 9 Thus, virtually two-thirds of the world's nations will be
treaty partners in the battle against drug traffickers. The new United
25. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv.
785, 832 (1988).
26. Id.
27. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 612 n.6; see also Blakesley,
A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial
Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 685, 717 (1984).
28. United Nations: Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 28, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989)
[hereinafter Convention Against Illicit Traffic].
29. Id.
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Nations Convention has some truly extraordinary provisions, some of
which are heightened forms of cooperation previously existing only on
an informal basis. Some, like the provision to allow shipments of drugs
to pass into and through countries as though unnoticed and undetected
simply to allow police agencies to trace the shipments to their consign-
ees for apprehension, are new in international law.30 Other significant
provisions exemplify the new spirit of international comity in the area
of drug trafficking. The Convention provides that all signatory nations
share and exchange criminal evidence, extradite those suspected of
drug trafficking, and generally co-operate to eliminate so-called "safe
havens." ' Nations that are signatories are pledged to adopt laws that
will permit seizure and forfeiture of drug traffickers' records and as-
sets.32 There are guarantees of the monitoring of chemicals and addi-
tives which are potential constituent elements of any controlled sub-
stance.33 Additionally, international carriers will be subject to
surveillance and inspection on a cooperative basis among the signato-
ries to the Convention.3 4 Certainly, it is not a great leap into the un-
known by the nations acceding to the terms of this convention to agree
that international judicial enforcement by a tribunal created for that
purpose in the war against drug trafficking is a step that is logical and
necessary.
There is another category or subhead of jurisdiction which could
be exercised by a new international criminal court involving crimes
which result in the degradation and spoliation of the environment.
Again, recent history clearly underrates that there is a surge of interest
in protecting what Grotius once called the "common heritage of all
mankind." He was speaking of the world's oceans. Today we refer to it
in far broader terms as the biosphere or the environment of the world's
global village. In November of 1990, the signatories to the London
Dumping Convention,35 adopted twenty years ago by nations including
30. See generally id. at art. 11.
31. See generally id. at arts. 6-7.
32. Id. at art. 5, § 2 ("Each party shall also adopt such measures as may be
necessary to. . .identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds, property, instrumentali-
ties. . . for the purpose of eventual confiscation.").
33. See generally Convention Against Illicit Traffic, supra note 28, at art. 12
("Substances Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs or Psycho-
tropic Substances").
34. Id. at art. 9, § l(b).
35. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No.
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the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, the Soviet Union,
Japan, and most of the industrialized nations of the world, took a fur-
ther enormous step forward in international environmental cooperation.
In an action binding on all signatories, the dumping of industrial waste
at sea is scheduled to be progressively phased out, resulting in a total
ban by 1995.36 Delegates to the conference which resulted in the ban
also recommended the creation of a "global mechanism :for controlling
.land-based pollution of the sea. '" 37 It does not seem either wildly fu-
turistic or unreasonably optimistic to see this action and the recommen-
dation for future action as encompassing the distinct possibility that the
enforcement mechanism for these new treaty obligations could poten-
tially be an international criminal court which could put teeth into this
ambitious environmental protection program by imposing sanctions
where needed.
From a political perspective, the inclusion within the jurisdiction
of an international criminal court of matters involving terrorism, drug
trafficking, and environmental protection make that idea highly salient
to some of the most pressing concerns today in a wide band of nations.
Their international components are clearly demonstrable. Obviously,
there will be concerns about possible intrusion on national sovereign-
ties. However, from the cases discussed above it would seem that the
post World War II period has witnessed a growing belief in the United
States that the traditional jurisdictional bases of territoriality and na-
tionality must be expanded to accommodate and acknowledge the
growing political and economic interdependence of the world. With the
very recent evidence of the resurgence and dynamism of the United
Nations because of its resolute posture in the midst of the crisis in the
Persian Gulf comes further substantiation of a politica.l mood in the
world which sees institution building as a necessary corollary to the
emergence of new areas for international cooperation. In addition,
surely a powerful impetus for this mood, at least on a regional basis, is
evidenced by the decisions being made by the European Economic
Community. There the ideas of supranationality have found expression
mainly in the field of economic cooperation. However, as that proceeds
apace with the goals of "Europe - 1992" (the almost total dismantling
of trade barriers), it should induce cooperation on a broader plane in
such areas as would be embodied within the jurisdiction of an interna-
8165.
36. Id.
37. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1990, § 1 at 7.
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tional criminal court.
It will be necessary to be careful to qualify the'extension of juris-
diction under any of the three subheads that have been suggested, ter-
rorism, drug trafficking, and environmental protection, to serious and
well-defined offenses. In United States v. Yunis, 8 Judge Parker ac-
knowledged that with respect to asserting jurisdiction on the basis of
the passive personality principle, many international legal scholars
agree only that it is the most controversial of the five sources of juris-
diction.39 The fear quite obviously is that under the guise of protecting
its nationals while they are abroad, the passive personality principle
could lead to a kind of judicial imperialism which would invite indefi-
nite criminal liability for a nation's citizens, while they are in foreign
states, for actions taken elsewhere which were unknown to them as ille-
gal. However, Judge Parker concluded that the authors of the Restate-
ment (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States40
had, in fact, withdrawn from their original stance on the issue of the
passive personality. 41 The authors of the Restatement (Third) accepted
the idea that "perpetrators of crimes unanimously condemned by mem-
bers of the international community, should be aware of the illegalities
of their actions."' 42 Therefore, qualified application of the doctrine to
serious and universally condemned crimes will not raise the specter of
unlimited and unexpected criminal liability.43
The Yunis44 case involved violation of both the Hostage Taking
Act 45 and the Aircraft Piracy Act.46 These acts are obvious examples
of clearly defined and "serious and universally condemned crimes." In
contrast to this case, there obviously are offenses which, although they
violate internationally recognized values of the world community, are
38. 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
39. Id. at 901. In his opinion, Judge Parker does, however, go on to assert that
the international community recognizes its legitimacy: "Most accept that 'the extrater-
ritorial reach of a law premised upon the. .. principle would not be in doubt as a
matter of international law.' " Id. (quoting Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterri-
torial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law
under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 203 (1983)).
40. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES (Tentative Draft No. 6 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED)].
41. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902.
42. RE TATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 40, at § 402, comment g.
43. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902.
44. Id.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1984).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1984).
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far less easily defined. Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni in his report sub-
mitted to the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders47 concedes the difficulty of the
problem. He singles out as an example the efforts by the United Na-
tions since 1947 to develop a Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, an effort which he suggests has faltered because
of a lack of clear perception of what constitutes an international
crime.48 Obviously, an International Court of Criminal Justice would
not have its more limited jurisdiction sweep so broadly. Nevertheless,
the problem of definition of cognizable offenses will be present.
One suggestion is that initially it seek to define offenses and ac-
cordingly subject individual defendants to its jurisdiction on the basis
of crimes which are most generally recognized and spelled out in
broadly comparable language under the national legislation of the sig-
natory powers. This principle might be extended, particularly in an
area like environmental protection, to include offenses which can be
clearly and substantively derived from obligations which all signatory
powers have undertaken under treaties and conventions dealing with
the general subject matter. With the passage of time, the accumulation
of experience, and the acceptance of the validity of the idea of an inter-
national court, surely other ideas will emerge for the refinement and
clarification of its jurisdiction and how and under what circumstances
it should attach to individual citizens and foreign nationals of the sig-
natory powers.
In its inception, a willingness on the part of the newly formed and
created court to recognize concurrent jurisdiction would seem wise. Al-
though acceptance of that principle might seem to carry with it the
danger of slowing its growth, some deference to preexisting national
courts who are willing to undertake to hear cases would seem pruden-
tial. Indeed, I foresee, and this has been borne out in some of the re-
cent comments made by leaders of small states where their judicial sys-
tems have been literally under siege by a powerful drug cartel,49 that it
47. A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on International Cooperation for the
Prevention, Control and Suppression of International and Transnational Criminality,
Including the Establishment of an International Court, A/Conf. 144 NGO ISISC, July
31, 1990.
48. Id. at 5-6.
49. In an address to the United Nations on October 9, 1990, the Prime Minister
of Trinidad and Tobago, A.N.R. Robinson called for the establishment of an interna-
tional criminal court to deal with drug traffickers and extremists who can destabilize
small emerging democracies like those in the Caribbean and Latin America.
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would initially be the small states who would most welcome the judicial
resources that would be provided by an international criminal court. As
the court developed its expertise and usefulness to the international
community, this would hopefully attract not only the attention, but also
the participatory interest and involvement of larger states as well.
CONCLUSION
On October 28, with the strong backing of Senator Arlen Specter
of Pennsylvania, the United States Congress passed into law a bill in
support of an international criminal court .5 The law declares that "the
United States should explore the need for the establishment of an inter-
national criminal court on a universal or regional basis to assist the
international community in dealing more effectively with criminal acts
defined in international conventions . . . . ,,51 The law insures execu-
tive action by mandating that the President report to Congress by Oc-
tober 1, 1991, "the results of his efforts in regard to the establishment
of an International Criminal Court" and that "[t]he Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States .. .report to the Congress by October 1,
1991, on the feasibility of and the relationship to, the Federal judiciary
of an International Criminal Court." 52 What this law represents is the
recognition by Congress that efforts by the United States to act unilat-
erally in an attempt to punish crimes of international scope lack both
efficacy and legitimacy. Congress has joined the growing number of
voices in the international community who have come to the realization
that an international criminal court is an institution whose time has
come: an institution which has become both necessary and feasible in
light of the current climate of international cooperation on matters of
great global importance.
50. H.R. 5114, 101st Cong., 2d sess. § 599(e) (1990). The bill was Foreign Op-
erations, Export Financing, And Related Appropriations Act of 1991 (1990). It was
initially approved by the Senate on October 19, 1990, and was read into the record by
Senator Specter. See 136 CONG. REc. S16, 216 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990) (statement of
Senator Specter).
51. H.R. 5114, supra note 50, at § (b)(1).
52. Id. at § (c), (d).
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The Torture Convention and The Reception of
International Criminal Law within the United States
David P. Stewart*
The unanimous adoption of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1984 reflected continuing interna-
tional concern over the use of torture as an instrument of state policy
and practice in many parts of the world.' Modelled in both form and
substance after several earlier multilateral conventions directed against
terrorist acts,2 the Convention is aimed at elimination of torture by es-
tablishing an effective international regime for the criminal prosecution
of torturers. While the Convention is certainly not the first interna-
tional instrument to criminalize acts violating internationally recog-
* Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights and Refugees, U.S. Department of
State. Mr. Stewart was involved in the Executive Branch's efforts to obtain the Sen-
ate's advice and consent to ratification of the Torture Convention. However, the views
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of the
Department of State or the U.S. Government.
1. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. Doec. A/RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1027
(1984), entered into force June 26, 1987. For the negotiating history of the Convention,
see J. H. BURGERS AND H. DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK (1988); see also N. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
2. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
("Hijacking"), done at The Hague, December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No.
7192; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation ("Sabotage"), done at Montreal, September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents ("Protection of Diplo-
mats"), done at New York, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. 8532; and the
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages"), done at New
York, Dec. 17, 1979, - U.S.T. , T.I.A.S. , reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1456-63 (1979). The United States is party to all of these conventions, as
well as the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Tak-
ing the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of Interna-
tional Significance, done at Washington, February 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S.
8413.
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nized human rights, it is one of the most specific and comprehensive.3
Now that the Senate has given its advice and consent to ratifica-
tion, the United States is poised to become party to the Torture Con-
vention.4 While strongly supportive of other recent efforts to adopt in-
ternational criminal regimes5, the United States has historically had
great difficulty in adhering to so-called human rights treaties. Indeed,
the Torture Convention is only the second such treaty recently to re-
ceive advice and consent (the other was the Genocide Convention, rati-
3. It is not the only multilateral convention specifically addressed to the problem
of torture. Within the OAS, a parallel Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Pun-
ish Torture was adopted in 1985 by the OAS General Assembly. See 25 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 519 (1986). The 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Eur.T.S. No. 126, reprinted in
27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1152 (1988), entered into force Feb. 1, 1989, supplements
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms by establishing a committee of experts to conduct on-site visits to places of deten-
tion within States Party and to make recommendations thereon. A similar approach is
taken by the proposed Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention, the second draft of
which is currently before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. See generally Cas-
sese, A New Approach to Human Rights: the European Convention for the Prevention
of Torture, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1989).
4. A joint resolution of Congress had endorsed United States participation in the
negotiation of the Convention. See Pub. L. 98-447, 98 Stat. 1721 (1984). The Conven-
tion was signed by the United States on April 18, 1988 and submitted to the Senate by
President Reagan on May 20, 1988. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting
the Convention Against Torture and Other Treatment or Punishment, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 642-643 (May 20, 1988) [hereinafter the President's Transmittal].
Following a public hearing, and extensive consultations with the Executive Branch as
well as interested groups in the private sector, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported favorably on the Convention. See Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Hearing Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Committee
Hearing]; Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. ExEc. REp. No. 30, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30]. The Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification on October 27, 1990. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-92
(daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). The United States will not deposit its instrument of ratifica-
tion until after the Congress has adopted necessary implementing legislation. See Ap-
pendix A to SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30.
5. See, e.g., the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF/82/15 Rev. 1, adopted by
consensus Dec. 19, 1988, reprinted in 28 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 493 (1989). The
United States instrument of ratification was deposited with the U.N. on Feb. 20, 1990.
See generally Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DEN. J.
INT'L L. AND PoL'y 387 (1990).
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fication of which took some forty years),6 Some of the reasons for this
longstanding reticence were re-examined during the Senate's considera-
tion of the Torture Convention and are reflected, to a greater or lesser
extent, in the package of provisos on which the Senate conditioned its
advice and consent.7
This article briefly reviews the most important provisions of the
Torture Convention and examines the various reservations, declarations
and understandings contained in the Senate's resolution of advice and
consent." The conditions that the United States intends to impose on its
6. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
done at Paris, Dec. 9, 1948, - U.S.T. ...... , T.I.A.S. . , 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(1951), was initially submitted to the Senate in 1949 and received advice and consent
only in 1986. See 132 CONG. Ruc. S1355-1381 (daily ed., Feb. 19, 1986), and the
Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat.
3045 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§1091-1093). The United States is also party to
several earlier multilateral human rights treaties concerning slavery, the political rights
of women, and refugees. Five human rights treaties submitted to the Senate during the
Carter Administration remain pending. See generally Lillich, The United States Con-
stitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 53 (1990).
7. The Senate had before it an initial package of reservations, declarations and
understandings proposed by the Reagan Administration when it submitted the Conven-
tion for advice and consent. See Summary and Analysis of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, contained
in the President's Transmittal, supra note 4, at 1-18. The Reagan proposals were criti-
cized on a number of grounds, and in consequence a revised package was formulated
by the Bush Administration, which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accepted
with some modifications. See Committee Hearing, supra note 4; SENATE ExEc. REP.
No. 30, supra note 4, at Appendix A. Only minor modifications were made on the floor
by the full Senate. See 136 CONG. REc. S17486 et seq. (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). For
a critique of the Bush Administration proposals, see The Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 42 THE REc. OF
THE ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK 235 (1987).
8. The "package" finally adopted by the Senate includes two reservations, five
understandings, two declarations and a "proviso". See 136 CONG. REc. S17486-92
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). For present purposes, only the final versions of these condi-
tions, as contained in the resolution of advice and consent to ratification (which is ap-
pended to this Article), are discussed.
As a matter of international law, a reservation is required when a state party pur-
ports to exclude or modify the substantive legal effect of an international agreement in
its application to that state. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, Art 2 § 1(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; RESTATEMENT (TinuR) OF THE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF TM UNITED STATES §313 (1986)("A state may enter a reservation to
a multilateral international agreement . . ."). It is the substantive effect of a proviso,
not its label, which is controlling. In United States practice, a reservation is distin-
quished from a statement of understanding, which is binding domestically but not in-
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adherence to the Convention illustrate some of the current limitations
of the international system in establishing effective criminal sanctions
on a global basis. These conditions also demonstrate the problems of
reception or incorporation which international criminal law can en-
counter at the domestic level.
I. BACKGROUND
The prohibition against torture is hardly a new development in in-
ternational law. Indeed, it has been recognized so often and so widely
that most scholars and practitioners consider it a principle of custom-
ary international law binding on all states.9 Persistent non-compliance
with the prohibition, however, led the United Nations General Assem-
bly to adopt, in 1975, a comprehensive Declaration defining and elabo-
rating the substantive prohibition."0 Subsequently, in 1977, the General
Assembly called upon the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to draft
a multilateral convention incorporating the principles set forth in the
Declaration." The Commission completed its work in 1984, and the
General Assembly adopted the Convention by consensus on Human
ternationally. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §314. The terms "declaration" and "proviso" encompass conditions
which may be legally or politically relevant or important but which do not modify
substantive legal obligations under either domestic or international law.
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §702; Ackerman, Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment in International Law, 11 VAND. J. OF INT'L L. 653 (1978). The prohibition
is found, inter alia, in art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); art.
7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Dec. 19, 1966;
art. 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms (1950); art. 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969);
and art. 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981). Torture is
also prohibited by the humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts (see the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protections of victims of war, including the Addi-
tional Protocols of 1977). Even the U.S. Senate considered the Convention to represent
a codification of customary international law. See SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30 supra
note 4, at 3. Within the European human rights system, several cases have examined
the issue of which acts constitute torture. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur.
H.R.R. 25 (ser. A) (1978); Greek Case, 12 Y.B.Eur.Conv.Hum.Rts. (1969); cf. Tyrer
v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R.R. 1 (ser. A)(1978).
10. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
30/3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
'11. U.N. Res. 32/62 (Dec. 8, 1977).
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Rights Day, December 10, 1984. It entered into force on June 26,
1987; as of the end of 1990, a total of 52 states had become Party
through ratification or accession, and 21 others (including the United
States) had signed but not yet ratified the Convention.
The significance of the Torture Convention lies less in its restate-
ment of the well-established prohibition against torture than in its crea-
tion of interlocking law enforcement obligations among States Party to
take steps to bring alleged offenders to justice. The Convention can be
considered, in this respect, primarily as a law enforcement rather than
human rights treaty- although it also contains important preventive
and remedial provisions. Its principal application by States Party will
presumably be through prosecutions and other governmental law en-
forcement measures as opposed to invocation as a cause of action in
civil suits. Most of the problems it posed with respect to U.S. ratifica-
tion turned on the manner in which the Convention affected law en-
forcement interests.
II. PROVISIONS
The central provisions of the Convention require each State Party:
1) to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction; 2) to
ensure that such acts-including attempts and complicity - are crimi-
nal offenses under its domestic law; and 3) to cooperate with all other
States Party to ensure that alleged torturers will be criminally prose-
cuted, by relying on so-called "universal jurisdiction" and the duty to
extradite or prosecute alleged torturers.
The Convention defines torture to include any act by which severe
mental or physical pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted upon a
person by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiesence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.12 States
12. Art. 1(1) states:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimina-
tion of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the insti-
gation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
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Party are obliged both to prevent all acts meeting that definition and to
make them. a crime under their domestic laws punishable by appropri-
ately severe penalties.1" Each State Party must establish jurisdiction
over offenses committed in any territory under its jurisdiction (and on
board its registered ships or aircraft) or by its nationals, and may, if
that State considers it appropriate, do so with respect to acts of torture
against its nationals wherever those offenses occur.14
Torture is made an extraditable offense in all existing and future
extradition treaties between States Party, and each State Party is
obliged, under the aut dedere aut judicare principle, to submit the case
for prosecution if it does not extradite an alleged offender found within
its jurisdiction, regardless of where the offense was committed, who
committed the offense, or the individual against whom the offense was
committed.15 States Party must also provide each other with the great-
est measure of assistance in connection with such proceedings.1 6
In an effort to prevent as well as punish torture, the Convention
requires States Party to take various educational and remedial steps to
strengthen their domestic legal regimes, including providing the means
for compensation and rehabilitation of victims.17 Notably, Article 16
calls upon each State Party to undertake to prevent "other forms of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment not amounting
to torture" as that term is defined in the Convention, inte, alia through
many of the same educational and remedial measures. Finally, borrow-
ing from other human rights treaties, the Convention establishes a
13. Art. 2(1), 4(1) and (2). Attempts to commit torture, as well as complicity
and participation, must also be prohibited. The Convention does not require enactment
of a specific offense of torture corresponding to the definition in art. 1, only that all acts
falling within that definition must be criminal offenses under domestic law. It does
specifically provide, however, that neither exceptional circumstances, such as a state of
war or political instability, nor an order from a superior, may be invoked as a justifica-
tion of torture. Art. 2(2) and (3). These latter provisions are strongly suggestive that
the Convention was intended to apply in times of war as well as pe.ce. Interestingly,
the Convention does not make torture a crime under international law or even specify
that it is "an international criminal activity," as is the case, for example, with respect
to illicit narcotics trafficking under the new U.N. Convention.
14. Art. 5(1).
15. Art. 7 and 8. Art. 5(2) provides the so-called "universal jurisdiction" to sub-
mit the case for prosecution, whether or not any of the other grounds of jurisdiction
exist, when an alleged offender is present in a State Party and that State does not
extradite him to a State having jurisdiction under Art. 5(1).
16. Art. 9.
17. Art. 10-14.
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Committee Against Torture to monitor and enforce compliance with its
provisions, on the basis of reports from States Party, its own inquiries,
and consideration of complaints that other States Party or individuals
submit.'
III. CONDITIONS TO RATIFICATION
A. Definition of Torture
A central purpose of the Convention is to establish, as a matter of
treaty obligation, a standard, uniform definition of torture to be applied
by each State Party as a matter of its domestic criminal law.' 9 It does
so not by describing the particular acts or practices which are pro-
scribed but rather by articulating the criteria to be applied in determin-
ing whether a given act amounts to torture as opposed to a lesser form
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.20 Thus, ac-
cording to Article 1, "torture" includes any act by which severe mental
or physical pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted for purposes of
punishment, coercion, intimidation or discrimination, by or at the insti-
gation or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity, excluding lawful sanctions.21
By stressing the extreme nature of torture, by requiring both spe-
cific intent and specified motives, and by limiting the context to one
involving improper use of governmental authority, this definition de-
scribes a relatively limited set of circumstances likely to be illegal
under most, if not all, domestic legal systems. Without question, any
such act would be criminal under existing federal or state law in the
United States. Precisely because the Convention contemplates criminal
prosecutions, however, there was concern within the Executive Branch
to ensure that the treaty definition satisfied United States Constitu-
tional standards of clarity and precision. This was particularly true
with respect to the inclusion of mental pain and suffering, which was
critical to ensure that the Convention's protections extended to the psy-
chological effects of such methods as mock executions, sensory depriva-
tion, use of drugs, and confinement to psychiatric hospitals, but which
some thought fell short of constitutionally required precision.2
18. Arts. 17-24.
19. See SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30, supra, note 4, at 13.
20. See id.
21. Art. 1(1), supra note 12.
22. Committee Hearing, supra note 4, at 17.
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Accordingly, U.S. ratification will be conditioned on an under-
standing that, to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, and that mental
pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or result-
ing from one of four specified circumstances:
-the intentional or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering;
-the actual or threatened administration or application of mind
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt pro-
foundly the senses or the personality;
-the threat of imminent death; or
-the threat that any person will be subjected to any of the
foregoing.2"
For similar reasons of clarity and specificity, United. States adher-
ence will be conditioned on several related understandings relevant to
the definition of torture. In particular, it will be noted that the term
"acquiescence," as used in Article 1, requires that the public official,
prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activ-
ity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to
prevent such activity; 24 the definition of torture is intended to apply
only to acts directed against persons in the offender's custody or physi-
cal control;25 and, noncompliance with applicable legal procedural stan-
dards-for example, a failure to provide a Miranda warning which
might result in the inadmissibility of a subsequent staterent under the
exclusionary rule-does not per se constitute torture.26
23. SENATE EXEc. REP. No. 30, supra note 4, at 17.
24. See also the Appendix to this article, infra p. - at II(l)(d) [hereinafter
Appendix].
25. See Appendix at II(1)(b). This is consistent with the intent of the Conven-
tion to protect the rights of individuals subjected to any form of detention or imprison-
ment: "The history of the Declaration and the Convention make it clear that the vic-
tims must be understood to be persons who are deprived of their liberty or who are at
least under the factual power or control of the person inflicting the pain or suffering."
J.H. BURGERS AND H. DANELIUS, supra note 1, at 120-121. Thus the use of armed
force for military or police purposes would not by itself constitute torture.
26. See Appendix at II(1)(e). Art. 15 provides that statements which have been
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, "except
against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made."
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B. Lawful Sanctions Exception
The negotiators of the Convention agreed that the proper applica-
tion of penal sanctions by the State does not constitute torture. Accord-
ingly, the final sentence of Article 1 (1) states that the definition does
not include "pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or inciden-
tal to lawful sanctions." They were unable, however, further to define
the content of this exception or to agree on whether the lawfulness of
the sanctions in question should be determined by reference to domestic
or international law. 27 Because the exception clearly contemplates sanc-
tions which are, at the least, considered lawful under the relevant do-
mestic law, it was considered necessary to supplement the treaty defini-
tion by specifying that the exception means, for the U.S., actions that
United States law authorizes. However, it was also recognized that per-
mitting the "lawfulness" of sanctions to be assessed solely by reference
to domestic law could create a loophole in the definition by which the
exception could swallow the rule.
Accordingly, United States ratification will include an understand-
ing to the effect that "sanctions" includes judicially-imposed sanctions
and other enforcement actions authorized by United States law or by
judicial interpretation of such law, while at the same time expressly
noting that a State Party to the Convention could not, through its do-
mestic sanctions, defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to
prohibit torture.28 Thus, a sanction which amounted to torture could
not be justified merely on the grounds that it was authorized by domes-
tic law.
C. Non-Refoulement
An important protection to potential victims of torture is contained
in Article 3, which provides that no State Party shall expel, return
("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where substantial
grounds exist for believing that he or she would be in danger of being
subjected to torture. The Convention does not, however, specify what
constitutes "substantial grounds," leaving that issue to domestic law
27. The original draft text of the Convention limited the exception to sanctions
consistent with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted by the First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders (1955), approved by ECOSOC Res. 663C(XXIV) (1957). See J.H.
BURGERS AND H. DANELiUs, supra n. 1, at 121.
28. See Appendix at II(1)(c).
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and requiring only that in making the determination, the competent
authorities take into account all relevant circumstances including,
where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.29 A ques-
tion to be resolved, therefore, was the standard to be applied under
United States law for determining "substantial grounds."
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, an individual may not normally
be expelled or returned from the United States if his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of "race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion .... "1 The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted this mandatory "with-
holding of deportation" provision to apply when the threat of persecu-
tion is more likely than not."l By comparison, the Court has applied a
somewhat less rigorous burden of proof in the context of eligibility for
a discretionary grant of asylum, requiring only a "well-founded fear of
persecution" in order to meet the statutory standard. 2
In light of these statutory interpretations by the Court, and be-
cause adherence to the Convention would require (rather than permit)
non-refoulement, the former, more stringent standard was considered
the appropriate referent as a matter of domestic law. Accordingly, the
Senate adopted an understanding interpreting the non-refoulement pro-
vision in Article 3 to mean "if it is more likely than not" that the indi-
vidual in question would be tortured.3
D. Private Remedies for Victims
Article 14 provides that each State Party must accord the victim
of torture both a legal right to redress and an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation "including the means for as full rehabilita-
29. See Appendix, 11(2).
30. Pub. L. No. 96-212, §203(e), 94 Stat.102, [codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)
(1980)]. This provision implemented the non-refoulement obligatior of Art. 33 § 1 of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, which the United States undertook when it became party to the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577.
31. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984)(interpreting § 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1989).
32. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (interpreting § 208 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1989)).
33. See Appendix at 11(2).
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tion as possible." In the event of the victim's death as a result of tor-
ture, his (or her) dependents are entitled to compensation.
As finally agreed by the negotiators, this provision was expressly
limited to acts of torture committed in any territory under the State
Party's jurisdiction. 4 Inexplicably, this limitation was evidently deleted
by mistake in the final document, although the negotiating history sup-
ports the restrictive reading. Accordingly, the United States will clarify
its view of the issue by conditioning ratification on an understanding
interpreting Article 14 to require a State Party to provide a private
right of action for damages only for acts of torture committed in terri-
tory under the jurisdiction of that State Party. 5
In rejecting extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over acts of torture,
the Convention reflects a narrower view than some courts have been
prepared to adopt with respect to existing United States law. Under the
Alien Tort Claim Act of 1790,36 United States District Courts are
given jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens "for a tort only, commit-
ted against the law of nations." Several cases have found this statute to
apply, at least in principle, to alleged acts of torture committed entirely
outside U.S. jurisdiction by non-U.S. persons; in one, actual as well as
punitive damages were in fact awarded against a former Paraguayan
official alleged to have tortured the plaintiff's brother to death in
Paraguay. 7
Recent efforts to codify the extraterritorial reach of the civil juris-
diction of United States courts over acts of torture, through adoption of
the proposed Torture Victims Protection Act, have been opposed by the
Executive Branch as inconsistent with the approach that the Torture
Convention has taken, and as legally unwarranted and potentially prob-
34. See Appendix at H(3).
35. See id.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
37. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980), on remand 577 F.
Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp.
542 (D.D.C. 1981), affid 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1003
(1985); Rodriquez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), afid
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). See generally RESTATEMENT (TmiRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § § 702 and 703 ("A state violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones:
... (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.")("An
individual victim of a violation of a human rights agreement may pursue any remedy
provided by that agreement or by other applicable international agreements."). For a
recent case holding nonjusticiable claims based inter alia on extraterritorial torture, see
Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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lematic in practice. 8 The proposed Act would effectively open U.S.
courts to cases having no nexus whatsoever to the United States, essen-
tially providing the civil analogue to "universal jurisdiction" in the in-
ternational criminal field. Absent a treaty providing for such jurisdic-
tion, there would seem to be little justification for such overreaching.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Some commentators have perceived several issues that the Con-
vention presented as creating potentially difficult problems concerning
the relationship between a treaty - which according to Article VI of
the Constitution is the law of the land - and the Constitution itself.
A. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
As indicated above, Article 16 obligates States Party to undertake
to prevent-but not to prohibit or criminalize-other acts of cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment not amounting to torture
as defined in Article 1, "when such acts are committed by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiesence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity." In particular, the same
steps must be taken in this regard under Articles 10-13 as are required
with respect to torture itself: training of law enforcement personnel;
review of interrogation techniques and detention rules and practices;
investigation of violations by State authorities; and ensuring the right
to bring a complaint for investigation.
Arguably, the scope of Article 16 exceeds existing United States
law. Certainly, the phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" as interpreted in other contexts-9 varies from the closely
analogous prohibitions under various amendments to the United States
Constitution. Because it is unclear how the Convention's. terms will be
38. This was the position taken by the Departments of State and Justice at the
June 22, 1990 hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (no published transcript) concerning two bills intro-
duced in the 1st session of the 101st Congress, namely, H.R. 1662 (introduced April 4,
1989 by Congressman Gus Yatron (D. PA.) and others) and S.1629 (introduced Sept.
14, 1989 by Senator Arlen Spector (R. PA.)).
39. See, e.g., X v. Federal Republic of Germany, (No. 61594/74) 11 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 16 (1977). Corporal punishment, for example, is lawful under the
United States Constitution, unlawful under the analogous provisions of the European
Convention.
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interpreted, it was considered necessary to condition United States rati-
fication of the Convention on a formal reservation to the effect that the
United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16
only insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the fifth, eighth and/or fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution.40
B. Death Penalty
As noted at the hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on the Torture Convention, the death penalty does not violate
international law nor does international law require the abolition of the
death penalty.41 Many, perhaps even most, countries in the world today
provide for capital punishment for some offenses under their domestic
laws, and none of the major international human rights instruments
prohibits the death penalty.
The Torture Convention itself does not address the death penalty.
Nonetheless, some concern was expressed that its ratification could,
notwithstanding the "lawful sanctions" exception, provide an additional
legal basis on which to oppose the imposition of capital punishment in
U.S. courts. In part, this concern was motivated by the recent decision
of the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. United King-
dom,42 which held that extradition of a West German national from
the United Kingdom to the United States to stand trial on capital mur-
der charges, for which the penalty could be execution, would violate the
European Convention's prohibition against "cruel and inhumane pun-
40. See Appendix at I(1). Initially a proposed understanding addressed this po-
tential conflict, but since the intended legal effect was in fact to restrict, rather than
simply to interpret, the legal obligation which the United States was prepared to accept
under Article 16, a formal reservation was considered more appropriate. See SENATE
ExEc. REP. No. 30, supra note 4, at Appendix A.
41. Committee Hearing, supra note 4, at 10-11 (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Department of State). Various international conventions - for
example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - do
contain provisions limiting application of the death penalty, and some, such as the 6th
Optional Protocol to the European Convention, prohibit its use entirely. These obliga-
tions apply only to states that have affirmatively accepted them through ratification or
accession.
42. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4 (ser. A) (1989), reprinted
in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
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ishment." Interestingly, that decision did not turn on a finding that ap-
plication of the death penalty itself would violate the European Con-
vention, much less international law. Rather, the Court held that,
because the United States legal system permitted extensive appeals in
capital cases, the accused, if convicted, would face the prospect of
spending many years on death row, never knowing whether his sentence
would be carried out, overturned or commuted.43 Given his youth at the
time of the crime, the Court considered this "death row syndrome"
prospectively violative of the accused's human rights."
The Administration proposed - and the Senate endorsed - an
understanding reflecting its view that international law does not pro-
hibit the death penalty in order to allay any doubt about the position of
the United States in respect of the capital punishment issue. In addi-
tion, to clarify the United States' position on the application of the
death penalty in international law, the Senate consented to the ratifica-
tion of the Convention on the condition that the Convention neither
restricts nor prohibits the United States from applying the death pen-
alty consistent with the protections of the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution, including any constitu-
tional period of confinement prior to the imposition of the death
penalty. 5
C. The "'Sovereignty" Proviso
When the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the
Genocide Convention, it did so subject to the following reservation,
which was included in the United States instrument of ratification:
That nothing in the [Genocide] Convention requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of America prohib-
ited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the
United States.4
This reservation reflected the view, shared by those who believe
that Senator Bricker was historically and legally correct in proposing
43. Id. at 44-45.
44. Id.
45. See Appendix at HI(4).
46. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RjLATIONS ON THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION, S. EXEC. REP. No. 2 at 19 (1985); 132 CONG. REc. S1377
(daily ed., Feb. 19, 1986).
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his amendment to the Constitution,47 that an explicit statement of the
primacy of the Constitution over an arguably or possibly inconsistent
treaty is necessary to avoid any possibility that ratification of the sus-
pect treaty could in some fashion bind the United States to take actions
that the Constitution prohibited.
When consideration was given to the Torture Convention, neither
the Administration nor a majority of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee shared this view. As indicated in the Committee's report,
the Convention does not textually and could not, as a matter of domes-
tic law, require the United States to take any legislative or other ac-
tions that the Constitution prohibited .4  In Reid v. Covert49 the Su-
preme Court stated that it had "regularly and uniformly recognized the
supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty." This principle is ac-
knowledged as definitive.50 Even if an inconsistency did exist between
the Constitution and the Convention, a constitutional reservation by the
Senate would thus add nothing in the way of constitutional protec-
tion.5 1 Such a reservation could, however, raise questions among other
States Party to the Convention as to the extent of United States obliga-
47. For a useful recent account of the debate, see D. TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER
A ENDNMENT CONTROvERSY: A TEST OF EIsENHoWmR's POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
As initially proposed, the so-called Bricker amendment, S.J. Res. 102, 82nd Cong. 1st
Sess., 197 CONG. REc. 11344 (1951), would have repealed the second paragraph of
Article VI of the Constitution and precluded, inter alia, treaties respecting or abridging
rights and freedoms of United States citizens recognized by the United States Consti-
tution. Subsequent versions, including the one finally voted on and defeated, provided
that a provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with the
Constitution shall not be of any force and effect. The "sovereignty" reservation to the
Genocide Convention is a variant on this theme.
48. SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30, supra note 4, at 4.
49. 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
50. See, e.g., RESTATE MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 302(2): "No provision of an [international] agreement may contra-
vene any of the prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution applicable to the exercise
of authority by the United States;" see also id. at Comment (b): "The view, once held,
that treaties are not subject to constitutional restraints is now definitively rejected.
Treaties and other international agreements are subject to the prohibitions of the Bill
of Rights and other restraints on federal power. .. ."
51. However, such a reservation could be unsettling at the international level,
since it could.raise questions as to the exact nature of the treaty obligations undertaken
by the United States pursuant to the Convention. For other States Parties unfamiliar
with the United States Constitution and its interpretation by United States courts, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to assess the precise effect of the "proviso" or
"reservation" on the legal undertakings of the United States under the Convention.
1991]
121
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
tions under the Convention and, much more damaging, lead others to
invoke their own Constitutions to limit compliance with the Conven-
tion's central provisions, including the prohibition against torture and
the obligation to extradite or prosecute torturers.5
Nonetheless, when the Convention reached the floor of the Senate,
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina expressed continued concern
over the necessity of clarifying and preserving the supremacy of the
Constitution over any inconsistent treaty provision. He stressed, how-
ever, in particular, the importance of doing so with respect to "interna-
tional criminal law treaties" under which the United States accepts an
obligation to conform its domestic law to international standards, be-
cause of the potential harm that could be done to the safeguards guar-
anteed in the Bill of Rights.5" For this reason, he noted, i:he Senate had
attached so-called "sovereignty" reservations not only to the Genocide
Convention, but also to subsequently considered Mutual Legal Assis-
tance Treaties ("MLAT's") and to the Vienna Illicit Trafficking Con-
vention, eight times in all.5
Others - for example, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan - con-
sidered the "sovereignty" reservation to have been a raistake, noting
that it could be read as a matter of international law to render uncer-
tain the extent of obligations that the United States had undertaken
pursuant to the Convention. 5 Unlike a narrowly drawn reservation to a
specific article or clearly identified undertaking, the "sovereignty" res-
ervation broadly purports to condition every provision of the treaty on
the entire corpus of evolving United States constitutional jurisprudence.
Not only are other nations then left to question the meaning and reach
of United States adherence to the Convention, but some, could also be
drawn to attempt to condition their undertakings on their own domestic
constitutional law. Such a development would clearly undermine the
uniformity and universality which lie at the heart of a multilateral ap-
proach to the elimination of torture.5
52. See, e.g., SENATE EXEC. REP. 30, supra note 4, at 5.
53. See 136 CONG. REc. S17487-89 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
54. 136 CONG. REC. S17489 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
55. Indeed, some twelve countries have made just such an objection to the com-
parable condition imposed on U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention, and others
have indicated their intention to oppose a similar reservation if taken with respect to
the Torture Convention. Four of the six states involved with recent MLAT's have ex-
pressed strong concerns and/or take reciprocal reservations. See SENATE ExEc. REP.
No. 30, supra note 4, at 4-5.
56. See 136 CONG. REc. S17489-90 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
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To avoid these pitfalls, while at the same time recognizing the pri-
macy of the Constitution as a matter of domestic law, the Senate
agreed to include in its resolution of advice and consent a statement -
which is neither a reservation nor an understanding to the Convention,
and which need not be included in the instrument of ratification - that
"[t]he President of the United States shall not deposit the instrument
of ratification until such time as he has notified all present and prospec-
tive ratifying party to this Convention that nothing in this Convention
requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by
the United States."5
D. Federal-State Provision
Many provisions of the Convention impose obligations that neces-
sarily implicate State and local governments in addition to the Federal
government. For example, the central undertakings to criminalize tor-
ture and to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture apply throughout the territory
under the jurisdiction of each State Party58 and thus apply at the State
and local levels.59 With respect to a few provisions requiring specific
prophylactic and preventive measures, the question arose over the ex-
tent of the Federal government's undertaking to ensure that State and
57. See Appendix at IV; 136 CONG. REc. S17488 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). In
proposing this formula, Senator Clairborne Pell (D. R.I.), Chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, noted in particular that because it is not a reservation, other
countries cannot invoke it on a reciprocal basis to limit or eliminate their obligations to
comply with the Convention, and the President can comply with the proviso simply by
notifying all countries of the U.S. position.
58. Art. 2 and 4.
59. As indicated in the Reagan Administration transmittal, any act of torture in
the United States, including acts constituting attempts or conspiracy to torture, would
unquestionably violate criminal statutes under existing state and/or federal law. When
such acts are subject to state jurisdiction, the offense would likely be a common crime,
such as assault or murder. In some circumstances, the nature of the activity or the
persons involved could also give rise to a federal offense, such as interstate kidnapping
or hostage-taking under such statutes as 18 U.S.C. § § 1,12, 114, 115, 878, 1201 and
1203. Acts subject to federal jurisdiction would violate statutory provisions against as-
sault, maiming, murder, manslaughter, attempt to commit murder or manslaughter,
and rape. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § § 113, 114, 1111, 1112, 1113 and 2241-2245 (1988).
In addition, federal law defines two "constitutional crimes" under 18 U.S.C. § § 241
and 242 that would likely be relevant to any situation covered by the Convention.
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local governments comply. In particular, attention was focused on Arti-
cles 10-14, which require States Party to:
-ensure that education and information regarding the prohi-
bition against torture are fully included in the training of persons
involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of persons ar-
rested, detained or imprisoned;60
-keep under systematic review its interrogation rules, instruc-
tions, methods and practices for the custody and treatment of per-
sons arrested, detained or imprisoned;61
---conduct prompt and impartial investigations of allegations
of acts of torture within their territories;62
-provide individuals the right to bring complaints of torture
and to have such cases promptly and impartially examined;63 and
to
-provide victims of torture with enforceable rights of redress,
compensation and rehabilitation.
6 4
Under Article 16, States Party assume similar obligations with respect
to the prevention of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment not amounting to torture, except that the Convention does not
require provision of rights of redress or compensation.
In view of the division of authority between Federal, State and
local governments in the United States, and considering the largely de-
centralized distribution of police and related authorities at all levels, it
was considered necessary to clarify, primarily for the benefit of the in-
ternational community, that the Convention would not be implemented
solely by the Federal government or by Federal law. This clarification
was particularly necessary in respect to those preventive measures
which would in the first instance fall to State and local governments.
The object is not to limit or modify United States obligations under the
Convention but rather to indicate that implementation of those obliga-
tions will necessarily take place with respect to the Federal system.
6 5
60. Art. 10(1). This provision covers law enforcement personnel (civil and mili-
tary), medical personnel, public officials and others.
61. Art. 11.
62. Art. 12.
63. Art. 13. States are also obliged to take steps to ensure that the complainant
and witnesses are protected against all in-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of
the complaint or any evidence given.
64. Art. 14.
65. The provision is thus to be distinguished from a traditional "federal-state
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For this purpose, the United States instrument of ratification will in-
clude the statement, characterized as an understanding, that "this Con-
vention shall be implemented by the United States to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over matters covered by
the Convention and otherwise by the State and local governments. Ac-
cordingly, in implementing Articles 10-14 and 16, the United States
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to
the end that the competent authorities of the constituent units of the
United States of America may take appropriate measures for the ful-
fillment of the Convention."66
V. NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATY
Although the Convention, subject to the aforementioned provisos,
is deemed consistent with United States law (or, stated otherwise,
United States law is considered already to satisfy the substantive re-
quirements of the Convention), it was considered nonetheless preferable
to leave technical implementation of the Convention to the domestic
legislative and judicial processes. Accordingly, the Senate declared that
the provisions of Articles 1 through 16 are "non-self-executing," by
which it is meant they do not establish rights enforceable in United
clause" having the object of releasing a central government from international obliga-
tions which would require action beyond its power. See generally RESTATEMENT
(TmRD) OF nm FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THm UNITED STATES § 302, Reporters'
Note 4 ("A 'federal-state clause' is likely to render a federal state's commitment under
an international agreement less onerous than that of unitary states. Such clauses are
therefore more likely to be acceptable in multilateral agreements reflecting common
purposes than in those containing reciprocal exchanges.") The issue is not whether such
a provision is required, for example under the tenth amendment to the Constitution,
but whether a statement for the record is advisable.
66. See Appendix at 11(5). This issue was initially addressed in a proposed reser-
vation to the Convention, which suggested to some that the United States was in fact
not accepting an international legal obligation to implement the Convention to the ex-
tent that it required action beyond the existing scope of Federal legislative and judicial
jurisdiction. A reservation may have seemed appropriate to those who anticipated that
the Convention could or would be used by the Federal government to expand its legisla-
tive and judicial jurisdiction into areas now primarily or exclusively the province of
State and local authorities. Since neither was the case - the United States intends to
implement the Convention fully and consistently with the Federal system - the reser-
vation was rewritten and recast as an understanding by the Senate, and the amended
version was introduced on the Senate floor. See 136 CONG. REc. S17486 (daily ed.,
Oct. 27, 1990). An interesting, and one assumes hypothetical, issue concerns the re-
fusal of state or local authorities to comply with Convention obligations.
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States courts unless and until Congress has approved implementing leg-
islation.67 This provision concerns only the domestic effect of the Con-
vention and does not limit or alter the extent of the United State's
international obligations thereunder.
VI. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE
To monitor and supervise compliance with its provisions, the Con-
vention establishes an international Committee Against Torture, con-
sisting of ten experts in the human rights field.68 States Party are
obliged to submit to the Committee, within one year after ratification
or accession and every four years thereafter, reports on the measures
they have taken to give effect to the Convention; the Committee consid-
ers and comments upon these reports at its semiannual meetings.8 9 In
addition, the Committee has competence: (1) to investigate reports of
the use of torture by States Party when it receives "reliable informa-
tion which appears. . .to contain well-founded indications that torture
is being systematically practiced in the territory of a State Party;"70
(2) to consider complaints by one State Party that another is not fulfil-
ling its obligations under the Convention, where both States have rec-
67. See Appendix at III(1). For the distinction between "self-executing" and
"non-self-executing" treaties and agreements, see generally RESTATE;MENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111. Given the language of
the Convention, for example requiring each State Party to criminalize acts of torture
and to take "effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures" to pre-
vent such acts, there is little room to argue that the Convention was intended to. be self-
executing. Since United States law, at both the federal and state levels, seems to be
fully in compliance with the Convention, it may only be necessary to establish federal
jurisdiction over offenses committed by United States nationals outside the United
States, and over foreign offenders committing torture abroad who are later found in a
territory under United States jurisdiction, under Art. V(l) and (2) respectively.
68. Art. 17. The experts are required to be persons of "high moral standing and
recognized competence;" while nominated and elected by States Parties, they serve in
their individual capacities, not as representatives of governments. Creation of such
oversight bodies is common in contemporary multilateral treaty practice where there
are no existing international structures to perform the function; for example, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights established a similar body, the Human
Rights Committee, while the Vienna Illicit Trafficking Convention conferred supervi-
sory responsibilities on two standing UN bodies, the International Narcotics Control
Board and the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 403.
69. Art. 19(1), (3), and (4). See generally Report of the Committee Against
Torture, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 44), U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990).
70. Art. 20(1).
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ognized the Committee's competence to do so;1 and (3) to consider
complaints by or on behalf of individuals claiming to be victims of a
violation of the Convention by a State Party if that State Party has
recognized the Committee's competence to do so. 72
In addition to submitting the required periodic reports to the Com-
mittee, the United States will recognize and accept the Committee's
competence to investigate any reliable reports it may receive indicating
a systematic practice of torture in the United States, and to consider
complaints other States Party have lodged concerning alleged violations
of the Convention by the United States - if the opposing State Party
has made a reciprocal declaration.73 Because of this reciprocity, ac-
cepting the possibility of State-to-State complaints will permit the
United States to participate actively in the Committee's work by focus-
ing attention where it may be most warranted. Since the Committee's
authority to investigate reliable reports of a systematic practice of tor-
ture is accepted unless specifically declined, the United States' instru-
ment of ratification need only include a declaration recognizing the
competence of the Committee to receive State-to-State complaints
under Art. 21 on the basis of reciprocity.74
By contrast, the United States will not, at least at this point, ac-
cept the competence of the Committee to consider individual com-
plaints of treaty violations. Under Art. 22, such complaints are admis-
sible only after the individual has exhausted all available domestic
remedies - except when the application of the remedies is unreasona-
bly prolonged or unlikely to be effective. Given the extensive protec-
tions of the United States legal system, it is highly unlikely that any
complaint of torture by United States authorities not already resolved
under United States law would be substantively meritorious. The
71. Art. 21(1).
72. Art. 22(1).
73. See Appendix at 111(2).
74. Id. In submitting the Convention to the Senate, the Reagan Administration
had indicated its intent to "opt out" of the Committee's work by making a reservation,
pursuant to Article 28, that the United States did not recognize the competence of the
Committee under Article 20 to investigate charges of a systematic practice of torture in
the United States and by declining to make the declarations -necessary to accept the
Committee's other competencies under Articles 21 and 22. See President's Transmittal,
supra note 4, at (iii). The Bush Administration determined, after its review of the
"package," to drop the proposed reservation under Article 28 and to accept the Com-
mittee's competence over State-to-State claims. See SENATE ExEc. R P. No. 30, supra
note 4, at Appendix A.
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amount of time and otherwise scarce governmental resources poten-
tially required to respond to specious complaints outweighs any benefit
accorded by "opting in" to the individual complaint mechanism. De-
clining to accept the Committee's jurisdiction in this regard will not
prevent the United States from participating actively and effectively in
the Committee's work.
VII. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
A final reservation, concerning an issue of public international law,
will be made to the dispute settlement provisions of Article 30(1),
which requires States Party to adhere to a two-step process with regard
to dispute resolution. The process requires States Party to first submit
any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application
of the Convention to arbitration and then, if within six months the ar-
bitration has not been organized, to refer the matter to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. In
keeping with recent U.S. policy regard the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, and as specifically permitted by the "opt out" provision con-
tained in Article 30(2), the reservation will state that the United States
does not consider itself bound by Article 30(1) but reserves the right
specifically to agree to follow this or any other procedure for arbitra-
tion in a particular case.75
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States has been from the outset a strong supporter of
the Torture Convention. The Executive Branch participated actively in
its negotiation, with the endorsement and encouragement of the Con-
gress, and the Senate in giving its advice and consent to ratification
viewed United States ratification as demonstrating a clear national pol-
icy of unequivocal opposition to torture as well as a major step forward
in the international community's efforts to eliminate the practice."6
The various provisos upon which advice and consent was condi-
tioned were intended both to clarify points of possible confusion and to
resolve any potential conflicts between the Convention and United
States law. No proviso significantly or substantially modifies the com-
mitment of the United States to carry out its obligations under the
75. See Appendix at 1(2).
76. See SENATE EXEC. REP. No. 30, supra note 4, at 3.
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Convention. Some may contend that a few of these conditions are
overly technical, unnecessary or unduly limiting, and would in any
event have been more appropriately included in the Senate's record of
consideration or in domestic implementing legislation, rather than for-
mally placed in the international record as reservations, declarations or
understandings. Nonetheless, each addresses an actual or perceived dif-
ficulty of implementation or interpretation. Taken together, they reflect
the seriousness with which the United States approaches its interna-
tional undertakings, particularly when they affect the rights and obliga-
tions of individuals within its jurisdiction. A close study of the reasons
underlying the provisos may in fact help pave the way for future ratifi-
cation of other human rights and international criminal law treaties.
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APPENDIX
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
in Executive Session
October 27, 1990
RESOLVED, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted by unanimous agreement of the
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1984, and signed
by the United States on April 18, 1988,
Provided that:
I. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
reservations:
(1) That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation
under Article 16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment," only insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" means the cruel, unusual and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
(2) That pursuant to Article 30(2) the United States declares that
it does not consider itself bound by Article 30(1), but reserves the right
specifically to agree to follow this or any other procedure for arbitra-
tion in a particular case.
II. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following un-
derstandings, which shall apply to the obligations of the United States
under this Convention:
(1) (a) That with reference to Article 1, the United States under-
stands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that
mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application,
or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances
or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that
another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe pain or
suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering sub-
stances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or personality.
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(b) That the United States understands that the definition of tor-
ture in Article 1 is intended to apply only to acts directed against per-
sons in the offender's custody or physical control.
(c) That with reference to Article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that "sanctions" includes judicially-imposed sanc-
tions and other enforcement actions authorized by United States law or
by judicial interpretation of such law. Nonetheless, the United States
understands that a State Party could not through its domestic sanctions
defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture.
(d) That with reference to Article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that the term "acquiescence" requires that the pub-
lic official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of
such activity and thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene
to prevent such activity.
(e) That with reference to Article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that noncompliance with applicable legal proce-
dural standards does not per se constitute torture.
(2) That the United States understands the phrase, "where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture," as .used in Article 3 of the Convention, to
mean "if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured."
(3) That it is the understanding of the United States that Article
14 requires a State Party to provide a private right of action for dam-
ages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdic-
tion of that State Party.
(4) That the United States understands that international law does
not prohibit the death penalty, and does not consider this Convention to
restrict or prohibit the United States from applying the death penalty
consistent with the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States, including any constitutional pe-
riod of confinement prior to the imposition of the death penalty.
(5) That the United States understands that this Convention shall
be implemented by the United States Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered
by the Convention and otherwise by the state and local governments.
Accordingly, in implementing Articles 10-14 and 16, the United States
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to
the end that the competent authorities of the constituent units of the
United States of America may take appropriate measures for the ful-
fillment of the Convention.
III. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
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declarations:
(1) That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles
1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-executing.
(2) That the United States declares, pursuant to Article 21, para-
graph 1, of the Convention, that it recognizes the competence of the
Committee against Torture to receive and consider commtunications to
the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the Convention. It is the understanding
of the United States that, pursuant to the above mentioned article,
such communications shall be accepted and processed only if they come
from a State Party which has made a similar declaration.
IV. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
proviso, which shall not be included in the instrument of ratification to
be deposited by the President:
The President of the United States shall not deposit the instru-
ment of ratification until such time as he has notified all present and
prospective ratifying parties to this Convention that nothing in this
Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States as interpreted by the United States.
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Crime: The UN Agenda on International Cooperation
in the Criminal Process
Roger S. Clark*
This article focuses on a package of model treaties on international
criminal cooperation that were approved at the Seventh and Eighth
United Nations Congresses on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, in 1985 and 1990.1 These models represent an at-
tempt to capture the state of the art in international cooperative prac-
tice. The model treaties in question are: Model Agreement on the
Transfer of Foreign Prisoners,2 Model Treaty on Extradition, 3 Model
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,4 Model Treaty on
the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters,5 Model Treaty on the
Transfer of Supervision of Offenders Conditionally Sentenced or Con-
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden, New Jersey;
Member, United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control (1986-1990);
B.A., LL.M. (Victoria U. of Wellington, New Zealand), LL.M., J.S.D. (Columbia).
This article is based on a paper delivered by Professor Clark at the Ninth Common-
wealth Law Conference, Auckland, New Zealand, Apr. 17-20, 1990. The author is
currently engaged in a broader study of the work of the United Nations in the criminal
justice area with the aid of an Andrei Sakharov Fellowship from the Jacob Blaustein
Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights.
1. The United Nations Congresses, held by the United Nations every five years
beginning in 1955, bring together specialists in penal law and administration, both gov-
ernmental and non-governmental, from most countries of the world to share common
experiences and to formulate standards. The tradition of holding Congresses of this
nature goes back to the 1870s. See generally B. ALPER & J. BOREN, CRIME: INTERNA-
TiONAL AGENDA (1972); L. RADZINOWICZ, International Collaboration in Criminal
Science in THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 467 (L. Radzinowicz & J.
Turner eds. 1945); Clark, The Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders, 1 CRiM. L.F. 513 (1990).
2. Report of the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders,U.N.Doc.A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 at 53 (1986) [here-
inafter Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement].
3. Report of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28 (1990) at 71 [hereinaf-
ter Model Extradition Treaty].
4. Id. at 82 [hereinafter Model Mutual Assistance Treaty].
5. Id. at 96 [hereinafter Model Transfer of Proceedings Treaty].
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ditionally Released," and Model Treaty for the Prevention of Crimes
that Infringe on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the Form of Mova-
ble Property.7
I shall endeavor both to analyze the documents themselves and to
place them in legal and historical context.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE MODELS
In the simpler world of the nineteenth century, most of the impe-
tus for encouraging transnational cooperation in criminal matters was
generated by fleeing thieves and murderers. The basic response was the
development of a network of bilateral extradition treaties which pro-
vided the means for the return of fugitives to justice.8 Few countries
were ever entirely systematic in their pattern of treaties and there were
always relatively safe havens left in the cracks. Many former colonial
territories, moreover - including some developed ones like my own,
New Zealand - never got around after independence to negotiating
more than a handful of their own treaties. For the most part, they have
relied on treaty succession to the treaties of the former metropolitan
power. If my unscientific examination of the literature is any guide, the
most interesting issue in extradition for decades was the political of-
fender exception, a dash of human rights in an otherwise law and order
structure, normally written into at least those treaties between states
with a Western European political tradition.'
Along with the invention of the multilateral treaty in the nine-
teenth century, however, came a gradual realization that there were
some societal ills that were of international concern and should be dealt
with in part by the criminal law on a transnational and multilateral
6. Id. at 103 [hereinafter Model Transfer of Supervision Treaty].
7. Id. at 110 [hereinafter Model Cultural Heritage Treaty].
8. Within the British Empire, rendition of the likes of thievs and murderers
between parts of that entity was facilitated by Imperial legislation. The modern Com-
monwealth has its successor to that in the "Scheme" initiated in 19615 and amended in
1983 and 1986. The basic approach of the Scheme (which is not a treaty) is the adop-
tion by most members of the Commonwealth of what amounts to parallel legislation
permitting return of fugitives under circumstances where extradition would be appro-
priate between two non-Commonwealth countries or between a Commonwealth country
and a non-Commonwealth country. See Commonwealth Scheme for the Rendition of
Fugitive Offenders, as amended in, 16 COMMONWEALTH LAW BULL. 1036 (1990). The
actual workings of the scheme are similar to a network of bilateral treaties.
9. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION 72 (1980).
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basis. 10 Early examples were the slave trade,"- the trade in women and
children,' 2 trade in obscene publications,13 forgery of currency 4 and
trade in illicit drugs.1 5 These have continued to be of some moment,
but they were joined - as the twentieth century progressed and the
United Nations came into existence - by perhaps more politically
charged items such as genocide, 16 war crimes,17 apartheid,18 and vari-
ous terrorist offenses (like aircraft hijacking,' attacks on diplomats,20
the taking of hostages21 and torture22).
10. For a comprehensive list of multilateral criminal law treaties, see M. BAS-
sIouNI, A DRAFt INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 355 (1987) (published in this Symposium).
11. See, e.g., Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade,
Feb. 8, 1815, 2 Martens Nouveau Recueil de Traites 432; Slavery Convention, Sept.
25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
12. See, e.g., International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic, Mar. 18, 1904, 1 L.N.T.S. 83; International Convention for the Suppression of
the Traffic in Women and Children, opened for signature Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S.
415; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of
the Prostitution of Others, May 4, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
13. See, e.g., Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Pub-
lications, May 4, 1910, 7 Martens Nouveau Recueil de Traites (ser.3) 266; Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene
Publications, Sept. 12, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 169.
14. See International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Cur-
rency, Apr. 20, 1929, 112 L.N.T.S. 371.
15. See, e.g., International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187;
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151; United Na-
tions Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988).
16. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 260 (III)A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
17. Geneva Conventions of 1949.
18. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N.
Doec. A/9030 (1973).
19. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 133 (1971); Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1151 (1971).
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment'of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, G.A. Res. 3166 (XXVIII), 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doec. A/9030 (1973).
21. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146,
34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
Clark
135
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
Each of such activities became the subject of international efforts
at control, centered on one or more multilateral treaties which typically
require parties to the treaty to criminalize the activity and make an
effort to prosecute - or to extradite to someone else who will prosecute
- those who engage in it. The current fuel encouraging international
cooperation is thus abhorrence of the egregious violator of basic rights,
the terrorist, the drug cartel and organized crime in general. These ar-
eas are not, however, in all respects different from traditional crime
and there is, in fact, much cross-fertilization going on. More coopera-
tion in dealing with traditional problems is worth some effort too. In
the long run, cooperation in fighting traditional crime may be of more
practical note than attempts to deal with the obviously 'trendy topics.
In any event, the multilateral treaties commonly proceed with
some fairly standard variations within the arsenal of international coop-
eration. 23 Some of them try to facilitate extradition by adding the of-
fense in question to the list of extraditable offenses contained in ex-
isting bilateral treaties, or by providing that the multilateral treaty
itself may be regarded as sufficient basis for extradition, even in the
absence of another treaty. Making such an offense "ext:raditable" still
leaves the political offender issue up in the air. In some cases, such as
the Genocide24 and Apartheid25 Conventions, the treaty simply denies
that political offender status may ever attach to the person charged
with a treaty offense. In other cases, such as the Hijacking and Of-
fenses Against Aircraft Conventions, a state may take the position that
the accused is a political offender, but must nonetheless bring the case
before its prosecutorial authorities with a view to bringing the accused
to trial.2 6
The regional European Convention for the Suppression of Terror-
ism217 assimilates some of the broader multilateral terrorism treaties
with the Genocide and Apartheid models as between the parties to the
22. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
23. I have expanded upon this in Clark, Offenses of International Concern Mul-
tilateral State Treaty Practice in the Forty Years Since Nurembf'rg, 57 NoRwic J.
INT'L L. 49 (1988).
24. Convention on Genocide, supra note 16, at art. VII.
25. Convention on Apartheid, supra note 18, at art. XI.
26. See Clark, supra note 23, at 66-67.
27. Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, Europ. T.S. No.
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regional convention. It provides that for the purpose of extradition be-
tween its contracting states an offense within the scope of the Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 2 and
an offense within the scope of the Montreal Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation29 shall
not be regarded as a political offense or as an offense inspired by politi-
cal motives.3 0
Such treaties respond to the absence of an international penal tri-
bunal by treating nation states as the agents by necessity of the inter-
national system. They thus encourage the exercise of jurisdiction on
theoretical bases which have always seemed a little esoteric to the com-
mon law mind - such as the nationality of the accused, the nationality
of the victim (so-called "passive personality" jurisdiction) and universal
jurisdiction.3 1
Rather plainly, though, the multilateral treaties have not ad-
dressed all of the relevant problems of international cooperation. What
is more, they rely for their efficacy on the network of bilateral relations
already mentioned, since they in effect incorporate those relationships
by reference. This has led to efforts both to modernize the bilaterals3 2
(not only as to extradition but also as to areas of cooperation beyond
that) and to encourage states that do not have a serious network of
bilaterals to enter into negotiations with others. This is indeed the role
of the models adopted in 1985 and 1990. It has been taken as a given
that a massive global treaty tying together all the loose ends is simply
not about to happen. Thus, painstaking work must be done by individ-
ual countries to put the pieces together mostly on a bilateral basis,33
28. Convention on Aircraft, supra note 19.
29. Convention on Aviation, supra note 19.
30. Convention on Terrorism, supra note 27, at art. 1 (which also denies political
offense status to various acts constituting offenses against internationally protected per-
sons, kidnapping and the taking of hostages and various acts involving a danger to the
public).
31. Clark, supra note 23, at 85-86.
32. On the strategy of United States' modernization efforts, see Nadelman, The
Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Criminal Law, 31
HARv. INT'L L.J. 37, 64 (1990).
33. Note the trenchant comment by Nadelman, supra note 32, at 65: "Multilat-
eral arrangements suffer from their tendency to settle on the lowest common denomina-
tor of cooperation. Bilateral treaties, on the other hand, afford the opportunity to push
the negotiating partner to include those provisions of greatest interest and advantage to
the United States." It is, of course, not only the United States that may seek such
advantages - mutual ones even! A very good discussion of the practical and cultural
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although some further regional developments might be expected. 4 For-
eign offices and justice departments, especially those in developing
countries and even small developed ones, simply do not have the re-
sources to re-invent the wheel each time they enter into negotiations.
Hence, it was deemed helpful to have some widely accepted models to
which to turn - a kind of international form book.
This enterprise represents a new departure for the United Nations.
The organization has had a great deal of experience with the drafting
of other kinds of "instruments" - multilateral treaties such as the
Covenants on Human Rights, 35 and resolutions of a softer legal nature
which contribute to the development of international custom, such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 6 and the Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.3" But the present docu-
ments are instruments of a different juridical nature. They represent a
benchmark to follow but anticipate that states will almost certainly
make some variations as they tailor-make the contents to their own
needs and legal structure.38
problems encountered by negotiators in the area, especially those dealing across differ-
ent legal systems is contained in Eser, Common Goals and Different Ways in Interna-
tional Criminal Law: Reflections from a European Perspective, 31 :-IARV. INT'L LJ
117 (1990).
34. Thus, the models are all drafted primarily in language that assumes the
treaty to be a bilateral one, but occasionally there are lapses where the language reads
more like that of a multilateral. Not much tidying up is required to utilize the models
in either mode.
35. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI)A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, id. at 52.
36. International Bill of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, 3(1) U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
37. ECOSOC Res. 663 (XXIV) C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.1) at 11, U.N.
Doc. E/3048 (1957).
38. On earlier efforts by the International Penal and Prison Commission (as it
then was) to develop a model extradition treaty, see Radzinowicz, supra note 1, at 478-
79 n.2. The technique of drafting model agreements to deal with developing areas of
the law is not unknown in domestic legal practice. For a recent example, see American
Bar Association, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchang,; - A Report and
Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAw. 1645 (1990). The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law is considering whether it might be possible to
produce a model electronic data interchange agreement with global possibilities in the
commercial community. Report of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/45/17 (1990). The
work in the United States of the Uniform Law Commissioners is alko analogous. See
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II. THE MODEL TREATIES
1. The Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners
The first of the model treaties was the lone one adopted in 1985,
the Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners. 9 Its ratio-
nales are stated rather succinctly in two preambular paragraphs of the
adopting resolution which has the Congress "[r]ecognizing the difficul-
ties of foreigners detained in prison establishments abroad owing to
such factors as differences in language, culture, customs and religion,"
and "[c]onsidering that the aim of social resettlement of offenders
could best be achieved by giving foreign prisoners the opportunity to
serve their sentence within their country of nationality or residence. '40
generally Leflar, Minimizing State Conflicts of Law, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1325 (1983);
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1979).
39. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2. The written legislative
history of this and the other model treaties is rather thin. The United Nations does not
make either verbatim or summary records of these planning sessions. At best there are
rapporteurial or secretariat accounts of the debates together with what can be gleaned
by considering successive drafts and any explanatory notes thereon. There is some use-
ful material in the Note by the Secretariat prepared for the Seventh Congress under
the title Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners and Recommendations
for the Treatment of Foreign Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 121/10 (1985). The first
U.S. treaties were those with Mexico and Canada in 1976 and 1977 respectively. See
Note, Criminal Law: Exchange of Prisoners, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 703 (1977). For
debate on the advisability and constitutionality of the exercise in the American context,
see Abramovsky & Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of
Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 IowA L. REv. 275 (1979); Vagts, A Reply to 'A Critical
Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, id. at 325;
Stotzky & Swan, Due Process Methodology and Prisoner Exchange Treaties: Con-
fronting an Uncertain Calculus," 62 MiNN. L. Rnv. 733 (1978). Prisoner transfers
have been most developed in European practice. The first example was apparently the
Convention Regarding the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Criminal
Matters, Mar. 8, 1948, Denmark-Norway-Sweden, 27 U.N.T.S. 117. See also Euro-
pean Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, May 28, 1970,
Europ. T.S. No. 70; DeSchutter, International Criminal Cooperation - the Benelux
Example, in 2 A TanATIsE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL LAW 249 (M. Bassiouni &
V. Nanda eds. 1973).
40. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, Preamble (paras. 2-3).
This is the idealistic rationale for such treaties, and sometimes the real explanation. Cf.
the following, concerning the first two transfer treaties negotiated by the United States:
The Canadian treaty appears genuinely intended to aid prisoner rehabilita-
tion, parolee supervision, and law enforcement cooperation between the
two countries. The Mexican treaty, however, is principally a response to
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The model treaty itself begins with a set of "general principles."
The desirability of fostering "social resettlement" is again stressed.41 A
transfer should be effected on the basis of mutual respect for national
sovereignty and jurisdiction.42 There must be double criminality: a
transfer should be effected in cases where the offense giving rise to con-
viction is punishable by deprivation of liberty by the judicial authority
of both the "sending" (or "sentencing") state and the state to which
the transfer is to be effected (the "administering state") according to
their national laws.43 A transfer may be requested either by the sen-
tencing or the administering state. The prisoner, as well as close rela-
tives, may express to either state an interest in the transfer. To that
end, the states in question must inform the prisoner of their competent
authorities.44 A transfer shall be dependent on the agreement of both
the sentencing and the administering state, and shall also be based on
the consent of the prisoner.45 The prisoner must be fully informed of
the possibility and of the legal consequences of the transfer, in particu-
lar whether or not he or she might be prosecuted for other offenses
committed before the transfer.46 Moreover, the administering state
should be given the opportunity to verify the free consent of the pris-
,oner.47 In cases where the prisoner is incapable of making a free deter-
both popular and congressional concern with allegations that Americans in
Mexican jails were subject to intolerable living conditions, acts of brutal-
ity, and extortion by prison officials and fellow prisoners.
Stotzky & Swan, supra note 39, at 736.
41. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 1.
42. Id. at para. 2.
43. Id. at para. 3.
44. Id. at para. 4.
45. Id. at para. 5. As the Secretary-General explains in his Note, id. at paras. 4-
5:
[T]he requirement that prisoners must consent to the transfer ensures that
transfers are not used as a method of expelling prisoners, or as a means of
disguised extradition. Moreover, since prison conditions vary considerably
from country to country, and the prisoner may have very personal reasons
for not wishing to be transferred, it seems preferable to base the proposed
model agreement on the consent requirement.
The issue has been joined on whether "consent" is "freely" given or refused when it
takes place in the face of intolerable prison conditions. See Abramovsky & Eagle,
supra note 39; Vagts, supra note 39; Stotzky & Swan, supra note 39; Abramovsky, A
Critical Evaluation of the American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Policy, Wisc. L.
Rnv., Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 25.
46. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 6.
47. Id. at para. 7.
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mination, that person's legal representative is competent to consent to
the transfer.48
As a general rule, at the time of the request for a transfer the
prisoner must still have to serve at least six months of the sentence;
however, a transfer should also be granted in cases of indeterminate
sentences. 9 One provision is in the pious hope category: The decision
whether to transfer a prisoner shall be taken without delay.50 The
model treaty also contains a double jeopardy provision. A person trans-
ferred may not be tried again in the administering state for the same
act on which the sentence to be executed is based.51
There follow a number of what the model describes as "procedural
regulations." A rather basic proposition is that a transfer shall in no
case lead to an aggravation of the situation of the prisoner.5 2 The ex-
tent to which the prisoner may be better off (aside from the benefit of
returning to his or her own country) is complex. When the transfer
occurs, the authorities of the administering state must (a) continue the
enforcement of the sentence immediately or through a court or admin-
istrative order; or (b) convert the sentence, thereby substituting for the
sanction imposed in the sentencing state a sanction prescribed by the
law of the administering state for a corresponding offense.5 In the case
of continuing enforcement, the administering state is bound by the le-
gal nature and duration of the sentence as determined by the sentenc-
ing state. However, if this sentence is by its nature or duration incom-
patible with the law of the administering state, this state may adapt the
sanction to the punishment or measure prescribed by its own law for a
corresponding offense.5
In the case of conversion of sentence, the administering state shall
be entitled to adapt the sanction as to its nature or duration according
to its national law, taking into due consideration the sentence passed in
48. Id. at para. 9.
49. Id. at para. 11.
50. Id. at para. 12.
51. Id. at para. 13. Principles of double jeopardy are quite undeveloped at the
international level. This and other models represent tentative efforts to move in the
direction of exploring the matter further. For some tentative efforts to raise the issue,
see International Law Commission, Fifth Report on the Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (1987), at 5-6,
12 (Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur).
52. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 19.
53. Id. at para. 14.
54. Id. at para. 15.
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the sentencing state. However, a sanction involving the deprivation of
liberty shall not be converted to a pecuniary sanction.55 The adminis-
tering state is bound by the findings as to the facts in so far as they
appear from the judgement imposed in the sentencing state. Thus, the
sentencing state has the sole competence for a review of the sentence.5 6
The period of deprivation of liberty already served by the sentenced
person in either state shall be fully deducted from the final sentence.57
A final "procedural regulation" deals with costs. Any costs in-
curred because of a transfer and related to transportation shall be
borne by the administering state, unless otherwise decided by both the
sentencing and administering states.58 Two brief paragraphs deal with
what is described as "enforcement and pardon." One asserts that the
enforcement of the sentence shall be governed by the law of the ad-
ministering state.59 The other confirms that both the sentencing and the
administering state shall be competent to grant pardon and amnesty.6"
As adopted by the Seventh Congress, the model was accompanied
by a set of nine recommendations of an essentially human rights and
humanitarian nature on the treatment of foreign prisoners.6' These rec-
ommendations insist that foreign prisoners must be treated in a non-
discriminatory fashion. They must also be informed without delay of
their right to request contacts with their consular authorities, as well as
of any other relevant information regarding their status. Contacts of
foreign prisoners with families and community agencies should be facil-
itated, by providing the necessary opportunities for visits and corre-
spondence, with the consent of the prisoner. Humanitarian interna-
tional organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, should be given the opportunity to assist foreign prisoners. The
recommendations were formulated taking into account that among the
foremost measures for alleviating the problems of foreign prisoners -
including those whose transfer cannot be effected - is the provision of
55. Id. at para. 16.
56. Id. at para. 17. Few states are likely to agree to treaties that permit the
administering state's courts to review the original decision on the merits. See generally
Vagts, supra note 39.
57. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 18.
58. Id. at para. 20. Presumably other costs - notably the cost of imprisonment in
the administering state - lie where they fall.
59. Id. at para. 21.
60. Id. at para. 22.
61. Report of the Seventh United Nations Congress, supra note 2 at 57, Annex
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information and contacts, including information in their own
languages. 2
2. The Model Treaty on Extradition
The Model Treaty on Extradition" follows a fairly standard mod-
em format, based to a substantial degree as a drafting matter on recent
Australian extradition treaties." The parties would agree to extradite
to each other, upon request and subject to the terms of the treaty, a
person who is wanted in the requesting state for prosecution for an ex-
traditable offense or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in
respect of such an offense. 5 Extraditable offenses are defined, as is now
usual, not by a list of specific offenses, but by severity of penalty:
[E]xtraditable offences are offences that are punishable under the
laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other deprivation of lib-
erty for a maximum period of at least [one/two] year(s), or by a
more severe penalty. Where the request for extradition relates to a
person who is wanted for the enforcement of a sentence of impris-
onment or other deprivation of liberty imposed for such an offence,
extradition shall be granted only if a period of at least [four/six]
months of such sentence remains to be served. 8
(The bracketed numbers reflect some disagreement about the appropri-
ate parameters). The model contains both mandatory and optional
grounds for refusing extradition.
Extradition will be refused if the offense for which extradition is
requested is regarded by the requested state as an offense of a political
62. U.N. Doc, supra note 39 at 8 (Note by the Secretariat).
63. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3.
64. Australia has in recent years been unusually aggressive in tidying up its in-
ventory of extradition treaties. It has brought new treaties into force with Argentina,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Iceland, Ire-
land, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain
and Sweden. As of April 3, 1990, further treaties were awaiting ratification with Ecua-
dor, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Monaco, the Philippines,
Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela. Letter from Herman F. Woltring (Attorney
General's Department, Canberra, A.C.T., Australia) to Roger S. Clark (Apr. 18,
1990); see also Woltring, Extradition Law, 61 VICTORIAN L. INST. J. 919 (1987).
65. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 1.
66. Id. at art. 2, para. 1.
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nature.17 However, a bracketed variation on this is included which
provides:
Reference to an offence of a political nature shall not include any
offence in respect of which the Parties have assumed an obligation,
pursuant to any multilateral convention, to take prosecutorial ac-
tion where they do not extradite, nor any other offence agreed by
the Parties not to be an offence of a political character for the pur-
poses of extradition. 68
The effect of the first part of this variant is functionally the same as the
approach taken in the European Convention on the Suppression of Ter-
rorism.69 Essentially, the parties would agree that the extradite-or-
prosecute obligation in treaties such as the Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages70 or the aircraft conventions 71 would be treated as
an absolute obligation between those parties to extradite. The latter
part of the bracketed material is probably redundant. It confirms the
obligation of parties to the Genocide and Apartheid Conventions 72 not
to treat the offenses contained therein as political.7
Extradition will also be refused if the requested state has substan-
tial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account
of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opin-
ions, sex or status, or that the person's position may be prejudiced for
any of those reasons. 4 Similarly, it will be refused if the person whose
extradition is requested has been or could be subjected in the request-
67. Id. at art. 3(a).
68. Id.
69. Convention on Terrorism, supra note 27.
70. International Convention, supra note 21.
71. Convention on Aircraft, supra note 19.
72. Genocide, supra note 16; Apartheid, supra note 18.
73. Modern practice in the international crime area seeks, as has been noted
above, to deal with the "safe haven" problem in two over-lapping ways. Sometimes it
encourages prosecution through extradition by denying political offender status to ac-
tivities such as some varieties of terrorism; sometimes it permits a denial of extradition
on a ground such as political offender status, but nonetheless compels prosecution in
the state denying extradition. The nod in the model treaty goes towards extradition
rather than prosecution.
74. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 3 (b). Language to this effect
first appeared in the 1976 European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism,
supra note 27. There is perhaps something of a trend in multilateral practice for such a
provision to replace the political offender exception as the latter is whittled away.
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ing state to torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, or if that person has not received or would not receive the
minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, as contained in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.7 5 Extradition will also
be refused if the offense for which extradition is requested is an offense
under military law, which is not also an offense under ordinary crimi-
nal law; 70 if there has been a final judgment rendered against the per-
son in the requested state in respect of the offense for which extradition
is requested;7 7 or if the person whose extradition is sought has, under
the law of either party, become immune from prosecution or punish-
ment for any reason, including lapse of time or amnesty.78
Finally, extradition will be refused if the judgment of the request-
ing state has been rendered in absentia, the convicted person has not
had sufficient notice of the trial nor the opportunity to arrange his or
her defense, and has not had or will not have the opportunity to have
the case retried in his or her presence. 9
A footnote on grounds for refusal coyly adds what is probably the
nub of the matter for some: "Some countries may wish to add. . . the
following ground for refusal: 'If there is insufficient proof, according to
the evidentiary standards of the Requested State, that the person whose
extradition is requested is a party to the offence.' "80 There are two
significant issues raised here: whether there should be a proof threshold
at all and whether the requested state should defer to the evidentiary
rules of the requesting state. Both are controversial and raise awkward
questions about the extent to which one legal system should trust the
quality of decision-making in the legal system of a treaty partner.
Extradition may be refused if the person whose extradition is re-
75. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 3(0.
76. Id. at art. 3(c).
77. Id. at art. 3(d).
78. Id. at art. 3(e).
79. Id. at art. 3(g).
80. Id. at art. 5 n. 61. Cf. The Commonwealth debate about deleting the prima
facie case requirement from the Commonwealth Scheme; see, e.g., Commonwealth
Secretariat, Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers, Zimbabwe, Jul. 26 - Aug. 1,
1986, Secretariat Doc.LMM (86) 5 (Memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretariat
and the Government of Australia); see also Woltring, supra note 64, at 920; Kennedy,
Stein & Rubin, The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 5, 17-
18 (1990); Gilmore, International Action Against Drug Trafficking: Trends in United
Kingdom Law and Practice, 24 INT'L LAW. 365, 371-72 (1990).
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quested is a national of the requested state.81 In the past it has been the
case that, where extradition is refused on the basis of the accused's
nationality, a prosecution may proceed in the country of nationality,
pursuant to domestic legislation, but until recently it was uncommon
for treaties to make this obligatory. The present model, however, does
just that. It provides that where extradition is refused on the ground of
nationality, the requested state shall, if the requesting state so requests,
submit the case to its competent authorities with a view to taking ap-
propriate action against the person.82
Extradition may be refused in a number of cases other than na-
tionality, including those ne bis in idem cases where the competent au-
thorities of the requested state have decided not to institute or to termi-
nate proceedings against the person for the offense in respect of which
extradition is requested,83 and where a prosecution in respect of the
offense for which extradition is requested is pending in the requested
state.8 Again, it may be refused if the offense carries the death penalty
81. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4(a). A recent commentator
notes:
Most civil law countries, as well as some common law countries, regard the
nonextradition of their citizens as an important principle deeply ingrained
in their legal traditions. They justify the principle on various grounds, in-
cluding the state's obligation to protect its citizens, lack of confidence in
the fairness of foreign judicial proceedings, the many disadvantages a de-
fendant confronts in trying to defend himself in a foreign state before a
strange legal system, as well as the additional disadvantages posed by im-
prisonment in a foreign jail where family and friends may be distant and
the chances of rehabilitation are significantly diminished.
Nadelman, supra note 32, at 67.
82. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4(a). Functionally, this provi-
sion in the model extradition treaty would work the same way as a request for the
transfer of proceedings to the state of nationality. See discussion of the Model Treaty
on Transfer of Proceedings, infra note 108. There is no magic to a provision requiring
this type of vicarious administration of justice in the face of lethargy by the other
treaty party. Note, for example, the discussion by Nadelman, supra note 32, at 70, of
relatively unsuccessful efforts by United States authorities to galvanize Mexican prose-
cutors into action. (Art. 9 of the Mexico-U.S. treaty has a mild prcsecution require-
ment. Where a national is not extradited "the requested Party shall submit the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that'Party has juris-
diction over the offense." Extradition Laws and Treaties, United States, No. 590.19, at
art. 9(2) (I. Kavass & A. Sprudzs comp. 1979). As a civil law country, Mexico is more
likely than the United States to have nationality-based legislation in place in a particu-
lar instance, but may not necessarily use it.
83. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4(b).
84. Id. at art. 4(c).
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under the law of the requesting state, unless that state gives such assur-
ance as the requested state considers sufficient that the death penalty
will not be imposed, or, if imposed, will not be carried out.8 5
The model contains standard machinery provisions8 and re-asserts
the "rule of specialty" under which a person surrendered under the
treaty shall not be proceeded against, sentenced, detained, re-extradited
to a third state, or subjected to any other restriction of liberty in the
territory of the requesting state for any offense committed before sur-
render, other than an offense for which extradition was granted, or any
other offense as to which the requested state consents.87
Finally, the model reiterates the current "non-solution" to the
problem of how to deal with concurrent requests from different coun-
tries for the same person, by providing that in such a situation a party
"shall, at its discretion, determine to which of those states the person is
to be extradited."881 The problem is becoming acute in the area of ter-
rorism, where multiple bases for jurisdiction may be asserted in respect
of the same incident but no clear priority is assigned. The problem also
may arise in situations where the accused is wanted in more than one
place for different offenses. General international law provides no guid-
ance about priorities in such cases and merely forces states to negotiate
in each instance. The draft recognizes this approach, with an acknowl-
edgement that the state having possession of the accused is in the ulti-
mate position of calling the shots if no agreement can be reached. 9
85. Id. at art. 4(d). A footnote adds that some countries may wish to apply the
same restriction to the imposition of a life, or indeterminate sentence - an interesting
commentary on evolving contemporary attitudes towards modes of punishment.
86. See id. at art. 5 on channels of communication and required documents; art.
7 on certification and authentication; art. 9 on provisional arrest; art. 11 on surrender
of the person; and art. 13 on surrender of property found in the requested state that has
been acquired as a result of the offense or that may be required as evidence.
87. Id. at art. 14.
88. Id. at art. 16.
89. Some attention was given to this problem at the Eighth United Nations Con-
gress in the context of the struggle against terrorism, although the only recommenda-
tion that emerged was that "U]urisdictional priorities should be established giving ter-
ritoriality the first priority." Report of the Eighth United Nations Congress, supra note
3, at 190, para. 7 (Resolution on terrorist criminal activities). The Commonwealth
Scheme, supra note 8, para. 13, provides some help in some cases (it seems more help
in cases of requests for different offenses arising out of distinct events rather than re-
quests in respect of the same incident). It requires the requested state to consider all
the circumstances, including (a) the relative seriousness of the offences, (b) the relative
dates on which the requests were made, and (c) the citizenship or other national status
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3. The Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters
The Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 0
has benefitted, like the model extradition treaty, from a great amount
of work done by the Australians who have been actively engaged in
negotiating such treaties.91 It also has some similarities to the Scheme
Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Com-
monwealth, first adopted in 1986.92 The basic aim of the model treaty
of the fugitive and his ordinary residence. The recent Australian treaties echo this lan-
guage. See, e.g., art. 9 of the treaty with the Netherlands in Aust. Stat. Rules 1988,
No. 293. Simply granting priority to the territorial state does not catch the full range
of considerations in respect of multiple extradition requests relating to the same inci-
dent, either in respect of international crimes or in respect of ordinary crimes. As a
commentary on the transfer of criminal proceedings noted:
The assumption that it is normally most appropriate to prosecute an of-
fence where it has been committed is not justified. Rehabilitation of the
offender, which is increasingly given weight in modem penal law, requires
that the sanction be imposed and enforced where the reformative aim can
be most successfully pursued. That is normally in the State where the of-
fender has family or social ties or will take up residence after the enforce-
ment of the sanction. On the other hand, it is clear that difficulties in se-
curing evidence will often be a consideration militating against the
transmission of proceedings from the State where the offence has been
committed to another State ...
European Committee on Crime Problems, Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on
the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 15
(1970). Terrorism offenses may be different from other crimes because rehabilitation
considerations may not weigh heavily with ideological offenders.
90. Model Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 4.
91. By Apr. 3, 1990, Australia had recent Mutual Assistance treaties in force
with Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the U.S. and Vanuatu. Treaties were awaiting ratifi-
cation with Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom (the last limited to drug trafficking offenses). Letter
from Herman Woltring, supra note 64. On recent United States practice, see Ellis &
Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters," in II
INT'L CRIM. LAW (PROCEDURE) 151 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986); Nadelman, supra note
32, at 58. On the socialist countries' experience in the area, often as part of a larger
package of conventions "on legal co-operation in civil, family and criminal matters,"
see Gardocki, The Socialist System, in II INT'L CGlM. LAW (PROCEDURE), supra, at
133.
92. Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Within the
Commonwealth, as amended in, 16 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1043 (1990). See Mc-
Clean, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: The Commonwealth Initiative, 37
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 177 (1988).
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is that the parties shall afford each other the widest possible measure of
mutual assistance in investigations or court proceedings in respect of
offenses the punishment of which, at the time of the request for assis-
tance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities of the re-
questing state.93
The types of assistance may include:
(a) taking of evidence or statements from persons;
(b) assisting in the availability of detained persons or others to
give evidence or assist in investigations;
(c) effecting service of judicial documents;
(d) executing searches and seizures;
(e) examining objects and sites;
(f) providing information and evidentiary items; and
(g) providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents
and records, including bank, financial, corporate or business records. 4
Mutual assistance is a somewhat limited concept, but of great
practical importance. The draft underscores the limitations by indicat-
ing areas to which "assistance" does not extend, although such areas
may be covered by other treaty obligations. Notably, the treaty is not a
mode of extradition; it does not require the enforcement in the re-
quested state of criminal judgments imposed in the requesting state;95
it does not deal with the transfer of persons in custody to serve
sentences; nor does it deal with the transfer of proceedings in criminal
matters.9 A mutual assistance treaty, in short, is useful in conjunction
with other treaty relationships that deal with associated aspects of the
general problem of cooperation.
States are required to designate competent authorities to process
requests,9 7 and the form for requests and modes of dealing with them
are set out.98 Assistance may be refused where the requested state "is
of the opinion that the request, if granted, would prejudice its sover-
eignty, security, public order (ordre public) or other essential public
interests."9 9 Assistance may also be refused on political offender and
human rights grounds which largely track the grounds for refusal
93. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 1, para. 1.
94. Id. at art 1, para. 2.
95. Except as permitted by the law of the requested state and the optional proto-
col to the draft. See infra note 102.
96. Model Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 1, para. 3.
97. Id. at art. 3.
98. Id. at art. 5.
99. Id. at art. 4, para. l(a).
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under thie model extradition treaty."' 0
In one striking way, the model treaty differs from the Common-
wealth Scheme 0 1 on which in part it is based. The latter includes in its
standard list of modes of assistance "tracing, and forfeiting the pro-
ceeds of criminal activities," but nothing to this effect appears in the
United Nations model treaty itself. The matter is, however, singled out
for an "Optional Protocol to the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters Concerning the Proceeds of Crime.1 0 2 Parties to the
Protocol would agree that a requested state will endeavor to trace as-
sets, investigate financial dealings, and obtain other information or evi-
dence that may help secure the recovery of proceeds of crime.103 The
requested state must, to the extent permitted by its law, give effect to
or permit enforcement of a final order forfeiting or confiscating the pro-
ceeds of crime made by a court of the requesting state, or take other
appropriate action to secure the proceeds following a request.104
An explanatory note to the Protocol suggests that the Protocol is
included "on the ground that questions of forfeiture are conceptually
different from, although closely related to, matters generally accepted
as falling within the description of mutual assistance."10 5 It further
provides that states may wish to include such provisions because of
their significance in dealing with organized crime. Forfeiture seems to
be in vogue both in domestic law106 and in current bilateral 07 assis-
100. Id. at art. 4, paras. 1(b), (c); see also Model Extradition Treaty, supra note
63 and accompanying text.
101. Commonwealth, supra note 8.
102. Model Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 4. "Proceede; of crime" is de-
fined broadly as "any property suspected, or found by a court, to be property directly
or indirectly derived or realized as a result of the commission of an offence or to re-
present the value of property and other benefits derived from the commission of an
offence." Id. at para. 1.
103. Id., para. 3, at 95.
104. Id. at para. 5.
105. Optional Protocol, supra note 102 n. 90a.
106. See, e.g., Fisse, Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime: Funny Money, Serious
Legislation, 13 Cam. L.J. 368 (1989); Gilmore, supra note 80, at 399-90; McClean,
Seizing the Proceeds of Crime: The State of the Art, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 334
(1989).
107. As in some of the recent Australian treaties, see, e.g., Treaty Between Aus-
tralia and the Republic of the Philippines on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Apr, 28, 1988, art. 1, para. 3(e) and art. 18 (on file with the author); Treaty between
Australia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Oct. 28, 1988, art. 1, para. 2(h) and art. 18 (on file with the author). It also
appears in dramatic detail in one recent multilateral treaty, the December 1988 United
[Vol. 15492
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tance practice, so it is not surprising that some effort is made to deal
with it here.
4. The Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in Crimi-
nal Matters
The Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal
Matters08 proceeds on the basis that when a person is suspected of
having committed an offense under the law of a state which is party to
the treaty, that state may, if the interests of the proper administration
of justice so. require, request another state which is a party to take
proceedings in respect of the offense.' 0 9 For the purposes of the Treaty,
a request provides the requested state with the necessary jurisdiction in
respect of the offense if that state does not already have jurisdiction
under its own law. Indeed, the Treaty obligates the parties to take the
necessary legislative measures to ensure that a request to take proceed-
ings shall allow the requested state to exercise the necessary jurisdic-
tion."10 This kind of jurisdiction is referred to, particularly in European
usage, as "vicarious administration of justice.""' One suspects that the
most likely field of application for such a treaty is where an accused
has returned to his or her state of nationality and an extradition re-
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988). Article 5 of that Convention has fairly
strong provisions requiring legislative, judicial and administrative action to effect
confiscations.
108. Model Transfer of Proceedings Treaty, supra note 5. According to the Re-
port of the Experts who met in Baden in 1987 to work on the draft of this model:
The model agreement on transfer of proceedings ... could contribute to a
reduction of pre-trial detention and to the solution of problems of concur-
rent jurisdictions and plurality of proceedings which laid an additional
burden on national criminal justice systems and caused unnecessary hard-
ship for offenders. This model agreement might eventually lead to the re-
ciprocal formal acknowledgement of the validity of foreign criminal judge-
ments and, thus, may constitute significant progress towards the further
establishment of international recognition of the principle of double jeop-
ardy (ne bis in idem).
Report of the International Expert Meeting on United Nations and Law Enforcement,
Baden near Vienna, Nov. 16-19, 1987, at 63 (hereinafter Baden Report).
109. Model Transfer of Proceedings Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 1, para. 1.
110. Id. at art. 1, para. 2.
111. For a good introduction to theory and practice in the area, see Meyer, The
Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction, 31 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 108 (1990).
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quest is futile since that state does not extradite nationals. 12 It is not,
however, intended that the treaty should be limited to such cases and it
is also meant to encompass situations where the requested state would
not be in a position to effect the extradition of a national of a third
state. Selling this treaty to common law countries is somewhat difficult
since they do not usually exercise jurisdiction over what their nationals
do abroad, yet that idea is not altogether unprecedented. 11 3
As in the other models, the parties are to designate channels of
communication;11 4 certain documents are required;115 and various for-
malities are spelled out.110 Dual criminality is required.117 Various
grounds of refusal are given: l that the suspected person is not a na-
tional of or ordinarily resident in the requested state; that the act is an
offense under military law which is not also an offense under ordinary
criminal law; that the offense is in connection with taxes, duties, cus-
toms or exchange; that the offense is regarded by the requested state as
being of a political nature.
The suspected person is entitled to express to either state his or her
112. For a good discussion of the situations in which transfer treaties are useful
and on the genre in general, see Schutte, The European System, in II INT'L CRIM.
LAW (PROCEDURE), supra note 91, at 319. As was noted earlier in the discussion of
extradition, supra note 3 and accompanying text, there may be a case based on the
rehabilitation of the offender for trial and subsequent punishment in his or her country
of origin. If the states in question have an extradition treaty with the provision for the
prosecution of non-extraditable nationals discussed supra, then the present treaty
would be redundant in the particular cases suggested in the text but may be useful in
other instances. Moreover, transfer of custodial or non-custodial punishment to the
state of origin after conviction may serve the same ultimate purpose as transfer of
proceedings. Thus, the various forms of cooperation treaties discussed may often be
alternative routes to the same end.
113. Note, for example, New Zealand's exercise of jurisdiction over diplomats
who commit offenses abroad but who are immune from local jurisdiction at the place of
commission. Crimes Act (New Zealand) 1961, Section 8A, as substituted by Section
14 (1) of the External Relations Act 1988. A number of British Cormonwealth coun-
tries (anomalously) exercise jurisdiction over bigamy committed abroad by nationals
but not over more serious offenses such as murder. See, e.g., R. v. Lander, [1919]
N.Z.L.R. 305 (C.A.) (the "constitutionality" of such legislation, if not its wisdom, was
conceded by the 1930s).
114. Model Transfer of Proceedings Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 2.
115. Id. at art. 3.
116. Id. at arts. 3-5.
117. Id. at art. 6.
118. Id. at art 7.
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interest in the transfer of proceedings," 9 although the factors to be
taken into account in deciding whether to give effect to those views are
not articulated. Both states are required to ensure that the rights of the
victim, in particular the victim's right to restitution or compensation,
shall not be affected by the transfer.120 The suspect's right not to be
prosecuted twice is protected. 21 A framework for dealing with multiple
prosecution possibilities 22 is also suggested by language asserting that
where criminal proceedings are pending in two or more states against
the same suspected person in respect of the same offense, the states
concerned shall conduct consultations to decide which of them alone
should continue the proceedings. An agreement reached thereupon
shall have the consequences of a request for transfer of proceedings. 123
5. The Model Treaty on the Transfer of Supervision of Ofend-
ers Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released
The fourth of the 1990 models is the Model Treaty on the Trans-
fer of Supervision of Offenders Conditionally Sentenced or Condition-
ally Released. 24 It follows up from the 1985 model on persons sen-
tenced to imprisonment. It applies to a person who has been found
guilty and (a) placed on probation without sentence having been pro-
nounced, (b) given a suspended sentence involving deprivation of lib-
erty, or (c) given a sentence, the enforcement of which has been modi-
fied (parole) or conditionally suspended, in whole or in part, either at
the time of the sentence or subsequently. 25 The sentencing state may
request another party to the treaty ("the administering state") to take
responsibility for applying the terms of the decision.' 2 The rationale
for the scheme is, as in other instances, found in the preamble to the
119. Id. at art. 8.
120. Id. at art. 9.
121. Id. at axt. 10.
122. Id. at art 13.
123. Id.
124. Model Transfer of Supervision Treaty, supra note 6. According to the Ex-
perts who met in Baden in 1987 to work on the draft of this and other instruments, the
model "could contribute to a reduction in the numbers of persons required to serve
prison sentences and to the social resettlement of foreign offenders by avoiding impris-
onment through the increased application of supervision alternatives.", Baden Report,
supra note 108, at 63.
125. Model Transfer of Supervision Treaty, supra note 6, at art.1, para. 1.
126. Id. at art 1, para. 2.
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draft. It argues that such transfers should further the ends of justice,
encourage the use of alternatives to imprisonment, facilitate the social
resettlement of sentenced persons and further the interests of victims of
crime.127 The draft contains similar grounds for refusal to those con-
tained in the Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings.1 2 The sentenced
person is entitled to express his or her views on the transfer 129 and the
rights of the victim, especially to restitution or compensation, must not
be adversely affected as a result of the transfer.130
The acceptance by the administering state of the responsibility for
applying the sentence extinguishes the competence of the sentencing
state to enforce the sentence.13 1 The supervision is to be carried out in
accordance with the law of the administering state. That state alone
has the right of revocation. The administering state may, to the extent
necessary, adapt to its own law the conditions or measures prescribed,
provided that such conditions or measures are, in terms of their nature
or duration, not more severe than those pronounced in the sentencing
state.3 2 The sentencing state alone shall have the right to decide on
any application to reopen the case.133 Either party, however, may grant
pardon, amnesty or commutation of the sentence in accordance with
the provisions of its Constitution or other laws. 3
6. The Model Treaty for the Prevention of Crimes that In-
fringe on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the Form of
Movable Property
The last of the 1990 models is the Model Treaty :"or the Preven-
tion of Crimes that Infringe on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the
Form of Movable Property.3 5 "Movable cultural property" is defined
127. Id. at Preamble, para. 5.
128. Id. at art. 7.
129. Id. at art. 8.
130. Id. at art. 9.
131. Id. at art. 10.
132. Id. at art. 11, para. 1.
133. Id. at art. 12, para. 14
134. Id. at art. 12, para. 2.
135. Model Cultural Heritage Treaty, supra note 7. This model was the most
controversial of the drafts considered at the Eighth Congress. It had not received the
careful consideration of members of the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control
(the preparatory body for the Congress) that the other drafts had received. It was
revised by a drafting group of experts in Chicago in June of 1990 and the revised
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for the purposes of the treaty as referring to property which, on reli-
gious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by a state party as
being subject to export control by reason of its importance for archaeol-
ogy, prehistory, history, literature, art or science, and as belonging to
one or more of a lengthy list of categories. 138 Each state party
undertakes:
(a) To take the necessary measures to prohibit the import of mova-
ble cultural property (i) which has been stolen in the other State
Party or (ii) which has been illicitly exported from the other State
Party;
(b) To take the necessary measures to prohibit the acquisition of,
and dealing within its territory with, movable cultural property
which has been imported contrary to the prohibitions resulting
from the implementation of subparagraph (a) above;
(c) To legislate in order to prevent persons and institutions within
its territory from entering into international conspiracies with re-
spect to movable cultural property;
(d) To provide information concerning its stolen movable cultural
property to an international data base agreed upon between the
States Parties; 37
(e) To take the measures necessary to ensure that the purchaser of
stolen movable property which is listed on the international data
base is not considered to be a purchaser who has acquired such
property in good faith;
(f) To introduce a system whereby the export of movable cultural
property is authorized by the issue of an export certificate;
(g) To take the measures necessary to ensure that a purchaser of
imported movable cultural property which is not accompanied by
version did not become available until the Congress in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/L.2
dated 28 August 1990. Consequently some delegates would have preferred to put more
work into it, for reasons of professional pride. The subject-matter is, moreover, of con-
siderable political significance, especially between developed countries with large collec-
tions of precious objects from elsewhere and developing countries which would like
them back. As a model, it is, of course, not cast in stone.
136. Id. at art. 1, para. 1. The list includes rare collections and specimens of
fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of paleontological interest; products of
archaeological excavations or discoveries; pictures, paintings and drawings; and rare
manuscripts and incunabula.
137. A footnote to the draft text at this point suggests that there should be fur-
ther development of the data base approach. For a concrete suggestion along these
lines, see Government of Canada, Proposal for the International Exchange of Informa-
tion to Combat Crimes Against Cultural Movable Property (1990).
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an export certificate issued by the other State Party and who did
not acquire the movable cultural property prior to the entry into
force of this treaty shall not be considered to be a person who has
acquired the movable cultural property in good faith;
(h) To use all the means at its disposal, including the fostering of
public awareness, to combat the illicit import and export, theft, il-
licit excavation and illicit dealing in movable cultural property. 38
Each party, further, promises to take the necessary measures to
recover and return, at the request of another State Party, any movable
cultural property covered by the treaty.13 9 To emphasize the criminal
law nature of the treaty, Article 3, headed "Sanctions," requires each
party to impose sanctions upon (a) persons or institutions responsible
for the illicit import or export of movable cultural property, (b) persons
or institutions that knowingly acquire or deal in stolen or illicitly im-
ported movable cultural property and (c) persons or institutions that
enter into international conspiracies to obtain, export or import mova-
ble cultural property by illicit means. 140
Article 4 of the Model Treaty covers procedures to be followed.
Requests for recovery and return are to be made through diplomatic
channels, with supporting documentation.' 4' Expenses incidental to the
return of the property are to be borne by the requesting State Party
and no person or institution shall be entitled to claim any form of com-
pensation from the State Party returning the property claimed. Neither
shall the requesting State Party be required to compensate in any way
such persons or institutions as may have participated irt illegally send-
ing abroad the property in question, although it must pay fair compen-
sation to any person or institution that in good faith acquired or was in
legal possession of the property.' 42 The States Parties agree to make
138. Model Cultural Heritage Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 2, para. 1 (footnotes
omitted).
139. Id. at art. 2, para. 2.
140. Id. at art. 3. n. 122 at this point in the text makes the rather obvious point
in the circumstances that "States Parties should consider adding certain types of of-
fences against movable cultural property to the list of extraditable offences covered by
an extradition treaty." The present model is not an extradition treaty but is intended as
part of a package of relationships, and the other parts of the package need to be
dovetailed.
141. Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
142. Id. at art. 4, para. 2 n. 124 at this point in the text suggests that "State
Parties may wish to consider whether the expenses and/or the expense of providing
compensation should be shared between them"; n.125 suggests that "States Parties
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available to each other such information as will assist in combating
crimes against cultural movable property.1 43 Each party is, moreover,
to provide information concerning laws which protect its movable cul-
tural property to an international data base agreed upon between the
States Parties.1 "
III. CONCLUSION
So there is the package of model treaties. Given that many states
need to do a lot of work on their basic extradition law and treaties, it is
not all that likely that the more sophisticated models will command
widespread acceptance in the near future. But the Congresses and their
follow up within the United Nations represents an important opportu-
nity to spread among criminal justice professionals - the basic constit-
uency of the United Nations Congresses - further knowledge of the
range of co-operative opportunities suggested by modern state practice.
It was appreciated that there was no great likelihood that such
issues would be solved in a multilateral fashion (except perhaps among
regional, or other like-minded groupings)14 5 and that the emphasis
should, accordingly, be on suggesting to states the framework upon
which their negotiators might proceed, but leaving them to tailor-make
the final details. I suggest that this is a useful enterprise in which to be
engaged.146 One should not underestimate the paucity of resources in
many a Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Justice when it
may wish to consider the position of a blameless possessor who has inherited or other-
wise gratuitously acquired a cultural object which had been previously dealt with in
bad faith."
143. Id. at art. 4, para. 3
144. Id. at art. 4, para. 4.
145. Thus, as was noted supra, the documents are drafted primarily on the as-
sumption that they will be used for bilaterals, but they are readily adaptable to wider -
notably regional - use. The models, indeed, owe much to treaties developed in the Euro-
pean region. The limited ratification that has occurred there, however, suggests that
these are areas where much education is required before states are actually going to do
the nitty gritty work to bring the treaties into force. See Muller-Rappard, The Euro-
pean System, in II INT'L C iM. LAw (PROCEDURE), supra note 91, at 96.
146. According to a report prepared by the Secretary-General for the Eighth
Congress, 17 of 49 states which replied to a questionnaire item on the subject reported
that they were using the Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners for
bilateral negotiations. Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/11, at 7 (1990)(Report of the Secretary-
General).
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comes to acting on the international plane and the documents are
meant to be helpful in such eases.
Ultimately, however, there is no escaping the hard work involved
in the network of individual exercises in diplomacy that are necessary
to put the edifice of cooperation in place.
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The Development, Objectives and Planned Activities
of the International Criminal Law Center of Fordham
University School of Law
Abraham Abramovsky*
Jonny Frank**
In the spring of 1990, Fordham University established the Interna-
tional Criminal Law Center to commence in the 1990-91 academic
year. As the first and only center of its kind in this country, the Inter-
national Criminal Law Center seeks to respond to the many and vary-
ing needs of the entities and individuals who effect and are affected by
international criminal law. The International Criminal Law Center as-
pires to serve the United States, state and foreign governments, mul-
tinational corporations, the private bar and private citizens. Among the
projects planned for the International Criminal Law Center are confer-
ences, lectures, consultations with'foreign missions and a scholars-in-
residence program. In addition, the International Criminal Law
Center, commencing in September 1991, will begin to publish its own
law journal featuring timely articles by both members of the bar, lead-
ing academic authorities in the field, as well as domestic and foreign
officials.
This article traces the adoption of the International Criminal Law
Center and defines its objectives and proposed activities. The article
begins with an explanation of Fordham University's decision to estab-
lish the International Criminal Law Center and then considers the In-
ternational Criminal Law Center's goals and plans for achieving its
objectives.
Development of the International Criminal Center
The authors originally proposed the establishment of the Interna-
* Professor of Law and Director of the International Criminal Law Center,
Fordham University School of Law.
** Adjunct Associate Professor of Law and Deputy Director of the International
Criminal Law Center, Fordham University School of Law; Chief, Special Prosecutions,
United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York. The views expressed
are his own and do not necessarily reflect any official law enforcement policy.
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tional Criminal Law Center at Fordham University School of Law in
the winter of 1990. International criminal law is a rapidly emerging
area of the law. This is evidenced by this symposium as well as by the
numerous articles being published in the field. The increasing number
of cases, both criminal and civil, concerning the myriad of problems
raised in this area likewise demonstrates the growing importance of this
field. The growing importance of international criminal law is further
evidenced by the decision of the American Bar Association to form an
independent International Criminal Law Committee. Professor
Abramovsky, who is the director of the center, is the Vice-Chair of that
committee.
Three major problems have contributed to the heightened impor-
tance of international criminal law: globalization of business, terrorism,
narcotics, and its attendant issues. The globalization of business neces-
sitates that both the United States government and other nations have
a readily available resource. Likewise, international businesses must be
cognizant of the impact of the criminal laws of the various countries
with which they do business. More specifically, in order to adequately
represent these entities, members of the private bar, both foreign and
domestic, must become aware and be kept up to date with the constant
evolution of legislation, treaties, multi-lateral conventions and other
agreements between nations which affect their clients.
Virtually every business transaction with any foreign ramification
potentially contains a putative violation of a United States and/or for-
eign treaty obligation, statute, or regulation. As a result, international
criminal law is not solely the concern of the scions of the bar who re-
present multinational corporations. Business has become so global that
a working knowledge of the substantive as well as procedural aspects of
international criminal law is a requirement of any lawyer who counsels,
represents, or litigates on behalf of any client - no matter how small
or large - who engages in or contemplates becoming involved in any
business which contains transnational components.
Crime, unfortunately, like business, has become globalized. Ter-
rorism is no longer just a national or regional problem. The atrocities
wreaked by international terrorists over the last two decades have out-
raged the overwhelming majority of sovereign states and have resulted
in numerous treaties and conventions to attempt to deal with this
problem.
Narcotics trafficking, which inevitably has international ramifica-
tions, similarly has spawned nations to band together to combat this
plague. That united effort has generated a number of international
[Vol. 15
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agreements ranging from memoranda of understanding to bilateral
treaties (i.e. extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties) to multi-
lateral conventions. Thus, for example, the United States Senate has
recently ratified the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.'
The international cooperation that has ensued from the "war on
drugs" has also resulted in an increased international effort in the in-
vestigation and prosecution of other types of criminal acts. These acts
range from intricate money laundering schemes to illicit offshore tax
havens. This in turn has brought into question such issues as to what
extent United States law may be applied extraterritorially and con-
versely, to what extent the laws of other countries may be used against
American citizens who have not actually committed criminal acts
within the territorial boundaries of those states, but whose activities
have impacted in a criminal or detrimental form in those states.
Directly connected to the issue is the scope and extent of constitu-
tional rights of American citizens who are targets of a criminal investi-
gation overseas and whether these rights are applicable to resident
aliens or even foreign nationals. This issue, in turn, raises the difficult
questions of which law enforcement agents of the United States may
operate abroad, what should their role be, and whether their actions
are monitored strictly by the host state. Likewise, an ever increasing
question which is asked domestically is to what extent and under what
control may foreign law enforcement agents operate within the territo-
rial boundaries of the United States.
These issues have arisen because, not only have the substantive
laws expanded, but the methodology utilized to investigate, prosecute
and defend international cases has become extraordinarily complicated.
Attorneys have assumed a greater role in these international criminal
cases. Until fairly recently, diplomatic agencies such as the Depart-
ment of State and law enforcement agencies, for example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration, have
shouldered most of the responsibility for setting policy and gathering
evidence in international cases. American prosecutors (both federal,
state and local) and criminal defense attorneys have become more in-
volved in investigations and have increasingly relied upon relatively
new law enforcement tools, such as mutual assistance treaties, to
gather evidence. For example, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh's
1. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988) (found in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989)).
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proposal to station federal prosecutors in foreign countries illustrates
the heightened involvement of lawyers in international criminal law.
Although international criminal law had developed into an area of
legal specialty, there was no academic center actively serving the inter-
national criminal law community. In the winter of 1990, the authors
proposed the establishment of the International Criminal Law Center
at Fordham University to serve that community. We chose Fordham
University Law School, both because of our ties there and because of
its geographic location and international graduate program. New York
City is this country's hub for international business and (unfortunately)
for crime. Moreover, the presence in the city of the United Nations and
over 100 missions makes New York City an ideal location for an inter-
national criminal law center.
Additionally, the authors believed that the International Criminal
Law Center would blend well with Fordham's international graduate
program, which focuses on international business programs. Fordham's
LL.M. Program, along with its European Community Center, both
founded by Professor Barry Hawk and currently administered by Pro-
fessor Michael Malloy, attracts students from all over the world. It was
thus clear to Dean John Feerick and Associate Dean Georgene Vairo
that the next component of Fordham's international program should be
a center dedicated to the study of international criminal law.
The university was very receptive and enthusiastic about the pro-
posal, and hence authorized the creation of the International Criminal
Law Center. The law school's commitment to the study of international
criminal law is evidenced by the recent addition to the: curriculum of
courses in international criminal law, inter-national criminal business
law, and international human rights.
Objectives of the International Criminal Law Center
A primary goal of the International Criminal Law Center is to
function as a think tank to help formulate United States policy in deal-
ing with international criminal law issues. It is the authors' belief that,
at present, there is no one office in the Department of Justice or De-
partment of State which is solely dedicated to developing long term
policy for international criminal law issues. Oftentimes, the United
States seems to formulate its "policy" on international criminal law
issues in an ad hoc manner. Perhaps even more alarming is the fact
that the policy is one of reaction rather than a well thought out and
[Vol. 15
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balanced proactive policy.'
The International Criminal Law Center will seek to offer guidance
to government policy makers through conferences and symposia as new
international criminal law issues arise. Further, the International Crim-
inal Law Center will offer counsel by way of lbriefings and memoranda
to the courts, Department of Justice and State officials.
The International Criminal Law Center will strive to serve a simi-
lar role to state and foreign governments as they create policies in re-
sponse to the international criminal law issues that affect their commu-
nities. The Center intends to take advantage of its geographic location
to consult with the many member states and observers of the United
Nations to ascertain the concerns and needs of the world community
that touch on international criminal law. Yet another function of the
center will be to serve as an information clearinghouse and educational
center to assist the private bar as new issues of international criminal
law emerge.
Activities of the International Criminal Law Center
The International Criminal Law Center will host conferences dedi-
cated to particular concerns of international criminal law. The papers
presented at such conferences will be published independently as a pub-
lication of the International Criminal Law Center and, on occasion,
will be published in the Fordham Journal of International Law.
In 1991, the International Criminal Law Center expects to sponsor
conferences on money laundering and the role of the United Nations in
resolving the problems posed by international narcotics trafficking.
These are but two samples of the type of conferences which the Center
will sponsor.
In addition to conferences, the Center will offer a series of lectures
at the law school by American and foreign lawyers and law enforce-
ment personnel. The Center plans to offer during the spring of 1991
lectures by American law enforcement agents about the dangers, regu-
lations and methodology for conducting criminal undercover investiga-
2. See, e.g., Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and
Snatch" Policy Run Amok, U. VA. INT'L L.J. (1991) (discussing dangers inherent in
using kidnapping to acquire in personam jurisdiction over fugitives abroad); Abramov-
sky, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The United States' Unwarranted Attempt To Alter
International Law in United States v. Unis, 15 YALE J. INT'L LAW 121, 138 (1990)
(discussing dangers inherent in extending subject matter jurisdiction beyond generally
accepted principles of international law).
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tions in foreign countries. At present, the International Criminal Law
Center also anticipates offering a lecture by counsel to large American
corporations about the representation of American corporations in
criminal matters abroad.
In addition to sponsoring the conferences and lectures, the Inter-
national Criminal Law Center takes advantage of its location in New
York City through private meetings with foreign mission personnel. In
addition, constant dialogue is had with leading members of the domes-
tic bar to ascertain which areas they feel are in need of analysis and
study.
Finally, the International Criminal Law Center is developing a
"scholars in residence" program which will be composed of foreign stu-
dents and their American counterparts. This program is intended to
combine the training of students from diverse backgrounds and legal
systems, which hopefully will result in creative proposals and solutions
to complex and ever-growing multinational criminal law problems. It is
the aspiration of the law school in general and the International Crimi-
nal Law Center in particular that these young men and women will one
day be the leaders in their respective lands, whether they be scholars,
public officials or private practitioners.
For information and/or assistance contact:
Abraham Abramovsky
or
Jonny J. Frank
Fordham University
School of Law
140 West 62nd Street
New York, New York 10023
212-841-5296
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International Cooperation in Criminal Matters:
Western Europe's International Approach to
International Crime
Scott Carlson*
Bruce Zagaris**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. International Aspects of Crime
Any sophisticated discussion of criminal law is apt to touch on the
nature of the criminal process itself. In so doing, questions should arise
as to how, when, and why the criminal process punishes someone for
engaging in certain types of behavior. Though one will not be able to
find unanimous answers to these questions, in most circumstances, ask-
ing these questions helps to frame the boundaries of the debate.'
That is not to say that the details of this inquiry are readily or
easily defined. In fact, such is clearly not the case. Take, for example,
illicit drug use and trafficking in the United States, and within that
topic focus simply on the role of drug testing in grappling with the drug
problem in the public sector. The issues are legion, and rules and regu-
lations are being regularly challenged in court. The litigants are look-
ing for answers to significant constitutional questions. Does the fourth
or fifth amendment apply? Is "reasonable suspicion" really an issue
any more?2 The answers to these questions will further define the crim-
inal process in this country.
* The author is an Attorney-Advisor with the Office of Chief Counsel, Internal
Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author.
** The author is Of Counsel, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Washington,
D.C.; Adjunct Professor of International Business Criminal Law, Fordham University
School of Law; Co-Chair, Committee on International Criminal Law, Section of Crim-
inal Justice, A.B.A.; and Editor-in-Chief of the International Enforcement Law
Reporter.
1. P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1-2
(1986).
2. Weeks, Public Employee Drug Testing under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going Under the Federal Decisions?,
20 URB. LAW. 445 (1988).
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However, criminal activity does not recognize national boundaries,
and to be effective, the criminal process must be flexible enough to deal
with this fact. In recent years, Americans have been confounded by the
ability of some criminals to manipulate national boundaries to their ad-
vantage. How can it be that someone who is wanted for trial in the
United States can relax with impunity at his Swiss estate?3
The answer is frustratingly simple. Most of the basic institutions
which Americans rely on to define and improve the criminal process
are nonexistent or extremely limited in the international sphere, for do-
mestic courts and legislatures are, by definition, institutions of limited
authority. To cope with the burgeoning international aspects of crime,
the institutions we rely on must be adapted to operate in the interna-
tional arena.
Years ago, Western European countries identified the shortcom-
ings of a domestic approach to international crime and began taking
steps to remedy the situation.4 To illustrate the European approach,
this paper focuses primarily on Western European developments in the
area of illicit drug use and trafficking. Though progress is being made
in other areas, the European approach to illicit drug use and trafficking
has produced substantial results in the context of international coopera-
tion; and with America's own "War on Drugs" raging, this subject has
particular relevance to the domestic practitioner.
B. New Foreign Policy Considerations
Another reason to examine international cooperation in Western
Europe is that we now live in an era in which the territorial state is
being eclipsed by non-territorial actors such as multinational corpora-
tions, transnational social movements, and intergovernmental organiza-
tions. The politics of global interdependence is inescapable.5
3. Copetas, The Sovereign Republic of Marc Rich, REGARDIES 47 (Feb. 1990).
4. See Abbell, Extradition of Business Crimes to and from European Countries,
A.B.A. Pahel on International Criminal Cooperation in European Business Crimes in a
Rapidly Changing Environment, A.B.A. Nat'l Convention 38, 40 (Aug. 7, 1990). For a
discussion of some recent U.S. efforts to cope with international crime, see Weiland,
Congress and the Transnational Crime Problem, 20 INT'L LAW. 1025 (1986). A sum-
mary of some of the international measures in the 1990 Crime Bill can be found at
Barber & Zagaris, Selected International Enforcement Provisions in the 1990 Crime
Bill, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REi. 401 (1990).
5. See R. KEOHANE AND J. NYE, POWER AND INDEPENDENCE WORLD POLITICS
IN TRANSITION 3-4 (1977).
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In acknowledgement of this fact, criminal policy has been elevated
to one of the priority issues within foreign policy itself. For instance,
the declarations emerging from G-7 summits' have expanded their
scope from economics to terrorism, drugs, and, more recently, money
laundering.7 These criminal problems often arise from international
networks operating outside the control of any single sovereign nation.
The fluid nature of these networks makes it difficult for a single nation
acting independently to combat these criminal problems. In this vein,
modern foreign policy increasingly reflects a situation where unilateral
displays of force play a diminishing role, for traditional instruments of
power cannot deal with these new, more subterranean, threats to inter-,
national political stability which permeate national boundaries.
In this context, international cooperation represents a valuable
new resource in the foreign policy arsenal, offering international solu-
tions to international problems. The section that follows describes one
method of facilitating international cooperation via international re-
gimes. If successful, a regime fosters an ongoing cooperative spirit that
enhances the participating nations' "soft powers."8 The term "soft
power" describes a nation's ability to persuade another to want what it
wants, in contrast to "hard power" which involves one nation ordering
another to do what it wants.9
In an era of multinational actors and concerns, the ability of na-
tions to exercise co-optive or soft power is becoming increasingly im-
portant, for as the mix of resources that define international power
change, so too must countries' approach to the acquisition and manipu-
lation of international power. This lesson is especially important to
countries which have enjoyed considerable influence from a hard power
perspective, such as the United States. These countries must be careful
to hone soft powers with the same vigor that they have devoted to hard
6. The G-7 Summit is an annual meeting of the heads of government of the
leading seven industrial nations (the U.S., Italy, France, the U.K., Japan, Canada and
Germany). The agenda is predominantly economic. The governments involved prepare
the agenda and do a substantial amount of background work. Traditionally, a state-
ment is released at the end of the summits containing agreements on policies reached.
7. See, e.g., Nye, Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL'Y 153, 164 (1990); Perez, OAS
Opportunities, 80 FOREIGN POL'Y 51, 55 (1990); see also Sorensen, Rethinking Na-
tional Security, 69 FOREIGN Am. 1-18 (1990) (discussion of criminal policy in the
context of national security redefinition).
8. See Nye, supra note 7, at 164.
9. Id. at 168.
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powers in the past.10 If they do not, their ability to participate in shap-
ing solutions to current international problems, such as illicit drug use
and trafficking, may be compromised. Moreover, due to the important
role that international regimes play in developing soft powers, an un-
derstanding of regimes is important, if not essential, to nations seeking
to shape these solutions.
In order to illustrate the usefulness of international regimes when
describing international cooperation in criminal matters, section two
defines the term "international regime" and discusses some of the qual-
ities of international regimes. In section three, the Western European
regime of cooperation in international criminal matters is outlined, and
section four then highlights recent developments and prospects for fur-
ther developing and defining European cooperation. The article closes
with some observations on the impact of the Western European regime
of international cooperation both within and without Europe.
II. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES-A FRAMEWORK FOR
COOPERATION
"International regime" is a term from international organization
theory that emerged in the early 1970s.1 The term applies to arrange-
ments that involve mostly government actors, but that affect non-gov-
ernment actors in diverse areas, such as international trade, telecom-
munications, and meteorology. A regime may be formal, like the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or informal where the re-
gime is merely implicit from the actions of the states involved.
Generally, the purpose of international regimes is to regulate and
control certain transnational relations and activities by establishing in-
ternational procedures, rules, and institutions. 2 In fact, international
regimes have been defined as "norms, rules, and procedures agreed to
in order to regulate an issue area. '"13
Thus, it is apparent that international regimes are goal-oriented
enterprises whose participating members seek benefits -through explicit
10. Id. at 171.
11. For an early discussion of "international regimes," see Keohane & Nye,
Transnational Relations and World Politics, INT'L ORG. 25, No. 3 (1971) (later en-
larged and published as a book by Harvard University Press in 1972).
12. R. KEOHANE & J. NYE, supra note 5, at 5.
13. Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes, 32
WORLD POL. 357-405 (1980).
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or tacit cooperation based on common concerns. In the case of illicit
drug use and trafficking, these concerns include: reduction in the supply
and demand of illicit narcotics; treatment for persons addicted to nar-
cotics; and diminution of power of the organized narcotics traffickers.
Though international regimes often enjoy the sponsorship of intergov-
ernmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations, the issues ad-
dressed by international regimes are usually more specific in nature.
Since the emphasis of a regime is on achieving a specific objective, in-
ternational regimes are considered to be more flexible in nature and
more likely to undergo evolutionary change than IGOs. 4
If an international regime is successful, it maintains or reduces the
cost of legitimate transactions while increasing the costs of illegitimate
ones such as money laundering and drug trafficking. In the rapidly
changing global marketplace and political scene, a premium is placed
on an international regime's ability to meet new developments head-on.
This challenge makes it an important function of the international re-
gime to facilitate ongoing negotiations among governments. 15
In the following section, this article generally outlines the interna-
,tional-regime of cooperation in criminal matters that is emerging in
Europe. Typically, there are several approaches used to discuss and de-
scribe international regimes. These approaches can range in emphasis
between an historical to a functional approach."" However, due to space
limitations, this article will not follow a particular doctrinal approach
in the interest of developing a general and accessible outline of the
regime.
III. THE EUROPEAN REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
The following discussion is framed in terms of the European Com-
munities and the Council of Europe. These organizations do not com-
pletely define the boundaries of the international regime, but they are
14. W. FELD & R. JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 40 (1983).
15. For additional background on the iniportance of international regimes to gov-
ernmental actors like the United States, see AFTER HEGEMONY, COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 107 (1984); see also KEOHANE, The
Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141-72 (Keohane ed.
1983).
16. See generally W. FELD & R. JORDAN, supra note 14. For an example of the
historical approach, focusing on alcohol and narcotics, see Nadelman, Global Prohibi-
tion Regimes, 44 INT'L ORG. 479-526 (1990).
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two of the regime's most significant components, and their activities
illustrate the general outline of the regime.
Though neither organization specializes in criminal matters, both
possess an international institutional framework for the ongoing regula-
tion and control of transnational relations, and both have dealt with
international criminal matters. As noted earlier, international regimes
are defined by their rules and procedures. Therefore, the following dis-
cussion describes not only the results of international cooperation in
criminal matters, but also the means used to achieve those results.
A. The European Communities
The term "European Communities" refers to the limited federalist
system established between Western European countries through trea-
ties of the 1950s. 17 The Communities comprise four main institutions:
the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Parliament, and the
Court of Justice. The Council and the Commission bear the primary
responsibility for producing legislation.18 The Commission is responsi-
17. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. "European Communities" refers to three
communities that were officially linked in 1967 with the ratificaticn of the merger
treaty. The three communities are the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom). J. Louis, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 9 (1980). Presently, the
member states of the European Communities are Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom.
18. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMU-
NITY LAW 3 (1983). The three binding acts that the Council and the Commission may
issue, regulations, directives, and decisions, are set forth in article 189:
In order to carry out their task the Council and Commission shall in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives,
take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national au-
thorities the choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is
addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
EEC Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 189; see also OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
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ble for preparing the initial legislative proposal, and the Council enacts
the legislation into law. In the interim between its proposal and its en-
actment, the legislation is reviewed by the Council, Commission, and
Parliament where opinions and amendments are offered.19 Once the
legislation is enacted, it is binding on the member states, and questions
of interpretation are resolved with the assistance of the Court of
Justice.20
Originally the Community system was quite limited in scope, deal-
ing primarily with the goal of economic integration.21 However, with
the promulgation of the Single European Act in the late 1980s broader
issues surfaced in the Community agenda-most notably the goal of
European unity among the member states.2 In title II of the Act, the
widely touted date of 1992 was set as the target date for completion of
an internal market without trade barriers, and toward that goal the Act
granted the Council greater authority to enact legislation.23
Prior to the Single European Act, it was simply conventional wis-
dom that the European Communities had little if any competence to
grapple with criminal law issues.24 Thus, the member states were left to
TIES 331 (1978) (In light of differences in translation, the documents published by the
European Communities are treated as authoritative for the purposes of this paper.).
19. Good, Institutional Reform under the Single European Act, 3 A.U.J. INr'L
L. & POL'Y 299, 311-12 (1988).
20. In the words of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice "ensure[s] the obser-
vance of law and justice in the interpretations and applications of this treaty." EEC
Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 164. The Court of Justice has consistently taken a pro-
gressive and pragmatic approach in this regard. See Recent Development, European
Economic Community--The Use of Article 173(2) of the EEC Treaty to Contest Ac-
tions of the European Parliament, Partie Ecologiste 'Les Verts' (the Greens) v. Euro-
pean Parliament [1987], 2 COMMON MKT. L. Rnv. 343 (1986), 18 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 85 (1988). Not only does the Court of Justice have primary jurisdiction over
certain matters, such as disputes between member states & Community institutions,
but also the Court has the authority to issue "preliminary rulings." These rulings are
binding responses to requests for assistance from domestic courts or tribunals for assis-
tance in interpreting a question of Community Law. EEC Treaty, supra note 17, at
arts. 170, 177.
21. EEC Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 2.
22. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUnTIES, SINGLE EUROPEAN Acr 2
(Supp. 1986). For an overview of the changes wrought by the Single European Act, see
Good, supra note 19.
23. Schildhaus, 1992 and the Single European Act, 23 IIr'L LAw. 549, 552
(1989).
24. Bridge, The European Communities and the Criminal Law, CIM. L. REv.
88 (1976); VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Criminal Law and the European Communities: De-
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administer all criminal matters. This fact proved especially troubling in
the context of Community commercial policy, for along with the Com-
munity's payment of premiums, subsidies, and refunds, there invariably
arose questions of abuse and fraud. To complicate matters, some
crimes are only punishable at the national level under certain circum-
stances. For instance, obtaining financial aid under false pretenses in
many member states is only punishable when against national interest,
and it is possible that a similar crime against Community interests
would go unpunished.25 Prosecution for crimes against the Community
is sometimes referred to as indirect enforcement when the prosecution
is conducted at the member state level. The limitations of this approach
are obvious, for some states have been more diligent than others when
it comes to criminalizing acts against the Communities.28
During the 1970s, the countries of the European Communities
considered ways to improve this system of indirect enforcement. Their
efforts resulted in two draft conventions establishing new offenses
against Community interests. One of the conventions criminalized cer-
tain offenses against financial interests of the Community, and the sec-
ond dealt with the criminal responsibility of Community civil servants.
Both drafts were discussed, but not ratified.27
Though no broad expansion of substantive criminal law at the
Community level appears immediate, the marketplace that each of the
member states operates within is expanding and changing rapidly. Ba-
sically, the Single European Act has made progress towards a Euro-
pean economic union a priority without directly addressing collateral
issues in substantive criminal law. This state of affairs has led some to
conclude that 1992 may prove to be a boon to sophisticated criminals.2 8
fining Issues, in TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 247 (1983); Har-
ding, The European Communities and Control of Criminal Business Activities, 31
COMP. L.Q. 255 (1982).
25. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, supra note 24, at 247-48. The authority for Commu-
nity payments in this area is set forth in the EEC Treaty. See EEC Treaty, supra note
17, at arts. 39 & 40.
26. B. ZAGARIS & A. FANTAUZZI, European Integration and International Crim-
inal Law, 1 1992 THE EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION 9 (No. 11,
1989).
27. Zagaris & Fantauzzi, Application of Foreign Criminal Laws to U.S. Busi-
nesses Abroad, 1 INT'L Q. 126 (October 1989).
28. M. BORNHEIM & B. ZAGARIS, International Cooperation Against Money
Laundering in the European Integration Context, 1 1992 THE EXTiERNAL IMPACT OF
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION 13 (No. 15, 1989).
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With the free circulation of goods, services, and capital, criminals will
have an easier time moving operations and capital from country to
country. 9
Nevertheless, preparations for 1992 have not wholly overlooked
the criminal element in the member states, and the Community institu-
tions have been taking an active role in defining Community policy in
this regard. The following subsections describe briefly some of the most
recent and significant efforts of these institutions to further define the
criminal process at the Community level.
1. The European Parliament
In 1985, the Parliament set up a Committee of Enquiry to look
into the Community drug problem. This committee enjoyed a broad
base of support from parties across the political spectrum. Upon con-
cluding their inquiry, the Committee issued a report. The aim of the
report was to set forth a basic understanding of the facts of the situa-
tion upon which to base proposals for improving both the short and
long term outlook within the Community.
30
The Committee discovered that the 1970s and 1980s saw a rise of
serious proportions in hard drug use. At the time of the report, it was
estimated that as many as 1.5 million people in the Community were
regular users of heroin. Accompanying this increase in drug use are
other more sinister and subterranean developments. The Committee
noted that drug traffickers and criminal organizations are emerging in
strength. In the words of the Committee, "[tihe activities of these orga-
nizations constitute an unprecedented attack on national and interna-
tional social order." 31 In the face of this problem, the Committee con-
cluded that the European Community suffered from a lack of
coordination exacerbated by the absence of any strategic roadmap for
the future.32
Developing an adequate strategy would be no easy task, the Com-
29. According to Bank of Italy Governor, Carlo Agzelio Campi, the Mafia has
billions of dollars waiting to be laundered and converted into various investments. Id;
see also Parmelee, European Unity: An Offer the Mafia Can't Refuse, Wash. Post,
May 19, 1989, at Fl, col 5.
30. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COM-
MITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO THE DRUGS PROBLEM IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COM-
MUNITY 12 (1987) [hereinafter ENQUIRY].
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id.
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mittee conceded-especially in the substantive legal realm. Section IV
of their report was devoted entirely to discussing some of the broad
legal issues that demand Community-wide attention. The beginning of
the section framed the discussion by raising a fundamental, if not con-
trolling, concern: the wide variation in laws and penalties found in the
criminal systems of the member states.33 Within this topic, the Com-
mittee focused on four significant aspects: sentencing, extradition,
freezing of assets, and money laundering. 4
During the discussion the Committee made the following recom-
mendations: 1) the Community address the issue of sentencing through
harmonization of member states law or by adopting a "Community po-
sition" on the subject; 2) extradition be dealt with by the adoption of a
multilateral European agreement;35 3) seizure and freezing of assets be
addressed by "common legislation across the community" with the
seized assets to be used directly to combat the problem; and 4) the
European Commission address money laundering by publishing guide-
lines, and issuing a directive requiring currency transaction reporting."
In addition, the report identified the need for a Community computer
database to house relevant information.37
2. The Council of Ministers of the European Communities
Though the Council of Ministers has not fully addressed all the
points raised by the extensive report of the European Parliament's
33. Id. at 44. "The matter is complicated by the fact that Napoleonic and Com-
mon Law exist in different countries within the Community. In addition the individual
constitutions of some countries make it difficult to apply certain laws across the Com-
munity." Id.
34. ENQUIRY, supra note 29, at 45. However, the report acknowledged the
broader reach of the subject: "Throughout it will be important to ensure as far as
humanly possible that the law is applied in equal measure in all countries of the Com-
munity." Id.
35. Id. at 45.
36. Id. at 46-47. Basically, such an arrangement would be a European version of
the International Currency Control Authority suggested in the And -Drug Abuse Act
and the Interpol working group resolution of April 21, 1989. M. BORNHEIM & B.
ZAGARIS, supra note 28, at 14. Note that some countries, such as Itily, have expressed
reservations about detailed currency transaction reporting. Id. For an overview of some
recent U.S. activity in this area, see Plambeck, The Money Laundering Control Act of
1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAW. 69 (1988).
37. Id. at 57-58. See also ICC, EC to Establish European Drug Intelligence
Unit, COM. CRIME INT'L 1 (1989).
[Vol. 15
174
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
1 Carlson and Zagaris
Committee of Enquiry, it has taken steps toward improving interna-
tional cooperation in criminal matters within the European Communi-
ties. In May of 1987, the Ministers of Justice met in Brussels. This
Council of Ministers clearly expressed a resolve to tackle some of the
problems facing the European Communities in cooperation in criminal
matters. Specifically, the Council reminded the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities of the urgent need to accelerate international le-
gal cooperation in criminal matters. According to the Council, this in-
creased cooperation is necessary to facilitate the development of a
"European legal area" as envisioned, by the Single European Act.3 8
The Council went on to discuss and endorse specific developments.
In particular, the Council applauded the member states signing the
conventions on the transfer of sentenced persons and double jeopardy. 9
Also, the Council examined possible reforms that can be made to the
extradition process.40 Though the scope of the above developments was
limited, recent developments indicate the Council is willing to expand
the range of issues it will address.4 1 This trend is both promising and
necessary if there is to be a European legal area.
3. The Commission of the European Communities
In addressing international crime, the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities has been active in both its capacity as an advisor
and as an initiator of legislation. Indeed, they have addressed these
matters both within and without the Communities.
In a seminal proposal on November 26, 1986, the Commission out-
lined a broad program to combat the growing drug problem.42 The pur-
pose of the program was to "initiate an ongoing dialogue between the
member states and the Commission aimed at identifying the priorities
38. Council of the European Communities, Press Release 1167th Council Meet-
ig 5 (1987) [hereinafter Press Release].
39. Id. at 6. For a more detailed treatment of the double jeopardy issue, see
1983-1984 EUtR. PARL. Doc. (No.1-1397/83), Report of the Legal Affairs Committee
(1984).
40. Press Release, supra note 38, at 6-7.
41. Zagaris & Fantauzzi, Breaking the Connection, 34 SEC. MGmT. 46, 49 (June
1990). In May of 1989, an informal meeting of the Council witnessed the opening for
signature of an European Community convention on international criminal cooperation.
Fantauzzi, EEC Ministers of Justice Meet on International Criminal Cooperation, 5
INT'L ENFORCEmENT L. REP. 220-21 (June 1989).
42. Fight Against Drugs in the Community, BULL. OF EuR. COMM. 8 (1986).
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and areas in which cooperation is essential if the fight against drug
addiction is to succeed. ' 43 The Commission's proposal was a follow-up
to factfinding activities like those of the European Parliament discussed
earlier."
With similar vigor, the Commission has pursued the matter exter-
nally. In 1987, the United Nations Convention Against [llicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was negotiated.4' Follow-
ing its completion, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council
of Ministers decision on the signing of the Convention.' 6
More recently, the Commission has begun to aggressively pursue
specific proposals geared toward internal structural changes needed in
light of 1992. On February 10, 1989, the Commission issued the propo-
sal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/799/EEC concern-
ing mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the member
states in the field of direct taxation and value-added tax.47 The propo-
sal mandated the development of national legislation which would abol-
ish restrictions on the exchange of information due to administrative
practices.48
These efforts complement new anti-fraud measures proposed by
the European Commission. Here too the management of information is
essential for law enforcement. Managing common commercial policies,
such as the Common Agricultural Policy, has proven intricate, and the
coordination of accounting controls among the member states is an es-
sential step if 1992 is to be met without encouraging wholesale fraud.49
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See United Nations: Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15, Corr. 1 and
Corr. 2, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
46. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision,
Jan. 26, 1989.
47. Reprinted in EC Prepares International Tax Enforcement Strategy, 5 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 297 (Aug. 1989).
48. Id. Also in preparation for a single capital market, a formal proposal was
issued considering a Community-wide 15% withholding tax on interest income. This
too would involve an increased rate of exchange of tax information. See Liberalizing
EC Capital Movements at the Price of Tax Avoidance, 5 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
50 (Feb. 1989).
49. Morris, EC Finance Ministers Discuss New Anti-Fraud Proposals, 5 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 268-69 (July 1989). However, these anti-fraud efforts have yet
to fully address the problem. See Zagaris, EC Court of Auditors Report Indicates
Fraud in EC Export Refund System, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 267 (July 1990).
[Vol. 15
176
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Carlson and Zagaris
Both of the areas mentioned above, exchange of information in tax
matters and accounting controls, fall within the predominantly com-
mercial matters where the European Communities' competence is tra-
ditionally asserted. A more controversial step this year was the Com-
mission's proposal for a directive which focused on preventing the
Community financial system from being used for money laundering.50
The proposal, if realized, would call on credit and financial institutions
to scrutinize transactions, challenging them when the true identity of
the customer is in doubt or no economic and lawful purpose appears
present. Moreover, the institutions would be required to notify law en-
forcement authorities on their own initiative.51
B. The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was formed on August 3, 1949, when the
Statute of the Council of Europe went into effect.52 The signatories
came together with the understanding "that the pursuit of peace based
upon justice and international cooperation is vital for the preservation
of human society and civilisation." 53 There are two principal organs of
the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers and the Consulta-
tive Assembly. 4
The Council of Europe, through its organs, investigates matters of
importance to its members, and in some cases issues recommendations
to its members. The Consultative Assembly deliberates and debates
matters within its competence, and presents its conclusions to the Com-
mittee of Ministers.55 The Consultative Assembly may, when appropri-
ate, establish committees and commissions to consider and report on
For an example of the fraud problem, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
50. Nilsson, European Legal Cooperation in Criminal Matters, A.B.A. Panel on
International Criminal Cooperation in European Business Crimes in a Rapidly Chang-
ing Environment, A.B.A. Nat'l Convention, Aug. 7, 1990, at 3, 19.
51. Id. at 20.
52. STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Aug. 3, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103
[hereinafter STATUTE OF nE COUNCIL].
53. Id. at Preamble. The 12 members of the European Communities are als'o
members of the Council of Europe.
54. Id. at art. 10. The Council sits in Strasbourg. Id. at art. 11.
55. Id. at art. 22. The Assembly consists of representatives selected by the re-
spective national parliaments. Id. at art. 25. Its competence is rather broad except that
it does not deal with issues of national defense and should not interfere with the work
of international organizations. See id. at art. 23.
1991]
177
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
specific matters.5 6 Upon receiving the recommendation of the Consulta-
tive Assembly, the Committee of Ministers considers what action
would further the goals of the Council of Europe. The Committee may
also examine matters and issue conclusions on its own motion. In its
conclusions the Committee is free to put forth a range of options, in-
cluding the adoption of international agreements and common
policies. 17 .
In this manner the Council has been actively addressing interna-
tional components of the criminal process. Historically, their approach
has been pragmatic. For instance, noting that the territoriality principle
of jurisdiction did not adequately address the transborder elements of
modern criminal activity, the Council promoted the 1964 Road Traffic
Convention which departed from the territoriality approach.58 Not only
does it allow the state of residence to prosecute, at the request of the
state of offense, an offense on the latter's territory, but also the state of
residence is permitted, at the request of the state of offense, to enforce
foreign judgements of the latter. 9
While the Council has maintained a progressive approach to trans-
border criminal activity, the member governments have lagged behind
in the area of conventions. For example, only a handful of governments
have ratified the 1964 Road Traffic Convention. Some have concluded
that the reason for this is that member governments were not alarmed
enough by the spread of crime. 1
However, recent developments in the area of conventions give rea-
son to be optimistic, and progress has been made in areas outside of the
signing of conventions. The following subsections describe some of
these promising developments.
56. Id. at art. 24.
57. STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 52, at art. 15(a). "In appropriate
cases, the conclusions of the Committee may take the form of recommendations to the
Governments of Members, and the Committee may request the Governments of Mem-
bers to inform it of the action taken by them with regard to such recommendations."
Id. at art. 15(b).
58. See Muller-Rappard, The European System, II INT'L CraM. L. 95, 100-101
(M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
59. Of course, the aforesaid provisions only apply to offenses hat are related to
road traffic. Id.
60. Id. at 110-11.
61. Id. at 97-98.
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1. Cooperation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking in Drugs-The'Pompidou Group
The Pompidou Group was formed in 1971 at the suggestion of
Georges Pompidou, President of the French Republic, to his colleagues
in Western Europe. The Group undertook to examine, from a multidis-
ciplinary point of view, the problems of drug trafficking and abuse. The
Group does not have the official character of an international organiza-
tion, but it has conducted its activities since 1980 under the auspices of
the Council of Europe. 2
In the spring of 1980, the Committee of Ministers sanctioned an
agreement for operating the Pompidou Group within the Council of
Europe. Under this agreement, governments outside the Council of Eu-
rope may join with the unanimous agreement of the Group members.
Still others, like the United States, have begun to participate on an ad
hoe basis.6 The members are represented at ministerial meetings by
the appropriate minister from the member's government.
Like the European Parliament, the Pompidou Group has proven
adept at gathering information. On September 12 and 13, 1984, the
Seventh Ministerial Conference met in Paris where it was decided that
the Group should examine cooperation between the criminal justice
system and social/health services. A subsequent working group pro-
62. Council of Europe, A Brief Description of the Activities of the Pompidou
Group and Its'Establishment within the Framework of the Council of Europe 1, Oct.
4, 1989, P-PG(88) Inf. 1.
63. Id.
The original members of the Group were Belgium, France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom. Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden were subsequently ad-
mitted to the Group. Turkey joined the Group when the Partial Agree-
ment was established by the Council of Europe in March 1980. Since then
Greece became a member in 1981, Norway in 1983, Spain in 1984, Portu-
gal and Switzerland in 1985, Finland in 1987, Austria on 1 January 1988,
Malta on 1 April 1988 and Cyprus on 1 October 1989 bringing the num-
ber of member states to 20.
Certain countries which are not members of the Council of Europe
participate in some activities of the Group on a technical ad hoc basis, for
example, Canada, the United States, and the Holy See.
In addition since May 1986, the Commission of the European Com-
munities takes part in the Group's work with a view to ensuring coordina-
tion of the two organizations' activities.
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posed that two symposia be held on the subject.6 4 The: first, held on
October 29 and 31, 1986, collected a wealth of informat.on on the sub-
ject, cataloguing differences among the members in pros;ecution, treat-
ment,65 sanctions, et cetera.6 The second, geared towards rehabilita-
tion issues, was held on December 1 through 4, 198 7 .61 Though such
broad based symposia are not a frequent occurrence, the Pompidou
Group's factfinding efforts have been maintained over the years, and
the Group continues to keep track of developments between and within
Group members.68
Their factfinding activities are complemented by their efforts to
coordinate international measures to combat the drug problem. Often,
these efforts focus on developing international agreements. 9 For in-
stance, the Eighth Ministerial Conference noted that a convention or
multilateral agreement would be useful in dealing with drug trafficking
in international waters and the confiscation of dr-ug trafficking
proceeds.7"
Regarding drug trafficking, the Group has proven especially per-
sistent. In a Political Declaration at the Extraordinary Ministerial Con-
ference in May of 1989, the Group "urged that the current work in the
Council of Europe on the preparation of a European Convention on the
search, seizure, and confiscation of the proceeds from crime be expe-
dited.171 The Group noted that international cooperation is essential for
progress because criminal activity in this area has reached new levels of
64. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SYMPOSIUM ON DRUG MISUSERS IN CRIMINAL PRO-
CEEDINGS: A DIFFICULT BALANCE BETWEEN PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT 3 (1987).
65. Id. at 24.
66. Id. at 116.
67. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SYMPOSIUM ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
SOCIAL REHABILITATION MEASURES FOR DRUG MISUSERS (1988).
68. E.g., Council of Europe, Background Document on the Cocaine Threat in
Europe, P-PG/MIN (89) 2 Revised (1989), Extraordinary Ministerial Conference,
London 18-19 May 1989; Council of Europe, Background Paper on HIV/AIDs and
Addiction, P-PG/MIN (89) 4 Revised (1989), Extraordinary Mini;terial Conference,
London 18-19, May 1989.
69. Council of Europe, Declaration of the 8th Ministerial Conference, (1987) P-
PG/MIN (86) 5 Def., 8th Ministerial Conference, London 20-21, Jan. 1987.
70. Id.
71. Council of Europe, Political Declaration of the Extraordinary Ministerial
Conference in London May 18-19 4, (1989) P-PG/MIN (89) 5 Def. The declaration
went on to note that "[w]hen adopted this convention would provide a suitable frame-
work for international, intra-European cooperation." Id.
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sophistication.72 Though earlier ad hoc technical conferences had pro-
vided some of the foundation for developing a convention to address the
situation, the convention itself was slow to follow.73 The Group noted
that in this field, "there is no long-standing tradition of working coop-
eration. 17 4 In addition, current national legislation on the subject was
woefully inadequate to cope with the problem. However, the Group was
optimistic about the prospects for the future, noting that national dif-
ferences on the subject were often matters of form more than sub-
stance.75 The Group urged that members maintain a "steady momen-
tum in developing international action."7 6
The optimism of the Group was not unwarranted, for in June of
1990, the Council of Europe's European Committee on Crime
Problems adopted the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime.77 Even more surprising was
the fact that on November 8, 1990, the first day it was open for signa-
ture, twelve governments signed the Convention."8
2. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime
Though the Convention was drafted with drug offenses particu-
larly in mind, it was drafted broadly so that it addresses all types of
criminality. Parties to the Convention will enjoy cooperation in the ar-
eas of investigation, search, and seizure in such diverse areas as arms
dealing and trafficking in children.79 The Explanatory Report to the
72. Council of Europe, Background Paper on Confiscation of the Proceeds of
Drug Trafficking at the Extraordinary Ministerial Conference in London May 18-19,
1989 2, (1989) P-PG/MIN (89) 3.
73. In 1983 and 1985, the Group held these technical conferences, but it was not
until 1987 that the Council of Europe's European Committee on Crime Problems offi-
cially took up the matter. Id.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Council of Europe, Draft Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, adopted at Strasbourg July 25, 1990, CDPC
(90) 17 Addendum I [hereinafter COE Convention].
78. The governments which signed were Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany,
Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. Zagaris, Twelve Countries Sign European Laundering Convention, 6 INT'L
ENFORCEmENT L. REP. 380 (Nov. 1990).
79. Council of Europe, Draft Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laun-
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Convention noted that the broad sweep of the Convention would re-
quire some states to make substantial amendments to their domestic
legislation in order to become parties to the Convention.81, However, the
experts drafting the Convention considered that the somewhat strict
obligations of the Convention would be operating within a group of
like-minded states so a certain spirit of cooperation would prevail.81
Moreover, in the same vein, the drafters left out the word "European"
in hopes that "like[-]minded states outside the framework of the Coun-
cil of Europe" would choose to participate.82
a. Chapter I-The Use of Terms
Chapter I sets out some of the basic terms utilized in the Conven-
tion. Article L.a. defines "proceeds" to mean "any economic advantage
from criminal offences." 8 This broad construction of the term includes
assets and property that may be held by third parties.84 Similarly, arti-
cle 1.b. gives a broad definition of "property." It defines the term to
include "property of any description, whether corporeal or incorporeal,
movable or immovable, and legal documents or instruments evidencing
title to, or interest in such property."8' 5 The "confiscation" of the afore-
said is phrased in terms of a "penalty or a measure, ordered by a court
following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or criminal
offences." 8 6
The prevailing consideration behind Chapter I was to structure the
scope of the Convention to be as wide as possible in principle. Any
offense that produces huge profits might fall within the ambit of this
chapter; examples include environmental offenses, insider trading, and
economic fraud. 7 Realizing that the extensive nature of this Conven-
tion might cause delays in ratification, the drafters provided that reser-
vations to certain subsequent provisions could be made by way of
dering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, Strassbourg, July
6, 1990, CDPC (90) 17 Addendum II, para. 8 [hereinafter Explanatory Report].
80. See id.
81. See id. at para. 14.
82. Id. at para. 18. In fact Australia, Canada, and the United States participated
in the drafting and are three such "like[-]minded states." Id.
83. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 1.
84. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 21.
85. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 1.b.
86. Id. at art. 1.d.
87. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 27.
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declaration.8
b. Chapter II-Measures to be Taken at the National Level
Generally, Chapter II prescribes the legal infrastructure that sig-
natories will need to implement the Convention. The articles of this
chapter list measures that the parties "shall adopt."8 9
Articles two, three, and four deal with confiscation, investigative
and provisional measures, and special investigative powers and tech-
niques, respectively. As in Chapter I, the approach of these articles is
broad in scope. For example, confiscation is to be permitted both of
specific items and items of equivalent value,90 and provisional measures
must be developed to identify and prevent the disposition of these
items.91 However, unlike Chapter I, reservations to article two were
permitted insofar as the categories of covered offenses is concerned, 92
though it was anticipated that parties would do so sp'aringly. 93
The need for such reservations is further minimized by the inclu-
sion of article five. This article calls on parties to insure that the rights
of innocent parties are preserved.9 The provision implies that parties
should be given an opportunity to be heard in court with the assistance
of counsel.95
The final article of the chapter, article six, establishes an obliga-
tion to criminalize money laundering.9 6 Furthermore, to the extent that
it is not contrary to a party's constitution or basic legal concepts,
criminalization of "money laundering" should include the knowing use
or possession of "proceeds" or aiding and abetting in the commission of
money laundering. 7 Again, reservations are permitted insofar as the
88. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 2.2.
89. E.g., COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 2.1. But see id. at art. 4.2.
(dealing with special investigative techniques such as wiretapping and stating, "[e]ach
party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary
.") (emphasis added).
90. Id. at art. 2.1; see also id. at art. 13; Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at
para. 48.
91. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 3.
92. Id. at art. 2.2.
93. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 27.
94. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 5.
95. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 31.
96. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 6.1.
97. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 32.
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categories of covered offenses is concerned, 98 but it should be noted
that reservations under this article are independent of any in article
two.9
9
c. Chapter III-International Cooperation
Building on the foundation laid by the first two chapters, Chapter
III sets forth the obligations and procedures needed to connect interna-
tionally the national measures described by the previous chapter. This
chapter is divided into sections with each section addressing a general
topic elaborated upon through the articles therein.
Section one describes the guiding principles to be used in constru-
ing the sections that follow.1°0 Article 7.1. states the general rule that
"[p]arties shall cooperate with each other to the widest extent possible
.... 1U01 To do so, article 7.2. mandates that parties "shall adopt" any
needed legislation to provide the international linkage to comply with
requests for assistance from another party.102 Though phrased expan-
sively, the Explanatory Report makes clear that this section is defined
by the parameters of the Convention; thus, for example, "fishing expe-
ditions," which are not contemplated by the Convention, do not fall
within the obligation to cooperate.103
What does fall within the obligation to cooperate is further defined
quite specifically in sections two,1°4 three,105 and four, 08 which deal
with investigative assistance, provisional measures, and cAnfiscation, re-
spectively. The initial article of each section requires the requested
party to comply with a request from the requesting party.107 Later arti-
cles in each of the sections provide that the request will be executed in
accordance with the domestic legislation of the requested party.108
98. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 6.4.
99. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 34.
100. Id. at para. 35.
101. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 7.1.
102. Id. at art. 7.2.
103. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 35. "If the requesting party
has no indication of where the property might be found, the requested party is not
obligated to search, for instance, all banks in the country; cf. Article 27, paragraph
l(e)(ii) [sic]." Id.
104. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 8.
105. Id. at art. 11.
106. Id. at art. 13.
107. See supra notes 93-95.
108. COE Convention, supra note 77, at arts. 9, 12, 14.
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However, the execution of the request via domestic machinery does not
mean that the grounds for a request are always subject to a de novo
review. For example, when the competent authorities of a requesting
state have determined the factual basis for a confiscation request, the
competent authorities of the requested state should not then re-try the
facts. Rather, the requested authorities should respect the decision of a
competent foreign authority. 10 9
Despite these strict obligations, a requested state may still refuse
to cooperate, citing one of the grounds listed in section five, Refusal
and Postponement of Cooperation. The grounds listed here range from
sovereignty interests110 to a de minimis exception where a sum to be
confiscated will not outweigh the expense of confiscation.,1 Though the
drafters concede that this section gives a requested state broad leeway
to refuse a request, they stress that it nevertheless places some restric-
tions on refusal. 112
Assuming cooperation is present, the issue of the rights of third
parties may arise. Section six, Notification and Protection of Third
Parties' Rights, deals with providing notice and an opportunity to be
heard.113 This section coordinates and secures the rights of third par-
ties. As a general proposition, the rights of third parties may be ad-
dressed in either the requesting or requested state. However, the actual
forum will be decided on the basis of procedural considerations particu-
lar to the parties involved. 4
Section seven is the final section of this chapter, entitled Proce-
dural and Other General Rules. The section sets out basic procedures
to administer the international cooperation. These provisions address
generally such matters as the format of the request, 115 to whom it
should be addressed, 1  confidentiality,1 1 7 and costs.118
109. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 52.
110. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 18.b.
111. Id. at art. 18.c; see also Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 62.
112. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 58.
113. COE Convention, supra note 77, at arts. 21, 22.
114. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 81; see also COE Convention,
supra note 77, at art. 30 (obligating a party who refuses to cooperate to give reasons
for refusing).
115. COE Convention, supra note 77, at arts. 25, 27. These provisions are some-
what detailed covering translations, content, and methods of communication. Id.
116. Id. at arts. 23, 24.
117. Id. at art. 33.
118. Id. at art. 34.
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d. Chapter IV-Final Provisions
Most of the provisions in Chapter IV are model clauses used by
the Council of Europe.129 These provisions cover reservations,'120 acces-
sion, 2I ratification, 2 et cetera.
The one notable exception is article forty-one, dealing with amend-
ments. Unlike other penal law conventions concluded in the Council of
Europe, this provision allows for minor amendments without the neces-
sity of protocols.12 3
Lastly, it should be noted that provisions for dispute settlement are
not specifically prescribed. A standard list of possible methods for dis-
pute resolution is offered, leaving it to the parties to decide upon a
particular method by agreement. 24
IV. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN REGIME
This section elaborates on some of the developments mentioned in
the previous section, and introduces others. The subsections that follow
point out areas and proposals that, if pursued and ratified, will expand
and further define the scope of the European regime of international
cooperation in criminal matters.
A. The European Communities
1. Directive on Money Laundering
On December 17, 1990, the Council of Economic and Finance
Ministers (ECOFIN Council) agreed on a common position for a direc-
tive to address money laundering' 25 The directive, if finalized would go
into effect January 1, 1993, calling on member states to make launder-
119. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 93.
120. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 40.
121. Id. at art. 37.
122. Id. at 36.
123. Id. at art. 41. See also Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 96.
124. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 42.
125. Zagaris, EC Finance Ministers Reach Agreement on a Money Laundering
Directive, 6 INr'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 432 (Dec. 1990). The position was reached
after discussion of the Proposal for a Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the
Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, March 23, 1990, COM (90)
106 final SYN 254.
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ing drug trafficking proceeds a criminal offense."26
Though the draft directive initially only requires action in the
realm of drug proceeds, it also allows member states the option of ap-
plying this convention to other areas such as terrorism and kidnapping.
Furthermore, it calls for the establishment of a working party to ex-
amine the possibility of uniformly extending the directive to other crim-
inal activities. 27 Supplementing the substantive requirements of the di-
rective are procedural provisions. In this regard, financial and credit
institutions would be subject to certain reporting requirements, includ-
ing a duty to report suspicious transactions.
However, the most significant aspect of this draft is the manner in
which it deals with the question of the Communities' limited jurisdic-
tion. It provides that member states take all necessary measures to im-
plement the provision, including participation in a multilateral declara-
tion in which it is agreed that penal sanctions will apply to credit and
financial institutions which refuse to comply with the directive. This
approach is to counter objections that criminal law is outside the scope
of Community law, for the penal sanctions themselves would be a re-
quirement of an extra-Community agreement. In a similar vein, it is
contemplated that some of the new democracies in Eastern Europe may
be able to associate themselves with the agreement.128
2. European Communities as International Actor
The European Communities, as an entity, has participated in ne-
gotiations at the international level. As noted earlier, the United Na-
tions Drug Convention is one example.1 29 Whether the Commission's
proposal for a Council decision on the Convention will be fol-
lowed-and to what extent it will create obligations on the member
states-remains uncertain. However, if the Council does issue a bind-
ing decision, the mere fact that the Communities will be taking such a
position on the Convention demonstrates potential for future interna-
tional cooperation in criminal matters at the Community level.
In addition, Community level cooperation is evident in other areas
outside of treaty negotiations. Two notable examples of this cooperation
126. For additional background, see Kellaway, Agreement to Outlaw Laundering
of Money in the Community, Fin. Times, Dec. 18, 1990, at 20, col.5.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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are the Communities' participation in Interpol and the Basle Commit-
tee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices. Both of these
organizations have adopted rules or declarations on the subject of mon-
itoring suspicious financial transactions.130 By participating and ex-
changing views on the subject, the Communities will be able to further
hone internal policy on the same subjects.
B. Council of Europe's Influence on Non-Member States
A consequence of the Council of Europe's involvement in the inter-
national regime is that human rights are given added attention, for in
article three of the Statute of the Council, there is the requirement that
members of the Council "accept the principles of the rule of law and of
the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 13 ' Though this obligation is addressed to mem-
bers of the Council of Europe, its influence reaches non-members.
In this regard, the Council of Europe is monitoring the human
rights situation in Eastern Europe. The new democracies in Eastern
Europe that want to join the Council will have to demonstrate the nec-
essary respect for human rights. Implicit in such a demonstration is a
criminal process that respects human rights. Furthermore, the same
measures that secure human rights domestically can also be expected
to foment international cooperation in criminal matters: for in the
Western European regime, provisions for human rights are often a fac-
tor, if not a prerequisite, to international cooperation in criminal
matters.132
Already, Eastern European countries have demonstrated an eager-
ness to accept advice and training on certain criminal .justice policies,
such as white collar crime. In the future, it appears probable that the
Council's influence in Eastern Europe, and thus, the European regime,
130. For the Interpol Resolution, see Resolution Adopted by 'Working Group on
Assets Derived from Crime-St. Cloud, France, April 1989; see also Assembly Passes
and Begins Implementation of Currency Information Resolution, 6 INT'L ENFORCE-
MENT L. REP. 96 (Mar. 1990). For the Basle Committee, see Committee on Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Practices, Prevention of Criminal Use of Banking System,
Draft Code of Conduct (B.S./88/52 May 9, 1988); see also Zagaris & Bornheim,
Foreign and International Money Laundering Laws, MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCE-
MENT LEGAL AND PRACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS (Criminal Justice Section, A.B.A., Oct.
26-27, 1989).
131. STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 52, at art. 3.
132. See Nilsson, supra note 50, at 6.
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will continue to grow.
C. The Schengen Accord
In addition to developments in the context of the European Com-
munities and the Council of Europe, international cooperation has sur-
faced in Europe in other areas. The Schengen Accord, signed June 19,
1990, by five countries, is one example. 133
Generally, this accord provides that signatory countries will
strengthen cooperation between police and justice officials in the signa-
tory countries. This effort will formalize the already existing informal
cooperation that allows police to pursue criminal suspects across their
national borders.3 Also, signatories agree to begin working on the
simplification of information exchange and extradition procedures and
the harmonization of gun-control legislation.
Regarding illicit drug trafficking, several articles of the accord ad-
dress the issue specifically. For instance, one article provides for the
establishment of a permanent working group to examine the problems
of and design solutions to illicit drug trafficking,'3 5 while another provi-
sion serves to supplement the 1988 United Nations Drug Convention
and efforts of the Communities such as the directive discussed above. 3 6
It is anticipated that more countries will be signing the accord in
the near future.37 Expanding cooperative efforts in this manner,
outside the framework of the Council and Communities, will add to
and further define Europe's international regime. Moreover, develop-
ments of this type serve as further proof of the flexible nature of
regimes.138
133. Convention to Apply the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985. Among
the Countries of the Benelux Economic Union, Federal Republic of Germany, the
French Republic Relative to the Gradual Suppression of Border Controls, signed on
June 19, 1990, in Schengen [hereinafter Accord]. For a discussion of the Schengen
Accord's enforcement provisions, see Five EC Members Reach Agreement on Schengen
Accord, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 226 (June 1990) [hereinafter Five EC Mem-
bers]. The five signatories are Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, and
Germany.
134. In some cases, police officers from one country will be able to chase criminal
suspects up to ten kilometers (6.21 miles) into a neighboring country. Five EC Mem-
bers, supra note 133.
135. Accord, supra note 133, at art. 70.
136. Accord, supra note 133, at art. 71.
137. Two likely candidates for signature are Spain and Italy. Id.
138. See W. FELD & R. JORDAN, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSIONS-IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN REGIME
A. As a Model for Other Regional Groups
The study of the European regime's approach to illicit narcotics
trafficking and money laundering has significance for other regional
groups, because many other regional groups are contemplating estab-
lishing regimes and are searching for the proper models. ]Kn light of the
changes in international money movement and illicit narcotics traffick-
ing, other regional groups, such as the Caribbean Common Market and
Community (CARICOM), have agreed on the need to take action
against these problems. However, their proposals are not yet as definite
and sophisticated as the actions of the European Communities or the
Council of Europe.1' 9
Nevertheless, the need for international cooperation is just as evi-
dent, if not more so, in groups like CARICOM. None of the members
of CARICOM have the means to take unilateral action because, unless
they take action in a uniform manner, the countries taking action will
likely lose economically as illicit profits move to their nonconforming
neighbors. 140 In this economically depressed region, such a result might
be difficult to justify politically. To facilitate the necessary cooperation,
the institutional models of a European Committee on Crime Problems
have been suggested for the Americas: the establishment of an Ameri-
cas Committee on Crime Problems with the Assistant Ministers of Jus-
tice and their assistants meeting on a regular basis to discuss and take
action and cooperate against drugs, money laundering, and a panoply
of criminal justice problems.14'
139. See, e.g., the communiques of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of
Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community from July 3-7, 1989 (support for
the establishment of a multilateral force under the aegis of the United Nations to pro-
vide assistance in intelligence and interdiction of illicit narcotics and for the creation of
an international criminal court to investigate and adjudicate criminal responsibility of
persons allegedly engaged in drug trafficking); and the communiques; of the Eleventh
Heads of Government Meeting on August 2, 1990 (support for the development of
mechanisms to protect the regional international banking and financial systems from
subversion by the international drug traffickers). See Caribbean Heads of Government
Issue Communique, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 336 (1990).
140. See the excellent discussion by Sanders in The Drug Problem: Social and
Economic Effects-Policy Options for the Caribbean, 3 CARIBBEAN AFF. 18 (1990).
141. For a discussion of this idea, see Zagaris & Papavizas, Using the Organiza-
tion of American States to Control International Narcotics Trafficking and Money
Laundering, 57 REV. INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 118 (1986). For further discussion of
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Proper consideration of the appropriate models requires an under-
standing of the origins and status of existing international regimes and
organizations. Moreover, a consideration of regimes is at a premium in
the Caribbean where within CARICOM there exists dynamic subre-
gional groupings, such as the Organization of East Caribbean States
(OECS), containing still another informal sub-sub-regional group, the
Leeward Islands Group.1 4
2
B. On International Cooperation with the United States
The current United States' posture towards international coopera-
tion in criminal matters is not wholly encouraging. Recent remarks by
William P. Barr, a Deputy Attorney General at the Justice Depart-
ment, make clear that the advocates of hard power, unilateral action
have a voice in the current administration. For example, in Mr. Barr's
opinion, the United States is free to seize foreign criminals (particu-
larly drug traffickers) and bring them to the United States for trial.
According to Mr. Barr, the authority for such acts is provided by do-
mestic laws, regardless of customary international law to the
contrary.143
However, soft power, cooperative approaches are also being pur-
sued by the Justice Department. Mark Richard, the Director of Inter-
national Affairs, has expressed enthusiasm for updating treaty relations
with other countries, while simultaneously continuing to work with ex-
isting treaties.1 4 4
Clearly, a hard power approach to criminal matters in Western
Europe would be an extreme and untenable position. If the United
States is to develop an effective international criminal policy with re-
gard to Europe, it will have to develop more effective ways of working
with Western Europe's international regime. Recently, the United
recent developments in the Caribbean, see Zagaris, Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force Aruba Meeting Presages Cooperation by Caribbean Jurisdictions, 6 INT'L EN-
FORCEMENT L. REP. 217 (1990).
142. See W. FELD & R. JORDAN, supra note 14 and accompanying text. Also, in
this regard, the Communities and the Council of Europe have examined some of the
benefits and difficulties of cooperation between regional groups. Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, Commission Communication to the Council on relations between
the Community and the Council of Europe, Brussels, March 8, 1989, COM(89) 124
final [hereinafter Commission of the European Communities].
143. Anderson, Fighting the International Drug War, A.B.A.J. 24 (Jan. 1991).
144. Id. at 25.
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States has experienced difficulties in working with this regime,14 5 and
future difficulties appear likely.146 Though the United States has shown
some interest in working with the European regime,147 it cannot be as-
sured of an effective policy in Europe without a more aggressive com-
mitment to work with the existing regime. Such a commitment requires
that United States practitioners and policymakers familiarize them-
selves with the regime.
C. On Future Western European Cooperation in Criminal
Matters
Though the European regime's sophistication is due in part to the
active sponsorship of both the Council of Europe and the European
Communities, this dual sponsorship is not without attendant difficulties.
Both organizations have distinctly separate agendas, and. the potential
for redundant and conflicting approaches to cooperation in criminal
matters is real.
In acknowledgement of the need to coordinate the activities of the
two organizations, formal structures have appeared to ensure that dia-
logue between the two groups is maintained. 48 The most significant
structure is the relationship established between the Commission of the
European Communities and the Interdepartmental Working Party of
the Council of Europe. It is anticipated that this relationship can pro-
vide for a "regular comparison" of the activities of the two
organizations. 149
However, structural differences in the two organizations may still
prove problematic. The Council of Europe pursues its objectives largely
through conventions and recommendations. The Communities, on the
other hand, emphasizes legislative actions. Disagreements over which
methods to use when addressing particular problems may arise. The
future of Western European cooperation in criminal matters will de-
pend in part on the ability of the regime to accommodate these compet-
145. See, e.g., Breitnemoser & Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: the Soer-
ing Case, 11 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 845 (1990); Quigley, Death Row as a Violation of
Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1990).
146. Current U.S. forfeiture laws may not be respected by Western Europe.
Nilsson and Zagaris, A.B.A. National Institute Considers International and Foreign
Law Aspects of Asset Forfeiture 435, 437, (Dec. 1990).
147. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
148. See Commission of the European Communities, supra note 142.
149. Id. at 4.
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ing approaches to cooperation. In this regard, the flexible nature of re-
gimes and the current spirit of cooperation between the two
organizations provide a basis for optimism.
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The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A
Comparative Analysis
Sharon A. Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
The double or dual criminality rule is one that is more or less uni-
formly applied in principle in extradition law and process on a world-
wide basis. However, the particular construction differs from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, often quite considerably. The aim of this article is
to sample but a small segment of practice by looking at the law of just
three states: Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
America. These three were selected mainly because of historical and
geographical considerations. For example, Canada and the United
Kingdom, along with other Commonwealth countries, have a special
scheme for the so-called "rendition" of fugitive criminals based upon
historical ties. In addition, Canada and the United States, being so geo-
graphically close, are clearly appropriate and necessary partners for ex-
tradition matters. This article will place primary focus on the extradi-
tion law of Canada, and will show that Canada is in the process of
reforming both its rendition and extradition laws.
The purpose of this article is to: first, differentiate between extra-
dition to foreign states and "rendition" between Commonwealth coun-
tries; second, address the differences in approach between interpreta-
tion of extradition treaties and extradition statutes; third, make a
comparative analysis of the laws of the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Canada; and fourth, analyze the interaction between extra-
territorial jurisdiction over criminal offenses and double criminality,
and lastly, to draw some conclusions on the future of the rule of double
criminality in potential new Canadian extradition law.
* Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York Univer-
sity, Toronto, Canada.
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II. EXTRADITION AND RENDITION: COMPARISONS AND
CONTRASTS
A. Extradition
The basic precept of extradition law, contained in many countries'
extradition statutes and bilateral treaties, is that there must be a
threshold requirement of double criminality, otherwise known as dual-
ity of offenses. Under this doctrine, the offense for which extradition is
sought must be one for which the requested state would in turn be able
to demand extradition. In other words, the offense must be considered
criminal in both states. Double criminality is based upon a reciprocal
characterization of the offenses' and a type of mutuality of obligations2
between states. It is also premised upon the maxim nulla poena sine
lege, or "no punishment without law."3 As one author succinctly stated:
"No person may be extradited whose deed is not a crime according to
the criminal law of the State which is asked to extradite as well as the
state which demands extradition." 4
It is important to note right at the outset of this article that the
double criminality principle has not been viewed as a principle of cus-
tomary international law automatically binding states. Instead, it has
been considered a creature of treaty and statute. One commentator has
argued that double criminality "is not so much a rule of international
law as a consideration based on policy and expediency."" Thus, a fugi-
tive cannot raise the double criminality question as a bar to extradi-
tion if the applicable treaty or statute - or both, depending upon the
1. The reciprocal characterization is perhaps tied into the view of extradition as
a form of mutual assistance in criminal matters between states. See M.C. BASSiOUm,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 324 (1987).
2. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
314 (1974).
3. 1. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-41 (1971); see also
Karle, Some Problems Concerning the Application of the European Convention on
Extradition, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES 51
(1970); H. Schulz, The Principles of the Traditional Law of Extradition, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES 7, 12-13 (1970).
4. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 701 (8th ed. 1955).
5. 1 H. VE. HARTLY BOOTH, BRITISH EXTRADITION LAW AND PROCEDURE 50
(1980) (citing O'Higgins, British and Irish Extradition Law and Practice (1961) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis)); see also Brabyn, Exceptional Accusation Cases Under the
Extradition Acts 1870 to 1935, 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 796, 797 n.7.
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forum - is silent. In the famous case of Factor v. Laubenheimer, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the principle is based not
on international law but on treaty.7
In the past, there has been some confusion between the distinct
concept of double criminality and the extraditable offense. Under ex-
isting Canadian law, section 2 of the Extradition Act provides that an
"extradition crime" is one that if committed in Canada or within Ca-
nadian jurisdiction would be one of the crimes listed in Schedule 1 of
the Act." The majority of Canada's extradition treaties which pre-date
the new "no list" approach likewise have a schedule and section 3 of
the Act provides that if there is an inconsistency between the Act and
the treaty, the treaty will prevail. In "list" treaties, the approach is
really two-tiered. The first tier considers whether the offense is listed in
the treaty as extraditable. If the offense is not included in the list in the
treaty, then the analysis is over, and extradition is not possible. How-
ever, if the offense is included in the list, it is necessary to move to the
second tier and consider whether double criminality exists.
In "no-list" treaties, the related principles of criminality of con-
duct and double punishability are of ultimate importance. It has been
aptly put by one author that "[t]he requirement of double criminality
provides the substantive basis needed to ensure that the process shall
not . . . be arbitrary." 9
6. 290 U.S. 276 (1923).
7. Id. at 287, 300. But see I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 138: "The rule seems to"
be universally established by practice, however, that it could without much doubt be
regarded as a customary rule of international law should the question ever arise as a
result of some chance omission in the wording of a treaty." Shearer's conclusion does
not seem to gel with actual practice. See, e.g., In re Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir.
1982); In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980).
8. Extradition Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. E-23, § 2 (1985).
9. M.C. BAssIouNI, supra note 2, at 322. There has been much debate as to the
two potential ways to interpret double criminality. The in concreto, or objective, ap-
proach looks to the exact labelling of the offense and its constituent elements. See 41 R.
INT. DR. PEN. 12 (1970), for resolutions adopted by the 1969 10th Congress of the
International Association of Penal Law, which indicates a preference for the in con-
creto approach. The in abstracto, or subjective, approach looks to the actual criminal
nature of the act without undue preponderance on the label and full identity of the
elements in the states. See C. van den Wyngaert, Double Criminality as a Require-
ment to Jurisdiction, in DOUBLE CRIMINALITY: STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 43
(N. Jareborg ed. 1989) for an example of a preference for the in abstracto approach.
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B. Rendition
The surrender of fugitives to and from parts of the Commonwealth
is called rendition. It has the same basic meaning as extradition but
there are fundamental differences in Canada between its application
under the Fugitive Offenders Act,10 and extradition pursu ant to the Ex-
tradition Act."1 First, no treaties are required for rendition. This is pre-
mised upon the historical connection of the members of the Common-
wealth and the feeling at the inception of the scheme in the late
nineteenth century that the rigid formality and safeguards of the extra-
dition process with "foreign" states were not appropriate or necessary
within Canada.
Second, under Canada's Fugitive Offenders Act, there is no list of
extraditable offenses and no provision for double criminality. Under
section 3 of the Act, the only requirement is that the offense carry a
penalty in the requesting province of at least twelve months' imprison-
ment with hard labor.1 2 Under section 4, the offense does not have to
be criminal in Canada, nor does it have to be punishable in Canada
with at least twelve months' imprisonment with hard labor.13 The argu-
ment to be addressed towards the end of this article is the need to bring
rendition into line with extradition by providing that both rendition and
extradition offer similar safeguards.
III. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
The differences in approach between interpretation of extradition
treaties and statutes become apparent when the question considered is
what role extradition actually plays. From an international law per-
spective, it is a treaty matter bearing on the rights and duties of states;
thus, emphasis is placed on inter-state cooperation. From a domestic
law perspective, extradition may be viewed as a part of the criminal
process and is thus necessarily interpreted in a fashion that stresses the
protection of the fugitive's rights.
Generally speaking, the rule fundamental to the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties is that of literal interpretation according to
10. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 (1985).
11. Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23 § 2 (1985).
12. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 § 3 (1985).
13. Id. at § 4.
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the ordinary meaning of the words used in the text.14 There is also the
essential commitment that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith,
"which is at once psychological and ethical, requiring adherence to or-
dinary meaning and context."15 A treaty must necessarily be inter-
preted in a manner that is calculated to give it effect and content
rather than to deprive it of meaning. 16
Applying this principle to extradition treaties, the approach of
courts in Canada, and certainly in the United Kingdom, has been that
of liberal interpretation to give effect to the treaty. As one commenta-
tor stated, "treaties should receive a fair and liberal meaning and...
in extradition matters the ordinary technical rules of criminal law
should only apply to a limited extent.""u
In Schmidt v. The United States,"' Mr. Justice La Forest made
the following declaration:
I would add that the lessons of history should not be overlooked.
Sir Edward Clarke instructs us that in the early 19th century the
English judges by strict and narrow interpretation, almost com-
pletely nullified the operation of the few extradition treaties then in
existence: see A Treatise Upon the Law of Extradition (4th ed.,
1903), c. V. Following the enactment of the British Extradition
Act, 1870 (U.K.), 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52, upon which ours is mod-
elled, this approach was reversed. The present system of extradition
works because courts give the treaties a fair and liberal interpreta-
tion with a view to fulfilling Canada's obligations, reducing the
technicalities of criminal law to a minimum and trusting the courts
in the foreign country to give the fugitive a fair trial .... 19
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.39/27, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 679 (1969) (instrument of accession de-
posited by Canada, October 14, 1970, pursuant to Order in Council, P.C. 1979-1339;
entered into force January 27, 1980). Although it has not been ratified by the United
States, the Vienna Convention provisions are considered to the greatest extent to be
declaratory of customary international law. See RESTATEMENT (TMRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF nr UNITED STATES (1987).
15. See S.A. WILLIAMS & A.L.C. DE MESTRAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ]INTEfINA-
TIONAL LAW 359 (2d ed. 1987).
16. Id; see also M. MCDOUGALL, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 156 (1967).
17. G.V. LA FOREST, EXTRADITION To AND FROM CANADA 57 (2d ed. 1977).
18. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
19. Id. at 524. According to section 52 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, see Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, which is Schedule B, Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), ch. 11. Should a treaty provision, as implemented into Canadian law by the
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In the United States one author has stated that
[w]here a provision is capable of two interpretation; either of
which would comport with the other term of the treaty, the judici-
ary will choose the construction which is more liberal and which
would permit the relator's extradition, because the purpose of the
treaty is to facilitate extradition between the parties to the
treaty.20
The author further observed that "[a]t times the judiciary will inter-
pret terms beyond their actual meaning to encompass their spirit and
intent .... -21 This approach of liberal interpretation of extradition
treaties may be labelled "cooperative," as it responds to the mutual
interests of states in having a flexible extradition process and reciprocal
cooperation.2
Halsbury's Laws of England characterizes this approach as fol-
lows: "The words used in such [extradition] treaties are to be given
their ordinary, international meaning, general to lawyer and layman
alike, and not a particular meaning which they may have attracted in
certain branches of activity in England."2 In the case of Belgium v.
Postlewaite,24 Lord Bridge of Harwich addressed this issue and re-
ferred to the well-known dictum of Lord Russell in In re Arton (No.
2),25 where the latter stated: "In my judgment those treaties ought to
Extradition Act, violate a Charter Right and not be saved by section 1, the provision
will be struck down as would domestic legislation itself. See Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
at 518, where Justice La Forest states that "[tihere can be no doubt that the actions
undertaken by the Government of Canada in extradition as in other matters are subject
to scrutiny under the Charter. .. " See also Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 455, 464.
20. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 88 (emphasis added) (citing the rule of
liberal interpretation of extradition treaty terms); see also U.S. v Wiebe, 733 F.2d
549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1980); In re
Sidona, 584 F. Supp. 1437, 1447 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
21. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 89 (citing L. OPPENHEiiq, supra note 4, at
952-53). This rule was applied in Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300 (2nd Cir.
1984).
22. See C. Warbrick, The Criminal Justice Act 1988. The New Law on Extradi-
tion, 1989 CiuM. L. REV. 4, 5 n.19; see also Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. H.R.R. 297, 326-
7 (ser. A) (1987) (Schermers, J., dissenting).
23. 18 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND para. 216, at 88 (4th ed. 1977).
24. [1987] 2 All E.R. 985 (H.L.); accord United States v. howe, [1989] 3 All
E.R. 315.
25. [1896] 1 Q.B. 509.
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receive a liberal interpretation, which means no more than that they
should receive their true construction according to their language, ob-
ject, and intent."2
Lord Bridge went on to hold that the judgment in Arton was good
authority for the proposition that the court should not interpret any
extradition treaty, unless so constrained by the language, in a way
which would "hinder the working and narrow the operation of most
salutary international arrangements." 27 It is interesting to note that in
Postlewaite Lord Bridge refers to Lord Widgery's statement in R. v.
Governor of Ashford Remand Centre, ex parte Beese.28 In Beese, Lord
Widgery held that because an extradition treaty is a contract between
two sovereign states, it must be construed as if it were a domestic stat-
ute.29 However, in applying that principle in Postlewaite, Lord Bridge
held that the parties to bilateral extradition treaties have entered into
reciprocal rights and duties for the purpose of bringing to justice those
who have committed grave crimes and thus to "apply to extradition
treaties the strict canons appropriate to the construction of domestic
legislation would often tend to defeat rather than to serve this pur-
pose."30 Thus, in Postlewaite Lord Bridge indicated that we should be
looking for the underlying intention of the high contracting parties in
interpreting the treaty provisions.-3
This emphasis on inter-state cooperation in an era of transnational
and international crime may be seen as conflicting with the protective
function of extradition law. One commentator has made the following
suggestion:
The conflict between the cooperative and protective functions of ex-
tradition law creates a certain tension, something exacerbated by
the different views among States about the exact place of extradi-
tion in the criminal process. To the extent that extradition is seen
[as] simply part of the process of gaining custody of the fugitive,
the protections appropriate are relatively slight and the matter may
be regarded as administrative rather than judicial.3 2
26. Id. at 517.
27. Postlewaite, [1987] 2 All E.R. at 991.
28. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 969.
29. Id. at 973.
30. Postlewaite, [1987] 2 All E.R. at 992.
31. Id.
32. Warbrick, supra note 22, at (footnotes omitted).
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The protective side of the extradition procedure clearly lays emphasis
on the penal law aspects and provides for procedural safeguards for the
fugitive.33 The Postlewaite case illustrates a preference for the coopera-
tive approach, and this preference can also be seen in other fairly re-
cent extradition cases dealing with evidentiary issues,3 4 the political of-
fense exception, 5 and the double criminality rule itself. 6
In conclusion, on this issue of interpretation, it appears that courts
in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have in recent
times emphasized the. cooperative intent of the parties to extradition
treaties when called upon to interpret their provisions. It is only where
the domestic statute is in question that the courts have been more pro-
tective. When the courts have been required to interpret the extradition
legislation, such as the Extradition Act or Fugitive Offenders Act, then
the penal aspects have been stressed and where ambiguities have been
found they have been construed in favor of the fugitive.37 In Regina v.
Governor of Pentonville ex parte Cheng,3 8 in the House of Lords, Lord
Simon of Glaisdale argued that "the positive powers under the Act [i.e.
to extradite] should be given a restrictive construction and the excep-
tions from those positive powers a liberal construction."39 Moreover,
"[s]ince the common law, as so often, favours the freedom of the indi-
vidual, the rules enjoining strict construction of a penal statute or of a
provision in derogation of liberty. . . merely reinforce the presumption
against change in the common law."'40
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATUTES AND CASE LAW
In order to interpret and analyze the direction in which extradition
law is heading, it appears most fruitful to engage in a comparative
33. For a recent case in which the European Court of Human Rights held that
extradition to. Switzerland involved a violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights, article 5(1)(f), see Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. H.R.R. (ser. A) 297 (1987).
34. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Office ex parte Rees, [1986] 2 All
E.R. 321.
35. Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1973] 2 All E.R. 204; Keane v.
Governor of Brixton Prison, [1972] 1 All E.R. 1163.
36. U.S. v. McCaffery, [1984] 2 All E.R. 570; Denmark v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 All
E.R. 81.
37. See In re Aronson, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 436, 466.
38. [1973] App. Cas. 931.
39. Id. at 954.
40. Id.
[Vol. 15
201
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Williams
study of the status of the law in the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Canada. This comparative study is particularly helpful in
light of the fact that there is a new British statute that has recently
addressed the question under consideration.
A. The United Kingdom
In December 1989 the United Kingdom enacted a new Extradi-
tion Act. For the sake of the following analysis, this section will be
divided into the pre-December 1989 case law - based on the earlier
Extradition Act,4 Fugitive Offenders Act, 2 and Treaties - and the
post-1989 composite statute, for which as of yet there is no judicial
interpretation.
1. Pre-1989 Extradition Act
When discussing the British position on double criminality, per-
haps the best approach is to look at the case law and government docu-
ments leading to the 1989 Act and to comment on them first. In March
1979 the Home Secretary announced the appointment of a Working
Party to review the law and practice of extradition in the United King-
dom. In 1982 this Interdepartmental Working Party produced its Re-
port.43 Regarding the double criminality question, the Report stated
the traditional rule that fugitives should only be surrendered for acts
which are not only offenses against the law of the requesting state, but
which would also constitute offenses against the law of the requested
state if committed within its jurisdiction. 4
The Working Party Report stated that the justification for the
double criminality rule is the basic principle that the fugitive should be
treated by the requested state in the same way as any other person in
its jurisdiction. 5 Therefore he should not be detained or proceeded
against for acts which do not contravene the requested state's criminal
law. It should be emphasized that the double criminality rule, as ex-
41. Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52.
42. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, ch. 68.
43. HoME OFFIcE, A REviEw OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXTRADITION IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM (1982) [hereinafter REPORT].
44. This double criminality principle was contained in the relevant British stat-
utes at that time: the 1870 Extradition Act, the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act, and the
1965 Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act.
45. REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
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pressed in the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act, had been interpreted differ-
ently from the double criminality provisions in the 1870 Extradition
Act. This will be evident from the analysis of the cases that follow.
In the case of R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Bud-
long and Kember," it was held that the acts or omissions for which the
extradition request is made should disclose an extraditable offense if
the acts or omissions had occurred in the requested state. This case was
decided under the 1870 Extradition Act, and the double criminality
rule was well articulated by Lord Justice Griffiths. He stated that
double criminality would be satisfied if it is demonstrated "that the
crime for which extradition is demanded would be reccgnized as sub-
stantially similar in both countries [and] that there is a prima facie
case that the conduct of the accused amounted to the commission of
the crime according to English law."14 7
The 1982 Report stated that this was, in the view of the Working
Party, the correct approach.48 According to the Report, the test applied
in Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Gardner, 4 9 a Com-
monwealth rendition case under the 1967 Act, was too stringent.50 In
Gardner, Lord Parker made the following argument:
It seems to me that what is clearly contemplated [in the 1967 Fu-
gitive Offenders Act] is that a request coming forward to the Sec-
retary of State must set out in some form, and no doubt the most
useful form is the warrant or warrants for arrest, the offence or
offences of which the fugitive is accused . . . . Not only must it
supply a general description. . . but it must condescend to suffi-
cient detail to enable the matter to be considered. 5'
The Working Party elaborated that the strictures impos;ed in Gardner
were that "the offence disclosed must be identical, either in its descrip-
tion or in its constituent parts, to the offence named in the
requisition." 52
46. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1110.
47. Id. at 1122. Note that Lord Griffiths also held that it is the "substance of the
two offences that must correspond, not their precise definitions." Id. at 1120 (citing In
re Arton (No. 2), [1896] 1 Q.B. 509); see also Rex v. Dix, [1902] 18 T.L.R. 231;
Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Ecke, 1974 Crini. L.R. 102.
48. REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
49. [1968] 2 Q.B. 399.
50. REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
51. Gardner, [1968] 2 Q.B. at 415 (emphasis added).
52. REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
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As the two cases indicate, there was a clear disparity in the ap-
proach between these two statutory applications. The later cases also
bear this out. The key case applying the 1870 Extradition Act is In re
Nielsen.53 This case concerned an extradition request from Denmark,
and the House of Lords held that double -criminality need only be
proved when the particular extradition treaty provides for it.54 Lord
Diplock described it as the "exceptional accusation" case.5 5 The 1870
Extradition Act was held to require no more than that the conduct
disclosed in the evidence delivered by the requesting state be an "extra-
dition crime" in the United Kingdom. There are several passages from
the judgment that are worth quoting, as they illustrate quite clearly the
conduct-based approach to double criminality. Lord Diplock, writing
for a unanimous court dismissing Nielsen's appeal, began the opinion
as follows:
It is ... appropriate at this juncture to draw attention to the fact
that, when one is describing crimes committed in a foreign state
that are regarded in the United Kingdom as serious enough to war-
rant extradition of an offender by whom they have been committed,
one is describing the way in which human beings have conducted
themselves and their state of mind at the time of such conduct.
Since conduct of that kind consists of wicked things that people do
in real life it is possible to describe it either in broad generic terms
and using popular language, or in varying degrees of specificity
The 1870 [Act] list uses the former technique ....
So in order to determine whether conduct constitutes an 'extradi-
tion crime' within the meaning of the Extradition Acts 1870 to
1935, and thus a potential ground for extradition if that conduct
had taken place in a foreign state, one can start by inquiring
whether the conduct if it had taken place in England would have
fallen within one of the 19 generic descriptions of crimes in the
1870 list.56
On its own facts Nielsen was not an "exceptional accusation case,"
which resulted in the case being decided by reference solely to whether
the conduct was criminal if committed in England and covered by the
53. [1984] 2 All E.R. 81 (H.L.).
54. Id. at 82.
55. Id. at 89. As to the term "exceptional accusation cases," see Brabyn, supra
note 5, at 796.
56. Nielsen, [1984] 2 All E.R. at 84.
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1870 list.57 The Nielsen case clarified the meaning of section 26 of the
Extradition Act 1870. Section 26 defined an extradition crime as "a
crime which, if committed in the United Kingdom or within United
Kingdom jurisdiction, would be one of the crimes described in the first
Schedule to this Act."58
Until Nielsen it was uncertain what meaning attached to the word
"crime." There were two possibilities. The first was that "crime" re-
ferred to a specific criminal offense under the laws of the requesting
state. The second possibility was that it referred to conduct that is
viewed as criminal. It was this second "conduct" approach that was
adopted by Lord Diplock in Nielsen. As one writer has stated:
It follows that, since the first Schedule provides that the list of
crimes therein is to be construed according to the law existing in
England at the date of the alleged crime, only English law is rele-
vant to the question whether particular, behaviour amounts to an
extradition crime for the purposes of the Act. So far as, the statu-
tory definition of 'extradition crime' is concerned, foreign law is not
relevant at all.59
It is interesting to observe that in Nielsen and in the next case to
be considered, United States v. McCaffery, 0 the House of Lords did
not use the term "double criminality" in any shape or form. It has been
suggested. by one commentator that by not using this term the justices
"sought to disassociate themselves" from the Budlong definition quoted
earlier in this section.61 The commentator goes on to suggest that the
Budlong requirement, "that the foreign crime with respect to which
extradition is requested must be substantially similar to a relevant of-
fence in English Law," was forcefully rejected in Nielsen as having no
justification in the words of the 1870 Act.62 Lord Diplock's rejection of
the double criminality rule is explicit in his use of the expressions "the
57. Id. at 88-89. See J. Crawford, Case No. 5: Government of Denmark v. Niel-
sen, 1984 BmRT. Y.B. INT'L L. 343, reprinted in 48 J. CRiM. L. 373 (1984).
58. Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52.
59. See Brabyn, supra note 5, at 797. In contrast, section 3 of Canada's Extradi-
tion Act refers explicitly to Canada's extradition treaties taking precedence over the
Act in the event of conflict. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The treaties
contain double criminality clauses of varying descriptions.
60. [1984] 2 All E.R. 570 (H.L.).
61. Brabyn, supra note 5, at 798. For a discussion of the Budlong holding, see
supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
62. Brabyn, supra note 5, at 798.
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sobriquet of 'double criminality',"' 3 in Nielsen and "the so-called
double criminality" rule in McCaffery."
In McCaffery, Lord Diplock, again writing for a unanimous House
of Lords, held that the proper test under Nielsen is "whether the con-
duct of the accused, if it had been committed in England, would have
constituted a crime falling within one or more of the descriptions in-
cluded in that list."16 5 However, as Lord Diplock points out, "the pre-
cise matter on which evidence of foreign law would be necessary would
depend on the terms of the particular extradition treaty." 66 Thus, the
cases interpreting the 1870 Extradition Act can best be summed up as
pointing out that proof of double criminality is only necessary where
the Treaty calls for it. In all other cases it is sufficient that the conduct
amounts to an extradition crime in the United Kingdom.
Under the Commonwealth scheme, a different position has been
taken, as alluded to earlier in Gardner.67 Article 12 of the Scheme Re-
lating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders Within the Common-
wealth provides that "[t]he return of a fugitive offender will be pre-
cluded by law or be subject to refusal by law. . . if the facts on which
the request for his surrender is grounded do not constitute an offence
under the law of the country or territory in which he is found. '"68
Gardner required correspondence of the crime in both requested
and requesting states. Two writers have made the following suggestion:
As most of the requests to the United Kingdom under the Scheme
emanate from countries enjoying a common legal heritage, little
difficulty arose in the majority of cases in matching the ingredients
of the crimes in both countries. However, in Gardner and a subse-
quent unreported case of R. v. Pentonville Prison, ex parte Myers
63. Nielsen, [1984] 2 All E.R. at 90.
64. McCaffery, [1984] 2 All E.R. at 573.
65. Id. at 573.
66. Id; see also Jennings v. United States, [1982] 3 All E.R. 104, in which the
House of Lords held that evidence was required which would prove, under the criminal
law in force in that part of the United States where the conduct took place, that a
criminal offence occurred subject to the requisite minimum punishability required by
the Treaty. Id. at 113. The emphasis again, as in Nielsen and McCaffery, is on conduct
"rather than the particular packaging of criminal offences." See Brabyn, supra note 5,
at 800.
67. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
68. CrmD. 3008 (London, 1966). See also C. Nicholls & C. Nicholls, The Old
and the New 4 (October 1989) (unpublished paper presented at the Biennial Confer-
ence of the International Bar Association, Strasbourg).
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(1972) No. 293/72, the court refused to order the surrender of
fugitives because the Commonwealth crimes charged related to fu-
ture pretences, as there was no corresponding crime in the United
Kingdom. 9
In Canada v. Aronson,7 ° the issue before the House of Lords was
whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the trial of the fugitive
in the United Kingdom for what he was alleged to have done in the
requesting state and not simply for what he had appeared to have done
wrong according to English law.71 Lord Bridge of Ha:rwich declared
that he preferred this narrow construction. In fact he stated that "I do
not think that the language of the statute fairly admits of the wide
construction . . . . [I]f the language is ambiguous, the narrow con-
struction is to be preferred in a criminal statute as the construction
more favourable to the liberty of the subject."7 2
The court took the view that there was a basic fallacy in the argu-
ment of the appellants in that there was an attempt to assimilate the
requirements of the 1870 and 1967 Acts. This argument failed, as the
structure and machinery of both Acts is disparate. Lord Bridge stated
specifically:
Nowhere in the 1870 Act is there any provision which has the ef-
fect of imposing a double-criminality rule, though such a rule may
be introduced into the extradition machinery by the provisions of
particular treaties. By contrast . . . [1]egislating to give effect to
the [1967] scheme, it was necessary to provide that a returnable
offence should both fall within one of those broad categories and
satisfy the 'double criminality rule' laid down in cl 10 of the
scheme [relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders Within the
Commonwealth, Cmnd 3008, 1966].71
Lord Lowry, joined by Lords Bridge and Elwyn-Jones, addressed
the impact of extradition cases such as Nielsen upon rendition cases
such as Aronson in the following words:
[T]he appellants here seem to me to have represented to your
Lordship's the paramount position of Nielsen's case, :not only in
69. C. Nicholls & C. Nicholls, supra note 68, at 5.
70. [1989] 2 All E.R. 1025.
71. Id. at 1027.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1028.
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relation to extradition, concerning which it is of course the leading
authority, but also in regard to the return of fugitive offenders
[under the 1967 Act]. . . [S]uch an approach could not validly
be adopted in a fugitive offender's case.74
Lord Griffiths, one of the two dissenting judges, held that the rejection
of the Nielsen test of conduct would make the 1967 Act unworkable.7 5
He did not hesitate to construe the words "act or omission constituting
the offence," set out in section 3(1)(c) of the 1967 Act, as a reference
to the fugitive's conduct.7 6 He went on to state that "I cannot reconcile
the alternative construction with section 3(1)(a), which by its language
shows that what is required is broad similarity, not exact correspon-
dence, of offence . . . . " This sharply divided decision, which held
that Aronson could not be extradited, illustrates the problems in the
double criminality rule when narrowly construed, especially where fis-
cal offenses are concerned.
One final case that has dealt with this issue is that of In re Os-
man, 7 8 which involved a request from the Crown Colony of Hong Kong
under the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act. As to the double criminality
rule, Lord Parker held as follows:
The double criminality provision of FOA does not require in my
judgment a meticulous and precise identity of wording . . . The
74. Id. at 1048.
75. Id. at 1030.
76. Section 3(1)(c) of the Act provides for rendition of fugitives for ."relevant
offences," as follows:
(1)For the purposes of this Act an offence of which a person is accused or
has been convicted in a designated Commonwealth country or United
Kingdom dependency is a relevant offence if -
(c)in any case, the act or omission constituting the offence, or the
equivalent act or omission, would constitute an offence against the law of
the United Kingdom if it took place within the United Kingdom or, in the
case of an extra-territorial offence, in corresponding circumstances outside
the United Kingdom.
77. Id. Section (3)(1)(a) provides that an offense is a relevant offense if -
in the case of an offence against the law of a designated Commonwealth
country, it is an offence which, however described int hat law, falls within
any of the descriptions set out in Schedule 1 to this Act, and is punishable
under that law with imprisonment for a term of twelve months or any
greater punishment.
78. [1990] 1 All E.R. 999.
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combined effect of Aronson and its predecessors [Gardner and My-
ers] is, in my view, that if the charge as formulated by the request-
ing state would constitute, if proved, an offence here, the offence is
a relevant offence .... 7
2. The 1989 Extradition Act
It is not within the scope of this article to enter into a comprehen-
sive review of the 1989 Act. However, a brief account of its back-
ground will be given and the sections pertinent to this article on double
criminality will be discussed. The 1989 Extradition Act1° consolidates,
with amendments, enactments relating to extradition under the 1988
Criminal Justice Act,"' the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act,82 and the
1870-1935 Extradition Acts.
The impetus behind the new Act was not only to streamline the
extradition procedure by reducing the multiplicity of legislation, but
also to assist foreign states, particularly in Europe. Under the old law,
the European states had difficulty in obtaining extradition, primarily
due to the prima facie case requirement of sufficiency of evidence. In
fact, "[t]he legislation ha[d] been said to be too protective of the rights
of the fugitives and not sensitive enough to the cooperative needs of
states dealing with international crime and mobile cricminals." 83 The
process of reform can be traced back to the 1982 Report of the Inter-
departmental Working Party, considered earlier in this section." This
was followed by the Green Paper on Extradition in 1985 .85
It should be noted that running through this process was the im-
portant consideration of the necessity of amendment if the United
Kingdom was to become a party to the European Convention on Extra-
dition." In 1986, the White Paper entitled Criminal Justice: Plans for
Legislation8 7 was presented to Parliament. The proposals in these docu-
79. Id. at 1015-1016.
80. Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33.
81. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33.
82. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, ch. 68.
83. [3 CURRENT LAw STATUTES ANNOTATED 33 (1989)]
84. See supra note 43.
85. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department,
1985. CamND 9421.
86. European Convention on Extradition, 1957, E.T.S. No. 24.
87. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department,
CMND 9658.
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ments became legislation in Part I of the 1988 Criminal Justice Act.
However, it was not proclaimed into force immediately. In June 1989,
an Extradition Bill was introduced to consolidate legislation relating to
extradition.88
The new consolidated Extradition Act became effective in Decem-
ber 1989.89 Its language is clearly taken from the earlier statutes,
which are now wholly or largely repealed, 90 and from the recommenda-
tion of the Law Commission Report. In consolidating the earlier stat-
utes, the 1989 Act makes binding, where utilized, the language of the
earlier statutes. It could be argued that the case law interpreting those
statutes should not be of value. However, even though strictly speaking
this might be true, "it would be unrealistic to disregard the case law on
the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 (because it never came into force,
there is no case in law on Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988) and,
indeed the consideration of similar language in the Extradition Act
1870. "91
Section 2 of the new act defines "extradition crime." This defini-
tion is radically different from the definitions found in the 1870 Extra-
dition Act and the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act. Instead, it follows the
mode of Article 2 of the European Convention on Extradition.92 The
first striking feature is contained in Section 2(1)(a). This section de-
fines an "extradition crime" as "conduct" in the territory of a foreign
state, Commonwealth country or colony, which, had it occurred in the
United Kingdom, would constitute an offence punishable with a term of
imprisonment of at least 12 months. Moreover, however the crime is
described in the law of the foreign state, Commonwealth country or
colony, it must be so punishable under that law. This section clearly
follows the conduct-based line taken by the courts in Nielsen98 and Mc-
Caffery, 4 but not that of Aronson.95 Therefore, the narrow construc-
88. For consideration of the Bill and a Report making certain proposals, see The
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Extradition Bill: Report on the
Consolidation of Legislation Relating to Extradition, Law. Com. No. 182, Scottish
Law Com. No. 119.
89. Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33. See Hansard, H.L. Vol. 509, cols. 484, 846;
Vol. 510, col. 790; H.C. Vol. 157, col. 1129.
90. See Current Law Statutes Annotated, supra note 83, at 33.
91. Id. at 33-34.
92. See supra note 86.
93. [1984] 2 All E.R. 81.
94. [1984] 2 All E.R. 570.
95. [1989] 2 All E.R. 1025.
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tion of Aronson is dead.98
As to jurisdiction over the offense, section 2(l)(a) refers to the
territory of the requesting state. The British courts could take a broad
view of this basis of jurisdiction in a manner that can b- compared to
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Libman v. The Queen.7
One British writer has commented: "The practical importance. . . will
depend upon the extension of United Kingdom law, either by the courts
or by legislation, to catch crime with an extraterritorial element."98
Sections 2(l)(b), 2(2), and 2(3) deal with extradition for extra-
territorial offenses. Offenses will be extraditable where "in correspond-
ing circumstances equivalent conduct would constitute all extra-territo-
rial offence against the law of the United Kingdom" punishable by a
minimum of 12 months imprisonment.9 9 Thus, where there is duality of
jurisdictional bases extradition will take place.100 It should be noted
96. The minimum punishability requirement clearly will bring into play more
offenses than before. In particular, fiscal offenses will no longer be excluded, as they
generally had been in the past. But see R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magis-
trate, ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department, [19881 1 W.L.R. 1204;
see also Report, supra note 43, at 12-13. This new approach will take immediate effect
as regards treaties with such a provision. However, with the "old list" variety, that
method will continue until amendment.
97. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178. Evidence of this broad view may alo be seen in In re
Reyat, [CO 1157/88 Q.B.D. 1989]. In Reyat, the court held that the phrase "extra-
territorial offences. refers to cases which are wholly foreign in concept and not those
which merely have a foreign element . " See also R. v. Governor of Pentonville
Prison, ex parte Osman, [1988] Crim. L. R. 611; R. v. Governor of Plentonville Prison,
ex parte Herbage, 84 Crim. App. 149 (C.A. 1987); R. v. Treacy, [1971] App. Cas. 537
(H.L.).
98. C. Warbrick, The Criminal Justice Act 1988: The New Law on Extradi-
tion, 1989 CPUM. L. REV. 4, 8. The comments refer to the Criminal Justice Act, but as
the same provisions appear in the 1989 Consolidation Act, they still stand. See also
LAW COMMISSION, JURISDICTION OVER OFFENCES oF FRAUD AND DIsHoNEsTY WITH A
FOREIGN ELEMENT (1989); Leigh, Territorial Jurisdiction and Fraud, 1988 CalM. L.
REV. 280. For cases in which extradition was refused for lack of jurisdiction, see Gov-
ernor of Pentonville, ex parte Khubchandani, 71 Cr. App. R. 241 (1980); and R.
Harden (1962), 46 Cr. App. R. 90.
99. Supra note 89.
100. See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text for an analysis of duality of
jurisdiction. Note that this is in accord with the recent pre 1989 Act decision in R. v.
Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Naghdi, [1990] 1 All E.R. 257, where it was
held that under the 1870 Act, the meaning of "within the jurisdiction of the requesting
state" should not be interpreted solely in the sense as it is used by the foreign state,
since this could be regarded by the United Kingdom as an "exhorbitant jurisdiction."
Id. at 265-66.
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that the United Kingdom, much like Canada, utilizes a territorial ap-
proach to criminal jurisdiction,10 1 except with respect to murder com-
mitted by its nationals abroad and offenses under the various interna-
tional terrorism conventions.
Extradition will also take place for extraterritorial offenses (1)
where the nationality of the offender basis of jurisdiction is used by the
requesting state; (2) where the conduct took place outside the United
Kingdom; and (3) if, had it occurred in the United Kingdom, it would
constitute an offence subject to the minimum punishability rule of 12
months. This provision must be read in the light of the fact that many
states in Europe use this active nationality basis.10 2 It must be stressed
that this application is only addressed to the nationality of the offender
as the jurisdictional link with the requesting state. It is contrasted with
the passive nationality principle, which is based on the nationality of
the victim.103
A situation could present itself where a national of State A with
whom the United Kingdom has an extradition relationship commits an
offense in State B under the laws of State A. The conduct may be
lawful in State B. However, extradition will take place if the conduct
would be regarded as criminal if done in the United Kingdom and be
punishable under the minimum punishabili ty rule. One commentator
supports this result by arguing that the "justification is to be found in
the underlying policy of providing an effective response to certain kinds
of international crime. It will eliminate the 'safe haven', e.g. drug deal-
ing or planning terrorist operations, by allowing for the return of per-
sons to the State most affected by the activities."104
B. The United States
Until 1979 all the bilateral extradition treaties of the United
101. See R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Rush, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 165.
102. See Williams & Castel, The Extradition of Canadian Citizens and Sections
1 and 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, XXV CAN. YR. BK.
INT'L. L. 263, 268-69 (1987).
103. It appears that an early version of the Criminal Justice Bill inadvertently
did not so restrict it to active nationality. According to two commentators, the result
would have been "to allow 'long arm' claims of, for example, the United States, which
bases much of its federal jurisdiction on the nationality of the victim, particularly in
the case of banks. This jurisdiction would not be recognized under the new Act." See
C. Nicholls & C. Nicholls, supra note 68, at 12.
104. Warbrick, supra note 98, at 9.
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States used the enumerative method. One writer has commented that
the refusal to go with the no-list approach "stemmed basically from the
multijurisdictional criminal justice system" in the United States.10 5 The
fear in the United States was that the no-list approach would prove
unwieldy in that in every case it would have to be decided what law
determines the extraditibility of the offense.1"6 However, it appears that
recently "the United States Department of Justice has preferred to
adopt the no-list approach, in light of the high cost in time and effort of
updating treaties. 1 0 7
However, where the list approach still exists, the applicable case
law indicates that extradition will not be granted unless the fugitive
(sometimes designated the "relator") is alleged to have committed an
offense listed or described in some way in the applicable treaty. As is
true with most countries' list treaties, there is no detail or definition of
the offenses but simply an identification formula. 10 8 It stands to reason
that to determine this formula, a body of substantive criminal law must
be applied and that body of law is that of the place of arrest. 0 9 In the
now classic case of Collins v. Loisel,110 Justice Brandeis stated:
It is true that an offence is extraditable only if the acts charged are
criminal by the laws of both countries . . . The law does not re-
quire that the same name by which the crime is described in the
two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of liability shall
be coextensive, or in other respects the same in the two countries.
It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both
jurisdictions.""
This opinion dove-tails with the judgment of Chief Justice Fuller in
Wright v. Henkel,"2 where it was held that "it is enough if the particu-
lar variety was criminal in both jurisdictions."'1 3
105. C. Blakesley, International Extradition: An Exercise in Comparative and
International Law 37-38 (December 1989) (unpublished paper, presented at Confer-
ence on Extradition, Siracusa, Sicily).
106. Id. at 38; see e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
107. C. Blakesley, supra note 105, at 38.
108. M.C. BAssIoum, supra note 1, at 336.
109. Id.; see also U.S. v. Stokinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1959), affid, 361 U.S.
513 (1959).
110. 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
111. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
112. 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
113. Id.; see also Gluckman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508 (1910,'.
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Because of the variegated system of criminal jurisdiction divided
between the federal government and the states, certain questions arise
that are peculiar to the United States. For example, should double
criminality be determined by the law of the state in the United States
where the fugitive is found or by the law of the majority of states in the
United States? In Factor v. Laubenheimer,"" the United States Su-
preme Court mentioned that the crime charged was a crime under the
"law of many states, if not Illinois ... ."15 This approach has been
adopted by many courts in the United States.""6 One writer has
summed up the position as follows: "What the Supreme Court in Fac-
tor and subsequent decisions following it appear to hold is that the
judge will determine whether there is a sufficient number of States that
have criminalized the action in question to legitimize his decision. The
obvious defect is uncertainty. '117
In the recent case of United States v. Sensi,1 8 the circuit court of
appeals held that double criminality does not require that the criminal
laws of the requested and requesting states are "perfectly congru-
ent.""' According to the court, this would be an absurdity, based on
the fact that the criminal laws of different states will rarely match ex-
actly.120 It is important to note the part of the judgment dealing with
the fugitive's conduct as criminal. The court referred to the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which
states that the requirement for double criminality is that the "acts
charged" constitute a serious offense in both states.1 21 As the court
stated, "[the Restatement makes clear that the focus is on the acts of
the defendant, not on the legal doctrines of the country requesting
extradition. 1 2
114. 290 U.S. 276 (1923).
115. Id. at 300, 303.
116. See, e.g., Theron v. U.S. Marshal, 832 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1987); In re of
Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1986); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843
(1st Cir. 1980); In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); U.S. v.
Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
117. C. Blakesley, supra note 105, at 49.
118. 879 F. 2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'g 664 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1987).
119. Id. at 893; see also Oen Yiu-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F. 2d 1400 (9th Cir.
1988); Theron, 832 F. 2d at 492; In re Extradition of Russell, 789 F. 2d 801 (9th Cir.
1986); In re Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
120. Sensi, 879 F.2d at 893.
121. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATEs § 476 comment d (1987).
122. Sensi, 879 F.2d at 894. See also United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463
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In Reza Emami v. United States,128 a case in which an Iranian
physician was found to be extraditable to West Germany for criminal
insurance fraud offenses, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that the keynote was that the sub-
stantive conduct punishable in both states was functionally identical.
Thus, the principle of dual criminality was satisfied.
Pertinent to our discussion and of comparative assistance to Cana-
dian jurisprudential discussion is Quinn v. Robinson,124 where the cir-
cuit court of appeals held that "[tihe question whether the offense
comes within the treaty ordinarily involves a determination of whether
it is listed as an extraditable crime and whether the conduct is illegal in
both countries. 125
One author has noted that "a few decisions have more carefully
analyzed the elements of the offense against those listed. in the treaty
and denied extradition.1 128 He adds that "[1]ack of treaty coverage has
been a difficulty for the United States in seeking to extradite for pecu-
liar offences like mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation of
stolen goods, or securities law violations, none of which are listed in any
extradition treaties entered into prior to World War I.''t21
C. Canada
1. The No-List Approach
The recent treaties and protocol that Canada has negotiated with
India, France, Germany, the Philippines and the United States respec-
tively indicate that Canada has opted for the no-list approach, which
determines extradition on the basis of double criminality and a mini-
mum punishability requirement rather than on an enumerated schedule
of offenses in the treaty. This will prevent outmoded lists. However, it
(11th Cir. 1988).
123. 834 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1987).
124. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
125. Id. at 791.
126. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1444,
1463 (1988). For listed cases, see id. at 1463 n.124; see also, Melia v. U.S. 667 F.2d
300, 302 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981).
127. Kester, supra note 126, at 1463. Note the following statement by the De-
partment of Justice: "Many federal offences are based upon the commerce clause of
the Constitution. Regrettably these offenses are not extraditable under most treaties.
For example, the gravamen of 18 U.S.C. 2314 is interstate transportation, not theft."
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUsTICE, U.S. AttORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-15.220 (1977).
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is still necessary for the requesiing state to show that the offense is
criminal in both the requested and requesting states. In essence, the no-
list approach allows potentially more offenses to be extraditable. Of
particular note will be the inclusion of fiscal offenses, which unless pro-
vided for specifically in bilateral treaties are not extraditable at
present. 128
This approach appropriately places its concentration not on the
strict denomination of the offense but upon the conduct constituting the
criminal offense. This denomination or enumerative approach, may
vary radically between countries and even between states in a federal
system such as the United States of America. The no-list approach dic-
tates a move away from a rigid interpretation of extraditable offenses
within treaty schedules and emphasizes the conduct in question.
2. Canadian Case Law Interpreting Double Criminality
Canadian courts have long taken the position that even where
there was an applicable list of offenses appended to a treaty, it was not
necessary for the requesting state and Canada to use the same termi-
nology. Apparently, the key factor is not that both states use the same
terminology or denomination, but rather that the evidence as a whole
makes a prima facie showing that the offender has committed what
amounts to an offense in both states. In Cotroni v. A-G of Canada,129
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the test to be used is to ask
what is the essence of the offense. Accordingly, it does not matter that
the particular indictment, had it been issued in Canada, would have
been issued under the Criminal Code or any other statute. There is no
requirement of exact identity between the offense charged in the re-
questing state and the Canadian offense. The focus is on criminal
conduct.
In United States v. Smith,130 Mr. Justice Borins held that "it is
the conduct alleged against the [fugitive] which is central to the hear-
ing resulting from a request for extradition. It is the alleged criminality
128. Note, however, that this exception to extradition was recently eroded by the
House of Lords in R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1204 (H.L.).
129. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 219; see also In re Brisbois, 133 C.C.C. 188 (Ont. H.C.)
(1962); Virginia v. Cohen, [1973] F.C. 622.
130. 15 C.C.C. 3d 16 (1984); see also In re Smith and the Queen, 16 C.C.C. 3d
10 (1984).
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of this conduct to which attention must be paid." 13' The inquiry is not
focused on the legal framework of the requesting state. Instead, Can-
ada must fit a set of facts that constitute the conduct of the fugitive
into Canadian law in order to see whether conduct constitutes an of-
fense under that particular law.13 2 Using this "conduct" test, it is not
necessary to determine whether the requesting state can make out a
prima facie case under its criminal law. The essence is the sufficiency
of evidence in the forum.'33
The Supreme Court of Canada again had cause to deal with this
issue in Washington v. Johnson.184 In Johnson, the applicable treaty,
the 1976 Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States,13 5
contained a list of offenses. Mr. Justice Wilson, writing for the major-
ity, stated that the issue was whether the requesting state must estab-
lish that the offense charged in the foreign state is an offense in Can-
ada or whether it is sufficient to show that the conduct charged would
have amounted to a Canadian crime, listed in the treaty, if it had oc-
curred in Canada. 36 The court noted that Article 2 of the treaty re-
quires a combination extraditable crime and double criminality, with a
minimum punishment time of one year, and held that the double crimi-
nality rule looks to the conduct of the fugitive. 3 '
The Johnson court quoted the following passage from La Forest's
Extradition To and From Canada:
An extradition crime may broadly be defined as an act of which a
person is accused, or has been convicted of having committed
within the jurisdiction of one state that constitutes a crime in that
state and in the state where that person is found, and that is men-
tioned or described in an extradition treaty between those states
under a name or description by which it is known in each state.138
It is not necessary for an exact identity between terminology in the two
states, nor for the elements of the crime to be the same in both states.
131. Smith, 15 C.C.C. 3d at 16.
132. Id.
133. See United States v. Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported).
134. 40 C.C.C. 3d 546 (1988).
135. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, 27 U.S.T. 983, Can. T.S.
No. 3.
136. Johnson, 40 C.C.C. 3d at 548.
137. Id. at 553.
138. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 17, at 42; see also SHEARER, EXTRADION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1971).
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This would be an impossible task to accomplish.139 The focus is undeni-
ably upon the conduct of the fugitive.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently dealt with the in-
terplay of extraditable crime and double criminality in United States v.
McVey.140 This case involved an extradition request for the offense of
submitting false statements to the United States Customs Service. This
particular offense was not listed in the schedule to the Canada-United
States Extradition Treaty of 1976. However, the crime of forgery is
listed in the same Treaty. It was argued that the definition of forgery
was broad enough to include McVey's alleged crime. In the United
States his offense did not constitute forgery. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal, referring once again to La Forest's text,1 41 held that
the offense must be listed in the schedule to the Treaty under some
name or description by which it is known in each state.142 This case
demonstrates the need for the no-list approach to extradition, in which
the criminality of the conduct in both states is the keynote coupled with
a minimum punishability requirement. It gets away from the limiting
effect of the enumerative method. 43
None of the authorities discussed in this section so far bear di-
rectly upon this case. Although McVey's conduct was criminal in the
United States, and would have been considered criminal if it had oc-
curred in Canada, the difficult question is to decide what construction
must be placed upon Article 2 of the Treaty.144
139. See 1 H. BOOTH, supra note 5, at 50, where the author states that the
extradition court cannot "become a tribunal of foreign law." See also R. v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison ex parte Elliott, [1975] Crim. L.R. 516; R. v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison ex parte Narang, [1978] A.C. 247.
140. 33 B.C.L.R. 2d 28 (1989).
141. See supra note 138.
142. McVey, 33 B.C.L.R. 2d at 30.
143. M.C. BASSIouNI, supra note 1, at 330.
144. This Article provides as follows:
(1) Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this Treaty
for any of the offenses listed in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty, which
is an integral part of this Treaty, provided these offenses are punishable by
the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding
one year.
(2) Extradition shall also be granted for attempts to commit, or conspiracy
to commit or being a party to any of the offenses listed in the annexed
Schedule.
(3) Extradition shall also be granted for any offense against a federal law
of the United States in which one of the offenses listed in the annexed
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The key question to be addressed is whether the alleged criminal
conduct in the requesting state must be enumerated in the extradition
treaty as well as the offence established by Canadian law, if it has an-
other name, or whether it is sufficient to have the dual criminality con-
ception as to the conduct present and an enumeration of the Canadian
offense in the treaty alone. In interpreting treaty articles, and attempt-
ing to shed some light on the complex double criminality issue
presented in McVey, some fairly recent cases may be of valuable guid-
ance. In United States v. Smith, 45 Mr. Justice Borins saw the need for
double criminality with respect to the fugitive's conduct and an enu-
meration of the offense in the treaty. He relied upon La Forest's Extra-
dition To and From Canada14 for the proposition that "if the act
charged falls within the definition of different crimes in the two coun-
tries, the names of the crimes in both countries must appear in the
treaty; otherwise extradition will be refused."'' 47
A second valuable case is United States v. Caro-Payan,48 which
concerned, inter alia, the question of whether a continuing criminal en-
terprise relating to drug trafficking was an extraditable offence. Mad-
ame Justice Smith's reasoning succinctly addressed the point of extra-
dition law raised in McVey and referred to the earlier case of Sudar v.
United States.4" The justice stated that "a treaty must be [given] a
liberal interpretation in working to achieve its stated ends.'1 50
Madame Justice Smith applied the British cases of Nielsen'51 and
Schedule, or made extraditable by paragraph (2) of this Article, is a sub-
stantial element, even if transporting, transportation, the use of the mails
or interstate facilities are also elements of the specific offense.
1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. II, 27 U.S.T., 983 Can. T.S. No.
3.
145. 15 C.C.C. 3d 16 (1984).
146. G.V. LA FOREsT, supra note 138, at 52-55.
147. Smith, 15 C.C.C. at 28. This is the line that the British Columbia Court of
Appeal took in McVey, 33 B.C.L.R. 2d 28 (1989), see supra notes 140-143 and accom-
panying text, and more recently in In re Ogoshi, No. CC891575 (British Columbia
Supreme Court Nov. 3, 1989) (unreported).
148. (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported).
149. 39 N.R. 433 (1981).
150. Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported). This emphasis on not
frustrating the purpose of the treaty by resorting to technical argtaments can also be
seen in the trilogy of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada: Allard and Cha-
rette v. United States [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564; Mellino v. Argentina, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536,
and Schmidt v. United States, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
151. [1984] 2 W.L.R. 737.
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McCaffery,152 and held that the old double criminality test, which re-
quired an almost exact pairing of all the constituent elements of the
offense, is not the requisite test today. Instead, the conduct test should
be applied. Of the utmost relevance to the McVey issue is the state-
ment that "[t]he extradition judge need only consider whether the evi-
dence against the fugitive would justify a committal for trial if the
'conduct alleged' had been committed in Canada, and that conduct is a
crime that is listed in the Treaty. '1 53
The decision in Caro-Payan, which holds that for double criminal-
ity to be present there is no need for all the constituent elements of the
offense charged to be the same in both the requesting and requested
state, is non-controversial. Madame Justice Smith argued that "[i]t is
the conduct that must be criminal and not the offence that must be
identical in both the requested and requesting State."u5 4 She concluded
that this is a natural extension of Nielsen and McCaffery and is "to-
tally consistent" with the observations of La Forest in Extradition to
and From Canada.55
Madame Justice Smith seems to be holding that as long as the
conduct would be criminal if committed in Canada, and if that conduct
is a listed crime in the treaty, then there is no necessity for it to be also
referred to in the treaty list under a name by which it is known in the
requesting state. This point is re-emphasized further in the same case
where she states:
It is no longer necessary for the extradition judge to determine
whether a "continuing criminal enterprise", as alleged in Count 1
of the Requesting State's indictment, is an offence known in Can-
ada. Rather the question is whether the "conduct" alleged against
the fugitive would, if committed in Canada, constitute a crime
that is listed in the Schedule of offences to the Extradition
Treaty.1 5
6
This view would appear to go against the grain of La Forest's
statement that if the "act charged amounted [to different offenses in
the requesting and requested states], both crimes would have to be
152. [1984] 1 W.W.R. 867.
153. Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported).
154. Id.
155. Id.; see G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 57.
156. Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported) (emphasis added).
1991] 607
220
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Nova Law Review
listed in the treaty before extradition would be granted."' 17 The McVey
and Ogoshi courts relied upon La Forest's statement, but however
much assistance a doctrinal view may be, it is clearly not binding on
the courts. There must be a primary interpretation of the sections of
the statute and articles of the treaty. As indicated earlier, there is a
good argument to be made that Article 2(1) of the 1976 Extradition
Treaty does not require the offense to be listed under names by which
it is known in both states.158
The third case is particularly relevant because it is factually simi-
lar to McVey. In United States v. Golitschek,59 Madame Justice
Smith held, similar to her holding in Caro-Payan, that the essence of
double criminality is conduct-based. In Golitschek, the fugitive was al-
leged to have conspired with others outside of the United States to pro-
cure ten military helicopters and to take them outside of the United
States to a state to which export under United States law is prohib-
ited.60 In order to accomplish this export, the fugitive and others pro-
duced and submitted a false document (end-user certificate) to obtain
the required license to export from the United States Government.161
Madame Justice Smith held that the essence of the offense was a
conspiracy to obtain an export license by false pretenses or by false
statement.162 Canada utilizes extra-territorial jurisdiction over conspir-
acies pursuant to section 423(4) of the Criminal Code and the sub-
stance of the conspiracy would give rise to the offense of obtaining by
false pretenses, (section 321(a)), forgery or making false documents,
(section 324(1)), uttering a false document, (section 325), and making
false statements to obtain an export license under the Export and Im-
port Permits Act.6 3 Thus, the fugitive's conduct would be capable of
157. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 56-57.
158. See supra notes 140-157 and accompanying text.
159. (Ont. D.C. January 1986) (unreported). Golitschek was extradited to the
United States and was prosecuted and found guilty in March 1986.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The false pretence was contained in the end-user certificate which indi-
cated the helicopters were going to Spain rather than Iran. The essence of the second
offense was conspiracy to forge or make false documents, based on the facts that if
documents were presented to the U.S. authorities certifying that ths helicopters were
going to Spain so that they could effect an export to Iran, it would be by means of a
false document. Id.
163. Madame Justice Smith refers to the Import and Export Act, section 16.
This appears to be in error. I assume that she meant section 17 of the above named
statute, dealing with false and misleading information and misrepresentation. See
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prosecution in Canada if Canada was in the position of the United
States.
Madame Justice Smith went on to hold that this conduct on the
part of the fugitive was covered by several offenses listed in the sched-
ule of offenses appended to the Treaty, namely Numbers 12 (obtaining
property, money or valuable security by false pretences), 17 (offenses
against the laws relating to forgery), and 19 (making of false affidavit
or statutory declaration for afty extrajudicial purpose). Article 2(2) of
the Treaty stipulates that conspiracy to commit any of these7 offenses is
also extraditable.'" In addition, Count 2 on the extradition indictment
alleged a conspiracy to obtain an export license by false pretenses using
the telephone and telex.16 5 Although there is no precise Canadian
equivalent to fraud or obtaining property by wire, Madame Justice
Smith emphasized that it is the underlying conduct covered by the
Treaty which must be considered. In this case, it was the use of false
pretenses to obtain an export license and the method by which the par-
ticular crime was executed was not relevant. Therefore, this offense was
covered by Number 12 of the Schedule of Offences.
Madame Justice Smith concluded that the conduct on all counts
would give rise to criminal offenses in Canada and all were listed in the
Treaty. It is important to note that she did not discuss the issue raised
in McVey, which was that in the United States the offense did not con-
stitute forgery.16 6 She did not question that the Schedule encompassed
the offenses on the extradition indictment. As discussed earlier, this ap-
proach is the one that seems to be in keeping with the purpose behind
the extradition process. The rights of the fugitive are safeguarded, as
he or she will not be extradited unless the conduct is considered crimi-
nal in both states and is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceed-
ing one year pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Treaty.
This provision is supplemented by Article 10, which requires that
the evidence must be sufficient to justify committal for trial if the of-
fense had been committed in the territory of the requested state. 67 The
important question raised is why the McVey court, which failed to look
R.S.C. 1985, ch. E-19.
164. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. II, section 1, 27
U.S.T. 983, Can. T.S. No. 3.
165. Golitschek, (Ont. D.C. January 1986) (unreported).
166. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
167. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art X, 27 U.S.T. 983, Can.
T.S. No. 3.
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beyond the crime of "forgery" as listed in the Treaty, did not consider
the "false pretenses" possibility as the Golitschek court did.
The same approach utilized in Golitschek was also taken by the
Superior Court of Quebec in United States v. Meredith,65 where Mr.
Justice Hannan held that the nature and type of crime in the U.S.
indictment, obtaining goods using false pretenses, was recognized in
Canada. He argued as follows:
If the conduct of the accused, had it been committed in Canada
would give rise to offences in Canada, and these offences are
caught in the net of criminal offences covered by the Treaty, then
the conduct with which the accused is charged as being an offence
in the United States is an extradition offence. It is not the title of
the offence which is important but rather the essential element, so
that an offence may be subject to the treaty because of its essential
elements though it not be there mentioned by name.169
In assessing the position taken by Canadian courts, it is clear that
the case law stresses an interpretation of treaty obligations that is lib-
eral and fair and gives effect to Canada's international obligations. It is
also clear that section 2 of the Extradition Act has been interpreted to
mean that the conduct must be viewed as criminal, if it had occurred in
Canada. Section 2 allows for extradition as long as the "Canadian ver-
sion" of the criminal conduct amounting to an offense is "described" in
a "list-treaty." Section 3 of the Extradition Act provides that in the
event of inconsistency between the Act and the extradition arrange-
ment, the arrangement will govern and the Act must be so read and
construed. It is therefore necessary to look at Canada's bilateral ar-
rangements on a treaty by treaty basis. The 1976 Extradition Treaty
with the United States is for obvious geographical reasons the most
utilized and is the one at issue in the recent McVey case.
When the wording of Article 2, (1) of the 1976 Extradition Treaty
is examined, it can be readily divided into two distinct parts: (1) per-
sons shall be extradited according to the provisions of this Treaty for
any of the offenses listed in the Schedule annexed to the Treaty, which
is an integral part of this Treaty; and (2) these listed offenses must be
punishable by the laws of both contracting parties by a term of impris-
onment of no less than one year.170
168. No. 500-27-004092-872 (Que. S.C. Sept. 4, 1987) (unreported).
169. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
170. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. I, section 1, 27
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As indicated above, there may be no need for the denomination of
the offense to be the same in the requesting and requested state.1 71
Similarly, the scope of liability need not be co-extensive. It is enough
for the extradition process that the offense charged is considered to be
criminal conduct in both states. The intention of the parties to the
treaty was to extradite on the basis of reciprocity and the second part
of Article 2 (1) should be read in this light. There should be a fair and
liberal interpretation of extradition treaties that will not hinder the
working and narrow the operation of the arrangement.
The word "offences" utilized in Article 2 (1) of the Treaty should
be read to mean "conduct," and any "conduct" listed in the treaty
should be extraditable, provided the conduct is considered criminal in
both states and both states have a minimum punishability for it of at
least one year. This would seem to fit well within the analysis of recent
Canadian and British decisions considered earlier. It should also be rec-
ognized that in determining the extraditable nature of the crime, it is
necessary pursuant to Article 9(3) of the 1976 Extradition Treaty to
provide that there is "such evidence, as according to the terms of the
requested State, would justify his arrest and committal for trial if the
offence had been committed there .. .. 1"'7 This is a safeguard for the
fugitive - extradition will not be granted for acts not considered crimi-
nal conduct in both states or where there is an insufficiency of evidence.
The basis for these Articles is found in section 18 of the Extradition
Act.17 3
This issue of double criminality interfaces with the principle of
specialty, which holds that a person extradited shall not be tried or
punished in the requesting state for an offense other than that for
which extradition has been granted.17 4 It is important to note here that
the specialty principle is linked to the rigid approach of non-extradition
U.S.T. 983, Can. T.S. No. 3.
171. See Johnson, 40 C.C.C. 3d at 546, discussed supra notes 134-139 and ac-
companying text; Smith, 15 C.C.C. 3d at 16, discussed supra notes 145-147 and ac-
companying text; Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported), discussed
supra notes 148-158 and accompanying test; Meredith, No. 500-27-0004092-872 (Que.
S.C. Sept. 4, 1987) (unreported), discussed supra notes 168-169 and accompanying
text.
172. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. IX, 27 U.S.T. 983,
Can T.S. No. 3 (emphasis added).
173. Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33, § 18.
174. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. XII, 27 U.S.T. 983,
Can. T.S. No. 3.
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adopted by the McVey court.175 However, if a rigid, technical interpre-
tation is to be made of Article 2 (1) of the Treaty, it would result in
complex difficulties concerning criminal conduct. Several questions
have arisen over the last decade with respect to whether double crimi-
nality may be achieved when dealing with foreign legislation that has
no exact Canadian counterpart.
To use current examples, would offenses under the United States'
laws such as RICO 17 and CCE177 find equivalents under Canadian
criminal law? Assume the 1976 Treaty is strictly interpreted and extra-
dition could only take place for "forgery." If the conduct in the U.S.
would not be prosecuted as "forgery" under the U.S. Code and other
legislation, would this result in a violation of the specialty principle?
The British Columbia Supreme Court, in the habeas corpus application
in In re McVey, 7 8 held that the specialty principle would indeed be
violated. Again, this type of analysis would seem to be artificial and
defeat the purpose of the Treaty. The cornerstone of the Treaty is reci-
procity and recognition by both states of the fact that the alleged con-
duct is criminal. To put up these technical roadblocks hobbles the effi-
cacy of the whole process. Additionally, it should be noted that when
Canada extradites for an offense listed in the Treaty, the requesting
state may well be prosecuting under a different technical name. How-
ever, the emphasis always remains upon the conduct for which the ex-
tradition was granted; unrelated offenses allegedly committed before
the extradition was granted are not included. As Mr. Justice La Forest
stated in Parisien v. The Queen,'79 a state to which a request for extra-
dition is presented is under no 'obligation to surrender the fugitive for
prosecution in the requesting state "for behaviour not considered crimi-
nal in the requested state."'180 This is the basic principle upon which
the process is founded, as expressed in the maxim nulla poena sine
lege, - "no punishment without law."
In the case of Sudar v. United States,'8' the Ontario High Court
held that extradition on charges of racketeering and conspiracy to rack-
eteer could take place. It based this holding on the following rationale:
175. See supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
176. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1962).
177. Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1970).
178. 30 B.C.L.R. 2d 197 (1988).
179. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 950.
180. Id. at 956-57.
181. 39 N.R. 433 (1981).
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[T]he only real substantive components of the indictment against
Sudar for the purposes of extradition are the conspiracy. . . and
the activities of murder, threats to murder etc. There is no doubt as
to the criminality of these activities and of any conspiracy in rela-
tion thereto. They are recognized as such the world over.1 82
This appears to be an approach based upon conduct rather than de-
nomination.183 It was not necessary to find that the acts charged in the
United States were also set forth in the Treaty. The basic problem is
whether the extradition is granted for the offenses as named under the
United States statute, or whether extradition is granted by the extradi-
tion court because the offenses are considered criminal in Canada. If
the result is that the crimes are those articulated by the court, then any
prosecution in the United States under a special statute would violate
the principle of specialty. Canada extradited for the criminal conduct
involved - conspiracy, murder, threats of murder, arson and extortion.
All of these offenses are listed in the Treaty. However, Sudar was in-
dicted in the United States and eventually prosecuted under RICO.
A similar situation arose in the Australian case of Riley v. Com-
monwealth,184 in which the fugitives were sought by the United States
for the offence of continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) under 21
U.S.C. § 848.185 The fugitives were involved in a series of offenses re-
garding importation and possession for the purpose of distributing a
narcotic.1 8 6 The Australian court addressed the issue of whether CCE
was an extraditable offense under the 1976 Treaty between Australia
and the United States.18 7 The schedule of offences appended to the
Treaty had no CCE offense. However, the court assessed whether the
182. Id.
183. For a criticism of the Sudar decision, see Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman,
International Extradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. AND COMM. REG. 353
(1985), in which the authors argue that "the determination whether [CCE] . is rec-
ognized as punishable in the requested state must be made with reference to CCE as a
whole and not its separate parts. Extradition is sought, granted or denied on the basis
of the overall crime." Id. at 36. The authors also suggest that "[w]hen the elements of
CCE are combined, it is clear that the offence is an exclusive genus of United States
criminal law. Because it is not punishable in foreign countries, it cannot satisfy double
criminality, and thus, does not qualify as an extraditible offence." Id.
184. 60 A.L.J.R. 106 (Austl. 1985).
185. Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970).
186. Riley, 60 A.L.J.R. 106.
187. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Australia-United States, 27 U.S.T. 957, TIAS
8234.
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acts composing the CCE offense would be considered criminal in Aus-
tralia if committed there. The court found that the conduct would have
been criminal if committed in Australia, and concluded that the CCE
offense was extraditable, even though an exact parallel did not exist
under Australian law.188 As to the issue of double criminality, the court
reasoned that "because at least one act which formed an element of the
offence of continuing enterprise, or an equivalent act, would have con-
stituted an offence against a law . . . if it had occurred in New South
Wales, the offence itself is an extradition crime."' 189
In the British case United States v. McCaffery,190 the United
States sought extradition for federal offenses which consisted of using
wire, radio, or television to transmit communications for fraudulent
purposes in interstate or foreign commerce and of knowing transporta-
tion of a stolen security in interstate or foreign commerce. The House
of Lords had to address the issue that there was no English equivalent
to the charges. Following the decision in Nielsen,1 91 the court held that
the offense was extraditable and applied the test enunciated in Nielsen,
which stated that what must be considered "was whether the conduct
of the accused, if it had been committed in England, would have consti-
tuted a crime falling within one or more descriptions in that list.119 2
In Hagerman v. United States,193 CCE was once again under re-
view. This particular crime is unknown to Canadian law. Mr. Justice
McKenzie held that the intent of Article 2(3) of the 1976 Extradition
Act was to create a new extradition crime category if it "fits the
description of possessing as a substantial element a listed federal of-
fence or one listed under art. 2(3) . . .,. The thrust of the judg-
ment seems to be that Article 2(3) was aimed at giving greater scope
for extraditable crimes "even though they might possess the purely
American characteristic of requiring transporting, transportation, the
use of the mails in interstate facilities."'1 9 What Mr. Justice McKenzie
sought was (1) an offense against the federal law of the United States;
and (2) a substantial element of that offense must be one of the of-
188. Riley, 60 A.L.J.R. at 106.
189. Id. at 109.
190. [1984] 2 All E.R. 570.
191. [1984] 2 All E.R. 81. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Nielsen.
192. McCaffery, [1984] 2 All E.R. at 573; see Nielsen, 2 [1984] All E.R. at 573.
193. 44 C.C.C. 3d 157 (1988).
194. Id. at 162.
195. Id.
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fenses listed in the schedule to the Treaty.""8
V. DOUBLE CRIMINALITY AND DUALITY OF JURISDICTIONAL
BASES
One issue still to be addressed is the impact of assertions through
domestic law of extraterritorial jurisdiction over criminal offenses and
how this interacts with double criminality. As emphasized earlier, it is
essential that the requested state views the offense for which extradi-
tion is sought as extraditable. 9 7 Here, the principles of jurisdiction over
the offense are crucial. 198 If an extradition treaty provides for crimes
which are considered extraditable crimes if committed within the re-
questing state's jurisdiction, then, as La Forest stated, "[g]enerally
...it seems best to interpret jurisdiction generously. This is in fact
what has happened. In practice whether the term 'territory' or 'juris-
diction' is used in the Treaty, jurisdiction has been broadly
construed."1 99
This matter of double criminality and extraterritoriality has be-
come increasingly important as crime has become more transnational
in nature. Many of Canada's more recent extradition treaties provide
that when the offense for which extradition is sought was committed
outside of the territory of the requesting state, the requested state shall
have the power to grant extradition if the laws of the requested state
also provide for jurisdiction in similar circumstances. 00 Other treaties
go further and provide that even when the requested state does not use
196. Id. at 165. The scheduled offense does not have to be identical to the U.S.
federal law that forms a substantial element. Id.
197. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text for the discussion on extra-
territoriality and the 1989 British Extradition Act.
198. For an in depth analysis of this issue, see SA. WILLIAMS & J.G. CASTEL,
CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS, chs. 1-5
(1981); see also van den Wyngaert, Double Criminality as a Requirement to Jurisdic-
tion, in DOUBLE CRIMINALITY: STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 43, 46 (N.
Jareborg ed. 1989).
199. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 45.
200. See e.g., 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. II, § 3, 27
U.S.T. 983, Can. T.S. No. 3; Extradition Treaty between Canada and India, art II,
February 6, 1987; Treaty of Extradition between Canada and the United Mexican
States, art XI, § 2, January 24, 1990; Extradition Treaty between Canada and the
Republic of the Philippines, November 7, 1989; (no extradition without duality of juris-
dictional basis).
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a similar extraterritorial basis, extradition may be granted. 201
One of Canada's newest treaties with the United Mexican States
also provides specifically for ,the use of the active nationality basis of
jurisdiction. 2  The 1988 Treaty between Canada and France is worded
differently. It states in Article 6(1) that extradition may not be refused
if the offense for which extradition is sought was committed in whole or
in part in the territory of the requested state or elsewhere subject to its
jurisdiction.20 3 Moreover, Article 6(2) stipulates that extradition "may
not be refused when the offence was committed outside the territory of
the requesting state unless the legislation of the requested state does
not authorize prosecution of the same offence . . . in corresponding
circumstances. 20 4
Similarly, the European Convention on Extradition provides in
Article 7(2) that extradition may be refused, even though the offense is
extraditable under the Convention, if the offense was committed other
than in the territory of the requesting state and the requested state
does not utilize a similar extraterritorial basis of jurisdiction.20 5
Clearly, where both requested and requesting states utilize the same
extraterritorial basis of jurisdiction over the offense, no problem is
presented. The difficulty arises when the jurisdictional basis is not rec-
ognized by the requested state. 0 6 In such a case, unless 'the treaty pro-
vides specifically for extradition, double criminality will not be satisfied
and extradition will be refused.0 7 One concern underlying this limita-
tion is that a requesting state may seek extradition of a national of the
requested state on a "theory of liability that the requested state finds
troubling. o20 8
An interesting case dealing with the interface lb etween double
201. See Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition between the United
States and Canada, art. III. This protocol is not yet in force.
202. Treaty of Extradition between Canada and the United Mexican States, Jan-
uary 24, 1990.
203. Extradition Treaty between the Government of Canadl, and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of France, art VI, § 1, Nov. 17, 1988.
204. Id. at art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
205. European Convention on Extradition, 1957, art. VII, § 2, E.T.S. No. 24.
206. See Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction
over Extraterritorial Crimes, 4 UTAH L. REv. 685, 744 (1984). Th e author labels this
a "special use" of double criminality.
207. The United States recognizes this "special use" of double criminality. Id.
208. M. Tigar, The Extradition Requirement of Double Criminality in Complex
Cases: Illustrating the Rationale of Extradition 14 (December 1989) (unpublished pa-
per presented at Conference on Extradition, Siracusa, Sicily).
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criminality and basis of jurisdiction is France v. Moghadam, °9 in
which France sought the extradition of Moghadam, a United States
resident, for complicity in an agreement to import heroin into France.
The court addressed the subject of double criminality and extraterrito-
riality and determined on the facts of the case "that the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction [by the United States] over Moghadam
(under analagous circumstances) would be unreasonable. Hence the re-
quirements of dual criminality are not met. . . [T]he extraterritorial
exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. ' 210
A commentator has argued that "[o]ne reason for prohibiting
prosecution of those who have never physically entered the forum state
is that legal remedies differ, and that such differences lead us to doubt
whether an accused acted with enough knowledge, intent or desire to
make inculpation reasonable. 21 Many states with whom Canada has
extradition arrangements use the active nationality basis and it seems
to be "in the interests of justice" and also in the interests of Canada to
extradite in these circumstances to the state of nationality of the
fugitive. 12
In this era of increasing transnational and international crime,
where a state's citizens may be victims of criminal offenses organized
abroad, such as fraud or drug smuggling, it is reasonable and appropri-
ate to bring a more relaxed view to this jurisdictional question. As long
as the conduct can be considered criminal if committed in the re-
quested state, then this should be sufficient. The duality of jurisdic-
tional bases should not be paramount.1
The only caveat would be that such extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be in accordance with international law. 14 Reciprocity on a
strict basis would thwart the efficacy of the extradition process. As
Canada's criminal jurisdiction is fairly conservative, based to the great-
est extent on the territorial principle contained in section 6(2) of the
Criminal Code,215 unless specifically extended by other sections of the
209. 617 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
210. Id. at 786-87.
211. M. Tigar, supra note 208, at 15.
212. See REPORT, supra note 43, at 18; see also section 2(3) of the new British
Extradition Act, discussed supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
213. See REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.
214. Id. at 18.
215. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. ch. C-46, § (6)(2) (19___). See Libman
v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 for an interpretation of section 6(2) of the Criminal
Code.
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Code or other Act of Parliament, Canada would be unduly limiting the
possibility of extradition, even where the actual conduct is viewed as
criminal and where there is a sufficiency of evidence. It does not seem
that Canada views the use by other states of other bases of jurisdiction,
such as active nationality, as being untenable or unjust. Indeed, in
some limited circumstances concerning international crimes, stricto
sensu, such as hijacking, hostage-taking, attacks on internationally pro-
tected persons and war crimes, Canada now utilizes this approach.216
VI. THE FUTURE: A NEW CANADIAN EXTRADITION ACT AND
A REFORMULATION OF DOUBLE CRIMINALITY
In the early sections of this article, the basic distinction between
extradition to "foreign" states and rendition to Commonwealth states
was mentioned.217 Rendition under the Canadian Fugitive Offenders
Act2 18 is based upon Britain's now long repealed 1881 Fugitive Offend-
ers Act. 19 Extradition is dealt with under the Extradition Act,22 as
supplemented or amended by bilateral treaties.22' As this article is de-
voted to the principle of double criminality, it is beyond its scope to
consider all of the differences between the two Acts and how they could
be melded into one composite approach. It would also be beyond the
present article to canvass all the views on whether rendition merits
treatment separate from extradition. The last section has three pur-
poses: (1) to detail succinctly the basic reasoning between different
treatment of fugitives under the two schemes; (2) to analyze the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights arguments that a fugitive under the present Fu-
gitive Offenders Act could raise if treated differently; and (3) to make
some suggestions based on the comparisons drawn above for a new
composite Act.
The Fugitive Offenders Act imposes few of the traditional extradi-
216. See Criminal Code of Canada, C.R.S. ch. C-46, §§ 7(3), (3.1), (3.5), (3.7),(3.71) (19-).
217. See supra Part II.
218. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 (1985).
219. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., ch. 69, replaced by Fugitive
Offenders Act, 1967, oh. 68, and Extradition Act, 1989, oh. 33. La Forest points out
that "[t]he repeal of the British Act by Great Britain in 1967 has no effect in Canada
because of the Statute of Westminster." See G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 153
n.1.
220. Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23 (1985).
221. Id. at § 3.
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tion law safeguards, such as the specialty principle or the double crimi-
nality requirement. There are no treaties and no list of offenses ap-
pended to the Act itself. The omission of these formal safeguards
clearly illustrates the differing principles and assumptions upon which
intra-Commonwealth rendition was conceived and has operated. Since
Canada was originally a part of the British Empire, it appeared that
rigid extradition formality was unnecessary. Although a fugitive might
be surrendered from one part of the Empire to another, he or she never
officially left the jurisdiction of the highest appellate court, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.222
Some earlier court decisions clearly reflect this rationale. In In re
Harrison,223 the court commented that "[i]t is quite obvious that some
additional care ought to be taken in the case of extraditing persons to
foreign countries than in facilitating criminal proceedings in the vari-
ous parts of the Empire, to which alone the Fugitive Offenders Act
applies."'22' The New Zealand Supreme Court expressed a similar opin-
ion in Ex parte Lillywhite,225 where Justice Stout argued as follows:
At common law there was thought to be an asylum for foreign of-
fenders; and it is only by virtue of treaties that foreign offenders
are given up. The rendition of an offender against the Crown from
one portion of the possessions of the Crown to another portion
should, it seems to me, be differently viewed. 228
Bearing in mind the change from Empire to Commonwealth and
the resulting change in constitutional status of the member countries,
many questions arose as to whether the Fugitive Offenders Act was
appropriate and whether it still applied to all Commonwealth states.27
Another aspect of international life that cannot be ignored is that there
has been a diminution of shared political and social objectives of the
member states. The overall complexion of the Commonwealth has dras-
222. See O'Higgins, Recent Practice under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1965
CRnm. L. Rnv. 133.
223. 25 B.C.R. 433 (1918).
224. Id. at 437.
225. 19 N.Z.L.R. 502 (1901).
226. Id. at 505.
227. The current Canadian Fugitive Offenders Act applies to any part of Her
Majesty's Realms and Territories. See Fugitive Offenders Act, R:S.C. ch. F-32 §§ 2 &
3 (1985). If this is correctly interpreted as meaning those countries that recognize the
Queen as the head of state, there are a number of Commonwealth countries to which
rendition is not possible.
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tically changed since 1881. The constituent members are not aligned on
all issues, and certainly Great Britain no longer exercises dominion and
control. For most of the countries, appeal to the Privy Cduncil no
longer exists.
In 1966 a Commonwealth Conference was held in London, Eng-
land, and the problems concerning rendition were discussed. Following
this meeting, the United Kingdom enacted a new Fugitive Offenders
Act,228 as did several other Commonwealth states, excluding Canada.
The 1967 Act provided that intra-Commonwealth rendition would be
conducted basically in the same manner as extradition, including such
safeguards as double criminality.
Concerning double criminality and the lack thereof in the Cana-
dian Fugitive Offenders Act as it still exists, G.V. La Forest made the
following statement:
The act charged need not be an offence in Canada, let alone pun-
ishable by imprisonment with hard labour [see s. 4]. That is what
makes the situations described above so difficult. The question
whether a man should be surrendered from Canada should depend
primarily on the seriousness with which the crime is regarded here,
not in the foreign country. When the British Statute on which the
Canadian Act is modelled was passed, the British Government
could control the punishment inflicted for offences by virtue of dis-
allowing and reserving colonial legislation as well as by statute of
the Imperial Parliament. That situation is now largely of the
past.229
Section 17 of the present Canadian Fugitive Offenders Act provides for
situations where rendition may be refused because it would be un-
just.23 0 However, as La Forest suggests,"that section . . . should not be
expected to bear the whole burden of what has now become an obsolete
and defective piece of legislation. 9231
In 1978, Bill S-9 was introduced in Canada to bring into operation
a new Fugitive Offenders Act. 2 It provided for rendition for crimes
falling within a schedule of offenses appended to it. This schedule and
228. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, ch. 68.
229. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 157 (footnotes omitted).
230. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 § 17 (1985).
231. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 17, at 157 (emphasis added); see also id. at
166-69.
232. 30th Parliament, 4th Sess. 1978-79.
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the one belonging to the proposed amended Extradition Act were to be
the same. The idea of "returnable offence," mentioned in section 2(1)
of Bill S-9, in effect established a double criminality requirement. This
legislation would have brought Canada into line with the United King-
dom and other Commonwealth countries such as Australia. Unfortu-
nately, it died on the order paper. However, in 1981 two writers com-
menting on the demise of Bill S-9 stated that "[w]ithout a doubt a new
bill will be introduced soon which will cover the same ground. This
may be done in the same form as the previous attempt or it is sug-
gested the present system of extradition and rendition may be com-
bined in one statute. 2 3
Ten years later, in 1991, it is clear that Canada's extradition and
rendition laws are still in need of change. It is equally clear that the
changing international climate dictates that the same basic approach to
extradition should be taken with respect to all countries, Common-
wealth or otherwise. As for the double criminality requirement, the
Law Reform Commission of Canada mentioned in 1984 that there are
two Acts which, "for 'extradition' purposes, hold that the conduct in
question must amount to a criminal offence under the law of both the
requesting state and Canada, [but] do not make this a requirement for
'rendition' where an offence against the requesting state law
suffices. 234
The same Working Paper made the following observation:
[W]e have seen enough to convince us of the need to modernize our
statutes concerning these subjects. However, before that can be
done, the federal government will have to seek answers to questions
such as ... Does Canada need two Acts? Would not one suffice?
Is there any longer a need to differentiate between "extradition"
and "rendition?" 235
Finally, the Law Reform Commission recommended that "the Extradi-
tion Act and Fugitive Offenders Act be amended to provide for uni-
formity of treatment of persons under both Acts. ' 236
The Charter of Rights has since 1982 played a large part in as-
233. SA WILLIAMS & J.G. CASTEL, supra note 198, at
341.
234. WORKING P"AER 37, LAW REFORM, COMMISSION OF CANADA, EXTRATERRI-
TORIAL JURISDIcrION 136 (1984).
235. Id. at 137.
236. Id. at 137.
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sessing Canada's extradition legislation, but this is not the place to re-
count this case law history. Nevertheless, based on what has already
been said on the need to treat fugitives in the rendition process in the
same way as fugitives in the extradition process, many sections of the
Charter clearly apply.237
Separate and apart from the issue of modernizing the rendition
and extradition processes by amalgamating them within one statute,
there is the question of whether right now the Fugitive Offenders Act
violates the Charter of Rights by not allowing for the principle of
double criminality. Are fugitive offenders being denied fundamental
justice and being subjected to inequality before and under the law?
Why should X, being surrendered to Great Britain, not have the same
safeguards as Y, being extradited to the United States or Germany?
It is far from surprising that such a Charter argument was raised
in the case of The Queen v. Taylor.288 Taylor argued, inter alia, that
under the Fugitive Offenders Act his Charter Rights - guaranteed by
sections 7 and 15239 - had been violated, in that the offense for which
the requesting state asked for his rendition was not be an offense under
Canadian Criminal law, as contrasted with the double criminality safe-
guard of the current Extradition Act. Mr. Justice Scullion held that
there was no such breach of his rights under the Charter "so funda-
mental as to cause [him] to declare the [Fugitive Offenders Act] or
parts thereof of no force and effect under section 52 of the Charter. '240
Based on the foregoing analysis, including Justice La Forest state-
ment that the Fugitive Offenders Act is "an obsolete and defective
piece of legislation, '24 1 it is remarkable that Mr. Justice Scullion in
1988 was able to come to the conclusion that there is no need for the
same safeguards in rendition as in extradition. To illustrate this, he
refers to the need for safeguards when extraditing to a country where
the laws and judicial system are fundamentally different, as opposed to
rendition to a Commonwealth country sharing "a grea:t deal in that
237. See Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, which is Schedule B, Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), ch. 11. § VII (right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice);
§ XV (equality before and under the law; equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination) (1982).
238. (1988) [Ont. Prov. Ct.].
239. See supra note 237.
240. Taylor, (1988) [Ont. Prov. Ct.] at 10.
241. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 157; see also R. v. Governor of Brixton
Prison, ex parte Rush, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 165.
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common legal and political heritage."242
Although in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this may
have been true, it is submitted that it is not so today, as evidenced by
the perceived need for the safeguards in the 1967 Commonwealth
Scheme. However, Mr. Justice Scullion seems to be unaware that Can-
ada stands in almost splendid isolation in clinging to the nineteenth
century approach to rendition. As Aronson indicated,24 3 Canada would
not get the same treatment from Great Britain if the shoe was on the
other foot! Although the Commonwealth Law Ministers have recently
considered a modification of the Rendition Scheme of 1967, the con-
centration appears to be on the prima facie case question, not on
double criminality.
In conclusion, it is submitted that a new Canadian Extradition Act
should be drafted that would combine extradition and rendition. The
present scheme of two separate statutes no longer fits modern realities.
The time is ripe for reform. Without addressing the issue of whether
treaties should be entered into with Commonwealth countries as with
other foreign states, or whether they may simply be designated, the
section listing crimes that are extraditable should utilize the conduct
approach,244 coupled with a minimum punishability requirement. This
revision would allow for a more flexible approach and yet still offer the
fugitive the appropriate safeguards that are necessary.
242. Taylor, (1988) [Ont. Prov. Ct.].
243. See supra notes 70-77 for a discussion of the Aronson case.
244. See supra notes 65-79, 110-127, 129-173.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has been fighting the importation, distribution,
and possession of illicit drugs for a long time.' However, only within
the past fifteen to twenty years has international drug control become a
major priority in the formulation of United States foreign policy. The
recent United States emphasis on international drug control appears to
be a result of the perceived national security threat posed by domestic
increases in drug consumption, drug-related crime, and chemical de-
pendency, and by the strength of multinational enterprises involved in
1. Nineteenth century legislation includes the Act of February 23, 1887, Chap.
210, 24 Stat. 409, which banned the importation of opium into the United States by
Chinese subjects and criminalized participation of United States citizens in opium traf-
ficking. Hogan & Doyle, The Federal Response: A Growing Role, CRS Rv. (Nov.-
Dec. 1989). The beginning of the 20th century was marked by a meeting of the newly
created Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909 and by a Hague Conference and accom-
panying international convention in 1912. Id. at 11. See Hague Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, Jan. 23, 1912, T.S. No. 612, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187. Following from the
prescriptions of the Hague Convention, which advocated greater domestic drug control,
Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785,
which remained the principal drug control statute in the United States until 1970.
Hogan & Doyle, supra, at 12. The Harrison Act was a tax law requiring all those
legally involved in narcotics commerce to register with the Internal Revenue Service, to
pay a tax, and to comply with certain order form requirements. Id. at 11. In 1937,
Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551, which
mirrored the Harrison act. Between 1935 and 1963, Congress increased the penalties
for unlawful distribution and possession of illicit drugs. Hogan & Doyle, supra.
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy formed the President's Advisory Commission
on Narcotics and Drug Abuse (the Prettyman Commission), and the Commission's
1963 report served as a blueprint for legislation in the years that followed. Id. at 12;
see also Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961., 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (amended by 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118,
976 U.N.T.S. 3). In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1285, which made substantial changes in the system of penalties
for violations of law and increased regulation of the pharmaceuticals industry. Hogan
& Doyle, supra, at 12; see also Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971,
T.I.A.S. No. 9725, 1019 U.N.T.S. 14956. More recent United States domestic legal
machinations and international agreements concerning drug control are addressed infra
notes 3, 67, 70, and 106.
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drug trafficking.2
Although the United States seems to be amenable to multilateral
approaches devoted to the reduction of international drug trafficking, a
more searching inquiry reveals that it has given such approaches short
shrift.3 Rather, the United States takes the position that expanding ex-
traterritorially the reach of its jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its
criminal laws is the most effective way of reducing international drug
2. See THE WnITE HousE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES 7, 28 (1990). Consumption of and trafficking in illicit drugs is also on the rise
in Western Europe. See Zagaris & Fantauzzi, European Integration and the Volcano
of Illicit Drug Trafficking: Will 1992 Bring the Promised Avalanche of Cooperation?,
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 190 (May 1990); Ernestus, West German Government
Considers Three Anti-Narcotics Initiatives, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 201 (May
1990). Some commentators have suggested that the relatively new United States em-
phasis on international drug control stems from the loss of the Soviet Union as the
prime United States enemy. In essence, the United States has chosen drug traffickers
as the "new" enemy. Nightline: Washington's Dwindling Importance (ABC television
broadcast April 27, 1990) (comments of P.J. O'Rourke, columnist for Rolling Stone
Magazine). Note, however, that such commentary preceded more recent events in the
Persian Gulf.
3. From the beginning, the United States has participated in the search for mul-
tilateral solutions to stem international traffic in illicit drugs. See generally Bassiouni,
The International Narcotics Control Scheme, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
PROCEDURE 507 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986); Comment, International Narcotics Control:
A Proposal to Eradicate an International Menace, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 530 (1984).
The United States is a party to the most recent multilateral convention, see United
Nations: Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15, Corr. 1 and Corr. 2, reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 493 (1989), and has endorsed the establishment of an International Criminal
Court with jurisdiction over internationally recognized crimes such as terrorism, nar-
cotics trafficking, genocide, and torture. See H.R. Con. Res. 66 (1990) (Currently
under review by subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and
International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,'United States House of
Representatives).
Despite all of this, the United States has insisted on pursuing its own policy and
prescribing and enforcing extraterritorially its domestic law. In this regard, the lack of
United States financial support of multilateral and regional agencies charged with initi-
ating programs to fight narcotics production, processing, trafficking, and abuse, such as
the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), reveals the actual absence of United
States commitment to multilateral and regional solutions. For example, in Fiscal Year
1989, the United States Congress earmarked a mere $2,000,000 to UNFDAC and only
$1,000,000 to CICAD. International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. § 2222
(1988). In 1990, there was no such appropriation.
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trafficking.4
While the United States policy is certainly bilateral in nature be-
cause extraterritorial enforcement of domestic criminal law requires
the cooperation of other states, it is a mistake to infer that such cooper-
ation is always voluntary. This is particularly true when the United
States policy involves third world nations, where the culture differs rad-
ically thereby heightening the probability of friction caused by conffict-
ing political priorities. Ultimately, when a less developed country is re-
luctant to cooperate with United States international drug control
policy, the United States wastes no time in resorting to its substantial
bargaining power. Thus, the United States drug control relationship
with many third world nations is actually one of at least partial coer-
cion.5 Naturally, such arm-twisting by any nation in pursuit of a for-
eign policy objective is bound to upset the governments with which that
country must work, but which may have differing perspectives on, and
approaches to, the same objective. This describes the current situation
existing among the United States and certain Latin American
countries.6
4. On the expanding nature of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction to pre-
scribe and enforce see Zagaris & Rosenthal, United States Jurisdictional Considera-
tions in International Criminal Law, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303 (1935); see also Note,
Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National In-
terest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L. Rnv. 1273 (1990).
5. See infra note 70.
6. United States pursuit of international drug control by such means is usually
defended by United States officials and other proponents on moral grounds. This, in
turn, is reflective of a general United States attitude which has been particularly preva-
lent throughout the post-war era. In this regard, one well known commentator has
suggested:
The disproportionately high level of United States activity and initiative in
the international enforcement of criminal law reflects attitudes characteris-
tic of United States approaches to international relations. Most notably,
United States citizens often assume that the United States is obligated and
even destined to play a leading role in dealing with most international
problems. Far more than any other nation, the United States defines its
national interests in such broad terms that few significant events lie outside
their ambit. Global networks of military personnel, intelligence agents, and
law enforcement officials are required merely to look after this wide array
of interests. Yet criminal justice has historically been a dcmestic issue.
Hence, other governments naturally respond to the United States expan-
sive criminal law enforcement efforts with a mixture of gratitude, resent-
ment, and ambivalence. Like other areas of international cooperation and
conflict, foreign states welcome much of the United States assistance yet
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Ultimately, the United States' position has had an adverse impact
on its ability to carry out a successful drug control policy with the An-
dean nations of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru-the producing, process-
ing, and trafficking nations responsible for most of the world's supply of
cocaine.7 Colombia presents a particular problem because it is the
home of some of the most successful drug traffickers, and it is the traf-
fickers whom the United States seeks to immobilize by subjecting them
to the jurisdiction of its criminal laws. In this regard, the United States
has had to work closely with Colombia to facilitate the extradition of
suspected traffickers from that country to the United States.
The relationship that has evolved between the United States and
Colombia is notable for its schizophrenia. On one hand, the United
States demands the extradition of Colombian citizens suspected of
breaking United States laws against drug trafficking, even where a sus-
pect has acted wholly outside of United States territory. On the other
hand, cocaine consumption is not a serious problem in Colombia, and
drug trafficking is viewed by Colombians as one which can be reduced
react testily to the demands and pressures that frequently accompany it.
Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Crimi-
nal Law, 31 HARv. INT'L LJ. 37, 39-40 (1990).
7. The policy has also strained United States relations with important Latin
American allies such as Mexico, Costa Rica, and Honduras. With regard to Mexico,
most recently the United States orchestrated the forceful abduction of Dr. Humberto
Alvarez Machain to face charges in the United States stemming from the 1985 murder
of DEA agent Enrique Camarena. The abduction was carried out without the host
government's permission, and resulted in a severe rebuke from Mexican President Car-
los Salinas de Gortari. See U.S. Says it Won't Return Mexican Doctor Linked to Drug
Trafficking, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1990, at A3, col. 1. Ultimately, the trial court de-
cided that the abduction was illegal, and that Alvarez must be returned to Mexico.
United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Defendant was
Abducted in DEA Case, Judge Says, Washington Post, Aug. 11, 1990, at A3, col. 5.
With regard to Costa Rica, the only established democracy in Central America,
the foreign policy of the former Reagan Administration toward Nicaragua, i.e., encour-
aging United States assistance to the Nicaraguan contras by any means possible, in-
cluding participation in drug trafficking, led to Costa Rica's current status as a trans-
shipment point for cocaine and marijuana. See Deputies Move to Continue Narcotics
Probe, Tico Times (Costa Rica), May 11, 1990, at 5, col. 1; Accused U.S. Drug Traf-
ficker Reported Comfy, Tico Times, May 4, 1990, at 32, col. 1.
As to Honduras, in April, 1988, the United States pressured that country to de-
port to the United States suspected drug trafficker Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros. See
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct 209
(1990); U.S. v. Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Nadeimann,
supra note 6, at 73.
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through demand reduction in the United States combined with pro-
grams which will help stimulate the Colombian economy.8 Colombians
object to having their fellow citizens extradited and tried in the United
States, a nation whose culture and legal tradition differ markedly from
those of Colombia, and whose people are the primary users of cocaine.9
Colombians assert that drug trafficking suspects who are Colombian
citizens should be tried in Colombia, if at all.
Of course, the United States' response to the Colombian position is
that the Colombian justice system is paralyzed by drug-related violence
and corruption and, therefore, is incapable of dealing effectively with
the problem. 10 Thus, to the United States, the only solution is to bring
alleged traffickers, including Colombian citizens, to the United States
for trial.
The problem with the "paralysis" argument is that it is bolstered
by at least three as yet unquestioned assumptions. First, the argument
assumes that the United States' justice system is dealing effectively
with international drug trafficking because those being extradited, pros-
ecuted, and convicted are important players in the drug :rafficking bus-
iness, and their convictions will reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States. A second assumption is that Colombia should view the
drug trafficking problem with a moral disdain equal to that of the
United States. Finally, the argument assumes that all of the violence in
Colombia attributed to drug traffickers has been, in fact, carried out by
8. See Colombia Leader Emphasizes Anti-Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12,
1990, at A6, col. 1 (discussing new Colombian President Cesar Gavaria Trujillo's posi-
tion that while "drug terrorism" is a Colombian problem, narcotics trafficking is "an
international phenomenon that can only be resolved through joint action of all affected
countries. . . [including] a substantial reduction in demand in comnumer countries").
9. See Extraditables Iniciaron Huelga de Hambre en Bogota, El Siglo (Colom-
bia), July 9, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Bogota Chief Tells of Drug War's Toll, N.Y. Times,
May 27, 1990, at A3, col. 4; Bogota Mayor Advocates Talks with Traffickers, Wash.
Post, April 24, 1990, at Al8, col. 1; Americans, Colombians Disagree Over Drug War,
Survey Shows, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1990, at A18, col. 4.
10. Proponents of this argument cite as justification the killings of Colombian
judges and politicians, and other brutal acts against the government and citizens attrib-
uted to members of the illegal drug business. They also cite the 1987 release of sus-
pected drug trafficker Jorge Ochoa from detention in a Colombian prison-presumedly
the result of a kickback. However, these same commentators uniformly fail to give any
credence to the fact that Ochoa was released pursuant to an affirmative judicial finding
of unlawful detention following his petition for a writ of habeas orpus. See, e.g., S.
McDoNALD, DANCING ON A VOLCANO: THE LATIN AMERICAN DRUG TRADIE 41
(1988).
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the traffickers. Each of these assumptions is dubious.
While the United States has extradited fourteen Colombian drug
trafficking suspects since August, 1989,11 none of the suspects are high
level members of the illicit drug business, despite claims to the con-
trary.12 Rather, these people are, if anything, low-level actors who can-
not afford the political and paramilitary protection paid for by major
traffickers.13 If these "extraditables" are at all engaged in international
11. August, 1989 marked Colombia's resumption of extradition to the United
States of suspected drug traffickers. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
12. A case in point is that of Jose Rafael Abello Silva, a Colombian extradited to
the United States in October, 1989. Initially, Abello was reported to be a high ranking
member of the Medellin Cartel. See Medellin Suspect Extradited to the U.S., N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1989, at A13, col. 1 (high-level operative of Medellin Cartel); Suspect
is Extradited, Newsday, Oct. 30, 1989, at 12 (Abello said to rank "number four" in
the Medellin Cartel); U.S. Jails Accused Master Drug Smuggler, L.A. Times, Oct. 30,
1989, at A4, col. 4 (Abello accused of being Medellin Cartel's "master drug smug-
gler"). Abello was initially indicted in the United States in 1987 with three others on
drug trafficking conspiracy charges. United States v. Palmero, No. 87-CR-140-B (N.D.
Okla. filed Sept. 2, 1987); United States v. Palmero, No. 87-CR-140-B (N.D. Okla.
filed Oct. 7, 1987) (superseding indictment).
Abello's alleged co-conspirators all pled guilty and agreed to testify against or
provide information on him in exchange for light sentences. This led to the filing of a
second superseding indictment naming only Abello. See United States v. Abello Silva,
No. 87-CR-140-B (N.D. Okla. filed Jan. 3, 1990). The only testimony as to Abello's
participation in the alleged conspiracy was that of his former co-defendants, persons
related to his former co-defendants, other convicts, and Federal Bureau of Investigation
Agents. Despite the previous news reports, Abello's position within the Medellin Cartel,
if any ever existed, was never established. Ultimately, the jury saw its way clear to
convict Abello and Judge Thomas Brett sentenced him to thirty years in prison, the
maximum allowable under the existing United States-Colombia extradition regime. See
Extradited Colombian Drug Trafficker Sentenced to Thirty Years, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
May 29, 1990; Jury Convicts Reputed Key Colombian Drug Figure, L.A. Times, May
20 1990, at A27, col. 1 (Abello reported as "reputed ... key figure in the Medellin
Cartel). Regarding the current United States-Colombia extradition regime, see infra
notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
13. A case in point here is that of Edward Mitchell, a United States citizen
extradited from Colombia in July 1990. Mitchell was indicted in the United States on
charges of conspiracy in 1983. The charges stem from his alleged role in a Colombia-
Milwaukee, Wisconsin cocaine ring. United States v. Mitchell, No. 83-CR-86 (E.D
Wis. filed June 14, 1983). Notably, in light of the news reports which followed the
Abello extradition, and the lack of such reports following Mitchell's extradition, one
can reasonably deduce that Mitchell was not considered a major suspect. Indeed, it
seems that anyone who is considered to be a "drug baron" stands little chance of mak-
ing it out of Colombia alive. For example, in 1989, alleged Colombian cocaine traf-
ficker Jose Gonsalo Rodriguez Gacha was killed by Colombian police. The last "ma-
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drug trafficking, it is clear that they are considered by their superiors to
be expendable and are, therefore, easy targets for the Colombian au-
thorities and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA). Additionally, despite the fact that recreational drug consump-
tion is not a problem in Colombia, the United States has asked Colom-
bian civilians to support a policy which has helped transform their
country into a police state. At the same time, the Unit~ed States has
been unwilling to engage in a comprehensive drug demand reduction
program. Lastly, it is not clear that all of the violence carried out
against the Colombian government and justice system is attributable to
the traffickers. To be sure, the traffickers are a dangerous and violent
group. However, it must also be recognized that Colombian society has
been for many years characterized by violence; it is permeated with
various guerilla, paramilitary fascist and rural "self-protection"
groups, 4 and government military and police organizations which act
with virtual autonomy.15
There is much more to international drug trafficking than meets
the eye, and the current United States policy is unable to meet the
challenge. United States' international drug control policy has ad-
dressed neither cultural, political, nor socioeconomic underpinnings
which have given rise to the major role of Colombia in international
drug trafficking."8 Neither has the United States considered the sensi-
tivity of Latin American nations to outside intervention.17
The analysis cannot end here, however. While coercion has had
much to do with the Colombian government's cooperation with United
States international drug control policy, it does not tell the whole story.
jor" cocaine trafficker to be brought to the United States was Carlos Lehder-Rivas in
1987.
14. See infra notes 42, 46 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 32.
16. For example, many poor Colombians view the drug business as the only via-
ble alternative to climb the economic ladder in the absence of an effective welfare state.
See Medellin Journal: In the Capital of Cocaine, Savagery is the Habit, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1990, at A3, col. 1. Though largely unreported in the United States, much of
the drug-related violence in Colombia is the result of turf wars taling place between
private armies commanded by members of the Colombian elite, such as Victor Cor-
ranza, who are engaged in cocaine trafficking, and those of nonmembers such as Pablo
Escobar, Jorge Ochoa, and, formerly, Jose Gonsalo Rodriguez Gacha.
17. See Charter of the Organization of American States, arts 19, 20, and 21
(declaring nonintervention as a principle). This sensitivity was most recently witnessed
in the aftermath of the United States invasion of Panama in December 1989. See La-
tins Leery of U.S. Military, Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
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In Colombia, as in the United States, there are members of govern-
ment who have used the drug trafficking issue for personal and political
advantage. In addition, because many high ranking Colombian politi-
cians have strong familial or commercial ties with the United States
and do not want to jeopardize those ties, they lack the political Will to
diverge from United States policy. While there have been brief periods
in Colombia's recent political history where the government has sought
to distance itself from the United States, 18 the domination of Colom-
bian politics by members of the small social elite, and the considerable
political influence of Colombian police and military organizations, have
assured continued official Colombian support for Washington's policies.
The practical effect on Colombian society resulting from the
United States international drug control policy and Colombian govern-
mental complicity with that policy has been further detraction of Co-
lombia's ability to govern itself according to the rule of law. The con-
tinued extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States, despite
adverse rulings on the subject by the Colombian Supreme Court of Jus-
.tice (SCJ), has caused bitterness among the intensely proud Colombian
populace. The government stands accused of pandering to United
States interests while Colombian society remains under a system of
martial law which only promotes continued violence.19 The United
States does virtually nothing to effectively encourage the Colombian
government to abide by the Colombian Constitution and to appropriate
funds aimed at strengthening that country's understaffed, underequip-
ped,20 and overburdened judicial system. 1 Rather, the United States
encourages the Colombian Executive to usurp legislative and judicial
power and to increase the power of the military and police.
This article examines the steady deterioration of order in Colom-
bian society through an explanation and analysis of the Colombia-
United States extradition relationship in historical and political con-
text. The article shows that the Colombian government's current inabil-
ity to institute and effectuate the rule of law is a result of two destruc-
tive forces acting in concert: The first force is that of a United States
drug control policy which emphasizes extraterritorial prescription and
enforcement of domestic criminal laws - including extradition of Co-
18. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
20. See Fricker, A Judiciary Under Fire, A.BAJ. 54 (Feb. 1990).
21. See Grossman & Anderson, Lawyers and the Rule of Law in the Western
Hemisphere, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Rnv. 115, 124-25 (1988).
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lombian citizens to the United States - rather than assisting Colombia
in enforcing its own laws and rebuilding its justice system. The second
force is the Colombian elite's desire for political and, therefore, eco-
nomic self-perpetuation which prevents the nation from effectively
"dealigning" itself from United States policy. It is suggested that if the
United States is truly interested in reducing illicit drug traffic, and if
Colombia is truly interested in creating a more stable social climate,
both countries must undertake fundamental changes in thinking and
policymaking.
II. THE UNITED STATES-COLOMBIA EXTRADITION
RELATIONSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
A. The Early Years
1. The 1888 Convention and 1940 Supplementary Convention
Colombia enacted its current constitution in 1886. Two years
later, the initial extradition convention between the United States and
Colombia was signed,22 and went into force on January 1.1, 1891.23 The
1888 Convention was the typical enumerative type; it listed the crimes
for which an accused would be subject to extradition.24 Notably, the
1888 Convention did not provide for extradition on the basis of crimes
relating to illicit drug trafficking. Additionally, the 1888 Convention
advocated against extradition of United States or Colombian
nationals. 25
By 1940, it had become apparent to United States officials that
Colombia was a source of illicit drugs. Consumption of such substances
in the United States was increasing as was the number of crime organi-
zations involved in its importation and distribution. Thus, the United
States and Colombia amended the 1888 Convention to include
"[c]rimes against the laws for the suppression of the traffic in narcot-
22. Convention for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, May 7, 1888,
United States-Colombia, 26 Stat. 1534, T.S. 58 [hereinafter 1888 Convention].
23. Id.
24. Id. at art. 2. Typically, where an extradition treaty exists, the issue of
whether a particular alleged crime subjects an accused to extradition is determined by
either listing the specific offenses in the text of, or in the appendix lo the treaty, or by
establishing the degree of punishment according to which an offense shall be extradita-
ble. Comment, RICO, CCE, and International Extradition, 62 TEMPLE L. REv. 1281,
1295 (1989).
25. 1888 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 10.
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ics."28 This Supplementary Convention went into effect on July 6,
1943.7
2. Dark Times in Colombian Politics
Until very recently, Colombian politics was characterized by a
two-party system.28 Each of these parties, the Liberals and the Con-
servatives, was dominated by the nation's small socioeconomic elite.29
26. Supplementary Convention of Extradition, Sept. 9, 1940, United States-Co-
lombia, art. 1, 57 Stat. 824, T.S. 986 [hereinafter 1940 Supplementary Convention].
27. Id. At this point it should also be mentioned that the there are two relevant
multilateral extradition treaties in force. In 1933, as part of the Seventh International
Conference of American States in Montivideo, Uruguay, the United States and other
American republics signed the Pan American Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3111, T.S. 882 [hereinafter Pan American Convention]. The purpose of
this convention is to effectuate extradition where there is no existing extradition treaty
among the signatories or where an existing treaty lapses. In other words, the Pan
American Convention "does not abrogate or modify the bilateral or collective treaties,
which at the present date are in force between the signatory States." Id. at art. 21.
Unlike the bilateral 1888 Convention, supra note 22, and 1940 Supplementary Conven-
tion, supra note 26, which enumerate the particular extraditable offenses, the Pan
American Convention simply relies on a conditional reciprocity requirement. Pan
American Convention, supra, at art. 1. In essence, each of the signatory states promises
to surrender an accused to a requesting signatory state based on certain conditions.
Each signatory state contracts to surrender to the requesting state a person "who may
be in their territory and who [is] accused or under sentence," id., where:
a) [T]he demanding State ha[s] the jurisdiction to try and to punish the
delinquency which is attributed to the individual whom it desires to
extradite.
b) [T]he act for which extradition is sought constitutes a crime and is
punishable under the laws of the demanding and surrendering States with
a minimum penalty of imprisonment for one year.
Id. at art. 1(a), (b).
An interesting and innovative aspect of the Pan American Convention is that unlike
traditional extradition treaties, the Pan American Convention provides for discretion-
ary delivery of a signatory state's citizens unless such delivery is precluded by the sur-
rendering state's internal legislation or by the "circumstances of the case" as deter-
mined by the surrendering state. Id. at art. 2.
The second multilateral treaty is of more recent vintage but cannot be applied in
extradition situations involving the United States. Despite its formulation under the
auspices of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention on
Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, O.A.S., T.S. No. 60 (OEA/Ser. A/36) has not yet been
signed by the United States.
28. See infra note 42.
29. Findley, Presidential Intervention in the Economy and the Rule of Law in
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During the 1930's and the first half of the 1940's, national politics was
influenced by the Liberal Party. 0 In 1946 the Conservative Party took
power.31 The Conservative government formed the Departamento Ad-
ministrativo de Seguridad (DAS), a police organization with extraordi-
nary investigative and military capability. Although technically a part
of the Ministry of Interior, DAS operates with virtual autonomy. 2
In 1948, amid an increasingly violent political atmosphere, the
populist, left-leaning Liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitdn, was assassi-
nated.33 The blame for Gaitdn's death was attributed to rightist ele-
ments of the Conservative government, and Colombia soon became em-
broiled in a bloody civil war known as La Violencia 4 In 1949, the
government declared a state of siege.3 5 In 1950, another Conservative
Colombia, 28 Am. J. COMP. L. 423, 425 (1980); see generally R. Dix, COLOMBIA: THE
POLITICAL DIMENSION OF CHANGE (1967).
30. Bagley & Tokatlian, Politica Exterior de Colombia en los 80, in CON-
TINUIDAD Y CAMBIO EN LAS RELACIONES AMERICA LATINA/ETADOS UNIDOS 151, 176
n.50 (M. Hirst ed. 1987).
31. Id.
32. DAS is usually analogized to the United States Department of Justice's Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See Drug Lord's Base Hurt, Officials Say: Cartel
Leader Escobar Fleeing Into Jungle to Escape Dragnet, Wash. Post, July 14, 1990, at
A23. While in many respects DAS resembles the FBI, the former wields much more
power. Under the state of siege, see infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text, the gov-
ernment grants extraordinary powers to the police and military, allowing them to es-
cape civilian control and oversight. In turn, organizations such as DAS, with sophisti-
cated intelligence and military capability, pursue their own agendas and hold
themselves out as defending the state against those allegedly seeking to destroy it. The
current head of DAS, General Miguel' Maza Marquez, is both praised and criticized in
Colombia. He has been praised by conservatives for sustaining a hard line against drug
traffickers, and for uncovering corruption within the armed forces. See Colombian
Anti-Drug Hero's Post in Doubt, Newsday, July 5, 1990, at 13. On the other hand,
Maza has been criticized for turning a blind eye to serious human rights violations
committed by members of DAS. Id. Also, Maza himself has been ao-used of accepting
payments from drug traffickers who are members of the established social elite (the
Cali and Emerald Cartels). Id. In this regard, it has been rumored in Colombia that
the 1989 death of reputed cocaine trafficker Jose Gonsalo Rodrignez Gacha at the
hands of DAS was actually carried out by Maza at the request of either the Cali or
Emerald Cartels or both. It seems that Rodriguez was making inroads into legitimate
businesses operated by the Cali and Emerald Cartels and used by them as a front for
cocaine trafficking.
33. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30.
34. Id. See also Findley, supra note 29.
35. Findley, supra note 29, at 426. For a discussion of the state of siege and its
effect on the rule of law in Colombia, see infra notes 71-126 and accompanying text.
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was elected president when the Liberals refused to nominate a candi-
date.36 In 1953, the civilian government was overthrown in a military
coup led by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla who then imposed a morato-
rium on all organized political activity.3 7 In 1957, Conservative and
Liberal leaders forced the ouster of Rojas and called for election of a
civilian president. The Constitution was then amended to allow for a
Liberal-Conservative coalition government for the next sixteen years.38
Under the plan, known as the National Front, the parties equally di-
vided between themselves seats in all legislative, judicial, and executive
bodies.39 The presidency alternated every four years.40 Ultimately,
there was not a competitive election until the National Front disbanded
in 1974.41
Sixteen years of National Front leadership provided more than
enough time for the incubation of militant political groups which were
dissatisfied with a status quo favoring the elite. Indeed, it was during
the National Front period that various guerilla groups such as the Fu-
erzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejercito de
Liberacibn Nacional (ELN), and Ejercito Popular de Liberacibn
(EPL) formed and became powerful, appealing to Colombia's poor by
espousing variations of communist ideology.42
36. Findley, supra note 29, at 426.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 176 n.50.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 171 n.40. FARC, a Marxist-Leninist group, actually traces its origins
as far back as the period of La Violencia and currently is Colombia's most powerful
guerilla organization. Id. The ELN, which aligns itself more directly with Fidel Castro,
and the EPL, which espouses Maoist ideology, commenced their operations in the
1960's. Id.
Over the past year, many of Colombia's guerilla groups have begun to lay down
their arms and integrate themselves into the political process. In early 1990, the
Movimiento 19 de Abril de 1970 (M-19) organization, a powerful populist guerilla
group formed after the 1970 presidential elections, publicly laid down its arms. In the
May, 1990 elections, the M-19 presidential candidate, Antonio Navarro Wolff, gar-
nered thirteen percent of the vote despite the unexplained assassination of the organiza-
tion's initial presidential candidate. See Brooke, Colombia's Guerillas Break Into
Politics, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1990, at E5, col. 1; Brooke, Colombia Rebels Shun Arms
and Win Votes, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1990, at A15, col. 1. Subsequently, Navarro was
named Minister of Health by President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo. See Colombian Gueril-
las Forsake the Gun for Politics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1990, at A14, col. 1 (reporting
on demobilization of the EPL, the indigenous self-defense group Quintin Lame, and the
1991]
249
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
B. The Recent Record
1. Post-National Front Colombian Politics and Relations with the
United States
By the mid-1970's, trafficking in and use of illegal drugs had be-
come a major issue within the United States, and it was at this time
that the problem began to seriously manifest itself in the relations be-
tween Colombia and the United States. In response to the large
amounts of marijuana which were being imported into the United
States from Colombia, then United States President Jimmy Carter re-
quested of then Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, that
elimination of marijuana exports be given the highest priority. While
Lopez agreed to address the marijuana issue, he refused to adopt the
law enforcement measures advocated by Carter.4 As a result, Lopez
and Colombia suffered badly in the United States media and relevant
halls of the United States federal government."
Lopez' reaction to the Carter Administration's marijuana control
policy lends insight in regard to the differing perspectives of Colombia
and the United States toward the drug trafficking business. Professor
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Director of the Center of International Studies
at the University of the Andes in Bogota has written that,
during the [1970's] marijuana boom, [Colombian] policy was dom-
inated by a certain socioeconomic rationale, marked by a strong
vein of pragmatism. In fact, evidence of this can be found in sev-
eral manifestations: the creation of the so-called ventanilla sinies-
tra ([sinister] window) in the Banco de la Republica, which al-
lowed funds originating from drugs and other activities to enter the
country; the debates ...on legalization of drugs; the accept-
ance-albeit limited--of the new social sector associated with its
cultivation and marketing; and the government attitude.. that it
Revolutionary Workers Party).
Two powerful guerilla groups, FARC and ELN, continue to refuse to enter into
discussions with the government. Id. Moreover, throughout the twentieth century Co-
lombia has witnessed the proliferation of rightist, paramilitary "self-defense" groups.
See WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, COLOMBIA BESIEGED: POLITICAL VIO-
LENCE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 59-83 (1989) [hereinafter WOLA].
43. Tokatlian, National Security and Drugs: Their Impact on Colombian-U.S.
Relations, 30 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 132, 142 (Spring 1988); see also
Bagley, Colombia and the War on Drugs, 67 FOREIGN AFF. 70 (Fall 1988).
44. Tokatlian, supra note 43, at 142-43.
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not transfer unilaterally the cost of combatting the proliferating
consumption to Colombia. Clearly, in the 1970's the Colombian
system did not see itself seriously threatened by (1) the political
institutional reach of the marijuana business; (2) its negative effect
on national security; nor (3) the financial consequences of its pro-
duction and trade. Thus, Colombia did not accentuate, unilaterally,
repressive measures in its attempts to control and eradicate this
traffic. 5
In 1978, Liberal Party candidate Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala was
elected president of Colombia. Turbay was a proponent of increased
ties to the United States and upon assuming the presidency, he took a
number of steps to assure solidification of the Washington-Bogota
connection.
Because of the Colombian rural economy's poor state, and the ab-
sence of an effective welfare state, indigenous, rural-based "self protec-
tion" groups and labor unions such as the Asociacibn Nacional de
Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC) and the Consejo Regional Indigena del
Cauca (CRIC) had become quite active in the 1970s. These and other
organizations, including M-19,48 soon engaged in violence aimed at the
new Turbay Administration which was perceived as dedicated to the
preservation of the political status quo. Turbay had run his campaign
based on a restoration of "law and order,"'47 a code-phrase for repres-
sion of political opposition. To that end, just over a month after assum-
ing the presidency, Turbay, pursuant to his powers under the then ex-
isting state of siege, issued the Estatuto de Seguridad Nacional
(National Security Statute) .4 The Statute was similar to legislation
adopted by the military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and Uru-
guay, and increased the authority of the president and the role of the
45. Id. at 139.
46. See supra note 42.
47. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 154-176.
48. DECRETO LEGISLATivo No. 1923 de 1978, No. 35101 Diario Oficial 1033
(21 de septiembre de 1978); Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 171 n.41. The
Statute suspended the right to habeas corpus and permitted the armed forces to arrest
civilians without formal charges. Id. In addition, it provided that civilians accused of
crimes against the national security would be tried in front of military tribunals, and it
replaced civilian government with military government in several localities throughout
the country. Id. (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL MISSION TO THm REPuBUic OF COLOMBIA (1980)); see also infra notes 71-83
and accompanying text.
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Colombian military in the operation of government. 49 Turbay used the
Statute as a vehicle to establish closer relations with the United States
and to obtain arms, military equipment, and military training.50
Additionally, in 1979, Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza Debayle was
overthrown by the leftist Frente Sandinista de Liberacibn Nacional
(FSLN). The displacement of Somoza, a wealthy landowner whose
family had ruled Nicaragua for most of the twentieth century, was
taken as a signal by Turbay whose family belonged to Colombia's elite,
and who was well aware of the strong leftist and populist guerilla
movements in his own country. Also, the new Nicaraguan government
disputed the territorial claims of Colombia to the San Andres Archipel-
ago.51 In response, Turbay requested protection from the United States.
In this connection, while the United States initially supported the
FSLN, by the time of Turbay's request, United States patience with
the new Nicaraguan government had waned because of the FSLN's
failure to "moderate" its militaristic, pro-Cuban stance. Thus, in the
outgoing Carter Administration and United States Congress, Turbay
had found a wealthy anti-Sandinista ally. With the advent of the fer-
vently anti-communist Reagan Administration in 1980, Bogota and
Washington would reach even firmer common ground. 52
Finally, and most importantly for instant purposes, in 1979 a re-
luctant Turbay signed the controversial United States-Colombia extra-
dition treaty.53 Because of the consistent flow of marijuana to the
United States from Colombia and Colombia's failure to seriously ad-
dress the problem, the Carter Administration had placed political pres-
sure on Turbay. The purpose of the pressure was to force Turbay to
choose between signing the 1979 Treaty or asking the United States for
49. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 171.
50. Id. While the Carter Administration expressed its willingness to assist
Turbay, it also expressed its concern regarding possible human rights abuses under the
Statute. Id. at 172.
51. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 157. The San Andres Archipelago is a
group of islands located off of the Nicaraguan coast, near the Golfo de los Mosquitos.
The largest two islands are San Andres and Providencia.
52. Id. at 159-161. For example, in response to Turbay's fears of Nicaraguan
"expansionism" into the San Andres, and, more to the point, to gain it stronger military
foothold in the area, the United States secretly negotiated with Colombia an agreement
to allow the United States to set up a military installation on San Anadres. Id; see also
Treaty with Colombia Concerning the Status of Quitasueno, Roncador, and Serrana,
Sept. 14, 1972, United States-Colombia, 33 U.S.T. 4459, T.I.A.S. No. 10316.
53. Treaty of Extradition, Sept. 14, 1979, United States-Colombia, (unnum-
bered) S. Treaty Doc. 8, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter 1979 Treaty].
[Vol. 15
252
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Sherman
economic and military assistance without an illustration of Colombian
cooperation in helping the United States stem the flow of illicit drugs.
Just prior to Turbay's presidential victory in 1978, a report known as
the "Bourne Memorandum" had leaked from the White House." The
report accused Turbay and others in the upper echelons of Colombian
politics of having connections to groups involved in drug trafficking. 55
Despite an April 1979 report issued by the House Committee on Nar-
cotics Control and Abuse which concluded that Turbay was not in-
volved in drug trafficking,56 he was not entirely absolved of the taint of
corruption bestowed upon him by the Bourne Memorandum. Thus, to
gain political absolution and, therefore, economic and military assis-
tance, Turbay determined that it was in his administration's best inter-
ests to sign the 1979 Treaty.
2. The 1979 Treaty and The Palace of Justice Seizure
The 1979 Treaty went into force on March 4, 1982, and is one of
several extradition treaties negotiated by the United States between
1978 and 1983.7 Although each of the treaties negotiated within that
54. Bagley & Tokatlan, supra note 30, at 172 n.41.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 172 & n.44 (citing SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND
CONTROL, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FACT FINDING MISSION TO
COLOMBIA AND PUERTO Rico, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)).
57. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, 31
U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656; Treaty on Extradition, June 24, 1980, United States-
Netherlands, - U.S.T. . T.I.A.S. No. 10733; Supplementary Convention on
Extradition, March 14, 1983, United States-Sweden, - U.S.T. ., T.I.A.S.
No. 10812; Treaty on Extradition, Oct. 13, 1983, United States-Italy, - U.S.T.
. T.I.A.S. No. 10837; Treaty on Extradition, United States-Thailand, Dec. 14,
1983, S. Treaty Doc. No. 16, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Treaty on Extradition,
United States-Costa Rica, Dec. 4, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. 17, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984); Treaty on Extradition, United States-Jamaica, June 14, 1983, S. Treaty Doc.
18, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Treaty on Extradition, United States-Ireland, July 7,
1983, S. Treaty Doc. 19, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
These new extradition treaties illustrate important departures from the traditional
bilateral extradition treaties. For example, the new treaties expand significantly the
scope of the United States jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws, expressly in-
cluding acts of conspiracy. See, e.g., 1979 Treaty, supra note 53, at arts. 1-3. In addi-
tion, the treaties pick up on a trend first evidenced in the text of the multilateral 1933
Pan American Convention, supra note 27, expressly permitting extradition of the con-
tracting parties' citizens. While certainly unorthodox, the fact that this trend has con-
tinued in recently negotiated extradition treaties is not surprising in light of the advent
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period allows the extradition of the contracting parties' nationals, 58 the
relevant provision of the 1979 Treaty is notable for its specificity. Arti-
cle 8 grants the surrendering state's executive discretion in determining
whether a citizen of that state will be extradited, while simultaneously
requiring that extradition of nationals will be granted where "the of-
fense involves acts taking place in the territory of both States with the
intent that the offense be consummated in the Requesting State." 9
Clearly, this provision is meant to encompass acts by the surrendering
state's nationals which, under United States law, constitute conspira-
cies. Interestingly, the Letter of Submittal accompanying the 1979
Treaty specifically states that this "innovation . . . is especially impor-
tant in prosecuting exporters of dangerous drugs."60
Although the debate on the 1979 Treaty in the United States Con-
gress proceeded smoothly, the same cannot be said of the debate in the
Colombian Congress. The focus there was, of course, on article 8, the
text of which is considered by many Colombian politicians as an act of
submission to the United States and a violation of Colombian sover-
eignty."1 Despite the opposition, with the strong support of President
Turbay, the treaty bill was approved by both houses of the Colombian
Congress on October 14, 1980, and was sent to the President for
signature.
On November 3, 1980, Minister of Government Dr. German Zea
Hernandez, who had been delegated the exercise of presidential "con-
stitutional fuictions" by President Turbay while the latter was out of
the country on a state visit,62 signed the treaty bill and published it as
Law 27 of 1980.63 By the time the 1979 Treaty went into effect in
of modem communications technology which facilitates transnational crime, and when
read in connection with treaty provisions delineating the long arm of United States
criminal law.
58. See supra note 57.
59. 1979 Treaty, supra note 53, at art. 8(1)(a).
60. Letter of Submittal from State Department to White House, S. Treaty Doc.,
supra note 53, at vi.
61. Kavass, Introductory Note to Colombia: Supreme Court Decision on Law
Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between Colombia and the United States, 27
I.L.M. 492, 493 (1988).
62. See COLOM. CONST. art. 128.
63. Ley 27 de 1980, No. 35643 Diario Oficial 401 (14 de noviembre de 1980).
Notably, two other bilateral agreements were signed by the United States and Colom-
bia in 1980. First, through an exchange of diplomatic notes, the two governments
agreed to battle illicit traffic in narcotics. Narcotic Drugs: Cooperation to Curb Illegal
Traffic, July 21, Aug. 6, 1980, United States-Colombia, 32 U.S.T. 2301, T.I.A.S. No.
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March, 1982, Colombia was in the midst of a presidential campaign
with elections slated for May.
Ultimately, the Conservative candidate, Belisario Betancur
Cuartas was elected President. Betancur's success marked the first
presidential victory for the Conservatives since the demise of the Na-
tional Front in 1974. Contrary to the political attitude of Turbay, who
was willing to push certain controversial domestic measures as a way of
currying favor with the United States, Betancur took a populist stance
and sought to cool relations between Bogota and Washington." In so
9838. This agreement comprises an offer and acceptance of $13,225,000 in United
States assistance for,
supplying and maintaining helicopters, patrol vessels, fixed radar equip-
ment, transport vehicles, and fuel, which shall be used exclusively for in-
terdicting drug traffic, for training personnel with respect to the interdic-
tion of drug traffic, and for whatever other purposes the United States
Congress may authorize.
Id. at 2302. Second, the two governments entered into a mutual legal assistance treaty.
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, Aug. 20, 1980, S.
Treaty Doe. 11, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Each of these agreements is designed to
facilitate the purposes addressed by the 1979 Treaty, supra note 53.
In addition, in 1981, the United States Congress amended the Posse Comitatus
Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). The Act governs the use of the United States
military in foreign and domestic police actions involving illegal drugs, see Comment, A
Proposal for Direct Use of the United States Military in Drug Enforcement Opera-
tions Abroad, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291, 293 (1988) [hereinafter A Proposanl, and "pro-
hibits use of 'any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
execute the laws except with authorization by the Constitution or Act of Congress." Id.
at 294. However, the 1981 amendments, codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-78, authorize
military officials to furnish information, equipment, facilities, training, and expert ad-
vice to civilian law enforcement personnel. A Proposal, supra, at 295. Such authoriza-
tion applies to both domestic and extraterritorial drug-oriented police work and has
been relied upon to justify the increasing use of the armed forces in drug interdiction
and eradication efforts. See United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 U.S. 142 (1986) (cited in A Proposal, supra, at 299 (naval support used
and approved of in extraterritorial drug interdiction)); Comment, The Extraterritorial
War on Cocaine: Perspectives from Bolivia and Colombia, 12 SuiF. TRANSNAT'L L.J.
39, 45-60 (1988) [hereinafter Bolivia and Colombia] (discussing use of United States
military in extraterritorial coca eradication); Isikoff, War On Drugs Mobilizes Na-
tional Guard, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 3 (discussing National Guard's
escalating domestic role in assisting local police to identify suspected drug producers
and users, respectively); Isikoff, Interest in Grateful Dead Was Not Musical, Wash.
Post, Aug. 14, 1990, at A4, col. 1 (same).
64. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 176-186. For example, Betancur an-
nounced his intention to push for Colombia's membership in the Non-Aligned Move-
ment. Id. at 177. He also sought to revamp the Inter-American system following the
1991]
255
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
doing, Betancur intentionally delayed executive action on extraditions
under the 1979 Treaty. The case of Colombian Carlos Lehder Rivas is
instructive on this point.65
Following his indictment in the United States on drug trafficking
charges in 1983, Carlos Lehder appealed to the SCJ from a lower
court's ruling in favor of his extradition under the 1979 Treaty. On
November 29, 1983, the SCJ affirmed the lower court's ruling and for-
warded the extradition request to the President for final resolution. De-
spite the SCJ's favorable ruling, it was not until June, 1984 that Presi-
dent Betancur handed down Resolution No. 101 permitting Lehder's
extradition." It is notable that Betancur's decision to permit Lehder's
extradition took place at a time when the Colombian economy was in a
shambles because of the worldwide recession of the early 1980's. As a
result, Betancur's political "honeymoon" was coming to a close and he
actively sought United States economic assistance. 67
divisive Falklands-Malvinas War. Id. at 178. In this regard, he supported the right of
Argentina to exercise sovereignty over the Islands. Id. Indeed, during a visit to Wash-
ington, Betancur's foreign minister criticized the United States for siding with Great
Britain and abandoning Latin America at a crucial moment. Id; see I*nter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Sept. 27, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 62
Stat. 1681. Finally, Betancur offered to restore relations with Cuba if that country
ceased its support of Colombian leftist insurgent groups. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra
note 30, at 179.
65. United States v. Lehder Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1623 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
66. Id. at 1524-25.
67. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 197-99, 202-204. During this period
(1984-85), Betancur was forced to adopt economic austerity measures to compensate
for Colombia's ever-expanding external debt. In turn, such austerity depended on stabi-
lization help from the United States in its roles as individual lender and member of the
International Monetary Fund and other international financial organizations. Id.
Other notable events in Colombian politics during this time pesriod included the
Uribe truce agreement signed with FARC on March 28, 1984, and approved by
Betancur on April 2, and, that same month, the murder of Justice Minister Rodrigo
Lara Bonilla, allegedly the work of drug traffickers. Ultimately, after only a two year
hiatus, Betancur reintroduced martial law in May based on the Lare. assassination and
other violence attributed to members of the illicit drug business. See infra note 76.
On August 23-24, 1984, new truce agreements were signed between the govern-
ment, M-19, the Workers' Self-Defense Movement (ADO), and the EPL pending fur-
ther talks on political reform. The government/M-19 truce was short-lived, lasting less
than one year. M-19 justified its return to guerilla activity based on systematic viola-
tions committed by the Colombian army under the truce provisions, limitations on am-
nesty, failure of the government to implement basic political reforms, and the collapse
of dialogue. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 201 n.103. Similar problems led to
the collapse of the government truce with the other guerilla groups.
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On November 5, 1985, the Palace of Justice, home of the SCJ,
Was seized by members of the M-19 guerilla group and a number of
hostages were taken, including members of the twenty-four justice
SCJ. While the reasons for the seizure are unclear,68 rather than at-
Also, during this time period, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.
L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2168, was enacted by the United States Congress. The Crime Con-
trol Act marked the first serious attempt by the United States to combat international
drug trafficking through penal legislation. In addition to its provisions regarding the
stemming of international currency flows connected to the illicit drug business, the Act
established the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, Pub. L. 98-473, § 1302, 98
Stat. 2168. The Board was charged with the duties of development and coordination of
a national drug enforcement policy, including international drug control. Id; Bolivia
and Colombia, supra note 63, at 44 n.30. Ultimately, the Board failed in its mandate
because it was unable to bring under control the turf battles raging among the myriad
federal governmental bureaucracies involved in the anti-drug effort. Id.
68. Clearly, the M-19 leadership was angry with the government's perceived fail-
ure to act in good faith under the August, 1984 truce agreement. See supra note 67.
By the 1984-85 period, Betancur had lost any control of government that he may have
had at the commencement of his presidency. Although Betancur was amenable to ne-
gotiation with the guerilla groups, other factions within the government were not so
willing. These factions, bolstered by Betancur's increasing unpopularity and his lame
duck status, ultimately prevailed. See Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 200-201.
In light of these events, M-19's frustration with the "formal" political and legal process
is understandable and provides one explanation for the takeover of the Palace of
Justice.
An alternative explanation for the seizure of the Palace of Justice has been of-
fered: that M-19 was paid by drug traffickers to enter the Palace and destroy the extra-
dition files. This explanation has been given some credence through the writings of
commentators. See, e.g., S. McDonald, supra note 10, at 37-39; Note, Nonconsensual
Military Action Against the Colombian Drug Lords Under the U.N. Charter, 68
WAsH. U.L.Q. 129, 132 (1990). Despite the absence of any hard evidence as to the
truth of the "narcoguerilla" theory in explaining the Palace of Justice seizure, some
may justify the theory's veracity on the basis of an explanation proffered by the United
States Department of Justice connecting the Colombian guerilla groups with drug traf-
fickers. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Drug Trafficking and Terror-
ism, 12 DRuG ENFORCEMENT 19 (Summer 1985).
The essence of the Justice Department's thesis is that in return for "protection"
provided to traffickers and producers by M-19 (formerly) and FARC, the traffickers
provide the groups with the means to support their respective causes. Id. at 19-21.
While the Justice Department theory rings true, it is true only in part. A deeper view
into the extent of the alleged trafficker-guerilla symbiosis reveals the weaknesses in the
"narcoguerilla" theory as the reason for M-19's seizure of the Palace of Justice.
The Justice Department theory does not imply that the groups work together or
are "friendly" to each other. Each group has its own agenda and will use any avenue
available to accomplish its goals. Indeed, according to the Justice Department, Colom-
bian guerilla groups are not "employed" by the traffickers. Rather, the relationship is
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tempt to negotiate the release of the hostages, the government decided
to send in the military. The November 6th battle resulted in the total
destruction of the Palace, and the deaths of the gueri.las and eleven
justices of the SCJ. Another justice was assassinated on July 31, 1986,
following which several others resigned.
Article 148 of the Constitution directs the remaining members of
the SCJ to fill vacancies created by death or resignation. 69 Neither ex-
ecutive nor legislative advice and consent is required or permitted. Ulti-
mately, by the end of 1986, a majority of the SCJ justices were new
appointees. Also by that time, Virgilio Barco Vargas had assumed the
presidency.70
extortionary in nature. Id. Interestingly, while there seems to some kind of business
relationship between rural-based guerilla groups such as FARC, ELN, and EPL and
the traffickers, the existence of an M-19/trafficker relationship is less evident. The rea-
son for this is that production and processing operations in Colombia take place in the
rural southeastern parts of the nation, areas controlled by FARC, ELN, and EPL.
These groups "share" the territory with the traffickers, levying a "tax" on them for
protection of shipments, laboratories, and growing areas. See Select Committee on
Narcotics Abuse and Control of the House of Representatives, Drugs and Latin
America: Economic and Political Impact and U.S. Policy Options, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Drugs and Latin America]. However, because M-19 was an
"urban" guerilla group and controlled no resources precious to the traffickers, there
was no reason for the traffickers to pay a "protection" tax. Thus, despite assertions to
the contrary by the Justice Department, there exists no evidence as to the existence of
a symbiotic relationship between M-19 and the traffickers. See Lee, The Cocaine Mo-
rass in South America, in Drugs and Latin America, id. at 119, 122.
In the final analysis, it is difficult to comprehend the stupidity of any group who
would pay for seizure of the Palace of Justice in an effort to destroy extradition "files."
Copies of such files exist not only at the Palace of Justice, but in the Colombian For-
eign Ministry and Justice Ministry as well.
69. COLOM. CoNsT. art. 148
70. During this period, the United States government enacted the most sweeping
narcotics control legislation in United States history. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). The Act advocated law enforcement in
drug-producing countries, increased interdiction, criminal penalties fbr money launder-
ing, establishment of grants to state and local enforcement agencies, and increases in
funding for treatment and rehabilitation programs. Id; Hogan & Doyle, supra note 1,
at 12.
Most important for purposes of the present analysis are the provisions of the 1986
Act which provide for the use of United States armed forces in -:he extraterritorial
enforcement of United States anti-drug criminal laws, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2012, 100
Stat. 3265-66 (use of Army in Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia); id. at § 3051, 100
Stat. 3274-76 (increased use of military in interdiction), and those: which tie foreign
assistance to the adequacy of anti-drug efforts taken by producing/trafficking nations,
id. at §§ 2005, 2008, 100 Stat. 3261-62, 64. These latter provisions are most pertinent
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III. THE RULE OF LAW IN COLOMBIA AND THE DELETERIOUS
EFFECT OF THE RECENT UNITED STATES-COLOMBIA
EXTRADITION RELATIONSHIP
A. States of Siege and Emergency Under the Colombian
Constitution
To understand the adverse effects of the United States interna-
tional drug control policy on the administration of justice in Colombia,
it is first necessary to understand that Colombia has been governed
under martial law almost continuously since La Violencia. Under the
Constitution, a state of siege or state of emergency may be declared by
a Colombian head of state where, with the concurrence of all cabinet
members, the head of state decides that "the public order has been
disturbed and that the whole or part of the republic is in a state of
siege,"71 or that events have taken place "which disturb or threaten
seriously and imminently to disturb the economic or social order of the
country or also constitute a serious public disorder.""2
to United States-Colombian relations. Essentially, these sections of the Act make for-
eign aid to drug-producing nations contingent upon certification by the President that
those nations are making adequate independent efforts to eradicate production and
trafficking or, alternatively, are adequately cooperating with the United States in its
eradication and enforcement efforts.
The clear intent of the United States in tying third world foreign aid directly to
certification is to force those nations to cooperate with United States drug control pol-
icy. However, the problem with such an incentive is its negative, coercive, and inher-
ently paternalistic nature. Indeed, the certification process has caused much consterna-
tion among third world governments attempting to cope with huge external debts and
guerilla insurgencies. Moreover, the certification process is susceptible to politicization.
The clearest case illustrating the politics of certification is that of Panama in the
1980's. Less than one year prior his indictments on charges of drug trafficking General
Manuel Antonio Noriega was praised by both then DEA Director Jack Lawn and the
United States Embassy in Panama for his efforts in illicit drug interdiction. See Com-
ment, An Inquiry Regarding the International and Domestic Legal Problems
Presented in United States v. Noriega, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 393, 403
(1989). It appears that the reason Panama was certified was due to its assistance of the
United States effort in arming and training the Nicaraguan contras. Id. at 402; see
also Bagley, Narco-Diplomacy: Drug Trafficking and U.S. Latin American Relations,
in Drugs and Latin America, supra note 68, at 76, 78-79 ("In 1987, . . . U.S. Con-
gressmen proposed to 'decertify' Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, and the Bahamas, in
spite of the Reagan Administration's protests that such punitive measures would dam-
age U.S. relations with those countries . . . "').
71. COLOM. CONST. art. 121 (state of siege).
72. COLOM. CONST. art. 122 (state of emergency).
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State of siege and state of emergency powers allow the President
to issue executive decrees that have the same legally binding force as
congressional legislation passed under non-state of siege/emergency
conditions. Executive decrees issued during the state of siege/emer-
gency can amend laws previously enacted by Congress under the nor-
mal constitutional lawmaking regime, or can create entirely new laws.
Of course, executive decrees do not require or permit any action on the
part of the Congress. While executive decrees issued under the state of
siege/emergency are expressly subject to judicial review by the SCJ,'3
such review extends only to the procedure by which the executive de-
cree was introduced and does not touch upon its "merits."
73. COLOM. CONST. arts. 121, 122. A word of explanation is in order. Since 1886,
the Constitution has accorded the President state of siege powers. Findley, supra note
29, at 424. However, the state of emergency was not added to the Constitution until
the Constitutional Reform of 1968. Id. at 423-30. It seems that article 121 has been
resorted to by presidents to deal with disruptions not only in the "public order" (e.g.,
internal armed conflict) but in the public economic order caused by governmental in-
transigence and turf battling in economic planning. Id. at 423-27. Thus, to reduce ex-
ecutive reliance on the state of siege when Colombia was confronted with economic
problems, and thereby increase the role of the Congress and reinstitute democratic de-
cision making, article 122 was formulated. Id. at 427-30.
As originally envisioned by some members of the Colombian government, article
122 aimed to separate the concepts of economic disorder from political disorder. Id. at
452. The state of emergency, which could last no more than three months, was to be
invoked only where Colombia confronted an acute economic crisis (e.g., an abnormal
decline in national income due to sudden closing of foreign markets), as opposed to
situations where the government faced chronic economic problems (e.g., rural unem-
ployment or even a bloated external debt). Id. at 452-53. Despite the laudable inten-
tions of the government in implementing article 122, it soon became clear that the new
provision would be subjected to the same abuse as article 121, and that presidents
would quickly find non-economic reasons to invoke article 121.
For example, in September, 1974, one month after assuming office following Co-
lombia's first competitive presidential elections in twenty-six years, Alfonso Lopez
Michelsen indicated his intention of declaring a state of economic emergency under
article 122. Id. at 453. Lopez based his decision on a government deficit which
threatened to cut off salaries to government employees and suspend public programs.
Id. After 'the required nonbinding opinion was issued by the Council of State - Colom-
bia's highest level administrative tribunal - in favor of the declaration, Lopez finalized
his decision which limited the state of emergency to forty-five days,. Id. at 455 n.121
(citing Decreto 1970 of 1974). The legislative decrees issued thereur.der imposed a far-
reaching general tax reform package. Id. at 460-62. In 1976, Lopez declared a state of
siege for reasons of internal security. Id. at 473. Despite the Constitutional Reform of
1979, this state of siege lasted until lifted by President Turbay in July, 1982. Bagley &
Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 170 n.38.
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Under recent invocations of the state of siege, presidents have is-
sued decrees establishing trial of civilians by military tribunal,74 limit-
ing the jurisdiction of civilian courts, and altering basic constitutional
rights such as habeas corpus.75 During his tenure, under the current
state of siege imposed by President Betancur in 1984,78 Virgilio Barco
increased the power of the military and police in maintaining the public
order, diluting any demarkation that may have existed regarding their
different roles.77 Although Barco issued the decrees based on alleged
violence carried out by drug traffickers, much of the additional legal
firepower awarded to the military has been used to repress militant po-
litical opposition.
B. Martial Law and The Rule of Law in Colombia
A strict view of the rule of law is defined by application of "the
interrelated notions of neutrality, uniformity, and predictability."78
These notions must be promoted and reinforced through "differentia-
tion of the procedures of legislation, administration, and adjudica-
tion."79 In turn, popular participation in government legitimizes and
increases the power of each component because the legal order will "re-
present a balance struck among competing groups rather than the em-
bodiment of the interests and ideals of a particular faction."' 0 Con-
versely, the abdication of differentiation and the elimination of the
appearance of effective popular participation inevitably result in failure
of apparently neutral, uniform, and predictable application of the law
74. See, e.g., DEcRErO LEGIsLATIvo No. 2260 de 1976, No. 34676 Diario
Oficial 481 (17 de noviembre de 1976) (military tribunals imposed by President Lopez
under state of siege powers); see also DECRETO LEGISLAnrVO No. 1923 de 1978, supra
note 48 (National Security Statute issued by President Turbay imposing military tribu-
nals pursuant to state of siege powers). But see Decision of March 5, 1987 (Sala
Plena), 16 JURISPRUDENCIA Y DOCTRINA 492 (May 1987). In the March 5th Decision,
the SCJ declared unconstitutional the trial of civilians by military courts and restricted
presidential powers under martial law. Id.
75. See DEcRETo LEGISLArivO No. 1923 de 1978, supra note 48; see also
WOLA, supra note 42, at 87-106.
76. DEcRETo NUMERO 1038 de 1984, No. 36608 Diario Oficial 673 (14 de mayo
de 1984).
77. WOLA, supra note 42, at 88, 93-100.
78. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIErY 176 (1976).
79. Id. at 177.
80. Id. at 178.
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and, therefore, a breakdown in the rule of law."' This is exactly the
case in Colombia.
Because of the existence and cavalier invocation of the state of
siege/emergency powers, Colombia is a nation governed by executive
fiat rather than by democratic law. As a corollary, prevention of the
development of democratic practices has promoted violence and law-
lessness both within and without the government. Government institu-
tions are unable to assist Colombians in obtaining effective recourse.
The constant interference with legislative procedure and judicial inde-
pendence by Colombian heads of state, combined with close commiser-
ation between the executive branch, armed forces, and police has elimi-
nated respect for the rule of law by delegitimizing popular power.
The most recent invocation of the state of siege by President
Betancur in 198482 is based on a number of violent acts allegedly per-
petrated by participants in the drug trade. However, the inability of the
government to rule effectively under the normal constitutional regime
may have less to do with such violence than with the perceived threat
to the current political power structure posed by opposition groups, and
constraints imposed upon Colombia in its dealings with the United
States and the rest of the developed world.83
Regardless of the reasons for its invocation, the carrent state of
siege enabled former President Barco to effectively disable the Colom-
bian judiciary. Despite recent SCJ rulings affecting extradition, the ex-
ecutive ultimately has chosen to go its own way. Thus, redress through
the Colombian courts for anyone subject to extradition is no longer an
option.
C. The SCJ Decisions of December 12, 1986 and June 25, 1987
1. The December 12, 1986 Decision
On December 12, 1986 the SCJ handed down the initial decision
81. I write here of "appearance" because it has been argued effectively, particu-
larly by Legal Realists and adherents to the Critical Legal Studie; Movement, that
even in societies where differentiation and widespread public participation take place,
the transformative effect of such participation is limited, and application of the law in a
truly neutral, uniform, and predictable manner is mythical. See generally Blum, Criti-
cal Legal Studies and the Rule of Law, 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 59 (1990).
82. See DECRETO NUMERO 1038, supra note 76.
83. See Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 202-204.
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regarding the enforceability of the law containing the 1979 Treaty.84
Despite statements in previous Court opinions that it was prevented by
the separation of powers doctrine from ruling on the constitutionality of
public treaties (i.e., a broad political question doctrine), the Court re-
versed itself, basing its jurisdiction on article 214(2) of the Colombian
Constitution.85
A unanimous SCJ held that Law 27 was unconstitutional because
the President had not signed it.88 The Court reasoned that approval of
the law by a cabinet minister acting as president has no legal effect
because the delegation of presidential power under which he was acting
does not include conducting international relations.87 Such activity is of
a political nature which requires "the personal use of presidential pre-
rogative as the head of state."88 The delegation of presidential power
includes only the administrative functions of the office. Thus, without
the signature of the head of state, a law containing a treaty between
Colombia and another state is unenforceable under the Constitution.
It is notable that the Colombian Constitution contains no provision
distinguishing between the "political and administrative responsibilities
of the President or requiring the former to be exercised personally by
him."8 9 Thus, the SCJ's holding was one of inference derived from the
Constitution's text. However, the SCJ decision was reinforced by the
concurring opinion of the House of Representatives-appointed Attorney
General. 90
2. The June 25, 1987 Decision
In light of the SCJ's reasoning in its December 12th decision that
Law 27 was procedurally defective because of the absence of then Pres-
84. See Kavass, supra note 61, at 495 (discussing the Decision of December 12,
1986 (Sala Plena)).
85. COLOM. CoNsT. art. 214(2) (stating that "the Court shall have the ...
power: [t]o decide definitively on the legality of all laws and decrees issued by the
government ... when they are brought before the Court upon allegation of unconstitu-
tionality by any citizen.").
86. Kavass, supra note 61, at 495.
87. Id. at 496; see COLOM. CONST. art 128.
88. Kavass, supra note 61, at 496.
89. Id.
90. Under article 214(2) of the Constitution, the Attorney General is required to
render, prior to the Court's review of the case, an opinion in all cases involving chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of laws. COLOM. CONST. art. 214(2).
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ident Turbay's signature, President Barco attempted to cure the defect
by signing the original bill containing the 1979 Treaty, and promulgat-
ing it as Law 68 of 1986.91 Of course, Law 68 was immediately chal-
lenged and came before the SCJ in May, 1987.
The basis of the challenge to the new law was that, in signing Law
27 of 1980 and promulgating it as Law 68 of 1986, the President had
approved a law that did not exist. The SCJ Decision of December 12,
1986, while based on procedural grounds, invalidated the whole of Law
27 of 1980, therefore requiring the reintroduction of the bill to Con-.
gress, and congressional debate on and passage of the new bill. Because
these steps had not been accomplished, the President's promulgation of
Law 68 had no constitutional basis. The legislative process had been
violated.
In the Court's decision, twelve of the twenty-four SCJ justices
agreed that the Court's December 12th decision rendered Law 27 com-
pletely invalid.92 These justices reasoned that the various steps of the
legislative process described under the Constitution (i.e., legislative de-
bate, passage, and presidential approval/objection) mus: be viewed as a
single unit.93 While the Court did not, specifically allude to separation
of powers or "checks and balances," one can discern from its reasoning
that such a process was indeed what the Court had in mind. In other
words, where the legislature and executive fulfill functi.ons in the law-
making process, each of their respective functions must be subject to
the oversight of the other because of the inherently political nature of
both branches. Thus, any flaw in the lawmaking proces must be con-
sidered fatal if that process is to retain its legitimacy. If one lawmaking
branch makes a "mistake" in the process and is then allowed on its
own to "fix" its mistake, such an allowance gives the appearance of
removal of the oversight "check" of the other lawmaking branch
thereby ceding too much power to the former. In this regard, the opin-
ion of the first twelve-justice plurality is an interpretation of the Con-
stitution's text delineating the legislative process, prior cases dealing
with the same subject, and scholarly inquiry relevant lo the process. 94
The other twelve SCJ justices disagreed, holding that the SCJ's
December 12th decision invalidated Law 27 only insofar as it was not
91. Ley 68 de 1986, No. 37733 Diario Oficial 1 (14 de diciembre de 1986).
92. See Kavass, supra note 61, at 498 (reprint of Decision of June 25, 1987
(Sala Plena)).
93. See id. at 501.
94. See id. at 502.
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properly approved by the President, and that proper approval of the
law would remedy the procedural defect. This twelve-justice plurality
reasoned that because the December 12th Court's reasoning in the
"grounds" section of the decision was so specific as to why Law 27 was
unenforceable, "[t]he Court believed that the bill was consistent with
the Constitution as regards the legislative phase and that all that was
lacking was the presidential approval so that it could become a law
. . ,"I In other words, if it was the Court's intention to send the bill
back to Congress, it would not have been so specific in the grounds for
its decision. Thus, according to the second plurality of justices, the
Court stated the legislation's defect and prescribed the cure. The sec-
ond group of justices went on to give an expansive interpretation of the
Constitution's Article 86, arguing that the President can apprve and
promulgate a bill at any time after expiration of the time periods pre-
scribed for objection.98
Alfonso Suarez de Castro, the temporary justice appointed to
break the tie, sided with the first plurality.97 He noted that under Arti-
cle 2 of Law 1 of 1873, laws must be numbered consecutively in the
year they come through the Congress, and are sent to the President. 8
In this regard, executive approval is not considered in determining the
year that a law was enacted.99 Thus, because Congress did not enact
Law 68 of 1986, it does not satisfy the requirements of Law 1 of 1873,
and satisfies only one requirement of the Constitution's Article 81.100
Therefore, Law 68 must be unconstitutional.
Justice Suarez then addressed the apparent interpretational con-
flict among the Court stemming from the December 12th Court's speci-
ficity in describing the "grounds" for its decision and the statement in
the "operative" portion of the decision declaring Law 27 unenforceable.
Justice Suarez stated that the view expressed by the Court in its
"grounds" section is relevant only to the extent that it enunciates the
basis of the Court's ultimate decision. He reasoned that under the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine embodied in the Constitution, the Court, like
the legislature, is prohibited from making suggestions to public offi-
95. Id. at 509.
96. Id. at 510-11.
97. Kavass, supra note 61, at 505-506 (opinion of temporary Associate Justice
Alfonso Suarez de Castro).
98. Id. at 506.
99. Id.
100. COLOM. CONST. art. 81 (describing legislative process).
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cials,' 01 and that the remaining procedure by the President could not be
completed under Article 86 because of the expiration of the constitu-
tional time periods for legally executing them.l0 2 Therefore, the opera-
tive part of the Court's decision was tied to a very specific grounds
section is not restrictive because the grounds merely indicate the deter-
mining conditions-in essence, the cause or causes--of the unenforce-
ability of Law 27.108
Of all the reasons given by temporary Associate Justice Suarez,
the first seems the most powerful because it militates against the issu-
ance of advisory opinions. In turn, such reasoning goes hand-in-hand
with the first plurality's separation of powers or checks and balances
analysis.' 4 For the same reason, Justice Suarez's conclusion is also
quite strong. While Justice Suarez second reason appears weak because
Article 86 of the Constitution prescribes time limitations; only for presi-
dential objection to bills,105 it gains strength when read in conjunction
with his interpretation of the law numbering process. The ultimate ef-
fect of the SCJ's June 25, 1987 decision was to render the 1979 Treaty
unenforceable in Colombia. Suspension of all extraditions under the
1979 Treaty soon followed.
D. Decree Number 1860
Not until August, 1989 would extraditions resume. Why the two
year hiatus? It is hard to say specifically, but it is worth noting that the
summer of 1987 was not particularly good for the Reagan Administra-
tion because it was the summer of the Iran-Contra congressional in-
quiry. Later, United States Attorney General Edwin Meese resigned
and was replaced by Richard Thornburgh. By the time the Thornburgh
Justice Department got going, then Vice President George Bush was
101. Kavass, supra note 61, at 507 (opinion of temporary Afsociate Justice Al-
fonso Suarez de Castro); see also COLOM. CONST. art. 78.
102. Kavass, supra note 61, at 507.
103. Id.
104. See COLOM. CONST. art. 78(1) (forbidding Congress to make suggestions to
public officials); accord H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 66-68 (2d ed. 1973) (discussing the seminal 1793 'United States advi-
sory opinion case known as the "Correspondence of the Justices" in which the Supreme
Court refused to issue such an opinion to the Washington Administration, reasoning
that the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances prevented the Court
from doing so).
105. COLOM. CONsT. art. 86.
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hot on the presidential campaign trail, as were a number of members of
Congress and Senators. All of this served to push to the rear of the
priority list renewed pressure on Colombia to resume extradition of sus-
pected drug traffickers to the United States. However, the advent of the
Bush Administration in 1989, with its emphasis on increased law en-
forcement to reduce international drug trafficking, was all that was
needed to bring the extradition issue back to the forefront.10 8
A rather reluctant President Barco was left with four options in
reviving extradition: His first option was to defy Washington's request.
However, in light of his personal ties to the United States and the per-
ceived importance of United States economic and military assistance,
that option was simply not viable. His second option was to reintroduce
to Congress a bill containing the 1979 Treaty. However, because of the
congressional opposition to the 1979 Treaty expressed during the initial
debate in 1980 and the hostility toward extradition of Colombian na-
tionals that had developed within the Colombian populace, Barco knew
that the odds were against passage of a new bill. As a third option,
Barco could have sought either encourage adoption of the Inter-Ameri-
can Treaty on Extradition,'0 7 or renegotiation of the 1979 Treaty, de-
leting or restricting the provision allowing for extradition of Colombian
nationals. The problem there was that it was precisely that provision
which had been so strongly advocated by the United States during the
initial negotiations. s08 Thus, there was little chance that the Bush Ad-
ministration would support a Colombian request to restrict or delete
such substantive language. Ultimately, Barco chose his fourth option:
issuance under his state of siege powers of a legislative decree mandat-
ing "administrative" extradition.
The popular view in some sectors of Colombian society and in the
106. Note that in 1988, the United States passed a sweeping anti-narcotics law
known as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
The law created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (the "Drug Czar") to
coordinate all drug control efforts and required the President to formulate and submit
to Congress a National Drug Control Strategy. Pub. L. 100-690, §§ 1001, 1005, 102
Stat. 4181, 4185. The Bush Administration, the campaign platform of which included
a strong anti-drug crime plank, was quick in its response. The National Drug Control
Strategy, emphasizing extraterritorial law enforcement, soon became a major political
tool. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 49-63 (1990); see
also Perl, International Aspects of U.S. Drug Control Efforts, CRS REv. 17 (Nov.-
Dec. 1989).
107. See supra note 27.
108. See 1979 Treaty, supra note 53.
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United States was that President Barco issued Decree Number 1860 of
1989,109 providing for summary administrative extradition of those ac-
cused of drug trafficking, in response to the August 14 assassination of
Liberal presidential candidate Carlos Luis Galn. Of course, Galdn's
murder was alleged to have been committed by agents of drug traffick-
ers. According to the conventional wisdom, the Decree would be a sign
from the Barco Administration that it was serious about dealing with
those involved in the drug trade, and that it would not tolerate mass
bloodshed allegedly perpetrated by traffickers.
The problem here is that there are other well-informed and well-
connected members of Colombian society who relate a much different
story underlying the promulgation of D.N. 1860, a story much less al-
truistic and far more disturbing than the "official" version. The Bush
Administration's strong emphasis of a law enforcement.-oriented inter-
national drug control policy makes such an alternative view, plausible.
Faced with the fact that the Colombian Congress was not about to
approve a new bill containing the 1979 Treaty, in late spring or early
summer of 1989 members of the Colombian Executive Cabinet, in con-
sultation with members of the United States Department: of Justice and
the foreign ministries of certain European nations, devised the language
that was to become the text of D.N. 1860. However, because of the
then strong, anti-extradition feeling within Colombia, a pretext for is-
suance of the Decree was necessary-a pretext that would sufficiently
shock the Colombian people into backing extradition of Colombian na-
tionals. The death of Galdn, a vocal critic of drug traffickers, provided
such a pretext. His murder remains a mystery and Colombian authori-
ties have yet to uncover any evidence that it was carried out by sicarios
(professional assassins) in the traffickers' employ.
Certainly, in light of the alleged business acumen ;and complexity
of those involved in the illicit drug business, the lack of evidence does
not, in itself, mean that the drug trade had nothing to do with the
GaIn assassination. However, the official story simply does not com-
port with the strong Colombian popular feeling against extradition of
nationals in effect at the time of Galdn's death. It makes absolutely no
sense that members of the illicit drug business would commit such a
poorly timed assassination of a popular leader. Indeed, if drug traffick-
109. DECREMTO NtJMERO 1860 de 1989, No. 38945 Diario Oficial 5 (18 de agosto
de 1989) [hereinafter D.N. 1860 or "the Decree"]; see also DECRIrrO NuMERo 2105
de 1989, No. 38981 Diario Oficial 4 (14 de setiembre de 1989) (providing for personal
appearance of defendant during extradition proceedings). ,
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ers are considered to be sophisticated business people, how could they
have been foolish enough to kill a popular politician when things were
so much in their favor? They must have known that killing Galdn
would have resulted in a Colombian change of heart and a government-
led crackdown. If nothing else, such a move would be "bad for
business."
In any event, D.N. 1860 was in force. Although disturbed by the
new administrative summary extradition procedure, the majority of the
Colombian populace was caught sufficiently off-guard by the Galdn as-
sassination and the official story to deter a major political backlash.
D.N. 1860 is a severe measure. It was enacted by President Barco
pursuant to the state of siege that his predecessor had invoked in
1984.110 D.N. 1860 is designed to provide for summary administrative
extradition of those who participate in the narcotics business.111 Article
1 suspends subsection 2, Article 17 of the Penal Code "with regard to
everything related to narcotics trafficking and related crimes ....
Subsection 2 of Article 17 of the Penal Code provides that extradition
of Colombians "shall be subject to the provisions of public treaties."' 13
While the legislative intent of this provision is difficult to discern, one
can deduce that its wording provides a safeguard against the extradi-
tion of Colombian nationals by pure executive fiat. In other words, be-
cause extradition of Colombian citizens is to take place only within the
ambit of duly negotiated public treaties, and because all public treaties
are subject to congressional legislation, the executive is prevented from
extraditing nationals without congressional consultation.1 1
4
110. See supra note 76.
111. D.N. 1860, supra note 109, at Preamble.
112. Id. at art. 1.
113. CODIGO PENAL DE COLOMBIA art. 17, § 2, reprinted in REGIMEN PENAL
CoLoMBIANo (loose-leaf 1990).
114. A review of the history of Colombia's policy on extradition of its own citi-
zens reinforces this point. From the year of the nation's independence until 1936, extra-
dition of nationals was, at least, not expressly prohibited by law. However, note that
such extradition was discouraged under the 1888 extradition convention with the
United States. See 1888 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 10. In 1936, Law 95 was
enacted as part of the Penal Code, and expressly forbade extradition of citizens. It was
only in 1980, during the war on marijuana by the United States, and during the Wash-
ington-oriented Turbay Administration, that extradition of nationals was expressly per-
mitted. In that year, President Turbay issued Decree Number 100, amending the Penal
Code to its current form allowing for extradition of Colombian nationals, but only
where such extradition is made pursuant to public treaties. Clearly, this decree was a
response to the newly negotiated 1979 Treaty, supra note 53, which called for extradi-
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Article 2 of D.N. 1860 eliminates the requirement of a "prior rul-
ing by the Criminal Appeals Division of the Supreme Court of Justice"
in the granting of extradition requests for Colombian citizens and for-
eign nationals. 115 Under prior practice, requests for extradition were
subject to judicial review to assure that such requests were being made
in accordance with Colombian law.
Article 3 places those persons "held or arrested and subject to ex-
tradition" at the disposal of the Justice Ministry.' Article 5 provides
that an extradition request will preempt any conviction for another
crime of the requested person already obtained in Colombia prior to
the receipt of the extradition request."1 7 In other words, if a requested
person is already serving jail time in Colombia pursuant to a prior con-
viction, the Government may still "order the immediate delivery of
th[at] person . . . to the requesting State . . ." for trial in that state
on the charges upon which the extradition is based." 8
Article 6 provides that "any person may be extradited, although
the person may have been tried in Colombia for the same crime for
which he is requested, as long as sentence has not been rendered.""' ,,
Thus, it is possible for a person to be tried twice for the same crime,
albeit in different jurisdictions. Article 7 denies both the right to re-
lease on bail and the ability to obtain a suspended sentence to re-
quested persons against whom "other proceedings" are in progress in
Colombia. 2 0
Article 8 is very important, because it outlines the requirements
for the granting of an extradition request. Section A requires the re-
questing state to guarantee that the death penalty will not be imposed
upon the person extradited.' 2 ' Section B states that "[t he extradition
of a citizen shall not be granted in any case where the requesting State
does not fully guarantee that it shall not impose a term of imprison-
ment of more than thirty (30) years. 122 Section C provides that the
requesting State shall "guarantee that the human rights of the person
extradited shall be respected . . . in a manner that is non-discrimina-
tion of the contracting parties' nationals.
115. D.N. 1860, supra note 109, at art. 2.
116. Id. at art. 3.
117. Id. at art. 5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at art. 6.
120. D.N. 1860, supra note 109, at art. 7.
121. Id. at art 8, § A.
122. Id. at art. 8, § B.
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tory with regard to those convicted in its own country."1 23 Section D
provides that all costs of extradition (i.e., translation of documents and
transportation of the person extradited) shall be borne by the request-
ing state.1 24
Article 9 provides that the Government may issue a resolution in
favor of extradition in absentia. 25 In other words, the person requested
does not have to be "the object of detention or arrest" for a favorable
extradition resolution to be issued.1 26 However, in such a case, the Gov-
ernment is required to issue a "summons" to the person requested so
that the person may prepare a defense.
Ultimately, the promulgation of D.N. 1860 not only bypassed the
constitutional legislative process, but proscribed any kind of indepen-
dent judicial due process. By providing for extradition proceedings to
be carried out exclusively by the executive branch, D.N. 1860 leaves
much leeway for abuse of the requested person's civil rights. Essen-
tially, under the Decree, Colombia can extradite anyone it wants as
long as there is some type of illegal drug-related charge pending
against that person in the requesting state.
E. The SCJ Decision of October 3, 1989
The question of the constitutionality of D.N. 1860 came before the
SCJ in September, 1989, and the Court rendered its opinion on Octo-
ber 3.127 It began its opinion on the subject matter of D.N. 1860 by
recognizing the power of the President, under his state of siege power,
to amend the law when he believes that the public order is threatened.
Thus, the Court agreed that, on its face, Article 1 of the Decree, sus-
pending the section of the Penal Code restricting extradition of Colom-
bians to duly negotiated public treaties, was constitutional.
The SCJ then examined the Decree in the context of previous de-
cisions dealing with international extradition and international agree-
ments on extradition to which Colombia is a party and which are cur-
rently in force. The Court seemed particularly concerned with that part
of the Penal Code which D.N. 1860 left intact, to wit: that extradition
123. Id. at art. 8, § C.
124. Id. at art. 8, § D.
125. D.N. 1860, supra note 109, at art. 9.
126. Id.
127. Decision of October 3, 1989 (Sala Plena) (unofficial translation; on file at
the offices of the Nova Law Review).
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shall be granted, requested, or offered in accordance with public trea-
ties. The SCJ stated:
[T]he circumstance that the extradition of nationals for drug traf-
ficking and kindred crimes is now possible, even in the absence of a
public treaty authorizing it, does not in any way imply that if such
international instruments exist they should not be observed, inas-
much as, quite the contrary, it is imperative for both concerned
states that they be performed with exactness, for the bona fides
required of them is at stake. This conclusion, which goes hand in
hand with a literal as well as a systematic construction of the rules,
is unescapable [sic]. 128
Looking to its previous decisions both en banc and in its Criminal
Appeals Division, the Court held that under basic principles of interna-
tional law, despite the presence of conflicting domestic 1.egislation, Co-
lombia remains bound by its international obligations.1 29 This is the
rule in the United States as well."' 0
The SCJ attempted to draw distinctions among what it character-
ized as two of the three classes of international treaties: "contract"
treaties and "law" or "normative" treaties. According t:o the Court, a
contract treaty,
creates reciprocal rights and obligations between the parties which
are, therefore, the reason for mutual performance by the very
states that execute them; in this regard, they are subjective acts or
the source of legal relations of that nature; they settle different,
albeit not always contradictory or opposing, interests of the parties,
and their common will leads to the resolution of each such interest.
By contrast, law treaties or normative treaties regulate issues of
concurrent or shared interest and determine, not the behavior of
each state vis-A-vis the other's rights and obligations, but rather the
behavior that each state must observe in a certain matter, thus giv-
ing rise to objective law."3'
128. Id. at 9.
129. Id. at 10; see also VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, Nov.
22, 1971, S. Exec. Doc., 92d Cong., 1st sess., art. 27 (1971); Kearney & Dalton, The
Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970).
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115(1)(b), comments (a), (b) (1987).
131. Decision of October 3, supra note 127, at 10-11.
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Extradition treaties fall under the former category because such
treaties involve regulation of "a [contracting] state vis-A-vis another in
terms of mutual performance and on the international field, '132 while
treaties governing, say, intellectual property, fall under the latter cate-
gory because such treaties "determine the internal conduct of the [con-
tracting] states in transnational matters (international private law)
. . . .,x Because contract treaties, such as those involving extradition,
govern relations purely between states acting as legal persons, "the[ir]
prevalence . . . cannot even be doubted .*.". .""' Thus, in the pres-
ence of an extradition treaty, the contracting parties may not accord
preferential application to internal legislation on the same subject. Ulti-
mately, the 1979 Treaty, while dormant under Colombian law because
of the SCJ's 1987 decision, is still in force under international law until
it is denounced. Therefore, the 1979 Treaty takes precedence over D.N.
1860.135
Despite the October 3, 1989 decision by the SCJ, the Colombian
government, with the approval of the United States, has continued to
extradite both its nationals and noncitizens under D.N. 1860. There
has been no formal denunciation of the 1979 Treaty either by Colom-
bia or the United States as provided in Article 21 of the 1979 Treaty,
and by the rules under article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: a convention to which both nations are signatories. Thus,
under both countries' laws, the legal status of the 1979 Treaty, and the
extraditions which have taken place pursuant to D.N. 1860, have yet to
be resolved.
More poignantly, the Colombian government's refusal to abide by
the SCJ's declaration of D.N. 1860's subordinance to the 1979 Treaty
is indicative of its low regard for the authority of Colombia's highest
court and the pointlessness of SCJ decisions issued during a state of
siege. Equally disconcerting is the role that the United States has
played. Rather than implementing a policy focused on institution build-
ing which aims to reinforce the rule of law in Colombia, the United
States' policy contributes to its deterioration by actively promoting
debilitation of an independent Colombian judiciary and disrespect for
the Constitution.
It is quite clear that current administration of justice in Colombia
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 11-12.
135. Id. at 13.
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is carried out not by the judicial system pursuant to its constitutional
mandate, but solely by executive discretion. Thus, despite both the
"free and fair" presidential elections of 1990- the campaign which saw
the assassination of three candidates - and the absence of direct mili-
tary rule, Colombian democracy, governed according to the rule of law,
remains a fiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the United States and Colombia are serious about reducing the
volume of international drug trafficking emanating from Colombia and
restoring order in that country, they must endeavor to make the busi-
ness less attractive. The current international drug control policy of the
United States, and active participation in that policy by the Colombian
government, verges on the perpetration of fraud3 6 and has solidified
Colombia's status as a police state. Rather than addressing some of the
causes of Colombia's role as a base for drug trafficking: extreme pov-
erty in that country; corruption in the highest echelons of Colombian
society and government; and high demand for illicit drugs in the devel-
oped world, to name three, the current policy has only increased the
level of violence in an already violent society. To defuse the situation,
and this can occur only gradually, the rule of law must be established
in Colombia, thereby giving Colombians some sort of recourse other
than violence. That process can be initiated through a number of steps.
First, Colombia must amend its constitution to eliminate the state
of siege/emergency powers of the President. These powers have been
abused by Colombian heads of state who seem to prefer armed repres-
sion of political opposition to true competition, negotiation, and prob-
lem solving. The Colombian President's invocation of the state of siege/
emergency powers robs the rule of law of all meaning.137 If the state of
siege/emergency powers are not eliminated, all other efforts to restore
136. See supra notes 12, 13.
137. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. Indeed, the practical effect
of the state of siege regarding the independence of the judiciary,
is to reduce considerably the judiciary's sphere of action in protecting con-
stitutional rights from governmental abuse. Consequently, long-term usage
of the state of siege or its functional equivalents has substantially hindered
judicial independence in many Latin American countries by making pro-
tection of constitutional rights impossible.
Rosenn, Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. Rv. 1,
34 (1987).
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the rule of law will be for nought. In this regard, Colombia must break
with its authoritarian past.138 The government must exhibit the politi-
cal will to allow the judicial system to carry out its function as an invi-
olable branch of government with the power to overrule actions taken
by the Executive and Congress when either of those two branches over-
138. In light of Latin American political history in general, this appears to be a
tall order. Indeed, some knowledgeable commentators on Latin American law have in-
dicated that the trend toward authoritarian government in Latin America is a cultur-
ally natural and "not accidental" phenomenon, reflecting "the Roman law tradition of
granting autocratic powers to the emperors and paterfamilias, the corporativism and
patrimonialism of colonial rule, and the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church."
Rosenn, supra note 137, at 34 (citing Wiarda, Toward a Framework for the Study of
Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition" The Corporate Model, 25 WORLD POL.
206, 210-12 (1973); Wiarda, Law and Political Development in Latin America, 19 AM.
J. Corp. L. 434, 438-47 (1971)).
Unwilling to accept such analysis as the final word on democratic evolution in
Latin America, other specialists have attempted to provide an answer. For example,
Carlos Santiago Nino, Professor of Law at the University of Buenos Aires, writes that,
[a]s for the alleged Hispanic preference for strong leaders, this tendency
should be institutionally counteracted rather than promoted. In fact, the
postulation is rather dubious, given the easy adaptation of countries like
Spain to a parliamentary system (after forty years of a caudillo's rule),
and the adoption of strong leaders by non-Hispanic nations.
Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin
America, 44 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 129, 155 (1989). Professor Nino's attempt to dispel the
culturally linked Latin American authoritarian governmental model is laudable but un-
satisfying. It is laudable because it refutes a stereotype often bestowed upon Hispanic
culture. However, it is unsatisfying for three reasons. First Professor Nino fails to ac-
knowledge the differences among continental Spanish and Latin American cultures
which may have influenced Spain's transition from military rule to parliamentary de-
mocracy and which may prevent many Latin American nations from doing so, includ-
ing the influence of other democratic European nations on Spain because of geographic
proximity, Spain's membership in the European Community, and her membership in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Second, Professor Nino fails to admit that
even Spain experiences problems similar, albeit to a much lesser extent, to those of
many Latin American nations, to wit: difficulty in controlling the police in some parts
of the country, occasional coup attempts by the military, and the existence of separatist
insurgent groups such as the Basques.
Finally, Professor Nino's argument that non-Hispanic nations have adopted strong
leaders does not in itself effectively counter the cultural linkage argument. Rather,
such an argument merely indicates that culture is not the only reason underpinning the
rise of authoritarianism. Perhaps this strand of Professor Nino's reasoning can be
strengthened by comparing the seemingly similar problems of post-colonial Latin
America and post-colonial Africa and Asia. See Africa's Cities, Tim ECONOMIST 25
(Sept. 15, 1990); Crosette, In Pakistan, The Judiciary Tries to Keep an Even Keel,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, at D4, col. 1.
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steps its constitutional mandate.
Second, the United States and Colombia should immediately cease
all extraditions taking place under D.N. 1860, and the Colombian gov-
ernment should either reintroduce the 1979 Treaty to Congress, de-
nounce it, and enter into new bilateral negotiations, or denounce it and
insist on adoption of the Inter-American Treaty on Extradition.3 9 New
bilateral extradition treaty negotiations must take into account Colom-
bia's sensitivity in protecting its sovereignty and culture, and must rein-
force other aspects of a Colombian program to institute and effectuate
the rule of law. In this regard, if a new treaty is negotiated, prosecution
and incarceration of Colombian citizens accused of drug-related crimes
should take place in Colombia. Extradition of Colombians to the
United States should occur, if ever, only in certain clearly defined and
closely monitored cases. 140
Third, the United States must refrain from using negative incen-
tives in determining whether Colombia will receive economic assis-
tance. 4 Rather, the United States, the European Community, and Ja-
pan, under the auspices of international organizations, must positively
assist Colombia economically, and in reforming and rebuilding its judi-
cial system. 42 Military and economic assistance should be made con-
tingent on a Colombian commitment to such reformation and recon-
struction.'43 The developed nations might even earmark aid for specific
projects. For example, the United States, the European Community, or
139. See supra note 27.
140. Currently, this is not the case under D.N. 1860, supra note 109. See supra
notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 67, 70.
142.. A primary form of economic assistance should, of course, consist of trade
credits and preferences negotiated under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade.
Such credits and preferences should be targeted at Colombia's three most attractive
exports: Coffee, fossil fuels, and cut flowers. With regard to coffee, by far the nation's
largest export, the International Coffee Agreement, Dec. 3, 1975. 28 U.S.T. 6403,
T.I.A.S. No. 8683, which collapsed in July, 1989, should be renegotiated. See OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1990 TRADE PoLIcY AGENDA AND
1989 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 66-70 (1990).
143. Whether or not the new government of Cesar Gaviria Trujilo is prepared to
make such a commitment remains to be seen. However, there is some indication that
effective judicial reform is possible. See "Urge Reforma de la Justicta:" Pinzon Lopez,
El Espectador (Colombia), July 13, 1990 at 6A, col. 1 (testimony of former SCJ Jus-
tice and Labor Minister Jaime Pinzon Lopez regarding necessity of judicial reform to
restore order in Colombia).
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Japan could donate computer systems to be used by the Colombian
courts, and could train Colombian court personnel in the use of such
systems. In response, Colombia would agree to dedicate a substantial
amount of its budget to appropriations aimed at hiring and training
more judicial personnel, raising the desperately low salaries of judges
and rank and file police and corrections personnel, and purchasing
modern equipment for the courts. The Colombian government would
also agree to effectively separate the duties of the military from those
of the police.
Fourth, Colombia must seek to implement a social safety net that
provides realistic upward opportunities for its large, poor population.
Under the current system, such opportunities are non-existent, and
"rank" in society is determined at birth."," By changing the caste sys-
tem, Colombia will increase the alternatives available to the urban and
rural poor, thereby decreasing the attractiveness of the drug business.
Finally, the United States, Western European states, and Japan
must increase their emphasis on drug demand reduction. By engaging
in demand reduction, these nations, the largest consumers of cocaine,
will eliminate the economic incentive involved in the international drug
trafficking business.
The author recognizes that these suggestions challenge certain Co-
lombian cultural norms, as well as a United States policymaking pro-
cess which gives great weight to short term results reflected in opinion
polls. Long term policymaking obtains results which can be measured
only over a substantial period of time. However, only through such fun-
damental changes in thinking can the rule of law be implemented in
Colombia, and international drug trafficking be reduced significantly
without civil and human rights sacrificed and lives lost.
144. See generally INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEv., COLOMiA: So-
CIAL PROGRAMS FOR THE ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY (1990).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the rule of law under attack in the context of
international narcotics trafficking and narco-terrorism. To set the stage,
the paper discusses the role of law, both internationally and nationally,
in the fight against narcotics trafficking, and particularly, organized
crime and narco-terrorism. Organized crime is used as the focus of the
* The author is of counsel, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Washington, D.C.;
adjunct professor, international business criminal law, Fordham University School of
Law; co-chair, Committee on International Criminal Law, Section of Criminal Justice,
American Bar Association; is editor of the International Enforcement Law Reporter,
and was a consultant to the U.N. Crime Committee on organized crime.
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paper because narco-terrorists are extremely organized and powerful.
Increasingly, the battle against international narcotics trafficking and
narco-terrorism is a power struggle.' So powerful, wealthy, and intent
on maintaining their position are the drug barons that they now have
an inordinate amount of influence and power over many of the highest
echelons of government in certain countries.
For discussion purposes, international law as a target of organized
crime and narco-terrorism is treated. Surprisingly, many professionals
and lay persons that follow narcotics policy are not evert aware of the
existence of a comprehensive policy of an international organization.
Rather, they only know excerpts from the narcotics policy of the coun-
try in which they live. For instance, most professionals in the U.S. be-
lieve that international narcotics policy comes from the pronounce-
ments of the U.S. Government, as set forth by President Bush or the
Drug Czar. However, the international drug policy set by the United
Nations is the international policy within which national governments
must adopt and fund their own policy so that the international policy
can become operational and effective. Failure to coordinate national
policy with the international policy and failure to fund international
drug policy weakens the rule of law.
The importance of national law in combatting narcotics trafficking
and organized crime as manifested in narco-terrorism can be seen al-
most on a daily basis. Especially in the United States, attention is riv-
eted on the need to adopt our country's laws and on the assaults that
other countrys' judicial systems operate (e.g., the constant terrorism of
the judicial system in Colombia).
In order to discuss the rule of law as a target and how to safe-
guard it requires an overview of the growing internationalization.
A. Organized Crime
The paper discusses in part the growing internationalization of or-
ganized crime activity: its impact on different aspects of society and
international relations, and indicates possible avenues of action to
counter this development, including modalities of international coopera-
tion and instruments therefore.
The term "organized crime" refers to complex criminal activities,
1. This paper is based in part on an assignment of the author for the United
Nations on international cooperation to counter the growing internalionalization of or-
ganized crime activities.
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carried out on a large scale by organizations with the intent to estab-
lish, maintain and exploit markets for illegal goods and services, for the
sake of profit and enrichment of their members, and at the expense of
society. Such activities generally occur outside the law and often in-
volve crimes against persons, such as threats, intimidation, and physical
violence, including murder and mutilation. While organized crime has
not been precisely defined, some of its elements are clear. It is conspira-
torial crime aimed at economic gain using a hierarchical coordination
of a number of persons planning and executing illegal acts or pursing
legitimate objectives by unlawful means or through the use of funds
derived from illicit activities. A main characteristic of organized crime
is the hierarchical structure of closely knit groups. The tight organiza-
tion and the method of keeping it intact characterizes many of the or-
ganized crime groups. Organized crime has moved from classical forms
of illegal activities such as gambling, narcotics, and prostitution into
business crimes such as planned bankruptcies, fraud, and loan shark-
ing. Many of the new internationalized forms of organized crime have
not yet gone into business crimes and have concentrated on their own
brands of crime. However, durability and the conspiratorial character-
istics of organized groups provide common elements and an inevitable
evolution into different modus operandi if the groups are to success-
fully survive. A secondary, but extremely harmful effect of such activi-
ties on society is the corruption of public officials and political figures
through bribes and graft or mere collusion. The characteristics of a
criminal organization are: continuity in time, a hierarchical structure, a
defined group of members, criminal involvement, recourse to violence,
and the acquisition of power as the main goal.
2. In reviewing the types and characteristics of organized crime, one should con-
sider the identification by the U.S. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice
of seven descriptive characteristics:
a. Organized crime is a conspiratorial crime, sometimes involving the hierarchical
coordination of a number of persons in the planning and execution of illegal acts, or in
the pursuit of a, legitimate objective by unlawful means. Organized crime involves con-
tinuous commitment by key members, although some persons with specialized skills
may participate only briefly in the ongoing conspiracies.
b. Organized crime has economic gain as its primary goal, although some of the
participants in the conspiracy may have the attainment of power or status as their
objective.
c. Organized crime is not limited to patently illegal enterprises or unlawful ser-
vices such as gambling, prostitution, drugs, loan sharking, or racketeering. It also in-
cludes such sophisticated activities as laundering of illegal money through a legitimate
business, land fraud, and computer manipulation.
.1991]
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Traditionally, organized crime has developed monopoly control
and continues to derive resources from five areas of illicit activity: ille-
gal gambling, illicit narcotics trafficking, racketeering, prostitution, and
loan sharking. Legitimate businesses which were early targets of organ-
ized crime include the fields of juke-box and vending machine opera-
tion, laundry services, liquor and beer distribution, nightclubs, food
wholesaling, record manufacturing, and the garment industry.3 A dis-
tinction between the traditional forms of organized crime and the illicit
drug trafficking operations is the inter-linkage between modern organ-
ized crime and terrorist and guerilla movements. The methods of or-
ganized crime have been characterized by extortion that seeks as its
targets persons who are poorly situated and unable to protect them-
selves. They typically are without ready access to the l.aw, unable to
avoid monitoring by organized criminals because their earnings and ac-
tivities are regular or can be metered, and are "victims" whose regu-
larly conducted activity can be treated "fairly" by extortionists who are
dealing with other targets.
Although this paper addresses the problem of the internationaliza-
tion of emerging criminal groups generally, and in particular the prob-
lem of narco-terrorism, the international community can successfully
design mechanisms by directly pinpointing the nuances of each group.
d. Organized crime uses predatory tactics such as intimidation, violence, and cor-
ruption, and it appeals to greed to accomplish its objectives and safeguard its gains.
e. By experience, custom, and practice, organized crime's conspiratorial groups are
usually very quick and effective in controlling and disciplining their members, associ-
ates, and victims. Hence, organized crime participants are unlikely to disassociate
themselves from the conspiracies and are in the main incorrigible.
f. There is not one organized crime family or group. Rather, a variety of groups
engaged in organized criminal activity.
g. Organized crime does not include terrorists dedicated to political change, al-
though organized criminals and terrorists have some characteristics in common, includ-
ing types of crime committed and strict organizational structures. Organized crime
groups tend to be politically conservative, and want to maintain 'the status quo in
which they succeed, contrary to terrorist groups dedicated to radical political change
through violent acts. See U. S. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice and
Goals, ORGANIZED CRIME REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 7-8
(1976).
3. Organized crime usually controls legitimate business concerns in four main
ways: 1) investing concealed profits acquired from gambling and other illegal activities;
2) accepting business interests in payment of the owners debt from illicit activities such
as gambling or narcotics; 3) foreclosing on usurious loans; and 4) using various forms
of extortion. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 4 (1967).
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Hence, in order to deal with drug trafficking by persons in Andean
countries, the international community and even national governments
have signed a specific multilateral convention as well as bilateral con-
ventions on drug trafficking alone. Nevertheless, some criminal groups
have several criminal activities that require attention by other than per-
sons training in just in type of crime such narcotics and in particular
narco-terrorism.
B. The Impact of International Narco-Terrorism
At the recent Eighth U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention, the
complexity of dealing with organized crime and narco-terrorism was
underscored. 4 Many countries that lack essential institutional capabili-
ties, financial resources, and skilled personnel are not capable of de-
signing or implementing well-defined strategies for dealing with narco-
terrorism. The lack of resources of many countries and the transna-
tional nature of narco-terrorism requires effective international action.
Narco-terrorism is used to describe the role played by drug traf-
ficking in international politics.5 In recent years, the power of narco-
terrorists, their ability to manipulate sovereignty, and the comparative
slowness with which governments adopt to change has enabled narco-
terrorists to gain significant power both nationally and internationally.
Narcotics, trafficking in narcotics, terrorism, international money
movement, drug bartering for arms, arms trafficking, insurgent guer-
rilla movements, and covert activities by governments are all recog-
nized mechanisms to destabilize governments. Narcotics and narcotics
trafficking are considered by some to be an integral part of the symbi-
otic relationship between groups involved in transnational organized
crime and persons seeking destabilization through the "invisible wars"
of terrorism.6
Narco-terrorism is a popular term employed by the media and pol-
4. U.N. Economic and Social Council, Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Report of the Interregional Preparatory
Meeting for the Eighth United Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders on Topic III: Effective National and International Action Against
(a) Organized Crime; (b) Terrorist Criminal Activities, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/
IPM.2 (1988).
5. For a useful discussion of narco-terrorism from which this account draws
heavily, see Lupsha, The Role of Drugs and Drug Trafficking in the Invisible Wars, in
INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING 15 (D. Rowe ed. 1988).
6. Id. at 19.
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iticians to convey images of conspiracies between narcotics traffickers
and terrorist organizations. The term can be misleading because it ap-
plies to a wide range of relationships, situations, and groups. In terms
of the rule of law, narcotics-trafficking groups employ terrorism as a
means to intimidate governments and the judiciary, prosecutors, law
enforcement officials, and the military. Terrorism enables them to avoid
or substantially diminish the risk of apprehension, prosecution, and in-
carceration. The tactics of narco-terrorists in Colombia, for instance,
have been well documented.'
In some cases, narco-terrorists can be so intrusive that they as-
sume the role of the state itself in trafficking drugs and in cooperating
with drug-trafficking organizations. For instance, in the early 1980s
under the Luis Garcia Meza government, Bolivia was taken over by a
group of military officers who also dominated the drug trade. A similar
situation is alleged to have occurred in Panama under the Administra-
tion of General Manual Noriega.
One aspect of the relationship between drug trafficking and the
state has been the use of drugs and drug trafficking to foster and pro-
mote a state's policies and positions. For instance, a country uses trans-
actional criminal groups, such as drug and arms traffickers, as links to
terrorist and insurgent organizations. In the case of the U.S., a report
by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee documented the
arms-drugs trade in the support of the contra operations in Nicaragua.9
Organized crime and narco-terrorism have infiltrated into the in-
ternational financial system. A problem in combatting international
terrorism has been defining terrorism. Many experts have suggested
that rather than try to define terrorism, conventions should merely es-
tablish a list of specific acts that are criminalized and excluded from
the list of political crimes. Many experts believe that, rather than pre-
paring new conventions, the best approach is to revise anad improve ex-
isting agreements through concluding additional protocols to close gaps
and strengthen enforcement. The U.N. could take a leading role in
monitoring implementation of existing treaties and obtaining informa-
7. Id. at 16.
8. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, STAFF STATEMENT ON HEARING STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DRUG CARTELS (Sept. 12, 1989).
9. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS DRUGS LiW ENFORCEMENT
AND FOREIGN POLICY 2 (Apr. 13, 1989).
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tion by the use of extensive surveys and questionnaires.
State terrorism has been an important phenomenon. It includes
operations sponsored, organized, encouraged, directed or supported, ei-
ther individually or collectively, materially or logistically, by a state or
group of states for the purpose of intimidating another state, person,
group or organization.
The relationship between terrorists and narcotics traffickers de-
pends on a variety of the following: need, organizational infrastructure
development, ability, worth or value, and the availability of modern
technology.
As measures to combat international terrorism are strengthened, it
is also important to ensure the right of the defendant to seek and ob-
tain information that might contribute to his or her defense and to
safeguard the fairness of the system.
C. Impact of Organized Crime Activities on Society and Inter-
national Relations
The rapid internationalization of both organized crime and terror-
ist activities are threatening social and public institutions in many
countries. Organized crime is infiltrating legitimate businesses. Its
reach has extended into the international financial system and its asso-
ciation with economic and white-collar crime has become increasingly
more evident.10 Its diversification and expansion, its new forms of asso-
ciation with highly profitable operations and inter-linkages with the il-
legal arms trade, illicit drug trafficking, terrorist activities, corruption,
and professional sports are seriously undermining legitimate business
activity and society in general.""
The activities of organized crime and narco-terrorists are far more
destructive in developing countries, which are often highly vulnerable
to the operations of criminal organizations. Organized crime has deeply
infiltrated the agencies of public administration and political structures
in a number of developing countries, where it bribes government offi-
cials at all levels, including the armed forces, and contributes to the
10. See generally President's Commission on Organized Crime, THE CASH CON-
NECTION: ORGAMZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSnT=tnONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERNG
(Interim Report to the President and the Attorney General, Oct. 1984); U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Office of Attorney General, Drug Trafficking: A Report to the Presi-
dent of the United States 40 (Aug. 3, 1989).
11. See supra note 4.
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electoral campaigns of political parties, thereby undermining the fabric
of society, generating widespread demoralization and having a perva-
sive effect through all levels of society. 12
Widespread corruption constitutes, moreover, a serious impedi-
ment to effective international cooperation by the countries concerned.
In some cases, the officials in charge of implementing such cooperation
were on the payroll of organized crime. In addition, money laundering
and other financial operations carried out by organized crime in devel-
oping countries are a source of grave financial problems in those coun-
tries. Organized crime in those countries brings a new entrepreneur
class, the financial power of which is often used in a manner contrary
to national interests. Organized crime, therefore, has a devastating ef-
fect in all countries, and tends to spill over national borders in a most
insidious manner.
The role of some new forms of international organized crime have
assumed new importance, emphasis, and perspective, in part due to
their own nature, and in part due to technological changes. Drug traf-
ficking, terrorism, transnational money laundering, drug bartering for
arms, arms trafficking, insurgent guerilla movements, and cover activi-
ties by governments have destabilized national governments and their
regimes. Drug trafficking is now an integral part of the symbiotic rela-
tionship between groups involved in transnational organized crime and
revolutionary ideological groups seeking to overthrow or destabilize
governments.Y
Despite writings of pundits on "narco-terrorism," suggesting sim-
plistic alliances between narcotics traffickers and ideological criminals/
terrorists, scholars and law enforcement, intelligence demonstrate that
a wide range of relationships, situations, and groups occur : 4 Indeed,
collaboration between drug traffickers and insurgent guerilla groups
has occurred in countries, such as Colombia, Burma, Lebanon, and Sri
Lanka. Revolutionary insurgent groups on some occasions have ex-
ploited and extorted drug trafficking organizations. More recently, nar-
cotics-trafficking organizations have employed terror to intimidate gov-
ernments and their judiciary, police, and military, in order to prevent
their members from apprehension, prosecution and incarceration.1 5
Another new phenomenon arising out of narco-terrorism is the in-
12. Id. at 7.
13. Lupsha, supra note 5, at 22.
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 16-17.
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volvement of the state itself in trafficking drugs and in cooperating with
drug-trafficking organizations. A national government whose top offi-
cials control the drug trade and trafficking is indeed a pernicious force
since it has de jure legitimacy and the right to use force.
Another facet of the relationship between drug trafficking and the
state has been the use of drug trafficking and the profits therefrom to
promote a state's policies and activities. This use can be traced to the
activities of the British East India Company in China. More recently,
nation-states have used transnational criminal groups, such as arms
and drug traffickers, as links to terrorist and insurgent organizations. A
variant of this practice is the use of drug trafficking and its profits to
provide funds either directly, covertly or indirectly to other states that
act as surrogates for other persons in the power struggle. Another vari-
ation is the use of connections between drug traffickers and representa-
tives of nation-states to hide and protect private criminal activities.
The ubiquity of and enormous amounts of profits from drug traf-
ficking enable persons to use illicit drugs as a type of currency that can
be traded for money or for other commodities such as arms or jewels.
In recent times, technological innovations have enabled individuals to
garner types of property which used to be the sole province of govern-
ments: airplanes, radios, satellite communications, electronic fund
transfers, and automatic weapons, rockets, grenades, and other military
hardware. These developments have facilitated easy participation for
individuals and groups to engage in transnational criminal activities.' 6
Today, international organized crime groups-money launderers,
arms traffickers, ex-intelligence operatives, crime brokers, drug traffick-
ers, international fraudsters, and other intermediaries who can set up
and coordinate international criminal operations are in demand. Many
examples quickly come to mind of symbiotic ties between organized
criminal groups and the agents and agencies of legitimate governments.
The linkages among the diverse organized criminal groups, including
between narcotics traffickers, vary with the following: need, organiza-
tion infrastructure development ability, worth or value, and the availa-
bility of modern technology. One of the key components linking dispa-
rate groups is the need for funding. For instance, revolutionary groups
utilize both traditional and nontraditional means. Traditional crimes to
obtain financing have included bank robbery, kidnapping for ransom,
and extorting a "revolutionary tax" on persons within the areas con-
16. Id. at 18.
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trolled by the revolutionaries. Drug and arms trafficking, and money
laundering represent new forms. In many countries drug traffickers
have developed enormous amounts of capital and modern organiza-
tional structures. To some insurgent revolutionary groups, drug traffick-
ers offer the potential opportunity for funds and access to technology.
Due to the similarity of their needs, organizational skills, and infra-
structures, drug traffickers in some areas of the world have cooperated.
When drug traffickers and insurgent or terrorist groups find enough
similarities and opportunities, they will cooperate. However, significant
difficulties nevertheless exist between them. For instance, while drug
traffickers are politically conservative, insurgent revolutionaries are
propelled by a Marxist-Leninist ideology or its variants. In order to
properly chart the latest developments in the links among cooperating
groups of organized crime, especially the international elements, in-
cluding those only marginally involved (e.g., professionals providing
services on a regular basis), law enforcement officials should share in-
telligence and take collective action against such groups where
appropriate.
II. THE RULE OF LAW UNDER ATTACK
A. International Law
International law is under attack in the fight against narcotics
trafficking and organized crime because international law has not been
as flexible and as dynamic as either the organized criminals or the
narco-terrorists. International law develops new mechanisms only over
time. Normally it takes two to four years to negotiate, conclude, ratify,
and exchange instruments of ratification, even in the case of a bilateral
treaty. Multilateral treaties, such as the U.N. Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, take much more time. Organized
criminals and narco-terrorists are not as limited by political boundaries,
borders, sovereignty, double criminality or resource problems, and can
quickly change their routes, couriers, and modes of operation.
The absence of effective cooperation in extradition and mutual as-
sistance in the fight against organized crime and narco-terrorists results
in circumvention of international law. The taking of short-cuts in order
to accomplish a country's goals in catching and prosecuting suspects
has resulted in the abandonment of extradition of defendants and the
[Vol. 15712
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seizure of defendants. Examples are Yunis,' 7 Caro Quintero,""
Verdugo-Urquidez,1 9 and Manuel Antonio Noriega.20 The Noriega
case was especially egregious because of the use of masses of troops
and wholesale violence that killed hundreds of innocent civilians, wiped
out neighborhoods, and destroyed thousands of businesses.21
The rule of law and particularly international law is a target be-
cause some governments do not follow international law and policy. For
instance, the U.N. Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future
Activities in Drug Abuse Control sets forth four major areas of work:
1. Prevention and Reduction of the Illicit Demand for Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances;
2. Control of Supply;
3. Suppression of Illicit Trafficking; and
4. Treatment and Rehabilitation.
One problem has been that some governments do not pay proper
attention or devote resources to each of the four categories. Some gov-
ernments, for instance, emphasize control of supply and suppression of
illicit trafficking to the expenses of demand prevention, treatment and
rehabilitation.
Another problem is that governments do not provide the resources
to the international organizations charged with making and carrying
out anti-narcotics activities. For instance, the U.S. has fallen seriously
in arrears with its obligations to both the U.N. and the O.A.S.22 In
recent years, the U.S. contribution to international organizations in
anti-narcotics activities has increased and its cooperation generally with
17. U.S. v. Yunis, No. 89-3208, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 1991); United States
v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); see Levy, U.S. District Court Upholds Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over
Fawaz Yunis under the Hostage Taking Act, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 65 (Feb.
1988); Levy, U.S. District Court Denies Fawaz Yunis' Motion to Dismiss Charges
Based on Illegal Arrest, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 95 (Mar. 1988).
18. U.S. v. Caro-Quntero, No. CR 87-422-ER, slip op. (C.D. Ca. 1990).
19. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
20. U.S. v. Noriega, No. 88-79-CR-Hoeveler (S.D. Fla. 1988).
21. For a discussion of U.S. policy and legal issues see Abramovsky, Extraterri-
torial Abductions: America's 'Catch and Snatch' Policy Run Amok, - YALE J.
INT'L L. - (forthcoming); see also Abramovsky & Eagle, U.S. Policy in Appre-
hending Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extradition, Abduction or Irregular Rendition?,
57 Op. L. Rnv. 51 (1977).
22. See Drugs and Small Arms: Can Law Stop the Traffic, B. Zagaris, Remarks
at the Eighty-First Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(Apr. 8-11, 1987).
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intergovernmental organizations has also improved.
B. National Law
National law has been under attack by narco-terrorists and organ-
ized crime. By intimidating and killing judges, prosecutors, police, and
the media, narco-terrorists and organized criminals ensure that the rule
of law and a democracy cannot function properly. Similarly, by financ-
ing the campaigns of national and local politicians and by running for
office themselves, narco-terrorists and organized criminals also influ-
ence and control law-making and electoral processes. Indeed, the distri-
bution of money, jobs, and other forms of wealth of largesse by narco-
terrorists and organized crime provide the donors with an inordinate
amount of political power. The use of violence against politicians com-
plements the use of influence by narco-terrorists and organized
criminals.
So infiltrated with corrupt officials are the police, military, and vir-
tually all aspects of law enforcement in some countries that most inves-
tigations and prosecutions become impossible to successfully design or
execute.
An important development is that the small-time amateur opera-
tions of fifteen years ago have developed into sophisticated illegal con-
glomerates that routinely terrorize their adversaries, whether they are
rival terrorist groups, political, or law enforcement figures. The power-
ful activities of the narco-terrorists and organized criminals require a
strategy with intelligence to identify the groups, determine weak links
in their operations, and to design and successfully implement a strategy
to break them up.2"
III. MECHANISMS TO COUNTER ORGANIZED CRIME
DEVELOPMENTS
To effectively design international modalities to combat new forms
of organized criminals operating internationally requires an indepth use
of multidisciplinary approaches. In particular, international organiza-
tional science (theory), public international law, and criminal law
should be applied to various organized groups since international orga-
23. For a discussion of organized crime and international narcotics trafficking,
see the written statement of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, "Struc-
ture of International Drug Cartels" (Sept. 12, 1989).
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nizational theory and international criminal law are relatively new sci-
ences and neither nation-states nor academicians have devoted inten-
sive research to the interaction of these disciplines. Many of the
mechanisms to counter organized crime can also be used against narco-
terrorists.
A. Establishment of a Regime for International Criminal Law
Some global interactions are initiated and sustained entirely, or
almost entirely, by nation-states. Other interactions, such as the ones
initiated by organized criminal groups (i.e., narcotics transactions,
laundering criminal proceeds, traffic in guns), involve private persons.
One of the prerequisites to successfully combat organized criminals is
to view the law enforcement community as an actor in a world politics
paradigm and to contrast it with the state-centric paradigm in which
only nation-states have significant practical roles. If they are to succeed
in the battle against organized crime, nation-states and countries con-
fronting problems of emerging new criminal groups must become more
sensitive to a world politics paradigm in which organizations other than
the nation-states are accorded power. A successful effort will entail a
more innovative use of existing and new bilateral and multilateral legal
mechanisms, as well as more uniformity in national actions, so that law
enforcement officials can be as mobile and efficient as new organized
criminals. Already, law enforcement officials suffer from the lack of
close-knit family ties that facilitate the operations of criminal groups.
Likewise, they often lack the cultural skills to combat these new ethnic
organized criminals.
Fostering the world politics paradigm would permit national gov-
ernments as well as inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), interna-
tional non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) to make more effective use of limited
resources. Another result of international cooperation or transnational
coordination would be an attitude change in favor of international co-
operation. The attitude change toward increased cooperation would fur-
ther assist politically international efforts against drug smuggling and
money laundering. Still another result of international pluralism would
be to create and strengthen law enforcement organizations, IGOs, IN-
GOs, and NGOs, thereby adding additional actors with which national
governments can cooperate in combatting crime.
By improving transnational relations to combat organized crime,
national governmental law enforcement organizations should also as-
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sume larger roles in transnational organizations. Actors and especially
national governments should enable not only traditional law enforce-
ment agencies to participate in a world politics paradigm of interna-
tional criminal cooperation, but should also facilitate participation by
IGOs, such as INTERPOL, the anti-crime organizations within United
Nations, and regional organizations (i.e., the Council of Europe, the
European Community, and the regional organizations for tax adminis-
tration), NGOs, such as the American Bankers Association (e.g., in the
case of money laundering), and INGOs, such as the AsSociation Inter-
nationale de Droit Penal, International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP), the International Society for Social Defense, the International
Society of Criminology, and the International Penal and Penitentiary
Foundation. National governments and other concerned actors would
facilitate the establishment and development of long..term alliances
among the law enforcement community (e.g., a type of pattern of an
elite network).
Interested members of the world community, esp 5cially law en-
forcement officials, should plan and study the interactions of the above-
mentioned categories of organizations in the international criminal
arena in order to determine the best ways to design and implement a
regime for international criminal law. For instance, to chart the best
role for regional organizations and gauge their potential interactions
with IGOs, INGOs, NGOs, and national governments, studies of the
international relations of these organizations is required. To the knowl-
edge of this author, such a study has yet to occur. Any of five basic
approaches can be used: the historical approach, the normative ap-
proach, the structural-functional approach, the decision-making ap-
proach, and the interest approach.
After examining the role of intergovernmental organizations in the
context of these five approaches, the concept of an international regime
for international criminal law and its existence and future in a new
world paradigm should also be examined. International regimes are de-
fined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures within
which actors (governments, IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs) converge in a
given issue area such as international criminal law, or a subarea, such
as the international regulation of money laundering. Regimes are inter-
vening variables standing between basic causal factors, on the one
hand, and outcomes and behavior on the other. Two basic questions are
raised by this formulation: first, what is the relationship between the
basic causal factors such as power, interest, values, and. regimes? Sec-
ond, what is the relationship between regimes and related outcomes
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and behavior? The answer to the first question requires an application
of a paradigmatic framework. The answer to the second involves the
issue of whether regimes make any difference, and, if so, how.
Another approach to the study of international regimes has been
to utilize a supply-demand approach that borrows extensively from
microeconomic theory. One study, for instance, has focused on the de-
mand for international regimes in order to determine why international
regimes wax and wane. This approach focuses on why states desire to
institute international regimes and how much they will be willing to
contribute to maintaining them. This approach considers the list of con-
ditions which must apply if regimes are to be of value in facilitating
agreements among states. Such an approach enables researchers to
specify regime functions more precisely and understand the demand for
international regimes. Similarly, the methodology can be used to un-
derstand the performance of international regimes over time. In addi-
tion to studying and analyzing organized crime and trying to react to
the diverse emerging and powerful groups, international actors that
want to diminish and control these groups must take proactive ap-
proaches, so they dictate the battles before the organized criminals be-
come so powerful that the law enforcement community can no longer
cope.
Within the regime of international criminal cooperation, many
subregimes can and should be established to combat organized crime.
For instance, subregimes in many of the areas of enforcement modali-
ties include, inter alia, transportation, customs, immigration, and fiscal
cooperation. Law enforcement officials, and all persons throughout the
world outside the law enforcement community who are concerned with
organized crime, should be included in the design of future subregimes.
The task is to effectively design new principles, norms, rules, and deci-
sion-making procedures that will combat organized crime without de-
tracting significantly from normal business operations, human rights
and constitutional protections. Because of size constraints imposed on
this paper, I will discuss only the potential subregime against financial
crime, for illustration purposes.
1. Establishment of Subregime against Financial Crime
The studies of the new world politics paradigm, applied to the cre-
ation of a new regime for international criminal law, should be applied
to the subregime of international money laundering regulation. The
IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs that constitute international actors as well
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as the nation-state actors, have many similarities. However, different
organizations and indeed, different individuals are involved. Within na-
tion-states, ministries of finance, central banks, and bank regulatory
agencies, rather than ministries of justice and police commissions, are
involved. Within IGOs, a different set of individuals and organizations
may also be involved. The INGOs and NGOs, with expertise to estab-
lish and assist in the operation of an international money laundering
subregime, tend to be specialized in financial activities, corporate secur-
ity, and money management. The need to scrutinize and improve inter-
actions among national governments and international actors in money
laundering regulation is enormous since, until now, this activity has not
been highly active.
2. Establishment of Other Subregimes
The international community should decide, when certain types of
substantive crime are developing quickly or have reached a point of
great harm to the international community, to establish additional sub-
regimes. For instance, the international community bas become so
alarmed about narcotics that it has agreed to surrender some sover-
eignty in order to achieve new forms of cooperation. They have agreed
to do this partly by agreeing to new types of cooperation, such as extra-
dition and mutual assistance. They have also agreed to allow U.N. bod-
ies, such as the Commission for Narcotic Drugs, to monitor the compli-
ance with the U.N. drug convention.24 In the event that new types of
internationalization of crime become significant, the international com-
munity will want to develop other subregimes. For instance, in the area
of stolen art, which is often the domain of organized groups, Interpol
has developed international modalities.26 They include monthly and
semiannual bulletins, with descriptions and pictures of stolen objects.
When an Interpol National Central Bureau member believes a stolen
work of art may be in transit, Interpol circulates urgent messages in an
attempt to have it intercepted. Similarly, Interpol issues special circu-
lars on international thieves and recipients of stolen objects. NCBs in
receipt of such notices are encouraged to circulate copies among deal-
24. See U.N. Convention Against Illict Traffic in Narcotic D.rugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf./82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 LL.M. 493
(1989) at Art. 21(a).
25. See Fooner, INTERPOL ISSUES IN WORLD CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 156, 169 (1989).
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ers, private institutions, buyers, sellers, and custodians of art objects.
The development of cooperation between an IGO, such as IN-
TERPOL, states (NCBs), and INGOs and NGOs in stolen art is an
example of a small, but emerging subregime of criminal cooperation.
These subregimes should be monitored from the perspective of interna-
tional politics and international organizational theory, so that the re-
gimes can stay ahead of new forms of organized criminals. Regional
organizations, such as the Council of Europe, are playing a key role.
Other regional organizations, such as the U.N. Committees for the
Crime Prevention and Treatment, can and should play an important
role in combatting new forms of crime.
One reason for research, discussion, analysis and careful planning
of the development of subregimes and regimes in international criminal
cooperation is that the existing IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs are mostly in.
the beginning stages of their own development. To become efficient,
duplication must be avoided and linkages between different organiza-
tions and individuals active in law enforcement must be cultivated. The
.space limitations of this paper have resulted in the discussion of only
one specific subregime.
B. Specific Mechanisms and Avenues
Within the context of regimes and subregimes, the international
community can develop specific mechanisms. The discussion of specific
mechanisms employs primarily the perspective of a lawyer, especially
the fields of criminal law and international law.
Generally the need to develop international modalities to combat
new international forms of organized crime is only the reflection of the
more general need to design better international enforcement models
for international criminal law. One modality that would assist in the
ability to fairly adjudicate international criminal cases involving organ-
ized crime is the establishment of jurisdiction of an international court.
Two models have been suggested-the International Court of Justice
and the International Criminal Court. The United Nations Members
would expand the Charter of the International Court of Justice, so that
it could, in limited instances, handle selected cases of international
criminal law, especially cases dealing with certain organized criminal
groups. Another potential model for an international court is to create
a Permanent International Criminal Court. Initially, such a court
would be able to handle only specialized types of crimes, such as illicit
narcotics transactions and related money laundering. Another useful
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mechanism would be the creation of an International Indictment (or
accusation) Chamber as an attachment to the court. Its tasks would be
to hear the prosecution's evidence ex parte and determine whether
facts are sufficient to indict and order the arrest of an accustomed per-
son. Once the Chamber issued a warrant of arrest, any signatory state
would be obligated to arrest the defendant. Even if the state with cus-
tody did not arrest the defendant, such defendant would be virtually
immobilized, since travel to any other country could result in his arrest.
Still, another potentially useful variation of an international criminal
court would be Permanent Regional International Criminal Courts,
perhaps with the International Court exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the decisions of the regional courts.
The establishment of international ad hoc bodies of inquiry for the
purpose of fact-finding in cases of alleged flagrant violations of certain
international criminal laws by organized groups, such as the involve-
ment of states or their governmental entities or leaders in trafficking in
cultural property, would focus world opinion on such violations. Such
bodies and their reports have succeeded in focusing world attention on
human rights violations. To have credibility, such ad hoc bodies must
be strictly impartial. A condemnatory report by a duly established, im-
partial body would amount to an indictment without a. trial.
Another useful enforcement modality would be the establishment
of a mechanism for Complaints and Reports. It would be a communi-
cation procedure that would function similar to the Optional Protocol
to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the: Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Interested or
affected persons could lodge complaints to determine whether states are
fulfilling their obligations in combatting international organized crime,
and/or that they are themselves actively participating in and contribut-
ing to such crime. The complaint procedures would determine whether
consistent patterns of gross violations are occurring. The spotlight of
public attention consequent to such a finding, and its public discussion,
would be an important, albeit "soft," means of persuading miscreant
governments and some organized groups and their members into com-
pliance with international law. In circumstances in which the complaint
and report procedure does not achieve results, one could resort to the
remedy of an ad hoc body of inquiry committee, discussed above. In
the end, few governments would want to have a reputation for commit-
ting international crimes.
A periodic reporting system could be established whereby each
United Nations member state must report annually on the extent of
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implementation of United Nations agreements, guidelines, standards,
and other rules concerning certain international crimes of organized
groups, such as trafficking in arms and illicit narcotics. These reports
should receive wide dissemination and interested persons and organiza-
tions should have access to such reports. The world community should
consider conditioning the allocation of credits and eligibility for benefits
of intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Bank Group and
United Nations organizations, on compliance by states with the
above-mentioned U.N. agreements, guidelines, standards, and other
rules concerning certain international crimes.
With the above introduction on general enforcement modalities for
international criminal law, the remainder of the paper discusses more
specific modalities directed at organized crime.
1. Create Universality of Jurisdiction for Organized Crime
and Subspecies of Crimes Therein
The issue of jurisdiction needs attention. Due to the complexity of
transboundary criminality in the modern world, the traditional, almost
exclusively territorial concept of jurisdiction requires revision. Although
some expansion of the concept of jurisdiction has been introduced in
recent years in a number of international instruments, such extensions
were still inadequate to cope with the present challenges. Closely linked
with the question of international jurisdiction is the issue of the estab-
lishment of an international criminal court. Pursuant to the discussion
in III(B) above, support should be given to the efforts to establish inter-
national criminal courts, so that jurisdictions in which organized crimi-
nal groups have rendered the criminal justice inoperable or ineffective
will have alternatives to try persons involved in serious crimes having
international effects.
2. Strengthen Enforcement Modalities
a. International Organization to Supervise Adoption of Mecha-
nisms in U.N. Drug Convention
To ensure compliance with the enforcement modalities that the
world continually has agreed to implement, the U.N. Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance
(hereinafter U.N. drug convention) and other enforcement modalities
for which there is agreement should be scrutinized. In particular, the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of
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the U.N. has the responsibility, pursuant to Art. 21 of the U.N. drug
convention, to review the operation of the convention, to make sugges-
tions and general recommendations based on the examination of the
information received from the contracting parties, and to bring matters
to the attention of the International Narcotics Control. Board. More-
over, the Board will prepare an annual report on its work. Its work will
include making recommendations on: the prevention and the diversion
of precursor substances used for the purpose of illicit manufacture of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; the prevention of trade in
and the diversion of materials and equipment for illicit production or
manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; and the
proper documentation and labelling of lawful exports of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances.
Under Article 20 of the U.N. Convention, contracting parties must
furnish information to the Commission on the text of laws and regula-
tions promulgated to give effect to the Convention and the particulars
of illicit trafficking cases within their jurisdiction that they consider im-
portant because of new trends disclosed, the quantitics involved, the
sources from which the substances are obtained, or the methods em-
ployed by persons so engaged.
The Commission should consider disseminating a report certifying
compliance with the U.N. drug convention and with the enforcement
modalities in The Declaration of the International Conference on Drug
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and Comprehensive Multi-disciplinary
Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control (e.g., Targets 17
through 28 on the suppression of illicit trafficking). In particular, the
report should discuss legislation, treaties, and other international agree-
ments, and adherence to the U.N. plan on combatting organized crime
and drug policy, states with high marks should receive tangible benefits
in economic development and other national objectives over which the
world community has control. States with unexplained low marks
should lose benefits. Certification should be distributed to concerned
INGOs, NGOs, and they should be asked to disseminate the report and
to take whatever actions they deem appropriate. The certification
should give both praise and criticism, where warranted..
b. The U.N. Interregional and regional institutes and concerned
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations should give in-
creased attention to the issue of organized crime.
c. The U.N. Development Programme and other funding agencies
of the U.N. system, as well as member states, should be urged to
strengthen their support for national, regional, and interfiational pro-
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grams for the prevention and control of organized crime.
d. The International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and the World Bank
should integrate into their loan programs the recommendations of the
U.N. certification reports, especially since the failure to take proper
steps against narco-terrorism and the continuation of programs to na-
tion-states dominated or substantially penetrated by organized crime
groups only serves to further benefit such groups. The integration of
criminal development planning and the subsector dealing with organ-
ized crime should be reviewed by the United Nations Development
Programme (U.N.D.P.) and I.M.F.-World Bank in consultation with
the U.N. Crime Prevention Committee. Improved planning processes
designed to integrate and coordinate relevant criminal justice agencies
that often operate independently of each other will also serve as a de-
terrent to crime.
e. In view of the complexity and volume of the financial operations
of organized crime, it is essential to take an interdisciplinary approach
that involves the combined expertise of lawyers, police, accountants, fi-
nancial analysts, computer specialists, and investigators of corporate af-
fairs. Interdisciplinary law enforcement teams should be established.
Countries that have done this successfully should share information
and provide technical assistance to other governments. Sharing law en-
forcement methods to combat narco-terrorism should be encouraged
and facilitated. The complicated links between executives of entities
controlled by narco-terrorists and the alleged illegal activities must be
proven. This requires perseverance, effective investigative skills, solid
and reliable intelligence, a capacity to understand the complicated fi-
nancial arrangements, effective cooperation in the production and col-
lection of evidence, and above all, a great dose of courage to resist cor-
ruption and intimidation. Electronic surveillance and wire-tapping have
been important means of trapping the heads of organized crime syndi-
cates, with full regard for basic human rights concerns.
f. Simultaneous tax examinations should occur of organized crimi-
nal groups involved in narco-terrorism and individuals therein. Simulta-
neous tax examinations are especially valuable for detecting persons en-
gaging in transnational business, whether illicit drug trafficking,
environmental crimes, and related money laundering crimes.
g. Systematic attention should be paid by researchers and law en-
forcement officials to the property holdings of persons involved in
narco-terrorism, or to the property holdings of the groups in which they
participate. Because of the high degree of compartmentalization of in-
formation among law enforcement agencies, existing knowledge does
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not efficiently support specific case development or preactive law en-
forcement operations. For instance, knowledge about the title to prop-
erty of organized groups may enable law enforcement agencies to an-
ticipate the directions of the groups. Knowledge about the property
holdings of organized crime may enable certain law enforcement agen-
cies to operate more effectively, (e.g., estate and inheritance revenue
officials). Several recommendations should be reviewed. Intelligence
units should enrich their individual and group files by developing and
maintaining separate file sections on the subjects' property interests.
Property interest information should be regularly analyzed and distrib-
uted to potential users. Intelligence units should give special attention
to collecting and analyzing significant events that produce property in-
terest data (i.e., purchase or acquisition of real property or a business,
a divorce or a death). Intelligence units should develop, maintain, and
index an inventory of methods and devices used to create, maintain,
extinguish, and adjudicate organized crime property interests. A sys-
tematic and expanded effort should be made to study the estates of
deceased organized crime figures. Internally, IGOs, INGOs, and
NGOs should hold workshops and training programs or these tech-
niques. Bilaterally, states with Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
should have a working group on organized crime where their resources
and the amount of organized crime activity warrant sLch a working
group.26 The U.S.-Italian working group is an example of1 the success of
such groups.2 The recent series of bilateral narcotics agreements and
the commissions that implement such agreements can also include
working groups that, inter alia, exchange information on cases and
techniques of studying property holdings with each other.
3. Uniform Legislation
a. An international central data bank should keel) track of and
disseminate to interested governments laws and regulations on various
types of measures taken against organized crime, such as racketeering
and continuing criminal enterprises, sanctions against o:rganized crime
26. Zagaris & Simonetti, Judicial Assistance under U.S. Bilateral Treaties, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 219,
228 (M.C. BASSIOUNI ED. 1988).
27. Id. at 226-27. For a discussion of the formation of the working group, see
Meese Addresses Italy-USA-Switzerland Conference, 1.2 Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. 29
(Oct. 1985).
[Vol. 15
299
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Zagaris
and against activities in which organized crime are known to partici-
pate, including illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, theft of cul-
tural property, use of mails, and various types of frauds. In particular,
an international central data bank would show that, insofar as illicit
drug trafficking is concerned, the offenses defined in Article 3 of the
U.N. drug convention include, inter alia: the production, manufacture,
extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, de-
livery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in
transit, transport, importation, or exportation of any narcotic drug or
any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Con-
vention, as amended or the 1971 Convention; the manufacture, trans-
port or distribution of equipment, materials or of substances listed in
Table I and Table II of the U.N. drug convention, knowing that they
are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, production or manufac-
ture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; and the organization,
management or financing of any of the offenses enumerated in Article
3 dealing with illicit narcotics trafficking.
Article 3 of the U.N. drug convention also requires that the con-
tracting parties ensure that their courts and other competent authori-
ties with jurisdiction take into account factual circumstances that make
the commission of offenses established in accordance with certain arti-
cles of the Convention particularly serious, such as the involvement in
the offense of an organized criminal group to which the offender be-
longs; and the involvement of the offender in other international organ-
ized criminal activities.
b. States and international actors should begin to design, monitor,
disseminate manuals, and hold programs on the importance of the fol-
lowing laws:
i. Money laundering (right to financial privacy, currency transac-
tions reporting, criminalization of money laundering, remedial mea-
sures, and blocking laws). Stricter regulation on a uniform basis should
govern the persons who are able to establish and operate financial insti-
tutions, money exchange businesses, paper banks, and other businesses
that offer potential for near money (i.e., scarce commodity business,
such as gold, silver, and jewelry houses). The world community should
have a list of minimum requirements to establish such businesses and
an annual means to ensure conformity. Intergovernmental organiza-
tions, perhaps initially with technical and financial assistance from IN-
GOs, should participate.
ii. For serious cases of trafficking by narco-terrorist groups and/or
persons who belong to the groups, it would be helpful to introduce leg-
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islation that placed on the person holding the assets the onus of demon-
strating that the assets had been lawfully acquired. This is a revolution
in legal practice and theory, and as such should include the necessary
safeguards to protect the human rights of the suspect.
iii. The establishment of a specific agency to deal with all matters
concerning the activities of organized crime and to centralize all perti-
nent information on that subject.
iv. The establishment of special anti-corruption measures.
v. The adoption of new laws and methods on investigation and the
techniques to combat organized crime.
vi. Protection against violence and intimidation a:re increasingly
important in the criminal investigation and trial process and in enforce-
ment efforts against organized crime. The procedures involve the provi-
sion of protected accommodation and physical protection, relocation,
monetary support, and a new identity.
4. Financial and Technical Assistance
a. Special legislation aimed at narco-terrorist groups, include: the
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Practices Act (RICO) and Continu-
ing Criminal Enterprises (CCE), in which the Government can impose
draconian penalties upon conviction of defendants and in which the law
provides procedural advantages to the law enforcement officials and
prosecutors (i.e., ability to wire-tap and conduct undercover opera-
tions). Other countries, such as Italy, have counterpart laws that may
be adoptable, especially in civil law countries.
b. Legislation should provide rights and remedies to citizen groups
that are impacted by organized crime. For instance, in some civil law
countries, victims have a right to participate in the criminal proceed-
ings and in decisions to charge the defendant, and make their views
known to the court on evidence and appropriate sentences after convic-
tion. In the U.S., although victims and citizens do not have the right to
participate in the pretrial and trial aspect as parties, they can bring
civil actions. In the case of RICO, treble damages are allowed. The
laws concerning participation by victims and other interested citizen
groups should be reviewed and recommendations on uniform laws pro-
vided. Once individuals are mobilized to participate in groups to com-
bat organized crime, they can funnel their efforts into officially partici-
pating in the legal system to ensure that the criminal justice system
effectively works against narco-terrorists.
c. Uniform tax laws should'be enacted around the world, specifi-
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cally targeting narco-terrorists. Since the organized criminals earn a
great deal of money through criminal activities, they do not report and
pay tax on such activities. Hence, many countries have found that tax
laws provide a useful means to successfully prosecute organized
criminals. 28 Manuals showing the specific tax laws, methods of investi-
gating and prosecuting organized criminals in the various legal systems,
and recommendations for training should be provided. Technical assis-
tance should be available to requesting countries on these techniques.
d. There should be established, through existing IGOs, INGOs,
and nation-states, technical assistance groups to provide technical ser-
vices to requesting states. Some of the methods for providing technical
assistance by nation-states and IGOs can be utilized (i.e., use of retired
executives and use of NGOs on a state level).
e. Assets seized and forfeited should be shared with IGOs, INGOs
and NGOs, which participate in combatting the narco-terrorist crimes
from which the assets forfeited are derived, as well as national
governments.
f. A fund to provide technical assistance in narco-terrorism cases
should be established. It should be maintained by an appropriate U.N.
organ.
g. Technical assistance should be a part of regional conferences
bringing together members of law enforcement, prosecution, and judi-
cial authorities. They should all develop a network to facilitate commu-
nication between meetings and exchanges.
5. The Model Extradition Treaty Adopted at the Eighth U.N.
Crime Congress Should Be Widely Disseminated
Most experts supported the idea that the provisions of future
model international criminal cooperation treaties should complement
rather than replace existing cooperative arrangements. The view of
many experts is that the drafts could actually serve as a model for new
national legislation, thereby contributing to the harmonization and in-
creasing uniformity of domestic legislations.
Care must be exercised in the drafting of extradition treaties, so
that states can fulfill the dual criminality requirement in narco-terror-
ism cases. Extradition treaties should replace the list method of defin-
28. See generally Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Compa-
nies: Hearings on S. 98-151 Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (1983).
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ing dual criminality in favor of a simple, all-inclusive statement which
defines extraditable offenses as crimes punishable under the laws of
both states by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year
period of incarceration for a felony. Such a broad decision eliminates
the problems of constantly trying to update the lists. Another problem
in the application of the dual criminality provision in complex prosecu-
tions, especially those involving narco-terrorism and organized crime, is
the need to match particular criminal statutes adopted by individual
states to combat organized activities with parallel provisions in the laws
of other states. The need to demonstrate that the offense, for which
extradition is sought, is a criminal offense in the requested state gives
rise to the need to find an analogous crime punishable under the laws
of the requested state. For instance, difficulties are encountered by the
new laws that seek to combat organized crime by criminalizing partici-
pation in organized groups that derive financial benefit from the com-
mission of traditional crimes, such as extortion, usury or narcotics traf-
ficking. To strengthen the prospects for satisfying the dual criminality
standard, the extradition treaty should specify that particular types of
statutes will constitute grounds for extradition. For example, Article
11(2) of the U.S.-Italian Extradition Treaty provides that "any type of
association to commit offenses described in (the dual criminality Arti-
cle), as provided by the laws of Italy, and conspiracy to commit an
offense described in (the dual criminality Article) as provided by the
laws of the United States, shall also be extraditable offenses." Such
language will facilitate the fulfillment of the dual criminality require-
ment by modern statutes that are aimed at organized crime and narcot-
ics trafficking.
6. The U.N. Model Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT)
Should Be Disseminated
When concluding an MLAT, governments should apply as many
of the instruments of judicial assistance as possible.
In the case of MLATs, it can be useful to establish a working
group to develop on-going cooperation in focused areas and cases. For
instance, after concluding an MLAT in 1983, the U.S. Department of
Justice and Italian Ministry of Interior established an Italian-American
working group to further cooperation on law enforcement problems. In-
itially, the working group focused only on combatting organized crime
and narcotics. More recently, the working group broadened its agenda
to include cooperating on terrorism.
[Vol. 15
303
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Zagaris
Pending conclusion of a formal MLAT, states can and should ex-
plore more informal methods of cooperation if permitted under law.
For instance, on October 17, 1986, the French and U.S. governments
announced an accord to increase cooperation in the fight against terror-
ism by improved intelligence exchanges and law enforcement contacts
in absence of a former treaty. In substantive areas, such as securities
enforcement cooperation, governments have entered into memoranda of
understanding to cooperate on enforcement matters. Such memoranda,
providing for cooperation and mutual assistance against certain types
of organized crime, may be appropriate as an interim step for govern-
ments. Studies should be done of the initiation, operation, and potential
of less formal arrangements for mutual assistance. The studies would
see to what extent they are working and can be improved. The studies
would be shared with interested governments.
As a result of the attention focused on the U.N. drug convention,
several states, such as Australia, have strengthened their mutual assis-
tance infrastructure, and particularly, the new investigatory and en-
forcement measures that can serve as models for some states to emu-
late. New investigation techniques exist to follow the document and
money trails including the issue of court orders for the production and
seizure of relevant documents, the monitoring of transactions by finan-
cial institutions and the reporting of large scale cash transactions. New
powers enable states to freeze, confiscate, and forfeit the proceeds of
crime and to enforce monetary penalties representing the monetary
value of benefits derived from committing serious crimes. States have
new powers to search and seize property, articles and documents. New
authority exists for the taking of evidence under oath and for the pro-
duction of documents for transmission to another country for use in
proceedings in that country. States have new powers to make arrange-
ments for persons to travel to a requesting state to give evidence or
assist in investigations in that country.
As the Australian government has noted, the establishment of ef-
fective international mutual assistance arrangements requires enormous
political will. The exposure of a country's citizens to compulsory mea-
sures such as search and seizure or the tracing, freezing and confisca-
tion of proceeds of crime at the request of another country requires a
political decision by sovereign governments. The political aspect of that
decision cuts through every aspect of mutual assistance, from revising
domestic legislation so that mutual assistance can be given and re-
ceived, to establishing appropriate bilateral and multilateral treaties
and arrangements, and to deciding whether to grant or refuse a request
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in a specific cases. The U.N. should compile and disseminate informa-
tion on how states have changed domestic law to, inter alia: create
money laundering and related crimes; authorize telecommunication in-
terception for certain criminal activities; subject to judicial authoriza-
tion, facilitate the monitoring by law enforcement agencies of the
movement of large amounts of cash by requiring the reporting to an
agency of certain types of cash transactions; and provide the necessary
legal basis for Australia to give and receive a wide range of mutual
assistance in criminal matters, as well as to enter into extradition trea-
ties in a wider basis for making a mutual assistance request to, or exe-
cuting a request from such a country.
For most countries, strengthening its ability to cooperate interna-
tionally against narco-terrorism and other organized crime requires a
comprehensive treaty negotiating program to conclude conventions with
countries with which there are no conventions and to modernize ex-
isting cooperation conventions. In this connection, model extradition
and mutual assistance treaties that the U.N. Crime Prevention Com-
mittee is preparing should be helpful. Once adopted, it should be re-
viewed and, if appropriate, revised on a regular basis.
In order to ensure the efficient operation of mutual assistance
against new forms of organized crime, states must establish a Central
Office. A Central Office becomes especially important because the new
forms of mutual assistance, such as the development of a financial sub-
regime, requires the use of coercive investigatory or enforcement mea-
sures against citizens of one country and their property at the request
and for the benefit of another country, thereby directly impacting the
sovereignty of the requested country and producing divergent diplo-
matic, political, policy, and operational interests in both countries. The
establishment of the Central Office has the responsibility of: ensuring
the appropriate reconciliation of these interests; determining or helping
determine whether the request should be granted or refused; and ensur-
ing adequate coordination of all relevant agencies in the request and
consistency of approach to the making and execution of requests. The
U.N drug convention requests in Article 7(8) that parties designate an
authority, or, when necessary, authorities, which will have responsibil-
ity and power to execute requests for mutual assistance: or to transmit
them to the competent authorities for execution.
States should establish liaison units with the Central Office to deal
with certain forms of organized crime (i.e., ethnic grou.ps and/or sub-
stantive crimes, such as illicit narcotics trafficking and stolen art).
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7. Adoption and Dissemination of Transfer of Proceedings,
Transfer of Prisoners
Pursuant to the U.N. drug convention and other international con-
ventions, states should provide for transfer of proceedings and
prisoners.
8. Education and Promotional Programs to Raise the
Consciousness of the Public
Education and promotional programs should raise the conscious-
ness of the public to the pernicious nature and the level of power of
narco-terrorist groups, so that they will support new enforcement ef-
forts of IGOs and nation-states. The support of general public and of
targeted groups should be solicited for participation in existing and new
NGOs and INGOs concerned with combatting organized crime.
9. Assistance to Journalists and Other Media
One of the best modalities to identify and expose narco-terrorists is
to reward and motivate journalists and the media to focus on these
groups. The attention brought by media exposure removes the anoniym-
ity from narco-terrorist groups and the comfort they enjoy. In some
cases, an effective piece or series of pieces by a journalist will reveal
conduct or assets that may enable law enforcement officials to act to
immobilize persons in a narco-terrorist group.
a. A fund should be established to assist media/journalist victims
of organized crime.
b. In countries such as Colombia, stories by the media have re-
sulted in concerted violence against the media, including the murder of
journalists and arson and bombing of their businesses and homes. In
order to assist the media, especially since the media-victims are often
very knowledgeable about existing operations of organized criminals,
states, IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs should establish a fund to assist jour-
nalists and the media to continue to undertake their important work.
c. Better communication between local and international media/
journalists should be facilitated.
d. Multidisciplinary research into the structure and operations of
organized crime has proven effective in identifying the weak points of
the criminal syndicates. There exists a need for the frequent and regu-
lar pxchange of experiences in these and similar matters.
e. IGOs, NGOs, INGOs, and nation-states should educate the
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public on the important role of media/journalists in combatting narco-
terrorism.
f. IGOs, NGOs, and NGOs, especially those that deal with the
media and/or with international terrorism, and/or narcotics policy
should educate the public on the important roles of the media/journal-
ists, so that the general public will support the media/journalists, espe-
cially at critical moments. Governments should also provide education
to the public in this regard.
10. Support for Comparative Research and Data Collection
Comparative research and data collection related to issues of
transnational narco-terrorism, its causes, its links to domestic instabil-
ity and other forms of criminality, as well as its prevention and control,
should be supported. Research in target areas for combatting organized
crime should be encouraged. The encouragement of research must oc-
cur on the local and state levels as well as by the IGCs, NGOs, and
INGOs. Internationally accessible data banks should be established.
Some should be available to general public. Others should have more
limited access (to serious academicians, journalists). Others should only
be available to law enforcement officials. Law enforcement officials
should be encouraged to keep records of their findings fo:r dissemination
within the data banks.
Appropriate authorities should arrange for civic and professional
recognition or awards to individuals and non-governmental associations
that have made outstanding contributions to comparative research and
data collection on combatting organized crime.
11. Telecommunications and Other Communication Modes
Proper telecommunications and other communications modes
should be evaluated and designed, so that police and other interested
persons at the local, regional and national levels of the nation-state,
IGOs, NGOs, and INGOs have the most modern communication chan-
nels to learn about and adopt the latest means of combatting narco-
terrorism. Interpol can likely provide leadership in this area.
12. Links Between Different Organized Criminal Groups
Particular attention and action should be directed at the links be-
tween different organized criminal groups, such as insurgent revolution-
ary organizations and drug- and arms-trafficking organizations, partic-
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ularly with regard of the acquisition of sophisticated weapons. National
legislation for the effective control of weapons, ammunition, and explo-
sives and international regulations on the import, export, and storage of
such objects should be developed in order to prevent those weapons
from being used by terrorist or organized crime syndicates. Interna-
tional cooperation in securing evidence with respect to the prosecution
or extradition of terrorists is especially important. In that connection,
the U.N. model treaties on mutual assistance and extradition have sig-
nificance. The political offense exception for the extradition of terrorists
should be limited to cases where the requested state decides to under-
take prosecution of the person or agrees to transfer the proceedings to
another state to conduct the prosecution.
13. Strengthening Controls of Movement Through Official
Points of Entry
By strengthening international modalities to control security of
airports, exports, and land border crossings, these entry points will be
less vulnerable to penetration. The organization and layout of facilities
often present opportunities for evasion of controls. Few entry points are
equipped with modern or appropriate means of detecting illicit move-
ments of contraband, such as stolen art, illegal arms, or illicit narcotics.
Service personal that carry out activities such as maintenance, clean-
ing, refuelling, catering, and crew members, are not always adequately
controlled. Although customs services are under the jurisdiction of cen-
tral government authorities, the management of airports and seaports
may be conducted by a variety of local government or corporate enti-
ties. Organized private messenger and courier services also move across
borders and pose potential risks.
The largest seizures of contraband is in commercial freight, espe-
cially for drugs, since they are often concealed either among goods in
normal traffic or inside specially made cavities in means of transport.
The expansion of international trade, the accelerated rotation of inter-
national means of transport and the development of containerized traf-
fic should induce the supervising authorities to initiate action with re-
spect to the establishment of effective national and international
mechanisms to deter and enforce transportation of contraband which
are compatible with a rapid flow of international trade.
Appropriate IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs should contact air and rail
transportation entities and shipping and trucking firms that operate in-
ternationally, and/or the associations of such firms. A plan should be
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designed for them to review their procedures for the purpose of not
only safeguarding their services against misuse by traffickers, but also
to ensure that information about any trafficking operation or activity of
narco-terrorists is reported promptly. In particular, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO), the World Tourism Organization (WTO), IATA
and the International Chamber of Shipping should consider and adopt,
insofar as they have not already done so, standards or ccdes of conduct
for their members designed to improve control of the movement of pas-
sengers and goods, with the objective of curbing the illicit traffic in
drugs. In this respect, they should establish memoranda of understand-
ing with the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC).
Universal and regional IGOs and bilateral programs should assist
countries that require assistance in equipping the law enforcement au-
thorities, at points of entry, with mechanisms to detect contraband
(e.g., illicit narcotics), such as drug sensing mechanisms, trained snif-
fing dogs, drug identification kits and other means of control. On re-
quest, the ICAO, IMO, the Universal Postal Union (UPU), WTO, In-
terpol, CCC, IATA, the International Chamber of Shipping and the
International Association of Ports and Harbors should provide techni-
cal advice and assistance to Governments with respect to modalities to
provide appropriate physical security in standard layout and sign of
premises at official points of entry.
If narco-terrorist activity is deemed especially significant in two or
more particular countries, one or more of them should be able to call
on the above-mentioned IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs to Furnish modali-
ties to correct the problem, including law enforcement officials to assist
in investigations and other measures.
Legislatures should exchange information on the enactment of leg-
islation applying penalties to transportation entities that are aware of
narco-terrorism and do not take prompt and adequate steps to correct
and report it or are reckless and grossly negligent in this connection. In
such circumstances, model and uniform legislation should provide in
such circumstances for the seizure and immobilization of transport
equipment used in drug trafficking, where such legislation is not al-
ready in force.
In some new types of organized crime, the transportation compo-
nent is extremely important to the traffickers and is also thought to be
one of their most vulnerable areas. Many of pilots used by the organ-
ized traffickers are citizens of consuming, developed co)untries and pi-
lots are always in great demand. Pilots, even relatively new ones, are
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often brought to the producing countries (e.g., Colombia) to meet the
bosses of the organizations. This reliance on non-Colombians as pilots
seems analogous in organizations which otherwise rely on family mem-
bers or trusted associates from their region of Colombia, necessary be-
cause foreign-based pilots (e.g., American) have better technical know-
how and skill, and they are more familiar with terrain of the consumer
country. Also the transportation leg is the riskiest part of the operation,
since the transporter is in close physical proximity to the narcotics and
travels through areas where there are high concentrations of law en-
forcement officials. Hence, the consuming countries in which pilots re-
side should closely monitor the activities of pilots. For instance, by re-
quiring reports on international trips they make and then being able to
match the information would enable regulatory agencies to identify
certain suspicious activities. Pilots flying small planes could be required
to report on their passengers and cargo. Pilots could be held to a "know
your customer" standard, similar to that to which financial institutions
are held. Pilots and associated persons that fail to report would be sub-
ject to criminal penalties. Airports and other persons involved in the
trips could also be required to obtain and process reports. They could
also be required to report suspicious activities of pilots and planes.
i4. Improving Cooperation with Economic Integration Groups
In economic integration groups, in which sovereign states have
joined together to cooperate in economic matters, free movement of
goods, persons, and capital exists. In these cases, it may be difficult or
even impossible, in the case of an absence of intracommunity border
controls, to detect illicit movements of drugs and traffickers from one
state to another. Hence, the community and its members should confer
and agree to cooperative measures. They should, for example, exchange
law enforcement intelligence and form special narco-terrorism groups,
particularly when done according to unique characteristics (e.g., by
ethnic or specialized forms of groups) and on cooperation between dif-
ferent groups of narco-terrorists and other organized criminals. They
should permit member law enforcement officials the ability to operate
within their borders (e.g., the recent Schenegen Agreement signed in
June of 1990 between Belgium, The Netherlands, France, West Ger-
many and Luxembourg) and on request they should provide mutual
assistance. The more advanced economic integration groups (i.e., the
Council of Europe, the European Committee on Crime Problems, the
Trevi and Pompidou groups), working with IGOs such as the United
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Nations and INGOs such as the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, should provide technical assistance on request to other economic
integration groups (i.e., ASEAN, CARICOM). Special opportunities
and research on functional integration (e.g., a branch of international
organizational theory) in law enforcement cooperation exist in connec-
tion with economic integration groups. Such opportunities and research
should be encouraged, especially in developing countries.
15. Improved Protection of Land, Water and Air Approaches
to the Frontier
The difficulty of protecting frontiers has proffered opportunities for
organized criminals to build private air strips and to make parachute
deliveries in remote areas. More complete surveillance of frontiers, air-
space and remote areas is required to protect societies from the activi-
ties of organized criminals.
IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs should design minimum levels of con-
trols at a national level to protect land, water and air approaches to the
frontier. Once these minimum levels of controls have been prepared
and disseminated, states around the world should report on their efforts
to meet them. Appropriate authorities should strictly enforce existing
domestic and international regulations regarding the registration of all
aircraft, commercial or private, and the obligation of all aircraft opera-
tors to operate strictly in accordance with approved flight plans and
with the instructions of the air traffic control agencies.
Better controls should be imposed on the commerce of privately
owned boats, including pleasure craft, arriving from abroad outside any
official port of entry. Regulations should require that they report imme-
diately to the nearest designated authority, giving full details of port of
origin, cargo, passengers, owners and master of the ship or skipper, in
order to request permission to refuel and obtain supplies. Similarly, an
aircraft entering or leaving the territory of the state should be strictly
required to land at, or take off from, a designated customs airport pur-
suant to Article 10 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
The appropriate authorities of each state have an internationally recog-
nized right, without unreasonable delay, to search any aircraft pre-
scribed by national law and/or by international conventions. The non-
observation of such regulations would be punishable. The IGOs should
provide for a uniform document to report this information and such
information should be entered into a computer. If feasible, an IGO
should monitor the information, especially for suspect patterns. Persons
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providing fuel or supplies to such craft would be required to verify
compliance or would be liable to fines or other penalties.
The IGOs should establish goals for minimum levels of efficient
communication networks and means of transport and training and edu-
cation of law enforcement officials dealing with certain activities of
narco-terrorism. States should report annually on their capabilities and
IGOs should reassess the minimum levels of capability annually and
upgrade according to the changes in technology and business needs. If
states fall below the level of minimum capability, its national govern-
ment or IGOs could propose projects qualifying for multilateral or bi-
lateral assistance or for assistance from IGOs.
INGOs and NGOs of amateur pilots, yachtsmen and owners of
pleasure craft and owners of private aircraft, boats and ferries, as well
as associations of commercial and private fishermen and hunters and
their individual members should work with IGOs and national govern-
ments in designing better ways for law enforcement officials to establish
surveillance of land, water and air approaches to the frontier and to
assist them in implementing their strategies. The participating INGOs
and NGOs should arrange for recognition'or awards to individuals and
organizations that make outstanding contributions in this regard.
States should act at the regional and international levels to im-
prove the protection of land, water and air approaches to the frontier.
The air traffic control agencies and other authorities concerned should
improve flight control regulations in cooperation with their counterparts
in the region and on a world-wide basis. The ministry or authority con-
cerned, together with law enforcement agencies at the national and lo-
cal levels, should ensure that clear and effective channels of communi-
cation, with corresponding agencies in other countries, are established
and maintained. States, IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs should organize re-
gional seminars to facilitate the exchange of ideas and techniques
designed to strengthen frontier controls. The ministries or authorities
concerned should utilize regional and interregional cooperative mecha-
nisms, of the sessions of the law enforcement organizations, such as the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its Subcommission on Illicit Drug
Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East, regional
meetings of Heads of National Drug. Law Enforcement Agencies, and
of ICAO, IMO, CCC and Interpol, and IATA, in order to ensure max-
imum cooperation and consistency of implementation and training
methods in safeguarding and tightening the security of frontiers.
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16. Protecting Against Use of Mails by Organized Criminals
States should ensure that they have implemented international
agreements that require action against certain international criminal
activity. In particular, Article 19 of the U.N. drug convention provides
that, in conformity with the Conventions of the Universal Postal Union
and in accordance with the basic principles of their domestic legal sys-
tems, contracting parties will take measures to suppress the use of the
mails for illicit traffic and will cooperate with one another to that end.
In particular, they agree to undertake the following:
a. coordinated action to prevent and repress the use of the mails
for illicit traffic;
b. introduction and maintenance by authorized law enforcement
officials of investigative and control techniques designed 1:o detect illicit
consignments of narcotic drugs psychotropic substances and substances
in Table I and II of the U.N. drug convention in the mails; and
c. legislative measures to enable the use of appropriate means to
secure evidence required for judicial proceedings.
If a suspicious item is in transit in the mails through the territory
of the state whose authorities detect the illicit shipment, Article 1 of
the Universal Postal Convention and of the Constitution of UPU pro-
vides that postal items in transit through a state party may not be
opened. When this problem was discussed between CCC and UPU, the
latter invited postal administrations:
d. to cooperate in combatting illicit narcotics traffic whenever they
are legally required to do so by their national authorities responsible
for this matter; to ensure respect for the fundamental principles of the
international post, in particular, the freedom of transit; and
d. to make arrangements with their relevant national authorities to
ensure that bags of mail in transit suspected of enclosing items contain-
ing illicit narcotics substances are not opened, but to advise by the
quickest means, at the request of their customs authorities, the admin-
istration of destination so that the suspected bags can easily be identi-
fied on arrival; and to verify the origin of the mail. Hence, the proce-
dure is analogous to controlled delivery for postal items in transit, a
procedure already available with respect to items addressed to domestic
destinations.
States, IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs should also consider appropriate
action at the regional and international levels for combatting activities
of narco-terrorists. In particular, the UPU should provide state parties
to the Universal Postal Convention with models of standard procedures
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for cooperation of postal authorities with customs. The state parties to
the Universal Postal Convention might further consider how to prevent
the use of the international mails for illegal activities and contraband,
such as drug trafficking. For this purpose, they may want to consider
and propose appropriate amendments to the Convention. A study of
this problem and of appropriate action which may be taken to combat
it would be useful.
17. Controls over Ships on the High Seas and Aircraft in
International Airspace
Vessels and aircraft are used for illegal activities by organized
crime, especially for the illicit transport of drugs between countries,
outside national boundaries, on the high seas and in international air-
space. Many countries may be affected by organized crime activities,
such as the shipment of drugs, appropriate cooperative procedures for
interception must be devised which do not interfere with legitimate pas-
sage and commerce, subject to compliance with existing relevant inter-
national conventions.
States should review their national and state laws to determine
whether jurisdiction over illegal activities of organized crime groups on
the high seas and aircraft in international airspace requires broadening.
If the national or state authority have reasonable grounds to suspect
that a vessel or aircraft registered under the laws of the state is illicitly
carrying drugs or other similar contraband, it may request another
state, to assist in carrying out a search. For instance, the other state
may be asked to direct its authorities to board and inspect the vessel
and, if drugs are found, to seize them and arrest persons involved in the
trafficking. In such circumstances, the state's own authorities may
board or seize a vessel or aircraft registered under its laws.
Subject to international law provisions, law enforcement officials
should, to the extent allowed under national law, undertake to board
and seize a vessel unlawfully carrying drugs, provided that the authori-
zation of the state of registry and, when applicable, of a coastal state,
has been obtained. A state should respond promptly when requested for
permission to stop, board and search a vessel under its registry due to
illicit drug trafficking control. Subject to the same considerations, a
state should be able to search an aircraft upon landing at a designated
airport.
States, IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs should consider whether they
can establish international standards for the identification, seizure, and
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disposition of vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying drugs illicitly,
and of the drugs and traffickers found thereon. States should be en-
couraged to conclude bilateral, multilateral, and regional agreements to
strengthen such cooperation between states. Existing intergovernmental
fora, including transport and shipping programs of the regional com-
missions, should take up the issue of activities of narco-terrorists, the
need to coordinate efforts to halt it, and the importance of support for
the U.N. drug convention.
18. Monitoring Movement of Persons Among Countries
Migration among countries is an area in which cooperation can be
vastly improved in the fight against organized crime. Intergovernmental
organizations, such as the United Nations, should sponsor conferences
and exchange of information on the ways in which immigration author-
ities operate.
a. Studies have shown that automated look-out s-ystems are re-
quired to enable border entry officials to have access to computers that
input information on criminals. Countries, such as the U.S., are im-
proving their automated law enforcement systems to more effectively
apprehend fugitive alien criminals. They are experimenting with a na-
tional level of successful local choke point criminaL referral and
processing models. Immigration officials should be able to initiate ad-
ministrative and management remedies to more expeditiously hear
cases and effect deportation.
b. On a national and international basis, more communication
should occur, and agreements reached, to design acceptable procedures
for the notification of suspected aliens involved in serious criminal ac-
tivities. Memoranda of understanding should be concluded to establish
choke points at the time of arrest and provide for: a definition of crimi-
nal aliens who pose a particular threat to the citizens in a specific area;
procedures for notifying national immigration investigations of sus-
pected illegal aliens; and a commitment to conduct immigration record
checks, ideally through provisions of an immigration database line to
the law enforcement agency and the commitment to do follow-up
processing.
c. On a national and international basis, arrangements should be
made among law enforcement agencies on what categories of criminal
aliens should be defined for joint investigations/apprehensions on which
to commit resources, and to ensure logical guidelines and mutual re-
sponsibility for use of manpower resources and detention facilities re-
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quired in joint operations.
d. On a national basis, arrangements should identify choke points
at the point of the criminal justice system that is post-arrest, but prior
to a determination to incarcerate, to provide for:
i. immediate notification to immigration officials of the determina-
tion not to prosecute or otherwise terminate proceedings in favor of the
alien defendant, who may in some instances still be amenable to depor-
tation proceedings;
ii. contact with the immigration authorities at the time of pre-bail,
pre-sentence or pre-parole investigations by probation and parole of-
ficers, to ensure that the adjudicating authorities are fully aware of the
alien's immigration status in issuing their decisions(s);
iii. sentencing, or conditions of release on bail, probation, or parole
that require submission of the alien defendant to immigration authori-
ties for processing, appearance at deportation proceedings, and submis-
sion to removal if deportability is determined by an immigration judge.
e. Internationally, national governments should share intelligence
about the ethnic groups committing entitlement, credit card, and other
types of fraud, where such crimes are significant, and they should share
law enforcement mechanisms. Where appropriate, working groups
should meet, perhaps in the context of the implementation of a MLAT.
Consideration can be given to exchange of law enforcement officials
and joint operations to combat fraud. Such procedures should assure
the presence of the alien at all required hearings while ensuring compli-
ance with his or her due process rights. They also provide for special
conditions of release that stipulate that, if the alien should return ille-
gally during the period of probation, parole, pie-trial diversion, etcet-
tera, he or she will be returned for full completion of sentence or trial,
as appropriate.
IV. MECHANISMS TO COMBAT NARCO-TERRORISM
The experts meeting before the 8th U.N. Crime Congress pro-
posed a number of basic measures that would help to combat narco-
terrorism. Although some of the measures apply to organized crime,
many of them are unique to combatting narco-terrorism.
A. Identification of the Problem
Some experts appropriately note the need to establish additional
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norms to control terrorist violence. 29 Among the issues are: the lack of
a clear definition of innocent civilians; the limits of the use of force in
connection with wars of national liberation and conflicts of a non-inter-
national character; the limits of the use of force by states in response to
what they may perceive as constituting acts of violence; state policies
and practices that may be considered by other states as constituting a
violation of international treaty obligations; the lack of specific norms
on state responsibility in failing to implement existing international ob-
ligations; the abuse of the privilege of diplomatic immunity and the
diplomatic pouch; the absence of norms concerning the responsibility of
states for acts not prohibited by international law; the absence of inter-
national regulation and control of the traffic and trade in arms; the
insufficiency of international mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of
conflicts and for the enforcement of internationally protected human
rights; the lack of universal acceptance of the principle aut dedere aut
iudicare and the lack of adequate international cooperation in the ef-
fective and uniform prevention and control of all forms and manifesta-
tions of terrorist violence; and the absence of international norms on
the use of mercenaries.30
The discussion of the establishment of subregimes applies to inter-
national terrorism. Among governments, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and other persons, the establishment of rules to deal with the
types of crimes perpetrated by terrorists in general and narco-terrorists
in particular must be developed. Due to the variables in the interaction
between narcotics traffickers and terrorists, social scieni:ists outside of
law must be used (i.e., political scientists, sociologists, geographical
area specialists).
When governments circumvent international law to deal with in-
ternational terrorism, there must be better enforcement mechanisms to
punish states and individuals who try to violate the rule of law. Such
mechanisms seem best integrated into an international criminal court
with jurisdiction over terrorism.
29. See generally J. F. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS, THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY INITIATIVES (1985); Zagaris & Simonetti, supra note
26.
30. Eighth U.N. Congress, supra note 4, at 17. But see proposed International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,
adopted by U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 4, 1989, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 89, 1582
(1990) (update on signatures, accessions and deposit of ratification).
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B. Specific Mechanisms
1. Jurisdiction
Better uniformity in the laws and practices of states concerning
both criminal and extraterritorial jurisdiction must be developed as a
means to prioritize and resolve cases of conflicting jurisdictional claims.
2. Extradition
The political offense exception should be better refined, so that its
use is minimized for extradition for crimes of terrorist violence, except
where the requested state decides to undertake prosecution of the re-
quested person or transfer the proceedings to another state to conduct
the prosection.
Some experts have advocated the preparation of a multilateral ex-
tradition treaty covering all forms and manifestations of terrorist vio-
lence deal with in prior international conventions as a means to comple-
ment the existing treaties.
The use of lawful alternatives to extradition, such as deportation
or voluntary return of the subject to appropriate judicial guarantees,
should be encouraged.
3. Non-applicability of defenses
The defense of "obedience to superior orders," "act of State," and
other eventual international immunities should not apply with respect
to persons who have violated international conventions prohibiting acts
of terrorist violence.
4. State Terrorism
States that violate international law and resort to terrorist violence
should be more effectively sanctioned by the international community.
The U.N. should develop mechanisms for the control of such behavior,
especially through the strengthening of U.N. machinery for the protec-
tion of human rights and preservation of peace and security.
5. Control of Weapons, Ammunition, and Explosives
States must develop national legislation to effectively control arms,
ammunition, explosives, and other dangerous materials that may be-
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come accessible to terrorists. International regulations on the transfer,
import, export, and storage of such objects should be developed so that
customs and border controls can be harmonized to prevent their trans-
national movement, except for established lawful purposes.
6. Protection of Victims and Witnesses
States should establish appropriate mechanisms for the protection,
and should introduce relevant legislation for the assistance, of victims
of terrorism, pursuant to the Declaration of basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.
States should adopt measures and policies to protect witnesses of
terrorist acts.
7. Treatment of Offenders
Because ideologically motivated offenders are not often susceptible
to resocialization, programs must be designed for such offenders and
alternative measures of correction and programs oriented to social de-
fense. Care must be taken so that all offenders are treated without dis-
crimination and according to international recognized human rights, as
contained in several conventions.
8. The Role of the Mass Media
States should consider the development of guidelines for the mass
media or encourage the establishment of voluntary guidelines to control
the following: sensationalizing and justifying terrorist violence; dissemi-
nation of strategic information on potential targets; and dissemination
of tactical information while terrorist acts are occurring, thereby possi-
bly endangering the lives of innocent civilians and law enforcement per-
sonnel or impeding effective law enforcement measures to prevent or
control such acts and to apprehend the offenders.
9. International Criminal Court
When feasible, the establishment of an international (or regional)
criminal court with jurisdiction for terrorist acts is desirable.
10. Monitoring and Ensuring Improved Compliance
To ensure better compliance with international law on terrorist
[Vol. 15
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acts, the U.N., in cooperation with specialized agencies, should prepare
reports on compliance with existing international conventions, including
detailed reporting on incidents and cases for international circulation.
States that are not signatories to international conventions prohib-
iting terrorist violence should be urged to accede to such conventions at
the earliest opportunity and to take effective measures to enforce their
provisions.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Through designing and implementing a multidisciplinary program
that seeks to develop effective regimes of international criminal cooper-
ation, states and international actors can begin to mobilize resources
sufficient to combat the power and perniciousness of new international
activities of organized crime and narco-terrorism. Within the establish-
ment and development of regimes and subregimes, the individual mea-
sures should be adopted and- utilized.
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Apprehending and Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in
the United States
Jeffrey N. Mausner*
I. INTRODUCTION'
When World War II ended, there were millions of refugees in Eu-
rope. Many of them had been victims of the Nazis, survivors of Nazi
concentration camps, or persons who had been forced to leave their
homelands by the Nazis. But hiding in this large mass of people were
also some of the Nazi officials who had assisted in the mass murder and
persecution. They lied about their activities during the War, claiming
that they were also refugees from the Nazis or from the Communists.
In order to help the millions of true refugees, the United States
enacted special immigration laws in 19482 and 19531 which allowed
large numbers of refugees to come to the United States without regard
to traditional immigration quota restrictions.4 These special immigra-
tion laws specifically excluded any person who had assisted the Nazis
in persecuting civilians.5 However, Nazi criminals were able to enter
* Copyright 1990 by Jeffrey N. Mausner. All rights reserved. Jeffrey Mausner is
a partner in the Los Angeles law firm of Berman, Blanchard, Mausner & Kindem,
specializing in commercial litigation. He served as a Trial Attorney in the Office of
Special Investigations, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, prose-
cuting Nazi war criminals, from 1979 to 1985. He received numerous awards for his
work at the Justice Department, including the Exceptional Performance Award, the
Meritorious Service Award and the Special Achievement Award from the Attorney
General. Mr. Mausner graduated from Cornell Law School in 1976, magna cum laude.
He was an editor of the Cornell Law Review and a member of the Order of the Coif.
1. I wish to express my appreciation to my partner, Laurence M. Berman, for his
assistance on this article.
2. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (as
amended by Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950)).
3. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (expired 1956).
4. Since the 1920's, immigration laws have limited immigration into the United
States to a fixed percentage each year of persons of the same ethnic origin already in
the United States. The Displaced Persons Act admitted over 400,000 refugees to the
United States, but required that these admissions be counted against future quotas for
particular countries, thereby limiting or closing off immigration from some countries
for several years.
5. The Displaced Persons Act excluded from entry into the United States any
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the United States under these special immigration laws by lying about
their activities during the period from 1933 to 1945.
This article will discuss the apprehension, investigation, and insti-
tution of legal proceedings against Nazi war criminals in the United
States. The first part of this article will describe who these Nazis were,
the crimes they committed, and how Nazi criminals are apprehended
and investigated. The second part of the Article focuses on the prosecu-
tion of Nazi criminals and discusses the denaturalization, deportation,
and extradition proceedings which are brought against them.
II. NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN THE UNITED STATEiS: WHO ARE
THEY AND HOW ARE THEY FOUND?
A. Nazi Criminals Subject to Legal Proceedings in the United States
The Nazi criminals who are subject to denaturalization, deporta-
tion, and extradition proceedings in the United States are persons who
assisted in persecuting innocent civilians during the period from 1933
to 1945, and who lied about their activities during World War II in
order to obtain a visa to enter the United States. Most of these Nazi
criminals served as concentration camp guards, Nazi police officials, or
Nazi government officials.
1. Concentration Camp Guards
Among the Nazis who entered the United States by misrepresent-
ing or concealing their wartime activities were concentration camp
guards such as Feodor Fedorenko, Karl Linnas, and Ivan Demjanjuk.
Feodor Fedorenko was a guard at the Nazi death camp at Treblinka
where 800,000 Jews were brutally murdered in gas chambers. When he
entered the United States, Fedorenko claimed on his visa application
that he had been a farmer during this time. Fedorenko was denatural-
ized (i.e., his citizenship was revoked)6 and deported7 to the U.S.S.R.
person "who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, or national origin." Displaced Persons Act, § 13, 64 Stat. 227.
The Refugee Relief Act excluded from entry into the United States any person
"who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of
persons because of race, religion, or national origin." Refugee Relief Act, § 14(a), 67
Stat. 451.
6. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597
F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
7. In re Fedorenko, I & N Dec. 2963 (1984).
[Vol. 15
322
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Mausner
where he was tried and executed for crimes against humanity.
Karl Linnas served as chief of the Nazi concentration camp at
Tartu, Estonia. According to witnesses' testimony:
Linnas supervised the transportation of prisoners from his camp to
a nearby antitank ditch. On such occasions, innocent Jewish
women and children were tied by their hands and brought in their
underwear to the edge of the ditch where they were forced to kneel.
The guards then opened fire. The ditch became a mass grave.
There was also eyewitness testimony that Linnas on at least
one occasion announced his victims' death sentence at the side of
the ditch and gave the order to fire. Linnas was also said to have
then personally approached the edge of the ditch, and fired into it.
Another eyewitness recounted having seen Linnas help direct Jews
out of a school and onto a school bus. That witness recalled that
Linnas helped a small child with a doll onto the bus, and that the
doll was later placed in a storage area for the personal effects of
those who had been killed.8
When he entered the United States, Linnas misrepresented his ac-
tivities by claiming that he had been a student and technical artist dur-
ing this time. Linnas was. denaturalized9 and deported 0 to the U.S.S.R.
where he died in prison awaiting trial for mass murder.
When he came to the United States, Ivan Demjanjuk told immi-
gration officials that he had been a farmer during World War II. In
truth, he had been a guard at the Nazi death camp of Treblinka. Sev-
eral witnesses identified him as Ivan the Terrible, the man who actually
ran the gas chamber at Treblinka, in which hundreds of thousands of
Jews were murdered. Children, even babies, were thrown into the gas
chamber at Treblinka and murdered, just because they were Jewish.
Demjanjuk was denaturalized 1 and extradited to Israel"2 where he was
8. Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1026-1027 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
995 (1986).
9. United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afid, 685 F.2d
427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
10. In re Linnas, I & N Dec. 3000 (1985); Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
11. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), affd, 680
F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
12. In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Demjanjuk v. Petrov-
sky, 612 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ohio), affd, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
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convicted of murder. His case is currently on appeal to the Israeli Su-
preme Court.
2. Nazi Police Officials
Police officials in the areas under Nazi control often assisted the
Nazis in carrying out the murder of Jews and other innocent people.
One such police official was Boleslavs Maikovskis who was a police
chief in Latvia during World War II.13 On his visa application,
Maikovskis claimed that he had been a bookkeeper for the Latvian
Railway Department from 1941 to 1944. Because he lied, he was able
to procure a visa to enter the United States.1 4
Witnesses testified that while he was chief of police, Maikovskis
was in charge of murdering all the Jews in his police precinct. These
witnesses testified that Maikovskis and the policemen working under
him rounded up the Jews, took them into the mountains, and shot
them. Several hundred people were. killed in one day. Entire families
were murdered.
Witnesses also testified that Maikovskis and his men rounded up
all the inhabitants of the village of Audrini, took them into the moun-
tains, and shot them. Every inhabitant of the village, including all of
the children, were murdered. Maikovskis and his men burned the entire
village of Audrini to the ground. Maikovskis is currently in prison in
West Germany where he is standing trial on charges of mass murder.15
Another Nazi police official who entered the United States by mis-
representing his Nazi past was Serge Kowalchuk. Kowalchuk served in
the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft (militia-police) in the city of Lubo-
myl.' 6 Prior to the Nazi occupation, five thousand Jews lived in Lubo-
myl. Almost all of the Jews were shot by the Germans and the Ukrain-
13. Maikovskis v. I.N.S., 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1182 (1986).
14. Id. at 437.
15. After a deportation trial lasting several years, the trial judge ordered that
Maikovskis would not be deported. In re Maikovskis, No. A8 194 .566 (Immigration
Court, New York, June 30, 1983). However, this ruling was unanimously overturned
by the Board of Immigration Appeals, In re Maikovskis, A8 194 5615 (B.I.A Aug. 14,
1984), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circait, Maikovskis v.
I.N.S., 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986), which or-
dered that Maikovskis be deported.
16. United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affid, 773
F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
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ian Schutzmannschaft during two days in October, 1942.17 Witnesses
testified that Kowalchuk participated in the mass murder.1 8 Kowalchuk
swore at his trial that he was not in town on the day the Jews were
shot.19 Without finding that Kowalchuk had actually participated in
the murder of the Jews, the United States District Court revoked
Kowalchuk's citizenship on the grounds that he had been a Nazi police
official and had thereby assisted in persecution, and because he lied by
claiming that he had been a tailor during this time on his visa
application.20
3. Nazi Government Officials
Andrija Artukovic was a Nazi government official who was able to
enter the United States after World War II by misrepresenting his
wartime activities. Artukovic served as the Minister of Internal Affairs
of Croatia (now Yugoslavia) during World War II. Artukovic was in
charge of concentration camps in Croatia where thousands of Serbs,
Jews, and opponents of the Nazis were murdered. Artukovic entered
the United States in 1948 on a visitor's visa, using a false name. Ar-
tukovic's deportation was held up in the courts for more than twenty
years on various procedural technicalities." In 1984, Yugoslavia asked
the United States to extradite Artukovic. He was extradiied to Yugo-
slavia, where he was convicted of murder.22
These are only a few examples of the hundreds of Nazis who came
to the United States after World War II. The United States Justice
Department Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has investigated
hundreds of cases, and is still prosecuting Nazi criminals residing in
the United States.23
17. Id. at 81.
18. Id. at 76-80.
19. Id.
20. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affid, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
21. See, e.g., Artukovic v. I.N.S., 693 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. In re Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal.), stay denied, 784 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1986).
23. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) was formed in 1979 to consolidate
all activities of the United States government relating to Nazi war criminals. Its sole
purpose is to locate, investigate, and institute legal proceedings against Nazi criminals
in the United States. It is a part of the Criminal Division of the United States Justice
Department.
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B. Apprehending and Investigating Nazi Criminals in the
United States
Much of the information regarding Nazi criminals in the United
States comes from the governments of other countries, in particular the
Soviet Union, Germany, Israel, and Poland.24 The governments of these
countries cooperate very closely with the OSI in identifying Nazi
criminals in the United States. The OSI has also received information
regarding Nazi criminals from organizations such as Simon
Wiesenthal's documentation center in Vienna and the Simon
Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles.
Beginning in 1982, the OSI initiated a program to locate Nazi
criminals in the United States who were not known to foreign govern-
ments or to organizations. The OSI obtained lists of concentration
camp guards, police officials, members of the SS, and others who may
have taken part in Nazi atrocities. The OSI compute:rized these lists
and matched them against the lists that the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service maintains of persons who have entered the
United States. A sophisticated computer program was developed to al-
low matching of names on a phonetic basis so that names spelled in
Cyrilic and other alphabets could be matched against the American
spelling of the name. When the OSI obtains a match, it conducts an
investigation to determine if the person living in the United States was
a concentration camp guard, Nazi police official, or a member of the
SS, and if he participated in criminal activity.
Once the OSI identifies an individual who may have been a Nazi
criminal, it initiates a worldwide investigation of his activities during
the period from 1933 to 1945. As in any other lawsuit, there are two
main types of evidence which the OSI seeks-witnesses and documents.
1. Locating Witnesses to Nazi Crimes
The OSI has located witnesses in the United States, the Soviet
Union, Israel, Germany, and other countries. There are generally two
types of witnesses who testify for the government in these law-
24. Movies and television shows often depict the discovery of Nazi criminals by a
former concentration camp inmate who fortuitously runs into a former concentration
camp guard on the bus or walking down the street. I am not aware of any case in
which a Nazi criminal who has been prosecuted by the Justice Department was discov-
ered in such a manner.
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suits-survivors of the Holocaust and other Nazi criminals.
Because there were relatively few survivors of the Nazi death-
camps, it is generally very difficult to locate survivor witnesses who are
able to identify a particular defendant and testify about crimes which
they saw him commit. Additionally, many of those who were able to
survive have died during the forty-five years since the War ended.
Moreover, even if the OSI is able to locate a survivor who witnessed a
certain atrocity, it is often very difficult for that survivor to identify the
individual who committed the atrocity more than 40 years ago.
Despite the difficulties, there have been cases in which the OSI
was able to locate survivor witnesses who were able to testify about
crimes committed by a particular defendant. Several Holocaust survi-
vors were able to identify Demjanjuk, the guard at Treblinka who oper-
ated the gas chambers."5 These witnesses testified that they were able
to identify Demjanjuk because they saw him on several occasions and
because of the particularly heinous nature of his criminal acts. 6 Sev-
eral survivors were able to identify Kowalchuk as a Ukrainian police
official because they had gone to school with him before the War and
therefore 'easily recognized him when they saw him in a police
uniform.27
The OSI also uses other Nazi criminals as witnesses.28 For exam-
ple, in the Maikovskis case, policemen who served under Maikovskis
when he was the chief of police were located in Latvia. 9 OSI attorneys
conducted depositions of these witnesses in Latvia. The depositions
were videotaped for presentation in United States courts.
25. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
26. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1369-71 (N.D. Ohio 1981),
afifd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
27. United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 76-77 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd,
773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
28. In many prosecutions conducted by the Justice Department, it is necessary to
rely on the testimony of other criminals. This is often true in drug cases, securities
fraud cases, and other types of criminal prosecutions. In cases involving the prosecution
of Nazi criminals in which the testimony of another Nazi criminal has been used, there
has always been corroborating evidence from documents, survivor witnesses, or admis-
sions of the defendant himself.
29. Latvia has been incorporated into the U.S.S.R. The United States does not
recognize this incorporation.
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THE AUTHOR (LEFT) WITH FORMER OSI DIRECTOR ALLAN RYAN
(RIGHT) AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY IVARS BERZINS (CENTER), IN RIGA,
LATVIA FOR THE TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS.
The witnesses in Latvia testified that Maikovskis served as the po-
lice chief in Rezekne, Latvia, and that they served as policemen under
his command. They testified that Maikovskis ordered them to assist in
the shooting of hundreds of Jews and all of the inhabitants of the vil-
lage of Audrini. These witnesses were able to positively identify
Maikovskis from a photospread containing the photographs of Maikov-
skis and 17 other men. They easily recognized Maikovskis because they
had worked with him on a daily basis during their service with the
police.
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THE AUTHOR (FAR LEFT) WITH LATVIAN PROSECUTORS AND OTHER
UNITED STATES JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFI-
CIALS, IN RIGA, LATVIA AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF DEPOSITIONS. FIFTH
FROM THE LEFT IS ALLAN RYAN, FORMER DIRECTOR OF OSI. FIFTH
FROM THE RIGHT IS THE PROCURATOR GENERAL (ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL) OF LATVIA.
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Photospread used in the identification of Maikovskis by witness Anton
Zhukovski's at his deposition in Latvia. Maikovskis is shown in photo-
graph number 13 in his police captain's uniform taken in 1942. The
witnesses deposed in Latvia were able to identify Maikovskis, from this
photograph, as the person who served as the police chief and who was
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responsible for the murder of the residents of Audrini and the Jews in
Rezekne, Latvia. These witnesses were able to identify Maikovskis'
photograph from a photospread that contained eighteen different pho-
tographs of Nazi officials.
2. Locating Documentary Evidence
The OSI also relies on documents to prove its case and obtains
documents from all over the world, including Germany, Israel, the So-
viet Union, Poland, and the United States National Archives. The doc-
uments are records created by the Nazis during the period from 1933
to 1945. For example, the OSI has used duty rosters for concentration
camp guards at a particular camp in order to help establish that a de-
fendant was a concentration camp guard. The OSI has also used Nazi
police documents which conveyed orders to the police to establish that
a defendant served in the police and took part in- certain atrocities.
C. Use of Evidence From the Soviet Union
Because many of the crimes committed by the Nazis took place in
areas which are now part of the Soviet Union, much of the evidence
used ih the prosecution of Nazi criminals comes from the Soviet Union.
Nazi documents were captured by the Soviet army as it advanced to-
ward Germany, and witnesses to Nazi crimes reside in areas that are
now part of the U.S.S.R. Accused Nazis have claimed that documents
which OSI obtained from the Soviet Union were forged by the Soviet
secret police, the K.G.B. The accused Nazis have also alleged that So-
viet witnesses who implicated them in crimes were coerced into testify-
ing against them by the K.G.B.30
However, evidence from the Soviet Union has proven to be very
reliable. Documents which come from the Soviet Union are actual
World War II documents which were captured by the Soviet Army
during the War. These documents were created by the Nazis, not by
the Soviet government. All documents which the OSI uses are ex-
30. The cases which have gone to trial in which these claims regarding evidence
from the Soviet Union were raised were tried during the period from 1980 to 1987,
during which time cold war tensions were high. There have not been any trials in which
evidence from the Soviet Union has been used since Glasnost and Perestroika were
instituted. It will be interesting to see if defendants continue to raise the claim that
evidence from the Soviet Union is unreliable, now that there have been fundamental
changes in the Soviet political and judicial systems.
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amined by handwriting experts, chemists, and other scientists from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Treasury Depart-
ment, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. These experts
testify in court regarding the authenticity of the documents. If a Nazi
document was purportedly signed by the defendant, a handwriting ex-
pert compares the signature on the Nazi document with the defend-
ant's signature on his immigration application. Chemists examine the
chemical content of the ink and paper to determine if the ink and paper
of the Nazi document are consistent with its date. The inks and papers
in use during the 1940's have certain chemical contents. The govern-
ment chemists are able to determine if the ink and paper of the Nazi
documents were in use during the 1940's.
However, even with all of this expert testimony, some defendants
still claimed that documents which came from the Soviet Union were
forged. They claimed that the Soviet K.G.B. was extremely sophisti-
cated, and that it was able to use ink and paper stored from the 1940's
in order to forge the documents. However, during the 1980's the
United States Treasury Department developed a scientific technique
called relative aging. This technique allows experts to determine, within
certain limits, how long the ink has been on the paper by examining the
solubility of the ink (i.e., the extent to which the ink has dried). This
test reveals whether the ink was recently put onto the paper. In other
words, the test could prove that a purported Nazi document was not a
recent forgery. Without exception, every Nazi document which has
been examined, including all Nazi documents obtained from the Soviet
Union, has been found to be authentic through the use of handwriting
comparison, ink and paper analysis, and relative aging.:"
Evidence from the Soviet Union has also been c orroborated by
documents and witnesses from other countries. For example, in the
Kowalchuk case, witnesses from the Soviet Union, Israel, and the
United States all identified Kowalchuk as a Nazi police official.32 In
some cases, the defendant himself will end up admitting the truth of
facts proven by evidence which came from the Soviet Union. One of
31. See, e.g., United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1365-69 (N.D.
Ohio 1981), affid, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982); In re
Maikovskis, A8 194 566, at 15-17; Maikovskis v. I.N.S., 773 F.2d 435, 438 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
32. United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 76-81 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd,
773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
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the best examples of this is the Maikovskis case.33 When he came to
the United States, Maikovskis claimed on his visa application that he
had been a bookkeeper for the Latvian Railway Department from 1941
to 1944.34 The Justice Department received documents from the Soviet
Union, purportedly signed by Maikovskis, stating that he had been po-
lice chief in the city of Rezekne, Latvia during this time. These docu-
ments also indicated that Maikovskis had participated in the arrest of
all of the inhabitants of the village of Audrini and the burning of the
village by the police. 5 Former policemen who served under Maikovskis
were deposed in Latvia, and they testified that Maikovskis was in fact
the chief of police. According to these witnesses, Maikovskis had given
orders to arrest all of the inhabitants of the Audrini village and then
burn it to the ground. The former policemen also testified that Maikov-
skis and his men transported the residents of the village to the hills
outside of town and shot them in mass graves.38
When Maikovskis was first questioned by the Justice Department,
he denied that he had served as chief of police and further denied that
he had any involvement in the arrest or murder of the inhabitants of
Audrini or the destruction of the village. He claimed that the Soviet
secret police, the K.G.B., was trying to frame him. He and his attorney
argued that the witnesses in Latvia had been coerced into testifying
against him, and that the documents obtained from Soviet-occupied
Latvia had been forged.3 7
At the deportation trial, a handwriting expert and expert forensic
document examiner testified that the same person who signed Maikov-
skis' visa application also signed the documents obtained from the So-
viet Union. These were documents which were signed by Maikovskis as
chief of police, and which implicated him in the Audrini incident.38
Maikovskis was then recalled to the stand and admitted that he had
33. In re Maikovskis, No. A8 194 566 (B.I.A. Aug. 14, 1984); Maikovskis v.
I.N.S., 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
34. Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 437.
35. In re Maikovslds, No. A8 194 566 at 15-17; Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 438.
36. In re Maikovskis, No. A8 194 566 at 11-15.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 17 n.14; Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 438. One such document obtained
from the U.S.S.R. was a January 3, 1942 report from the Chief of Rezekne District
Police Precinct 2 (Maikovskis) to the Vice Prosecutor in the Second Precinct. The re-
port states that "on orders of the German authorities, all the residents of Audrini vil-
lage, Makeseni County, were imprisoned, but the village itself was burned." The report
was signed by Boleslavs Maikovskis, Police Chief.
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served as chief of police. He admitted that he had written and signed
the documents obtained from the U.S.S.R. and finally admitted that he
had given the order for, and participated in, the arrest of all of the
inhabitants of Audrini and the burning of the village." ' The evidence
from the Soviet Union had been correct.
However, Maikovskis continued to deny that he had participated
in the shooting of the Audrini villagers or the rounding up and murder
of the Jews of Rezekne, as the witnesses in the Soviet Union testified.
The United States courts did not have to reach a determination regard-
ing whether the witnesses from the Soviet Union were correct on those
points, because it was determined that there were sufficient grounds to
deport Maikovskis based on his own admissions. Maikovskis is cur-
rently in prison in West Germany, standing trial on charges of mass
murder. The West German court will determine whether Maikovskis
participated in the murders of the Audrini villagers and the Jews of
Rezekne. The German prosecutors have a convincing argument that
Maikovskis has been shown to be a liar, while the witnesses in the So-
viet Union have been proven correct on several points by Maikovskis'
own belated admissions.40
39. In re Maikovskis, No. A8 194 566 at 10-11; Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 438.
40. I have conducted depositions of witnesses in the Soviet Union (including the
witnesses in the Maikovskis case) and I have viewed the videotapes of depositions of
other witnesses. I believe that most of them are truthful. I have never seen any evi-
dence of coercion of witnesses by the Soviet authorities. The lawyer for the accused
Nazi can accompany the OSI attorneys to the Soviet Union and -Tross examine the
witnesses in order to test the truth of their testimony. When the Justice Department
has been able to locate witnesses in other countries, such as the United States, Ger-
many, or Israel, those witnesses have corroborated the testimony 3f the Soviet wit-
nesses. Nevertheless, there have been several cases in which courls have refused to
credit testimony of witnesses in the Soviet Union, simply because the witnesses were
from the Soviet Union. In re Maikovskis, No. A8 194 566 (Immigration Court, New
York, June 30, 1983), rev'd on other grounds, In re Maikovskis, No. A8 194 566
(B.I.A. Aug. 14, 1984), affid, Maikovskis v. I.N.S., 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd and remanded, 485
U.S. 759 (1988).
In the Maikovskis case, the trial judge, Judge Francis Lyons, went so far as to
deny the government's motion to take depositions in the Soviet Union. The trial judge
was overruled by a higher court, and depositions were taken in the Soviet Union. Not
surprisingly, the trial judge then refused to credit the testimony of the Soviet witnesses.
It should be noted that this was the same judge who determined that Maikovskis
should not be deported, even though he admitted lying about his activities during
World War II in order to obtain a visa to enter the United States, and even though he
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III. PROSECUTING NAZI CRIMINALS
Criminal proceedings are not brought against Nazi criminals in
the United States. Because the Nazi crimes did not take place in the
United States, the United States does not have jurisdiction over the
crimes. However, there are two types of proceedings which may be
properly brought against Nazi criminals in the United States. The first
type is under the United States immigration laws. A proceeding under
the immigration laws involves a two-step process: denaturalization (rev-
ocation of citizenship) and deportation (expulsion from the United
States). Denaturalization proceedings and deportation proceedings are
completely separate, are brought in different courts, and have separate
appeals. Deportation proceedings cannot be commenced until denatu-
ralization proceedings and all appeals have been successfully
concluded.
The second type of proceeding brought against Nazi criminals is
extradition. Upon the request of a foreign country, a Nazi criminal
may be extradited to that country to be criminally prosecuted for the
crimes he committed.
A. Immigration Proceedings
1. Denaturalization
If a Nazi criminal has become a United States citizen, his citizen-
ship must be revoked. As noted above, only after citizenship has been
revoked can deportation proceedings be instituted in order to remove
the Nazi from the United States. Denaturalization proceedings are
conducted in United States District Court. There are two grounds for
revocation of citizenship: 1) proof of a material misrepresentation in
the course of procuring citizenship; and 2) proof that citizenship was
illegally procured.41 Proof of either of these grounds must be by "clear,
admitted forcibly rounding up all of the residents of Audrini and burning the village to
the ground. This ruling was unanimously reversed by the higher courts, which ordered
that Maikovskis be deported. Maikovskis is now in prison in West Germany standing
trial on charges of mass murder. The trial is taking place in the city of Muenster, West
Germany.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1986) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys . . . to institute pro-
ceedings. . . in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may
reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting
aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the cer-
1991]
335
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence which does "not leave the issue
in doubt."'42 This burden is "substantially identical with that required
in criminal cases-proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'"
a. Denaturalization Based on Material Misrepresentation in
the Course of Procuring Citizenship
In order to become a United States citizen, an applicant must an-
swer questions regarding his background and history. Title 8, U.S.C. §
1451(a) provides for the denaturalization of citizens whose citizenship
was "procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrep-
resentation. . . . Courts have concluded that "this requires misrep-
resentations or concealments that are both willful and material.' 45 The
Supreme Court has held that this "provision plainly contains four inde-
pendent requirements: the naturalized citizen must have misrepre-
sented or concealed some fact, the misrepresentation or concealment
must have been willful, the fact must have been material, and the natu-
ralized citizen must have procured citizenship as a result of the misrep-
resentation or concealment.' 46
b. Denaturalization Based on Illegal Procurement of
Citizenship
Citizenship was illegally procured, and must be revoked, if the ap-
plicant for citizenship did not meet all of the requirements to become a
United States citizen at the time of naturalization. 47 One of the re-
quirements for United States citizenship is that the applicant must
tificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of
naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of
a material fact or by willful misrepresentation ....
42. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981); Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d
488, 493 (3d Cir. 1985).
43. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 73 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Riela,
337 F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir. 1964).
44. Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 438.
45. United States v. Kungys, 485 U.S. 759, 767 (1988); see also Fedorenko, 449
U.S. at 507-08 n.28.
46. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 767; see also United States v. Schellong, 547 F. Supp.
569 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007
(1984). In Schellong, the defendant lied on his citizenship application about his service
in the Nazi SS as a concentration camp guard. Schellong was denaturalized based
upon his misrepresentations in his citizenship application. Id. at 57.4-75.
47. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506; Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 494.
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have entered the United States pursuant to a valid visa.48 If a natural-
ized citizen was not eligible for the visa he obtained, citizenship must
be revoked. 9
Many Nazis illegally entered the United States under the Dis-
placed Persons Act ("DP Act").5 0 The DP Act excluded from entry
into the United States any person "who advocated or assisted in the
persecution of any person because of race, religion, or national ori-
gin."51 Consequently, citizenship must be revoked from those Nazis
who assisted in persecution and who entered the United States under
the DP Act.5 2 Additionally, section ten of the DP Act excludes "[a]ny
person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of
gaining admission into the United States as an eligible displaced person
... . , Therefore, citizenship of any person who willfully made a ma-
terial misrepresentation regarding his position or activities during
World War II, for the purpose of gaining admission into the United
States as an eligible displaced person, must be revoked." Although the
DP Act does not on its face require that a misrepresentation be mate-
rial in order to render an applicant ineligible, it has been held that such
a misrepresentation must be material.55
Another prerequisite for citizenship is that the applicant must be
"a person of good moral character."5 6 It has been held that a person
who participated in Nazi atrocities cannot be "a person of good moral
character," and must therefore be denaturalized.5
Lack of good moral character is also demonstrated when an indi-
vidual gives false testimony in the immigration or naturalization pro-
cess. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), a person shall be deemed not
to be of good moral character if he "has given false testimony for the
48. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 494.
49. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506; Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 494-95.
50. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (as
amended by Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950)).
51. Displaced Persons Act, § 13, 64 Stat. 227.
52. See United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affid, 685
F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982); Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72
(E.D. Pa. 1983), afl'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
53. Displaced Persons Act, § 10, 64 Stat. 226.
54. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507; Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 495.
55. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507; Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 495 n.8.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982).
57. See Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 439-40.
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purpose of obtaining" immigration or naturalization benefits. Recently,
the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) does not have a
materiality requirement, as does 8 U.S.C. § 1451 and the DP Act.58
The issue under section 1101(f)(6) is whether the misrepresentation
was made with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration bene-
fits. 59 Therefore, the citizenship of any person who gave false testimony
regarding his position or activities during World War II, with the sub-
jective intent of obtaining immigration benefits, must be revoked.60
2. Deportation
Once a Nazi criminal has been denaturalized by revoking his citi-
zenship, he must still be deported from the United States.
a. Deportation Based on Assistance in Persecution
As noted above, the DP Act prohibited the entry into the United
States of any person "who advocated or assisted in the persecution of
any person because of race, religion, or national origin."'61 Any person
who assisted the Nazis in persecution and then entered the United
States under the DP Act is deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). 62
There were, however, Nazi criminals who entered the United
States under other immigration laws which did not spec.ifically exclude
persons who assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians. Such persons
could not be deported based upon their assistance in persecution.
Therefore, in 1978, the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended
to specifically provide for the deportation of all persons who assisted
the Nazis in the persecution of civilians, regardless of the immigration
law they used to enter the United States. 3 This amendment (known as
the Holtzman Amendment) provides for the deportation of any person
who
58. United States v. Kungys, 485 U.S. 759, 782 (1988).
59. Id.
60. However, the Court in Kungys recognized that "it will be relatively rare that
the Government will be able to prove that a misrepresentation that does not have the
natural tendency to influence the decision regarding immigration or naturalization ben-
efits [i.e., an immaterial misrepresentation] was nonetheless made with the subjective
intent of obtaining those benefits." Id. at 780.
61. Displaced Persons Act, § 13, 64 Stat. 227.
62. Maikovskis v. I.N.S., 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985).
63. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19)
(1989).
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during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on
May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with-
(A) the Nazi government of Germany,
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military
forces of the Nazi government of Germany,
(C) any government established with the cooperation of the
Nazi government of Germany, or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi govern-
ment of Germany,
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecu-
tion of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or po-
litical opinion."
Ordinarily, a person found deportable for making a material mis-
representation may be eligible for a discretionary ruling relieving him
of the order of deportation. However, such relief is not available to a
person found deportable under the Holtzman Amendment for assis-
tance in persecution. Any person who is found to have assisted the Na-
zis in persecuting civilians must be deported. 5
b. Deportation Based on Material Misrepresentation in Procur-
ing a Visa
Section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act pro-
vides for the deportation of persons who were excludable at time of
entry into the United States because they procured their visa by fraud
or misrepresentation.6" The DP Act also made excludable any person
who "willfully ma[d]e a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining
64. Id. This provision is known as the "Holtzman Amendment," named for its
chief sponsor, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman of Brooklyn, New York. The consti-
tutionality of the Holtzman Amendment has been challenged on the grounds that it is
an ex-post-facto law and a bill of attainder. However, the amendment has been found
to be constitutional. See Artukovic v. I.N.S., 693 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1982); Linnas v.
I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1028-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
65. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241(0, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(0 (1989)
(waiver of deportation unavailable to person found to have assisted the Nazis in perse-
cution); Immigration and Nationality Act, § 243(h)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A)
(1989) (withholding of deportation unavailable); Immigration and Nationality Act, §
244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1989) (suspension of deportation unavailable); see also
Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 442.
66. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)
(1989).
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admission into the United States." 7 Such persons are deportable under
Section 241 (a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 Under all
of these statutes, "[a]n alien who has made misrepresentations in his
visa application documents is deportable on account of those misrepre-
sentations only if they were material. '8 9
3. Materiality of Misrepresentations
One of the issues which has caused a great deal of difficulty in
both denaturalization and deportation proceedings is the standard for
measuring the "materiality" of misrepresentations. In United States v.
Fedorenko,7° one of the first cases involving denaturalization of a Nazi,
the district court held that in order to establish materiality, the govern-
ment must prove that if the applicant for citizenship had revealed the
true facts about his position and activities during World War II, citi-
zenship would have been denied.7 1 Under this standard, the district
court held that Fedorenko, who admitted lying about his service as an
armed guard at the Nazi death camp of Treblinka, was not subject to
denaturalization, because the government had not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that a guard at Treblinka could not have been eli-
gible for immigration under the DP Act. 2
The court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a
misrepresentation was material if 1) disclosure of the true facts would
have led to an investigation, and 2) the investigation might have uncov-
ered other facts warranting denial of citizenship.73 The court of appeals
held that if Fedorenko had revealed his wartime activities when he ap-
plied for his visa, the American authorities would have conducted an
investigation, and this investigation might have resulted in denial of a
67. Displaced Persons Act, § 10, 62 Stat. 1013.
68. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); Maikovskis, 773 F.2d
435.
69. Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 440; see also Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507-08. As
noted above, a person who is found deportable for making material misrepresentations
is normally eligible for certain forms of discretionary relief from deportation. However,
a person who is found to have assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians is not eligible
for such discretionary relief and must be deported. See supra note 63 and accompany-
ing text.
70. 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
71. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 916.
72. Id. at 909.
73. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 950-51.
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visa. Consequently, the court concluded that Fedorenko's citizenship
must be revoked. 4
The Supreme Court affirmed Fedorenko's denaturalization, but
sidestepped the issue of which of the two lower courts' tests for materi-
ality was correct. The Court held that
disclosure of the true facts about [Fedorenko's] service as an
armed guard at Treblinka would, as a matter of law, have made
him ineligible for a visa under the DP Act. . . . At the very least,
a misrepresentation must be considered material if disclosure of the
true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa.75
After Fedorenko, courts set forth several standards for materiality
in the denaturalization and deportation contexts. For example, in
Maikovskis v. LN.S.76 the second circuit articulated the following stan-
dard for materiality in-deportation cases:
[O]nce it has been shown that the alien made misrepresentations in
his visa application, the materiality of the misrepresentations is es-
tablished where the government shows that disclosure of the con-
cealed information probably would have led to the discovery of
facts warranting the denial of a visa.77
In United States v. Kungys,78 the Supreme Court attempted to
frame a definition of materiality in the denaturalization context which
would clarify the standard and put an end to the inconsistent standards
adopted by different courts. The Court framed the relevant inquiry as
follows:
[W]hether the misrepresentation or concealment was predictably
capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the offi-
cial decision. The official decision in question, of course, is whether
the applicant meets the requirements for citizenship, so that the
test more specifically is whether the misrepresentation or conceal-
ment had a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the
applicant was qualified.7 9
74. Id. at 951-52.
75. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509.
76. 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985) cert denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
77. Id. at 442.
78. 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
79. Id. at 771-72.
1991]
341
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
4. Assistance in Persecution
The question of whether an individual "assisted in persecution,"
warranting denaturalization or deportation, has also been an issue in
several cases.80 In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court set forth the follow-
ing standard:
[A]n individual who did no more than cut the hair of female in-
mates before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted
in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there can be no
question that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a
rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed
to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who
admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the com-
mandant of the camp, fits within the statutory language about per-
sons who assisted in the persecution of civilians. Other cases may
present more difficult line-drawing problems but we need decide
only this case.8
The following cases exemplify the requisite "assistaice in persecu-
tion," which warrant denaturalization and deportation. In United
States v. Koziy, s2 a Nazi policeman who personally mu:rdered a little
Jewish girl was found to have assisted in persecution.8" In Maikov-
skis,84 a police chief who gave orders to arrest all of the inhabitants of
a village and burn the village to the ground, and then participated in
80. The issue of assistance in persecution becomes difficult in those cases in
which the court does not credit, or chooses not to rely on, testimony of eyewitnesses,
either from the Soviet Union or other countries, who testify that the defendant partici-
pated in murders, assaults, or other atrocities. If the court credits such testimony, there
is no question that the defendant assisted in persecution. See, e.g., United States v.
Linnas, 527 F. Supp 426 (E.D. N.Y. 1981) affid, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.) cert. denied,
459 U.S. 883 (1982); United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd,
728 F.2d 1314 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984). In those cases in which
the court does not credit eyewitness testimony regarding the defendant's commission of
atrocities, the court must usually rely on admissions made by the defendant as to his
wartime activities. The defendant will, of course, attempt to minimize his involvement
in persecution, thereby giving rise to close questions of whether the defendant assisted
in persecution. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
aSf'd, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
81. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34.
82. 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
83. Id. at 32.
84. 773 F.2d 435.
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the arrests and burning, was found to have assisted in persecution. 5 In
Kowalchuk,88 an individual who occupied a largely clerical, but respon-
sible, position in a Nazi police force which carried out atrocities was
found to have assisted in persecution, even though the court did not
credit testimony of witnesses regarding the defendant's personal partic-
ipation in the atrocities. 7
B. Extradition of Nazi Criminals
As mentioned above, extradition is the second type of proceeding
brought against Nazi war criminals. If a foreign country wishes to try
a Nazi criminal for his crimes, that country may request extradition of
the criminal. Extradition of Nazi criminals has occurred in only three
cases: In re Ryan,88 In re Artukovic8 9 and In re Demjanjuk.90
Extradition is a simple and quick procedure. The U.S. government
must only make out a prima facie case that there is probable cause to
believe that the respondent committed a crime.91 Review by appeals
courts of an order of extradition is very limited. 2
Extradition can only take place when there is an extradition treaty
85. Id. at 446-48.
86. 571 F. Supp. 72.
87. Id. at 81. In both Maikovskis and Kowalchuk, witnesses from the Soviet
Union testified that the defendants had personally participated in the mass murder of
Jews and other innocent civilians. However, the courts did not rely on that testimony,
instead relying on the defendants' own admissions regarding their service in the Nazi
police and assistance in persecution.
88. 360 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973).
89. 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal), stay denied, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
90. 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985). In the 1950's and 1960's, the U.S.S.R.
requested extradition of Maikovskis and Linnas, but extradition did not take place be-
cause there was not an extradition treaty between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
91. Id. at 548. In contrast, as noted above, the government must prove a denatu-
ralization and deportation case by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence which
does not leave the issue in doubt. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
92. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986). In contrast, denaturalization and deportation proceedings in-
volve the following steps: 1) denaturalization trial in United States District Court; 2)
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals; 3) certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court; 4) deportation trial in United States Immigration Court; 5) appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals; 6) appeal to the United States Court of Appeals; and
7) certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. This procedure can take from five to
ten years.
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between the United States and a foreign country covering the alleged
crimes, and the government of the foreign country asks the United
States government to send a person to the foreign country to stand trial
for crimes allegedly committed in that country or under that country's
jurisdiction. Germany has only requested extradition of one Nazi crimi-
nal from the United States.93
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the many obstacles in prosecuting crimes which took place
more than forty years ago, thousands of miles from the United States,
Nazi criminals in the United States are finally being brought to justice.
The OSI was not created until 1979, more than thirty years after the
murder of six million Jews and millions of other innocent people. Since
1979, the OSI has done an excellent job making up for the lost time in
bringing these criminals to justice. The work of the OSI must continue
until all Nazi criminals in the United States have been brought to
justice.
93. Ryan, 360 F. Supp. at 270. The government of Germany never requested the
extradition of Maikovskis. German law currently allows for extradition of Nazi
criminals from the United States only if 1) the Nazi criminal is or was a German
citizen; 2) the crimes took place on German territory; 3) the crimes were committed
against German citizens; or 4) the Nazi criminal was a member of a German military
or police unit. Because Maikovskis was a Latvian whose alleged crimes were committed
in Latvia against Latvian citizens, and he was a member of a Latvian police unit,
Germany could not request extradition under German law. However, once Maikovskis
was in Germany, he could be tried under German law for his alleged crimes.
Maikovskis' deportation proceeding and appeals lasted seven years. If German law
had provided for the extradition of Maikovskis and the government of Germany had
sought extradition, he could have been extradited in less than one ymr.
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I. THE RULE OF LAW AS A TARGET
MR. FRIEDMAN: Take your seats in the next minute or two,
please, and we'll begin our program. This is the second panel of our
program conference. It's entitled "The Rule of Law as a Target," and
a couple of logistic announcements, the first of which is that I regret
that our speaker Monica de Greiff was unable to make her transporta-
tion connections today, and therefore she will not be with us. So that
will give us ample time to ask questions and hear answers from the
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panel. We've agreed among ourselves that we're going to save as much
time as we can. We've imposed an arbitrary thirty second introduction
rule so that will save us a few moments.
We're, also going to be guided by the constraint of lunch. That's an
action-forcing event so we're going to adjourn promptly at 12:25. We
will have a few moments before we assume our seats at the tables
which are being set in the back. Our order of speakers today will be
Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, who will be followed by Bruce Zagaris,
and then finally Rafael Perl. And when those twelve to fifteen minute
presentations are concluded, then we'll have ample time for questions
and answers, and once again, please use the microphone which is sta-
tioned at the center of the room.
Our first speaker today will be Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano. She
has. a very distinguished history, and let me just mention a couple of
highlights. To begin with, she is a native of Peru. She holds a juris
doctorate from the University of Trujillo in Peru. She has served as
Visiting Professor of International Studies at Davidson College. She
has been a prosecutor in the province of Zarumilla, Peru, and she has
published widely in the field of terrorism and narco-trafficking.
It's our pleasure to introduce our speaker.
DR. TARAZONA-SEVILLANO: I would like to concentrate on
the case of Peru, and permit me to say that the war against drugs and
narco-terrorism in the producing countries such as Peru is particularly
complex. To simply criminalize all acts associated with the production
and trafficking of drugs has proven to be insufficient. The people who
decide to participate in any of the stages of the production and traffick-
ing of cocaine believe that the possible gains, sometimes very meager,
outweigh the risk and threat of the criminal sanction.
Beyond the legal aspects, there are a number of political, social
and institutional factors linked to the problem of narco-terrorism that
need to be explained to understand the acute contradictions of the mo-
ment. I will present a case study on Peru to illustrate this thesis. Peru
enacted the first and oldest law in South America against drug traffick-
ing, Law for the Repression. of Illicit Traffic of Drugs in 1978. This law
was inspired by the South American Accord on Narcotic Drugs and
the Psychotropic Substances of 1973. It was not until six years later
that other South American countries followed with laws on drugs: Ven-
ezuela in 1984, Colombia in 1986, Ecuador in 1987, and Bolivia in
1988. The Peruvian law was also the first one in South America to
outlaw coca cultivation. Since 1980, Peru has been the seat of the most
powerful and radical terrorist organization in Latin America, Sendero
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Luminoso or the Shining Path. Adhering to the theories of Marx,
Lenin and Mao, the insurgency is determined to overthrow Peru's ex-
isting socio economic . .. system and restructure the state with its
unique interpretation of communism. Sendero Luminoso has allied with
the Peruvian drug syndicate and controls the most important coca/co-
caine paste producing area of the world, the Upper Huallaga Valley.
Simultaneously, the Peruvian economy is passing through perhaps the
most critical moment of its recent history. With inflation skyrocketing
to 2,775 percent in 1989, legal and illegal segments of the population
have turned to the "parallel exchange system" to buy American dollars
to preserve, to some extent, the purchasing power of its money. Un-
doubtedly, the impact of drug money has been important.
Allow me to make a few observations about the social, political,
institutional and legal factors that are present in the Peruvian case to
help understand the complexity of the situation and the traditional ba-
sis of coca culture. The coca plant has played an important role in the
lives of the Andean people of Peru, who have cultivated it for centuries.
In those regions, the workday includes several breaks exclusively for
coca chewing, and I think a '70s survey shows that fifi:een percent of
the Andean population of Peru chews coca daily. In 1980, the first
large scale operation was mounted to eliminate coca cultivation. But
let's talk about the legal and illegal coca. Coca can be legally grown,
but only for ENACO, the state coca company that commercializes it
for commercial purposes. The 1978 law outlaws all other coca
cultivation.
In the Upper Huallaga Valley, a rain forest valley region to the
northeastern Andes, coca was first introduced as part of the subsistence
agriculture brought by the Andean colonists in the mid 1960s. The val-
ley provided ideal conditions for the growing of the coca. The expan-
sion of this crop was due to the inability of the state to provide techni-
cal assistance for farming rain forest soil and proper marketing of
goods.
As I mentioned to you, in 1980 the first large scale operation was
mounted to eliminate coca cultivation. It accomplished little. Govern-
ment forces were ordered to confiscate land and destroy coca crops.
Farmers and landowners were to be incarcerated. These measures
proved almost entirely counter-productive. The mandate of the police
was logistically impossible to fulfill and had the unexpected counter-
effect of causing higher prices for black market coca leaves. By 1988,
coca cultivation was estimated to incorporate 211,000 hectares in the
Upper Huallaga Valley alone. This growth has led the valley to become
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a major center of cocaine paste production. Sendero Luminoso pene-
trates the area. Sendero's presence in the Upper Huallaga dates from
the early 1980s.
Police sources believe that it was Osmd.n Morote who established
the region as Sendero's northeastern front in 1983-84. By 1985,
Sendero had become an armed presence in the region. The movement
of strength and support has continued to increase since then, filling the
political vacuum long present in the Upper Huallaga region. Predict-
ably, Sendero's visibility led to heightened military occupation of the
area. A development that Sendero Luminoso has also exploited to its
own advantage. The Peruvian government unwittingly fueled the grow-
ers' resentment by implementing programs designed to reduce or eradi-
cate coca grown in the Upper Huallaga.
Simultaneously, a narcotics police unit was introduced. Known as
umopar, this police force was immediately perceived by the local popu-
lace to be a threat, and it added considerably to their hostility toward
the state. These programs undertaken in conjunction with the U.S.
agencies have served only to aggravate the populace and augment per-
ceptions of official ineptitude. In the eyes of the farmers, these regula-
tions and programs are aimed at taking away their only means of sur-
vival, coca cultivation. The group that benefitted the most from the
state's anti-narcotics initiatives was Sendero Luminoso. The govern-
ment's programs provided insurgencies with the fortuitous opportunity
to denounce the United States as the primary culprit for the growers'
problems.
Sendero also contends that it protects the growers from exploita-
tion by traffickers. The rebels provided support for farmers seeking to
organize themselves against both the police and the traffickers. Organi-
zation has also made it possible for the growers to negotiate better
prices for their coca leaves.
The narco-terrorist alliance.
Drug money shifts the balance of power. Each hectare of coca in
the Upper Huallaga produces at least two metric tons of leaves annu-
ally. Growers sell each ton of leaves for processing into cocaine paste to
middlemen for around $600 (U.S.). The cocaesl of the valley encom-
pass 211,000 hectares. Of these approximately 200,000 enter the illicit
drug trade. Each metric ton of dry coca leaves yields twenty-one kilo-
grams of cocaine paste. The paste is purchased by traffickers for $890
per kilogram. These traffickers transport the past to hidden jungle labo-
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ratories where it is refined into pure cocaine hydrochloride.
Approximately three kilograms of paste are required to produce
one kilogram of pure cocaine. One metric ton of coca leaves is required
to produce seven kilograms of cocaine. The finished product is then
smuggled to the United States where it's sold to wholesalers in Miami
for at least $10,000 per kilogram. Will you please show figure three?
This figure is for coca leaves and cocaine paste yield, an estimated
wholesale value of $28 billion for the Peruvian originated cocaine upon
reaching the United States. According to these projections, it will yield
revenues of approximately $7.24 billion for the paste producers and lo-
cal traffickers, and $240 million for the growers who are cultivating
coca.
Of course, there are a great many other expenses to be considered.
Nevertheless, the gross amount of U.S. hard currency entering Peru
through these illegitimate channels is equal to approximately twenty
percent of the legitimate Peruvian GNP. Foreign exchange earnings
from copper, Peru's largest legal export, pale in comparison comprising
only 1.4 percent of the GNP. As of 1990, the Upper Huallaga ranks as
the primary region of coca cultivation in the world. The massive influx
of narco dollars has given the local traffickers unprecedented power and
created abnormal activity in the region. Even the smallest of the towns
in the coca region may boast several branch outlets of Lima's major
banks. All are strategically placed to capitalize on the high volume of
dollar transactions.
The estimated remaining $20.52 billion generated by the sale of
Peruvian originated cocaine remains in the hands of international traf-
fickers. Why has this alliance proven so cohesive? Alliance benefits
coca growers. Coca farmers initially associated with Sendero Luminoso
for one fundamental reason: it was in their economic interest to do so.
The Ministry of Interior indicates that there are 66,000 families culti-
vating coca in the Upper Huallaga. Assuming only two full harvests
per year, a low yield, the average annual family earnings come to about
$3,636 U.S. dollars before expenses, a handsome sum compared to
Peru's per capita income of $1,470 according to the World Bank.
The insurgency has shrewdly won the farmer's confidence by eas-
ing their two primary burdens: the coca eradication programs activated
by the government and exploitation from the traffickers and their in-
termediaries. Alliance benefits traffickers. It seems paradoxical that
Sendero Luminoso will associate with the capitalist oriented traffickers.
Nevertheless, a mutually beneficial alliance indeed exists. Sendero jus-
tifies its participation by explaining that narcotics contribute to the ero-
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sion and demoralization of "Yankee imperialism". Sendero offers co-
caine producers and traffickers three important benefits: discipline
among the growers; protection from police and military interference;
and the promise of further government destabilization.
Traffickers believe that because Sendero poses a far greater threat
to Peru's national security than they do, Sendero provides them with a
margin of freedom. They have also utilized the guerrillas to protect
their many clandestine airstrips scattered throughout the region. An
official from the Ministry of Interior has set the number of hidden air-
strips at 168. Compounding the problem is the fact that the small air-
craft traffic in the region is completely unregulated. The police do not
have radar, and planes come and go at will. On the occasion when a
police plane does sight a presumed trafficker's aircraft and orders it to
land, the radio commands are generally answered by a derisive
laughter.
Alliance benefits Sendero Luminoso.
Sendero, on the other hand, also benefits greatly from its-associa-
tion with the traffickers. Besides its commitment to undermining- the
United States through drugs, Sendero's presence in the valley has facil-
itated recruitment of thousands of new supporters and access to previ-
ously unavailable funds. Yet, Sendero Luminoso has done more than
simply take possession of the territory. It has also won the hearts and
the minds of the inhabitants. The Upper Huallaga may be counted as
one of Sendero's greatest successes.
In some areas, Sendero has also branched economically into other
fields. In some, for example, the rebels have become involved in cur-
rency exchange. This is the hard currency that is mainly exchanged in
the streets of Lima named the parallel exchange system. The actual
amount that Sendero receives for its services is obviously difficult to
determine, but it's generally thought to range in the tens of millions of
dollars annually.
Exactly what the movement does with these vast sums is unknown.
Present power of the narco-terrorist alliance-will you please put num-
ber one again-the Upper Huallaga, in effect, has become a state
within a state governed by Sendero and supported economically by the
cocaine syndicate. The two groups working together have given rise to
narco-terrorism. The informal governing system set up by the two
groups in the Upper Huallaga has actually proven quite successful
lending legitimacy to the eyes of the populace to two marginal social
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groups who, in reality, are delinquents. On a trip along the major high-
way of the region, one now finds walls blanketed with revolutionary
slogans, "Coca or Death," "Viva Presidente Gonsalo [sic]," "Out with
the Junkies, Viva La Revolucion."
The ubiquitous hammer and sickle is frequently carved into the
pavement itself. Many stretches of the highway itself has also been
claimed and are controlled by Sendero Luminoso.
Government response in the Huallaga Valley.
Ironically, almost every attempt made by the government to un-
dermine the narco-terrorist alliance has played directly into the hands
of the narco-terrorists. The situation is further complicated by the
state's refusal to acknowledge and address narco-terrorism as a single
social, military and political entity. Instead of formulating a policy that
will combat narco-terrorism as a whole, the government insists upon
addressing narcotics and terrorism as separate elements.
Drug trafficking in Peru is fought by police forces. Terrorism, on
the other hand, is considered a threat-to the national security, and is
therefore fought by the military. These two services are utterly uncoop-
erative. As a result, the narco-terrorist alliance presently faces little
tangible challenge from the Peruvian government. On May 31, 1987,
200 armed Sendero guerrillas stormed the civil guard station of
Jauchisa [sic]. That's one of the towns in the Upper Huallaga. Many
state officials have long feared these acts. The state was no longer the
dominant power in the Upper Huallaga. As a result, an immediate
state of emergency was declared in the department of San Martin.
That's in the Upper Huallaga. Although it was Sendero initiative that
actually led to its implementation, it was the police who were put in
charge of the operation.
The government was attributing the source of the problem to the
narcotics trade and not to the insurgency. For a short period of time,
the police were able to establish order in the emergency region. Over
the next few months the sales of coca leaves and cocaine paste slowed
significantly. But the growers grew hostile towards the police, and with
the help of Sendero Luminoso began to work against them. The police
soon found themselves out-gunned and out-manned by the insurgency
even though it was the traffickers that they had come to apprehend.
The government, alarmed by the state of total disorder in the Up-
per Huallaga, reacted by declaring the entire department of San Mar-
tin-it's equivalent to a state-under a state of emergency in early No-
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vember, 1987. This time the operation was placed in the hands of the
military, not the police. This policy change meant that the emphasis of
the fighting had been shifted from narcotics to terrorism. Here, the
complexities of fighting narco-terrorism are manifested as are the dele-
terious effects of such profound inter-service rivalries.
Despite a government implementation of a state of emergency in
the region, Sendero Luminoso continued to grow in strength and the
narco-terrorism phenomenon continued to spread. Sendero's strategy is
rooted in the Maoist invisibility principle. Senderistas [sic] wear no
uniforms, making them hard to distinguish from inhabitants of the
area. They have no base camps giving the opposition no opportunity for
debilitating counter-attacks, and they shy away from face-to-face fight-
ing, preferring surprise attacks and bombings. In addition to this, the
traffickers have used the corrosive influence of their wealth to further
turn the armed forces against one another, a shrewd maneuver that
even has led to one confrontation between umopar and army officers.
Military intervention.
Military intervention in the Upper Huallaga has had the effect of
alienating the populace from the state. The people of the region, al-
ready hostile toward the government eradication programs and police
occupation, are even more aggravated by the ominous shadow of the
military as can be seen by complaints of military abuses filed with local
district attorneys. Sendero Luminoso, in contrast, is well-positioned to
manipulate the people's distrust of the state. The district attorney's of-
fice in the Upper Huallaga receives countless complaints of army
abuses every day. Disappearances rank among the most frequently re-
ported. Unfortunately, the state of emergency status subordinates the
legal apparatus to the military command.
District attorneys are categorically denied access to areas that the
military has defined as critical, and cooperation from police forces op-
erating in the area is virtually non-existent. Thus, while Sendero Lumi-
noso and the narcotic traffickers work together to achieve their goals,
the forces of law and order are deadlocked in a senseless and counter-
productive power struggle.
In conclusion, geo-political control of the region has been almost
completely arrested from the Peruvian government. As a narcotic ter-
rorist alliance has created what amounts to a state within a state, gov-
ernment officials now realize that the fight against narco-terrorism has
been lost, largely because there are no comprehensive programs to
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counter it. Narco-terrorism must be aggressively approached with a
comprehensive strategy deserving serious multilateral solution. Impor-
tantly, an intensive, well-financed crop substitution program should be
initiated in the Huallaga Valley. Anything short of this integrated ag-
gressive approach is doomed to fail.
(Applause.)
MR. FRIEDMAN: Our second speaker is Bruce Zagaris. Very
briefly, Bruce has had an outstanding educational background. I dare
to say that he's the only one in the room among all of these lawyers
who has three-count them three-master of laws degrees, one from
Georgetown University, one from Stockholm University, and the other
from the Free University of Brussels in 1976. He has also served in
exotic places such as the faculty of law of the University of the West
Indies. He currently is associated with the law firm in Washington,
D.C. of Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, where he specializes in inter-
national legal affairs.
He is widely published in the area of international business law,
and among other things he serves as editor of the International En-
forcement Law Reporter, and for those of you who have: not seen it, or
are not acquainted with it, it's an outstanding publication. There is
some literature regarding it on one of the back tables as you leave the
room. It's our pleasure to introduce Bruce Zagaris.
MR. ZAGARIS: So pernicious and pervasive have become the
problems of organized crime, their involvement in drugs, and the
problems of organized crime, their involvement in drugs, and the prob-
lem of narco-terrorism, that the rule of law is indeed under assault and
in dire need of protection. I have recently had occasion to look at this
problem as a consultant for the United Nations Crime Prevention
Committee late last year where I did a study on developing new modal-
ities to combat new forms of international organized crime. The way I
will address the problem today is to first look at the way in which law
is under attack, and for discussion purposes, I will look first at interna-
tional law that's under attack, and then look at national law that's
under attack. Then I will look at some proposed solutions to the prob-
lem and I will first look from the macro-view at developing new re-
gimes of international criminal cooperation by marrying international
organization theory with public international law and criminal law, and
then I will look at some more specific solutions.
Let's now turn to the rule of law under attack. International law is
under attack in the fight against narcotics trafficking and organized
crime because international law has not been as flexible and as dy-
[Vol. 15
354
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Proceedings
namic as either organized criminals or the narco-terrorists. Interna-
tional law develops mechanisms only over time. Normally, for instance,
it takes two to four years to negotiate a bilateral treaty, and it takes a
far longer time to conclude a multilateral convention of the type that
Irving Tragen at CICAD was discussing today. The absence of effec-
tive cooperation in extradition and mutual assistance in the fight
against organized crime and narco-terrorists has resulted in the circum-
vention of international law.
Because international law is not effective, countries and govern-
ments tend to take shortcuts. For instance, the cases of Alvarez
Machain, Verdugo Urquidez, and Manuel Antonio Noriega are notori-
ous examples of this. In my opinion, the Noriega case was especially
egregious because partly in order to arrest the narcotics trafficker, the
U.S. used masses of troops in wholesale violence that resulted in the
deaths of innocent civilians, wiped out neighborhoods and caused
thousands of people to lose their businesses.
The case of Alvarez Machain is also important because the United
States in that case did not even try to use the extradition treaty which
exists between Mexico and the United States. Instead, in the case of
Alvarez Machain, and for those of you who are not familiar, he was
the medical doctor who is alleged to have participated in the torture of
Mr. Camarena. In the case of Alvarez Machain, he was one of three
people who had been brought back from Mexico by way of kidnapping.
The United States did this in the face of diplomatic protests by the
Mexican government, and as a result, the judge, Judge Raffertie, in the
District Court of Los Angeles ruled that because of the protests by the
Mexican government that court did not have jurisdiction to try the
case. As a result, the case right now is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
This case is very important to persons who are interested in na-
tional security and the law, and the reason is because now the Mexican
government has requested the extradition of the persons responsible for
the kidnapping including Mr. Beterase [sic] who is a high level official
for the Drug Enforcement Agency. It is quite probable if the United
States does not succeed in extraditing those individuals and does not
release Dr. Alvarez Machain that there will be a wave of kidnapping in
the case of the U.S. officials involved. Indeed, as many of you remem-
ber, that was one of the ways that the Jaffe case was resolved. That
case involved a kidnapping of Canadians by people in Florida, and in
the end Canada started playing the same way, and after a while the
governments resolved the case and basically agreed not to resort to kid-
napping in the future.
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Now if the United States democratic system, including its execu-
tive and judicial branches, cannot force the United Sta:es government
to follow international law, especially extradition treaties, then I believe
a wave of kidnappings will follow. And although the case of Mexico is
important, what should concern those people who deal with U.S. na-
tional security is the threat from other countries. For instance, the gov-
ernment of Iran passed a law providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction
and announced that they were going to apply it first against the captain
of the U.S. vessel in the Persian Gulf when the Iranian airbus carrying
civilians was shot down.
I think there is a severe threat to our national security from other
countries unless there is more international law brought to the process
of the way that governments arrest individuals wanted for crimes.
Another area in which the rule of law and especially international
law is important, and it has been addressed by several people this
morning, has to do with international drug policy. Many people in vari-
ous countries including our country hear the policy of their national
government, but they're not aware that there is actually an interna-
tional policy. Indeed, Mr. Tragen referred to the United Nations multi-
disciplinary program, which the Organization of American States
(OAS) has also adopted and has begun to follow.
Now this program has four major themes: one is the prevention
and reduction of illicit demand; the second is control of supply; third is
suppression of illicit trafficking; and the fourth is treatment and reha-
bilitation. Under each of these four categories, there are many specific
targets. Unfortunately, some countries only want to follow one or two
of these major program categories. What needs to be done is for the
international community and for lawyers and bar associations to ensure
that each of these program targets are being followed.
Another problem in the area of international law is that the inter-
national organizations which are charged with the policy and with the
implementation of the policy do not have .the resources to do their job.
And here national governments including the United States govern-
ment must pay the dues for which they are obligated. And if they don't
pay their dues, then the inability of international organizations to un-
dertake their obligations cannot be met. You may recall Rachel
Ehrenfeld mentioned the fact that although there are many interna-
tional laws, they are not being followed, and this is partly a problem of
resources. Some of this problem is being dealt with. As Irving Tragen
said, there are both new mechanisms such as the U.N. Drug Conven-
tion of 1988 and the series of declarations and new conventions of CI-
[Vol. 15
356
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Proceedings
CAD of the OAS, and within these conventions there are new enforce-
ment mechanisms. For instance, the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention
provides at the end for the U.N. Drug Commission to monitor, report,
and make suggestions on the improvement of the operation of that con-
vention. I think what you'll see happening is that eventually the com-
mission is going to start recommending that sanctions be taken against
certain governments that are not following the law.
Another innovation in that convention, which I think is very help-
ful, is that governments can share the funds of confiscated assets. This
is also a new legal initiative which has been pioneered by the United
States in the '86 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, and which. I think has been
effectively used because that helps provide incentives for governments
to cooperate in investigation of narco-terrorism and organized crime.
National laws have also been under attack, and I won't spend
much time on that partly because of the timq, but also partly because I
think a number of speakers today such as the speaker before me have
talked about the problems that many of the developing countries are
faced with.
Another problem has been the overreaction by certain countries,
and the fact that in overreacting countries, governments are trying to
deny wholesale the rights of defendants. And in this regard, for in-
stance, the confiscation of drug profits and the denial of effective assis-
tance of counsel, in my mind, undermines the integrity of our legal
system. In addition, another problem has been that in enacting money
laundering laws, some countries have gone so fast that the accumula-
tion of "know your customer," suspicious transactions, and criminaliz-
ing involvement by negligence, has resulted in wholesale deterioration
of relationships between professionals such as bankers, lawyers, ac-
countants and their clients.
Policymakers mist be cautious in this realm because the rights of
individuals in their confidential relations are also very important. An-
other factor which we are seeing right now in the United States is a
downturn in foreign investment in the U.S. The statistics in the first
quarter of the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of Com-
merce have shown a downturn, and this is continuing even more in this
quarter, and this is, in part, a result of the severe reporting require-
ments of the United States with respect to money movement in com-
parison with other countries.
To be effective in controlling money laundering, and it is very im-
portant to take the profit out of organized crime, narcotics trafficking,
and especially out of narco-terrorism, the world community should act
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multilaterally because if only one or a few countries act it, the organ-
ized criminals will simply use other countries. Let me now turn to
mechanisms to counter organized crime developments and specifically
narco-terrorism. I only have a few more minutes before I want to turn
the mike over, and my task was basically to focus on the rule of law
under attack. So I've focused on that rather than too much on
solutions.
One solution, which I think is very important and which really
hasn't been dealt with, and I think is especially useful for a group like
this dealing with national security and the law, is that international
organization theory can be used much more adeptly with public inter-
national law and international criminal law. Right now the law en-
forcement fight against organized criminals that are engaged in inter-
national narcotics crimes and narco-terrorism has really been confined
for the most part to the nation-state, using the classical definition of the
state centric paradigm in which only the nation-state is a chief actor in
international relations.
The world community needs to go beyond that and to foster and
enhance relationships between the nation state and international gov-
ernmental organizations, on the one hand, such as the United Nations
and Interpol and especially intergovernmental regional organizations
such as the European Community, the Council of Europe, and CICAD.
The academic and governmental communities must explore and im-
prove these relationships, so that nation states have more means to
combat organized criminals. In this regard, there is a need then to de-
velop an international criminal cooperation regime, and to also look at
developing subregimes such as the subregime of regulating illicit money
movement. This involves utilizing several areas of the law and also sev-
eral components of law enforcement both in our country and other
countries tend to be compartmentalized and which require better
integration.
With respect to other mechanisms, in my formal paper I have out-
lined about thirty different specific mechanisms, but in closing, let me
focus mainly on the need to develop more direct enforcement mecha-
nisms for international criminal cooperation. In this regard, recently
there have been developments towards creating an international crimi-
nal court which would have jurisdiction over some of these illicit nar-
cotics crimes. Although that is a long way away from happening uni-
versally, there is a much better chance that it will be implemented
either regionally, especially in the Americas, or subregionally within,
for instance, the Commonwealth Caribbean.
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There is also a need for an international police constabulary force,
and again, it won't happen internationally. It will first happen on a
regional or subregional basis. I also think, and I wrote in 1986 a paper,
which I had presented first to the Inter-American Juridical Committee,
suggesting that there really needs to be a Council of the Americas'
Crime Problems at an attorney general level which would meet daily to
focus not just on problems of illicit narcotics or problems of terrorism
or problems of arms trafficking, because all these criminal problems, as
several speakers have said, are integrated.
This organization already has a model. It is the Council of Europe
Committee on Crime Problems which has been functioning since the
'50s and which has just in the last two months prepared and adopted
through its committee of experts a new convention on laundering and
searching, seizure and forfeiture of assets. And this organization, I
think, has much for the Americas to emulate. And by doing that, gov-
ernments will find solutions to these problems on a multilateral level
and only if there is a solution on a multilateral level will this problem
be solved.
In conclusion, let me just say that in the post-Cold War era, where
the powers of major countries are becoming increasingly diffuse, the
success of U.S. diplomacy, in particular its narcotics policy, will in-
creasingly be determined not by force, but rather by adept ability to
persuade other countries to innovatively design and implement new le-
gal mechanisms. And with that, I thank you.
(Applause.)
MR. FRIEDMAN: The third and final presentation on this panel
will be made by Rafael F. Perl. He is a specialist in international nar-
cotics policy with the Congressional Research Service, which is, as you
know, an arm of the United States Congress. He received a doctor of
jurisprudence from Georgetown Law School. He's an author, an editor
of numerous publications relating to international narcotics, control,
and let me name just a few of them, to give you a sense of the richness
of his interest.
He has published the Andean Drug Strategy and the Role of the
U.S. Military. Another publication is Congress and International Nar-
cotics Control. He has also published Narcotics Interdiction and the
Use of the Military: Issues for Congressional Deliberation, and also
Combatting International Drug Cartels: Issues for U.S. Policy. He has
a very wide background in the area of development and policy, and
we're very anxious to hear the remarks of Dr. Perl.
DR. PERL: Thank you very much. The title of today's panel is
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"The rule of Law as a Target." And in my remarks I will focus on or
highlight briefly six ways in which drug trafficking organizations and
groups target the rule of law and impede its implementation, and then
I will briefly add some personal comments and observations of my own
on related issues. Drug trafficking organizations threaten the rule of
law by the very multinational nature of their criminal operations.
Bruce talked of the need for a multilateral or multinational solution or
regime, and a multinationalization of criminal enterprises engaged in
the drug trade and the methods that such groups emiploy. Methods
outside of the law pose a major threat to the rule of law.
Never before in history have criminal groups or insurgent groups
had access to such funding, such easily available funding on such a
massive scale. Irv Tragen spoke of the drug trade generating some-
where in the neighborhood of income equal to that of the arms trade.
Rachel Ehrenfeld spoke about income equal to that of the oil trade,
and figures we've heard range between $100 and $500 billion a year.
These staggering amounts of money in the international marketplace
can buy the best in communications equipment, can buy the best in
weaponry, can buy the best in transportation equipment, as well as the
best intelligence information, political power and other support.
As Irv Tragen said, power comes from drug money. And where
silver does not produce the desired results, lead and terror are routine.
Take Colombia for an example. Drug trafficking organizations and
groups do not respect international boundaries or borders. They do not
respect the law. In contrast, democratic governments and their policy-
makers and particularly those who implement their policies are pledged
exactly to do that, to respect the rule of law. And the drug trade, by its
international character, poses major policy dilemmas for national
policymakers intent on respecting the rule of law. Traffickers can with
impunity fly across national borders. They can transfe:r money across
national borders.
However, those who pursue them often have to follow cumbersome
procedures. They have to stop at customs. They have to check in. They
have to make arrangements. The law is often its worst enemy when
offenses, procedures and remedies differ from country to country. And
efforts at harmonization of laws and efforts to create cooperative mech-
anisms to combat drug trafficking, while often effective, nevertheless
require the means to implement such measures.
Remember Rachel Ehrenfeld spoke about the need for training, to
train people in the field. People must be trained, and funding has to be
made available for hiring the personnel as well as training them. And
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we have to keep in mind that law alone is not always an effective solu-
tion. The rule of law is stronger in some countries and weaker in
others. Policymakers recognize that whereas the rule of law may not
always prompt a foreign nation to enforce its laws, diplomatic or other
pressure may. Drug trafficking organizations also target the rule of law
by developing an economic and political base in the regions in which
they operate. They generate income-what was the figure-$240 mil-
lion for Peru in 1988 for Peruvian growers, and they buy political sup-
port. Just look at the power of the farm lobby in the United States.
Well, the farmers in Peru have political clout, too. The traffickers
also will support and fund high visibility public works projects. And
they often find powerful allies and industries which seek to avoid exces-
sive regulation: the arms industry, the chemical industry and the bank-
ing industry, just to name a few. Drug trafficking organizations also
target the rule of law by violence, intimidation and terror. And differ-
ing legal systems and political systems and economic systems have dif-
fering abilities to withstand sustained violence, intimidation and terror.
Such organizations and groups target the rule of law by seeking to ex-
ploit differing perceptions of the priorities nations -should assign to com-
batting drug production, trafficking and use.
For some countries, and perhaps rightly so, the drug issue is a rel-
atively unimportant one when compared to overall national problems of
debt, unemployment and insurgency. And many also suggest that drug
trafficking organizations target the rule of law by seeking to exploit
differences of opinion over what type of drug related activities should
be subject to criminal sanctions. Remember Gabriela spoke about
traditional coca production and use in the Andes. And also by exploit-
ing differences of opinion as to whether or not any criminal sanctions at
all are appropriate, Bill Ratliff suggested examining the option at least
as to whether or not marijuana should be legalized. In many countries,
including the United States, such perceptions are often deeply rooted in
moral values and intense feelings of nationalism.
And finally, drug trafficking organizations may target the rule of
law by destroying the power of the state to control territory within its
jurisdiction-the creation of a state within a state like the Upper Hual-
laga Valley-in some instances by destroying the state itself.
Now, before closing, I'd like to add a number of personal observa-
tions. The United Nations Anti-Trafficking Convention which comes
into force and effect next month offers a vehicle to help individual
states confront the international drug trade by internationalizing the
means to fight it, and basically by providing a framework for interna-
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tional cooperation. But there are a number of policies, general policy
issues here, that still need to be resolved, and in my opinion the central
policy issue or question underlying the success of the convention is to
what degree will the major drug producing and transit and consuming
nations be willing to diminish contacts and approaches on the bilateral
level and substitute multilateral ones instead.
Now let's look at which countries have ratified the convention to
date. There are some twenty or twenty-one such countries. Ratification
by countries such as Uganda, India and Togo is, of course, very impor-
tant. And important producing and transit countries such as Bolivia,
Ecuador, Chile and Mexico have ratified as well. But aside from the
United States, no major drug consuming nation has ratified the conven-
tion to date. Much more important than some of these other countries
would be ratification by consuming nations such as the United King-
dom, Germany, France, and the Soviet Union, just to mention a few.
And if this list of twenty or so countries, which have ratified or ex-
ceeded the convention to date, is any indication of enthusiasm to coop-
erate or levels of cooperation in the future, it would seem that prospects
for an enhanced international effort to tackle the drug trade may not
hold much promise.
In closing, I'd like to raise and address the issue of technology. In
wars, very frequently, technology provides the leading and the winning
edge. And one of the panels that we'll have tomorrow will be looking at
what types of regimes and what types of solutions can we be looking
towards in the future. I think it's very important to keel technology in
mind as we examine these issues. As one begins to do more research
into the causes of drug addiction, and what mAkes drugs addictive, one
begins to acquire more information on how to make more addictive
drugs. And I'm speaking about synthetic drugs, and I'm talking about
the possibility-let me just throw out two scenarios, and they're not
that farfetched- -a synthetic drug, which is not necessarily very harm-
ful to the health, which is unbelievably addictive, that everybody can
manufacture. Our kids can manufacture it in the garage. What will
this do to the whole order of the cartels and insurgent groups that gen-
erate their income or some of their income from this type of activity?
Or the other scenario. An equally addictive drug that I absolutely
have to have if someone slips it to me by design, where the formula is a
closely held secret, perhaps by a Pablo Escobar or a Muammar
Qadhafi or a Fidel Castro or an Abu Abbas or a Yasir Arafat. And
although these ideas and concepts are a little bit down the road, I be-
lieve that we will see this developing, more and more use of synthetics
[Vol. 15
362
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Proceedings
and more and more use of very powerfully addictive drugs. And with
that I'd like to end my comments.
(Applause.)
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you for all those presentations, and
we're almost on schedule. We'll have about twenty minutes for a ques-
tion and answer session, and I would ask those of you who have ques-
tions of our panelists to do two things. One, address the panel by using
the microphone, which is located in the center of the room, and if you
feel compelled to make an observation, make sure it's limited to an
observation rather than a speech, and please define your questions. Sir.
MR. BOYLAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm Robert Boylan.
I'm with the Department of Justice, and I have something that's going
to turn into more than a question. It is an observation directed to Bruce
Zagaris who has suggested that part of the attack on the international
legal system might be coming from potential law enforcement commu-
nity, and he referred specifically to the ruling out in California in the
Machain case. I wanted to, first of all, observe that the extradition
treaty with Mexico that was at issue here has, to my knowledge, not
resulted ever in the surrender of a Mexican citizen to the United States
for the purpose of prosecution here. At least, it has not in recent years.
I would also observe that the conduct that is complained of in that
case, namely the alleged kidnapping, appears to be entirely consistent
with United States law, as announced by the Supreme Court in the
Ker-Frisbee line of cases, and if you take it by analogy, to the cases
that authorize the Bank of Nova Scotia's subpoenas, and also to the
cases that authorized discovery pursuant to our Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as opposed to limiting discovery in international cases to
being taken in accordance with the Hague Evidence Convention.
So that is, as I said, a comment, but it's a comment which is in-
tended to focus on the commitment of the Department of Justice to
acting in the international spirit in accordance with the rule of interna-
tional law as we understand it. His solution for this alleged attack on
the international legal system is the development of new and different
kinds of mechanisms that would involve a multilateral approach, and I
would caution that the International Law Commission has been study-
ing for almost forty years the international criminal court that Mr.
Zagaris referred to, and while we're talking, the criminals out there are
doing stuff. We need to keep in mind that action needs to be taken,
action consistent with law and consistent with the rule of international
law, but we can't allow ourselves to be confused by the suggestion that
multilateralism provides a solution to these very real problems.
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MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you for your observation. I don't know
for purposes of conserving time whether a response is required, but if
any of the panelists have a short response, please feel free to do so.
MR. ZAGARIS: Yes, I have a brief response. With respect to the
fact that the extradition treaty has not successfully worked, that is cor-
rect. However, I think that before the United States or any other gov-
ernment resorts to extra-legal measures, they should at least exhaust all
alternatives. In that case, there was no attempt by the United States to
make a- reqhest for extradition, whereas the Mexican government in
seeking the persons responsible for the kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez
Machain has at least made an extradition request to which there has
been not even an acknowledgement by the United States.
Although multilateral measures are important-an example is that
although, as Rafael said, certain European governments have not
signed the U.N. Drug Convention or have not ratified it--the European
Community is a signatory and already the Council of Europe, which
includes sixteen countries, has adopted a convention on money launder-
ing and asset forfeiture to further implement the U.N. Drug Conven-
tion, another example of the potential and the immediate example of
action by international organizations. I also think that despite this
problem between Mexico and the United States, there have been at-
tempts by the United States government that have been successful bi-
laterally with Mexico.
An example would be the February '89 bilateral narcotics agree-
ment. Another example is the conclusion of a mutual legal assistance
convention and so while I think multilateral solutions are important,
it's also important to pursue bilateral ones.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. Sir, would you identify yourself
and your association, if you could.
MR. EMERSON: I'm Terry Emerson, formerly counsel to Sena-
tor Barry Goldwater, and my question is addressed to Mr. Perl. Narco-
terrorism is an area where the lines between what is foreign and what
is domestic policy blurs. So it seems the Congress as well as the Presi-
dent has an important role to play in shaping answers to this problem. I
wonder if you have any thoughts to share with us on how the two politi-
cal branches might cooperate with each other in developing American
initiatives to tackle the problem?
DR. PERL: First of all, I have to make clear these are my own
personal thoughts, and I'm not talking on behalf of the organization
that I work for. But just shooting from the hip, and I don't like to do
that, but I will do that, I think it would be important to create some-
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thing comparable to the Helsinki Commission by statute where you had
members of Congress from key committees and members from the ex-
ecutive branch from key agencies to work together on a policy planning
board to set national drug policy.
I think that would improve communication and unity of policy. I
think it's important. Drugs are an extremely fragmented issue, an in-
terdisciplinary issue. There are health aspects, national security as-
pects, agricultural aspects, all sorts of aspects, trade aspects, to the
drug problem. And it gets fragmented. Policy gets fragmented in the
Congress, and policy gets fragmented in the executive branch. Congress
created in the executive branch an Office of National Drug Control
Policy, not a real czar, but kind of a mini-czar, or some people say a
"czar-deen."
(Laughter.)
DR. PERL: But if Congress, and I don't think this is realistic, but
if Congress were to create a similar joint committee on drug policy,
something comparable to the Joint Economic Atomic Energy Commis-
sion in the '50s, this would produce more centralization to policy. But I
do not see this happening, so I think more coordination and communi-
cation, and I think some sort of a committee, where you have got key
people in power positions on the Hill, drug power policy positions on
the Hill, together with key people in drug power policy positions in the
executive branch.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Sir, next question.
MR. HALL: My name is Chuck Hall. I'm with the Washington
Office on Latin America, a non-profit public education and research
organization. My question is for Ms. Tarazona-Sevillano, and it re-
gards Peru. You stated that the Peruvian government has refused to
combat narco-terrorism as a whole, preferring to separate issues of
anti-narcotics from those of counter-insurgency. I'm not an expert on
Peru, but it seems to me that there is some sense in separating these
two. For example, you mentioned the alliance between Sendero Lumi-
noso and drug traffickers. There is also some aspect, as I understand it,
of conffict between these two in two areas. One is that Sendero has
aggravated the drug traffickers by imposing higher payment for coca
farmers.
Another is that they have also imposed taxes on trafficking, which
cuts into the profits of drug traffickers. And it seems that General Ar-
senaga [sic], who is the most well-known of the advocates of putting
counterinsurgency before anti-narcotics effort, pointed out that anti-
narcotics efforts really feed into Sendero's base of support by growing
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coca farms over there. So would you talk about this and what implica-
tions this aspect of conflict has for U.S. anti-narcotics policy, and par-
ticularly the legal issues involved?
DR. TARAZONA-SEVILLANO: All right. Yes, that is true. The
acknowledgment by the Peruvian government of the issue has been a
separate matter. And I think this is very counterproductive. For one
side, we have the military that was placed in the area just for control-
ling terrorism. And that was the stand of General Arsiniega. He was
one of the last military chiefs in the area that tried to address the issue
of narcotics and terrorism as completely separate entities. And in a way
he wanted to win the support of the farmers for the military, and not
do a thing with narcotics trafficking. That, the narcotics trafficking,
since it was the problem of law enforcement, had to be dealt with by
the police. So what General Arsenaga did is tried to gain this base of
support, and he was widely criticized for that.
Right after his commitment to fight this insurgency, but only the
insurgency as a separate manner, you know, he had tremendous
problems. The U.S. was one of the major critics of General Arsiniega,
and he was even said to be involved in drug trafficking himself, because
there was no tangible help from his part to the U.S. efforts in the Up-
per Huallaga. When I refer to the interservice rivalries between the
military and the law enforcement or police, actually there are areas of
the Upper Huallaga that are just in the control of the military. The
police cannot enter those areas. And it's said that the military also pro-
tects the activity of the local traffickers.
Now, when the police want to enter to a particular region that is
controlled by the military, there are confrontations. So no single area is
placed into the hands of the two forces at the same time; you know if
one has priority over the other in one given area. So that is why I said
there are two separate entities-that even though they work in con-
junction against the state, the state doesn't work together against them.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Next question.
MR. PRADO: I am Antonio Prado, Chief of the Legal Depart-
ment of the Embassy of Mexico, Sir. I'd like to make a brief comment
on what Bruce said about the probability, if the Ninth Circuit will not
return Alvarez Machain to Mexico, that Mexico would resort to kid-
napping of American officials, the way it happened in the Jaffe case
when Canada attempted to do something like that. No, we will not. We
believe that we should not resort to .illegal acts to further the rule of
law. We prefer to take whatever redress to our national sovereignty,
but we will not resort to illegal acts. This doesn't mean that we will not
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make our best efforts toenforce the rule of law.
If you have seen the papers lately, the Mexican Air Force has
been shooting down the Colombian planes that get into Mexican air-
space without asking for permission. We have been very clear toward
our South American friends that we do not want private planes in
Mexico that do not have a flight plan, and if they fly into Mexico re-
gardless of what their motives might be, and then won't abide by the
signals of the Air Force, they will be shot down. And two months ago,
we shot down two.
Now, referring to the comment that Mexico will never surrender a
Mexican national, the treaty says that our President is empowered to
surrender Mexican nationals. But in the case of Alvarez Machain, the
crime took place in Mexico. Mexico was the jurisdiction where Alvarez
Machain committed his crimes. Camarena was no diplomatic officer.
He had no diplomatic immunity. Why should we surrender one of our
criminals to a foreign jurisdiction? But the U.S. has lately resorted to
the same idea. We have requested the surrender of Michael Joseph
Carter from the U.S., an American who committed a crime in Mexico
as a result of drug trafficking, and the U.S. said "no, because according
to our discretionary power, we do not surrender 'Americans, but we
prosecute them here." And this is the case.
The U.S. prosecuted Carter here, and we in Mexico are very. satis-
fied because at least now we are operating in relatively the same way.
We don't get it. You don't get it. But we prosecute. You prosecute.
Now we have requested of the Department of State that they give Al-
varez Machain back, not to party with senoritas--
(Laughter.)
MR. PRADO:-because under Mexican drug trafficking laws,
there is no bail for traffickers, no bail for accessories before or after the
fact, no parole, and absolutely no chance of civil rehabilitation after
they get out. So that's what we want Machain for. And regarding the
Ker-Frisbee case, I'd just like to say that I'm also a member of this
bar, and I know a little of my American law, too. I went to Columbia
Law School. So the Ker-Frisbee doctrine says that whoever came to the
court wrongly seized but has been indicted or arraigned will remain in
the court. But Ker is an 1890 case. Kerr versus-the man was ab-
ducted, he was not a Peruvian citizen. He was an American citizen
living in Peru who claimed that he had the right to remain in Peru
because he had received a permanent residence from the Peruvian
government.
The case, the one in which the Frisbee doctrine is spelled out, is a
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domestic case. It has absolutely nothing to do with an international
situation. In none of those instances have the governments requested
that the culprit be surrendered to them. But there is no fear that we
will start kidnapping Americans. We resort to the rule of law, and after
all of this, I'm saying that we don't want Alvarez Machain for too
much. We are not requesting amicus curiae because we will need leave
of the court, and we support that a sovereign should not be asking any
other court to say what it wants. In contra-distinction, in my country
any officer of the American government is allowed to go to the Mexi-
can courts to file amicus curiae with the permission of no one. I just
hope this has clarified some of the issues.
(Applause.)
MR. FRIEDMAN: Your presence here is very important to us,
and your observations clarifying the issues are also very important. We
have a response.
DR. PERL: I just wanted to say, not necessarily speaking for my-
self, but many Americans feel very strongly that this whole issue could
have been avoided in the first place. One of the things that countries do
is avoid incidents between countries, and had the Mexican authorities
arrested this man in Mexico and investigated the case a little bit
stronger to begin with, it might have been avoided.
MR. FRIEDMAN: We have time for one more question. If not,
we will adjourn, and let me give you the logistics, I think we are
booked 101 percent for lunch, and I hope that all of you have your
luncheon tickets available. You can have about four or five minutes. I
think the luncheon tables are set and please take your seats. There are
no reserved tables. Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the meeting recessed, 1:o reconvene at
1:35 p.m. for the luncheon session.)
II. STRENGTHENING THE REGIME OF EXTRADITION
MR. LEIGH: Ladies and gentlemen, could I ask you to take your
seats so that we may begin the [next] panel of the day'? I realize that
even if we start in the next few minutes, we will have only approxi-
mately an hour for this subject. We have an agreement among the pan-
elists that we would like to leave as much time as possible for questions
and answers and so the speakers have agreed that we would probably
be best advised to keep each participant's remarks to about ten, not
more than fifteen minutes, and hope that we can save enough time for
a lively question and answer period.
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My name is Monroe Leigh. I've been asked to chair the panel on
Strengthening the Regime of Extradition. We have four speakers, and I
think you'll find that each of them has something very special to bring
to this subject matter. Our first speaker is Mark Richard, Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division. Mark is an old col-
league and friend of mine. We were involved in working out the details
for the first prisoner exchange agreement, the one between the United
States and Mexico.
He has had nearly every position of importance in the Justice De-
partment in connection with the Criminal Division, and it's a particular
pleasure to welcome him to this program. I think you will find that he
has a perspective and an experience in this field which is quite unique.
I give the microphone to Mark.
[This is a report on Mr. Richard's comments:
Mark Richard is responsible for processing the over 1400 U.S. ex-
tradition requests abroad, and the 450 foreign requests pending in U.S.
courts. He described various barriers to this expanding area of interna-
tional interdependence. Many treaties are obsolete, and fail to embrace
our most effective narcotics enforcement laws, such as RICO. The Eu-
ropean Court may be an obstacle in the future, taking jurisdiction even
after European countries have authorized extradition to the U.S. In
South America, if extradition is not allowed because of a "nationality
principle," fugitives may never be brought to justice, because those
countries cannot effectively apprehend and prosecute. That is less of a
problem with our European allies. The "political offense exception" has
been a significant impediment to extradition in certain cases, related to
the scope of habeas review. Finally, he expressed uncertainty about
how to handle cases in which the fugitive has already received a grant
of political asylum prior to the extradition request. All these factors are
impediments to mounting an efficient and effective program.]
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Mark, for that insightful
presentation indicating what the future difficulties are going to be. We
are very grateful for your presentation. Our next speaker, ladies and
gentlemen, is John Murphy. John is a professor of law at Villanova
University Law School. He received his law degree from Cornell Uni-
versity. He has also served with great distinction on the faculty of the
'law school at the University of Kansas. I should also mention that he
has held the Charles Stockton chair of International Law at the Naval
War College in Newport.
Among his publications, there are many which are relevant to to-
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day's discussion. He is the author of State Support cf International
Terrorism: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions, published in
1989. Another work, Punishing International Terrorists: The Legal
Framework for Policy Initiatives, published in 1985; United Nations
and the Control of International Violence in 1982; Legal Aspects of
International Terrorism: Summary Report of an International Confer-
ence, in 1980. I could give others. At the present time, Professor Mur-
phy is chairman of the ABA Committee on International Institutions
Law and the ABA's Alternate Observer at the United States Mission
to the United Nations. He is also a member of the U.S.-Soviet Task
Force to Prevent Terrorism, and serves on the board of editors of Ter-
rorism: An International Journal. It gives me great pleasure to offer the
microphone to Professor Murphy.
DR. MURPHY: Thank you very much, Monroe. Just one small
correction on your very generous introduction. I'm the past chairman of
the Committee on International Institutions Law of the American Bar
Association. We've just had a changing of the guard.
In the brief time that is given to us this afternoon, I'd like to set
the question of Strengthening the Regime of Extradition Against
Drugs and Narco-Terrorism in a slightly broader context than Mr.
Richard has. I'd like to set it in the context of the general question of
how we ensure that those who have been accused of engaging in terror-
ism or narco-terrorism or trafficking of drugs are brought before a fo-
rum where the due process rights of the accused will be protected.
That, indeed, is the primary goal of extradition. It's a method for
ensuring that the individual who has been accused of the crime is
brought to justice. I think it's important to note also that extradition is
only one of the methods of bringing an individual before a forum that
may exercise criminal jurisdiction over him.
And indeed, it is not the primary method. In addition to extradi-
tion, and in part because of the barriers to extradition as a methodol-
ogy, two other methods are often employed, one being deportation
where the individual is simply sent back to a country which would like
to exercise jurisdiction over him, and the other is kidnapping or the
seizure of the individual abroad. I think it's worth just a moment to
distinguish among these three different methods.
There are a couple of major distinctions. Extradition, of course, is
the only method that is truly bilateral or for that matter in some in-
stances multilateral. It is also the methodology that in most instances,
although not all, provides the greatest protection for the rights of an
accused necessarily involves the greatest amount of international
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cooperation.
By contrast, deportation is basically a unilateral method of ensur-
ing the return of an individual to a country that may be seeking him,
and of course, by definition, the seizure of an accused abroad is unilat-
eral, at least in the situation where there is no cooperation on the part
of the country where the individual is sought. Extradition has not been
utilized as much as the other methods because it does not serve as an
efficient method of ensuring the individual is going to be brought to
prosecution.
However, I would suggest that there is another goal to be served
here besides that of efficiency, and that is ensuring the due process
rights of the accused. And in most instances, as I mentioned, extradi-
tion is a method that is designed to ensure that the accused gets a fair
day in court.
Now let me turn to some of the problems of extradition. These
have been identified to some extent by Mr. Richard, but I'd like to add
one or two and maybe put a different spin on a couple that Mr. Rich-
ard mentioned. One barrier to extradition that was not mentioned is
that in the case of the United States there is a need for a bilateral
extradition treaty for the United States to send back an individual to a
country that is requesting his presence.
It is, at least in theory, possible, and perhaps even as a matter of
law possible, that the United States could use some of these multilat-
eral conventions in the antiterrorist area, hostage taking, attacks on
diplomats, and most recently the U.N. Drug Convention as an extradi-
tion treaty. However, U.S. law has been interpreted as not permitting
this. One of the problems with U.S. extradition law is that it's sadly out
of date. There was an attempt to amend extradition law that would
have allowed the use of these multilateral treaties as a basis for extra-
dition. Unfortunately, the law was not amended, not because of that
issue, but rather because of another problem we'll talk about in a sec-
ond, the political offense exception.
Another barrier to extradition is that there are a variety of de-
fenses, some of them quite technical, under the average extradition
treaty. Some are non-spectacular defenses. They don't get much atten-
tion: the need to establish probable cause; the need for double criminal-
ity; the need for specialty, i.e., that the individual be tried for the crime
for which the country is requesting his presence. The nationality bar-
rier that Mr. Richard has mentioned is another one, especially with
Latin American countries.
The political offense exception, I would suggest, while a major
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barrier in the terrorism area, is normally not going to be a barrier to
extradition in drug trafficking cases because, absent some extraordinary
circumstances, drug trafficking is a private act by private individuals.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the recent U.N. Convention expressly,
unlike other multilateral conventions, say in the terrorism area, rules
out the political offense exception as a defense.
So as the U.N. Convention gains more and more parties, the polit-
ical offense exception presumably will become less of a problem. An-
other barrier that is particularly relevant narco-terrorism is the situa-
tion that we see in Colombia and some other countries. That is, the use
of terrorist attack tactics against the law enforcement officers, the
courts and so forth, in an effort to prevent extradition. Colombia has
been the most spectacular example.
Now let me, in the brief time left, turn to some possible resolutions
of these problems. One resolution is to amend ,the United States extra-
dition law. It would be helpful from the point of view of efficiency to
amend the extradition law, especially with regard to this question of
what constitutes an extradition treaty. Moreover, the law badly needs
to be streamlined.
Second, with respect to the problem that a requested country may
not extradite its nationals, it seems to me there are two possible resolu-
tions. One is a change in the legal position of the potential requested
country, and this has happened to some extent. Another is the ap-
proach taken in the U.S.-Netherlands extradition treaty, which pro-
vides that a national may be extradited on the understanding that the
requesting country, if the individual is convicted, will send that individ-
ual back to the requested country in order to serve the prison term.
With respect to the political offense exception, there are a couple
of approaches. One, of course, is to eliminate drug trafficking as a pos-
sible political offense, as was done in the U.N. Convention, which was
done with respect to terrorism in a regional convention, the European
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, and more generally has been
done in U.S. bilateral treaties which eliminate as a political offense any
crime covered by multilateral criminal law conventions.
A second way to do it that is much more controversial is illus-
trated by the sharp debate over the U.S.-U.K. supplementary extradi-
tion treaty, where the political offense exception was simply eliminated,
not with respect to the specific so-called terrorist crimes, but more gen-
erally as to crimes of violence. The final outcome on the debate was the
insertion of a provision in that agreement which, in effect, changes the
rule of non-inquiry. The rule of non-inquiry is that a court will not look
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into the issue of whether a country is seeking a person for purposes of
persecution based on political opinion or race or nationality or religion.
This is a decision normally to be made by the executive branch.
The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty gives that func-
tion to a court. It was the price to be paid for substantial elimination of
the political offense exception. Moreover, the Ahmad case was men-
tioned in connection with the political offense exception. It's worth not-
ing that Judge Weinstein in the Ahmad case, while deciding that an
attack on an Israeli bus with civilians was not a political offense, also
decided not to apply the rule of non-inquiry and looked into two issues:
was Israel seeking to get this individual because of his nationality or
political opinion; and could he get a fair trial? Judge Weinstein found
that the answer to those questions was no, it was not seeking him for
purposes of persecution; and yes, he could get a fair trial.
There was an appeal by the accused. The Second Circuit upheld
the lower court's decision, and by way of dictum questioned Judge
Weinstein's waiver of the rule of non-inquiry. Judge Weinstein's deci-
sion and the appeal court opinion are well worth reading. Finally, I
want briefly to address the issue of an international criminal court. I
am not as negative on that prospect as Mr. Mueller is.
I'll just make a couple of quick points. First, those who are sup-
porting the idea of an international criminal court, at least at this junc-
ture, are talking about a very limited jurisdiction, just relating to drug
trafficking, not relating to terrorism. Terrorism is a different game.
Terrorism is too political and too controversial. Second, as far as the
U.S. perspective is concerned, the court would in all probability be sim-
ply an alternative forum. So if a country in the Caribbean decided that
it couldn't try an accused because of political or legal difficulties, and it
could not extradite him to a country such as the United States, it
would have available an alternative forum, namely, an international
criminal court. The issue is complex. I myself have been highly skepti-
cal of an international criminal court in the past. But I think that this
idea is one that deserves more thought, and I would hope not an a
priori rejection, until we've examined all the possibilities. Thank you
very much.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, John. We are moving along
now. We have had one governmental point of view. We've had now an
academic point of view. We next turn to a practitioner point of view.
Our next speaker is Joe diGenova, who has had a varied experience and
only recently has begun to concentrate in the private practice field. He
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is a graduate of the University of Cincinnati and of the Georgetown
Law School. He's held numerous important posts with the Congress of
the United States, and more recently he was for four years, a very
important four years, the U.S. District Attorney for the District of Co-
lumbia. Joe is a very much sought after person by the talk shows. You
can hardly name one that he has not appeared upon.
Joe, as I give you the microphone, I assure you that although we
cannot guarantee you the same audience that you would get on the
MacNeil-Lehrer Program, you nevertheless are very welcome.
MR. diGENOVA: Monroe, thank you very much. I'm delighted to
be here today, and particularly with this distinguishel panel, and I
wish to begin by expressing my respect and admiration for Luz Nagle,
who is here from Medellin, Colombia as a judicial officer with grave
responsibilities and who represents in the finest tradition the strength of
the rule of law in the area which we are seeking to address here today.
It's a privilege to share a podium with someone like her.
I will be very brief because I think the question and answer period
promises to be much more interesting than anything I might say.
Strengthening the Regime of Extradition. I don't think there is any-
thing more important that could be done in this area than the follow-
ing, and it is something which has been repeated by many people, and
it bears repeating again, and that is that extradition will only work if
countries never modify their behavior with regard to extradition based
on violence or the threats of violence.
There is nothing more fundamental to the regime of extradition
than never, and I underscore never, giving in to the threats of any or-
ganization, be they narco-terrorists or political terrorists, either within
your country against your citizens or threats against your citizens in
other countries, if people are going to be extradited by your country.
We have many examples of countries who have provided safe haven in
the false belief that by negotiating faustian bargains with either politi-
cal terrorists or narco-terrorists, they would secure for themselves some
form of political, legal, criminal and terrorist immunity.
It simply does not work, and the reason it doesn't work is when
you negotiate with terrorists or narco-terrorists or political terrorists,
they don't have to obey any rules ever at any time. And any deal you
cut with them is by definition a non-deal because it takes two parties of
equal strength to negotiate a bargain, any time you negotiate a deal
with a terrorist, narco, or otherwise, there is, in fact, no deal.
We know from our own experience in this country that such nego-
tiations not only serve no useful purpose, but they tend to discredit poli-
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cies which are important in encouraging the rest of the civilized world
to modify their behavior and to emulate ours. Our own recent experi-
ence in the Iran-Contra affair, I think, obviously underscores vividly
the danger of breaching the rule that you do not do the things that we
have long said you do not do.
Another point I would like to underscore is that strengthening the
law of extradition by virtue of better case law, which is beginning to
come our way with regard to interpretations of the political offense ex-
ception and other rules such as going behind or looking behind the rea-
sons and the likely outcome of proceedings in the requesting country,
are extreme developments. And it is important in those instances where
treaties are excluding the political offense exception to try and have
that repeated as much as possible. We must continue, the United
States must, and indeed has, thanks to the leadership of people like
Mark Richard and others in the State Department, to renegotiate trea-
ties, to modify treaties, to modernize treaties to include the offenses,
some of the offenses which have been alluded to.
I think, however, we must be realistic and understand that many,
many countries simply will not accept the expanded view of the crimi-
nal law which the United States has written into its statute books over
the last few years, and indeed, in order to be successful they need not
do so. It is quite fine with me if countries choose to use rudimentary
crimes as the basis upon which to extradite either their nationals or
somebody else's nationals to our country. Whether or not they choose
to enact copycat continuing criminal enterprise statutes, or the unman-
ageable, unannulable, unreviewable RICO statute, is a matter which I
would prefer to have left out of an already quagmired area of the law,
and I don't believe that we are going to be very successful in convincing
civilized countries that RICO is something that they should adopt.
Indeed, many of them look at it and wonder in amazement how we
ever could have structured something that is so complex that at least
four members of the Supreme Court have already said they don't un-
derstand it. We may not have RICO to worry about after the next
session anyway because there appears to be enough votes to question its
validity in some areas, at least. But that's not really the point. The
point is that we can modernize our treaty relations with a number of
countries, and this is vital, to add narcotics offenses and other types of
violent crimes, and other types of crimes involving financial matters
such as money laundering. I would prefer to spend much more time
worrying about money laundering additions to treaties than the more
complex issues of RICO and CCE.
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Those, I think, certainly would prove to be extremely helpful in
extradition matters. I will not say anything about the area of non-ex-
tradition seizures because that's the next panel. But I just want to al-
lude to it in the sense that it is important that we do, in fact, proceed to
strengthen the regime of extradition by all of the things which have
been mentioned by the panelists today because by doing so, we obviate
the necessity for countries who do abide by the rule of law to have to
resort to tactics which might not be acceptable to a lot of people under
very difficult circumstances, particularly when a country cannot provide
civil rule within its own borders and do all the things that we expect
from a neighbor in a civilized world.
That will be dealt with next, however. I do want to underscore,
however, once again that I don't think there is anything more impor-
tant, and I know it's repetitive, but I'm going to say it again, that there
is nothing more important in this exercise than a country never modify-
ing its behavior based on violence or threats of violence. From my own
experience in the area of extradition, which includes not only narco-
terrorism cases as a proponent for the United States, but financial
crimes in Western Europe, terrorism crimes in Western Europe and
narcotics offenses in Colombia, in my office in 1983, we brought back
the first Colombian ever to be extradited under the new treaties which
had been ably negotiated by the two governments.
It was not an easy task, and it took a great deal of courage on the
part of the Colombians, and I applaud them again fo: the risk that
they have taken because of the rapacious appetite of the American
public for illegal drugs. And while I have repeatedly criticized the Co-
lombian government for having taken too long to realize that it's own
faustian bargain with the major traffickers had led to the problems that
we were facing and they were facing, there is just no question that the
major responsibility for this problem lies with the people of the United
States who have created this problem as a result of their incredible
demand for illegal drugs.
And may I express my apology today to the representative of the
people of Colombia who is here for the conduct of our current mayor of
the nation's capital who singlehandedly has done more to damage the
relationships between our two countries, as a result of his conduct if not
his trial, than perhaps any single person in the United States. We in
America owe the people of Colombia a sincere and deep apology for
the level of our self-indulgence, and an apology on a grand scale for the
conduct of an elected official of this city.
Once again, we should never ever modify our conduct with regard
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to extradition based on the threats or actual carrying out of violence of
terrorists and we must do more to modify current law with regard to
extradition and make it streamlined, modern and accessible so that we
can stop the misuse of the extradition process as I believe it has been
misused in many, many cases, all of which are well-known to you, so
that extradition remains a viable tool to prevent countries from seeking
the options that none of us like.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Joe, for those very trenchant
observations. Our next speaker brings a perspective which we are prob-
ably more in need of receiving than any other person could bring. She
comes from Colombia. Luz Estella Nagle has come to us, however,
most recently from the University of California Law School where she
is a student and a candidate for an LL.M. degree. But before that, she
had a very distinguished career in her native Colombia.
She is a doctor of law in political science from the Universidad
Bolivariana in Medellin, Colombia. In addition, she has served on the
faculty of law at that institution. She also has been a district judge in
the ministry of justice of the Republic of Colombia. She presided over
the investigation and expedition of civil and criminal cases. She arbi-
trated and mediated labor conflicts in the capacity of an amiable com-
positor. She also supervised law enforcement throughout the jurisdic-
tion. She served on the bench of Colombia from 1983 to 1986. She has
been a lecturer also on sports law at her University in Colombia. It
gives me the greatest pleasure to welcome Ms. Nagle to our panel.
(Applause.)
DR. NAGLE: Thanks. First of all, I'm going to tell you briefly
about where I lived when I became a judge. This was a small village
close to Medellin, a town called Sevanata [sic], close to where the drug
lords have the big farms. Even as judge, I had to buy my pencils, my
pads, and sometimes I had to take the bus or ask my mother to give me
her car because I didn't have enough money to get to work. But the
worst part was in 1985, when we had the big crisis and the Palace of
Justice, as you all know, got blown up and so many people died. We
received a communique from the government that they couldn't bring
any forces to any judges or protection to anyone, and by that time the
guerrilla groups had said that they were going to attack Sevanata
where I was working.
The strike was a national strike. There were no buses,-no one went
to work, yet we had to work. Otherwise, we were going to be punished.
I had to go out and try to see who could take me to work. I had to
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change cars three times, but I got to work. They told us to wear tennis
shoes to work because if you have to run, you run. And that is no joke.
I wore my tennis shoes, and that was one of the days; in which the
government couldn't provide the judges with any protection at all.
Once on a Sunday, in this small village, a seven year-old child
came to me and his shirt was all bloody. His father had been stabbed
with a knife, with a machete, by another person. I called the police, the
police station was twelve kilometers away from where my office was,
but the officers said they were taking their lunch. They said they had
no car, and could not respond. I was shocked, and begged
them-knowing time was short and this attacker could escape. They
said they had no transportation, so I had to take my car and go down
and pick up the police officers, so that they were able to go and chase
this person before he escaped.
All this, just to tell you that in Colombia, the judiciary system is
the Cinderella of the three branches. It's the Cinderella because the
judiciary system hasn't had the respect that it should have. I mean all
of you know that being a judge should be something that will bring
respect because they are imparting justice. But no, in Colombia, the
judiciary system is the one that is begging left and right. Judges don't
even have enough money to take buses sometimes. How can we expect
judges to sit comfortably on the bench and be able to provide justice
when they receive so little respect from the other two branches?
That is very difficult. But judges do apply the law in Colombia. Of
course, some of them were and are corrupt, but others aren't. Others
are trying to really do their duty, and the Colombian system is one
which is positivist. In Colombia, what's important is the statute. If
there isn't a statute that is going to tell the judge that certain conduct
has to be criminalized, that judge cannot say this person has committed
a crime. So the judge has to follow the law, and some judges do try to
apply the law. But during this period of time in which I was on the
bench, so many changes occurred, the government was trying to find
more statutes to help solve the problem, to try and resolve this crimi-
nality that was really eating alive the judiciary system in the whole
Colombian society.
But that wasn't the answer. We had many rules in the criminal
code and many cases were taken away from the judges, yet they cre-
ated new judges, provisional ones to deal with the drugs, because they
thought that the existing judges were not doing their job. But they
didn't realize that sometimes it was very difficult because even the ex-
ecutive power, the politicians, were getting involved in criminal sen-
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tencing. Politicians had their hands in the solutions that the judges
were trying to implement, because some politicians, too, were and are
corrupt. They had their own interests.
So, again, we have judges in the middle. They are like a sandwich.
They are caught in the middle of the crisis. And the problem is not one
that is going to be resolved by imposing higher punishment, or by re-
ducing the penalty for narco-traffickers, because not even these people
are secure. They know that as soon as they are seen talking to the
judge, they might be killed also.
I think that the problem is that we have too many statutes, and
that those statutes that we have already are not applied. If someone
that's going to commit a crime knows for certain that the rule is going
to be imposed on his behavior, and he's going to be punished because of
that, maybe he will think twice. But if we are going to start changing
the rules and changing the treaties and changing the statutes, we are
going to be creating more of a crisis. And then judges and people who
will have to make decisions are going to get lost.
- Some comments were made this morning that drugs run Colom-
bia. Drugs don't run Colombia. And the proof is that Colombia had
elections last year. We couldn't say that the elections were bought. No,
people in Colombia do believe that there is democracy, and they want
to believe that they do have a democracy. They elected a new presi-
dent, and they are putting all their faith and hopes in this new presi-
dent. They are doing business, they are contracting, they are still going
before the judges, asking the judges to give them justice.
So I think that although there are so many problems, Colombia
does believe in democracy, and the problem in a sense is the infrastruc-
ture. If the United States is going to help Colombia, it should be will-
ing to give advice in that infrastructure. As soon as the Colombian gov-
ernment rebuilds the judiciary branch, Colombians will be able to take
the judgment of those that we're calling extraditables into their own
hands.
President Gaviria talked about the extradition. I don't think that
what he expressed was that Colombia wasn't willing to cooperate with
the extradition. He was talking about narco-traffickers and narco-ter-
rorists. He was talking about two different figures that within the Co-
lombian system we call peoples, which means they are two different
conducts. And if an individual behaves in a way that his conduct has
every single element of one or another, the sanction for that one will be
imposed on him as a punishment. And he said that one of them will be
the extreme sanction, which will be extradition.
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That prospect scares the extraditables. By President Gaviria say-
ing that, he meant not that he was going to talk with the extraditables.
No, a judge is going to judge their conduct and simply apply one or
another sanction for that conduct. And he meant, for certain conduct,
even extradition.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Dr. Nagle. We have, I think,
heard a most extraordinary presentation, and we have to be grateful to
you for coming here to share your experience and to share the record of
your extraordinary courage in your country. The floor is now open for
questions. I will ask those who wish to speak to find the microphone,
which unfortunately has been turned in the wrong direction. Take it a
little father back down the aisle. In any case, are there questions for
any member of the panel?
I think all of us are somewhat numbed by the realization of the
experience that you have lived through, Dr. Nagle. My question really
goes to John Murphy where he was talking about the question of using
multilateral treaties for the purposes of extradition. I remember a good
many years ago when I was in the Pentagon, and my job was to super-
vise the administration of the status of forces agreement on a world-
wide basis, and annually my colleagues would have to go up to the
Senate of the United States and make a presentation on how we were
doing. And that brought us before a most extraordinary man, Senator
Sam Ervin, himself a great lawyer. And very sympathetic to our pro-
gram. But one of the issues that we discussed with him, John, from
time to time was the question of the provisions of the NATO status of
forces agreement, which require the sending state to cooperate with the
host state in the punishment of crimes, especially where there was par-
allel jurisdiction. We had cases where servicemen were actually
brought back to the United States, discharged from the service with
honorable discharges, and nevertheless thereafter it was discovered that
they had committed a crime abroad.
So the question is should we use the treaty as a basis for picking
up a former soldier now a civilian United States citizen and returning
him to Germany in order to stand trial for a criminal offense. During
the time that I had responsibility for this program, we never had to
face that question. But we discussed it from time to time with Senator
Ervin. I would wonder what your reaction would be to that?
DR. MURPHY: Well, the question of using the multilateral trea-
ties as a basis for extradition requests arises in the case of the anti-
terrorist treaties and the Drug Convention, because i-; is specifically
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provided in those conventions that, if there is no bilateral extradition
treaty between the two parties concerned, they can use the multilateral
convention. In that context, it seems to me that there is something to
be said for at least considering these multilateral conventions as a pos-
sible basis for extradition, because there is an extradite or prosecute
protection that is built into most of those. If, for example, the United
States were to try to get an extradition from a country with which it
does not have a bilateral extradition treaty, that country could refuse
the request, but it would be obligated to submit the individual to prose-
cution under its own system of driminal justice. There is a requirement
that submission to prosecution be done in good faith, and that would
require a prosecution free of the political dimension.
It also would require-in fact, this is often written in-the imposi-
tion of severe sentences if it appeared that the accused indeed had com-
mitted the crime. The problem may be most acute going the other way.
That is, where the other country uses the multilateral convention as the
basis for a request to the United States that it send an accused to that
country for trial. The fear has been that the accused will not get pro-
tection in terms of due process.
In that kind of situation, however, under the multilateral treaties,
the United States itself would be under an obligation to bring the indi-
vidual to justice if it declined to extradite. Indeed, it's an obligation
under the convention that the United States enact legislation which
would give extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime in the situation
where it declines to extradite. So if the United States is worried about
the protection of due process rights, it would be able, indeed it would
be obligated, to submit the individual to prosecution in the United
States.
My problem with the United States requiring in all instances that
there be a bilateral extradition treaty is that there may be instances
where we want to trigger the mechanisms of the multilateral conven-
tions and ensure that the individual is submitted to prosecution some-
where, in the United States or abroad. But under a regime that will not
allow extradition from the United States in the absence of a bilateral
extradition treaty, and requires a bilateral extradition agreement for
the United States to make an extradition request, you may never get
the extradite or prosecute mechanism into operation. And so, as I said,
in the draft legislation that was before Congress at the time there was
this huge battle over the wording of exceptions to the political offense
exception, the law would have been changed to permit the use of these
multilateral conventions as a basis for an extradition request.
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MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much. I have another question I'd
like to direct to Mark Richard, and that is the question about extradi-
tions. I must confess I'm not too familiar with the recent history of the
U.S. government position on amendments to the extradition treaty. We
have categories that permit the extradition of U.S. nationals and cate-
gories which have been interpreted in the Valentine case as not permit-
ting the extradition of nationals of the United States.
MR. RICHARD: Well, the Valentine case, which is fairly old,
does not reflect a policy position of the U.S. government. We have con-
sistently taken the position that as an issue of policy, we are prepared
to extradite our nationals. What we have is a drafting defect, if you
will, reflected and picked up by the Supreme Court in the Valentine
case that suggested that given the underlying statute, and the almost
discretionary terminology of some of our older treaties, there was insuf-
ficient treaty language to accomplish the extradition of the nationals.
We have been consistently trying to, as part of the process of updating
the extradition treaties, to take care of the Valentine situation which,
as I said, is at least in my perspective essentially a drafting problem.
As a question of policy, we take the position that if we're prepared
to enter into an extradition relationship with a country, it is a reflection
of our confidence in the integrity of the system and the fairness of the
processes employed by our treaty partner, and therefore, we would be
prepared to see the U.S. nationals be subject to the extradition. We are
confident that if there is any deviation from the capability of the re-
ceiving country to provide adequate due process protection, regardless
of whether we're dealing with a U.S. national or otherwise, we're confi-
dent that the State Department would not issue the final warrant and
allow the extradition to a country where it, the State Department, did
not have confidence the individual would receive a fair trial.
If I may, Monroe, I wonder if I can just go back and elaborate or
comment on some of the implications, as I see it, of utilizing a multilat-
eral as a basis for extradition out of the United States? Aside from
questions of treaty interpretation whether these multilaterals are for
our purposes self-executing and could constitute an adequate treaty ba-
sis for extradition, we have a variety of very real practical concerns
with that approach. One, it at least raises the specter of us entering
into potential treaty relationships, extradition relationships with coun-
tries that we are not particularly ready to do so. If you look at some of
the multilaterals you have some interesting countries that are signato-
ries to those multilaterals.
I'm not sure that we want to, at this point in time, enter into bilat-
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eral extradition relationships with Libya and other countries that are
members of these multilaterals. Moreover, our concern with the extra-
dite or prosecute language in a lot of these multilaterals is a very real
one. By and large, to fulfill the requirement of prosecute, the country
will turn around and ask us for our evidence. This is not always, as a
practical matter, an easy task to provide the country with the evidence,
depending on the source of the evidence, the willingness of witnesses to
cooperate with the foreign government and what have you.
So the technical arrangements that are engendered by this trigger-
ing of the requirement do pose at times-some real problems. That's
reflected, for example, in the German decision on Hamadei to exercise
their right to try him rather than extradite him. One final point that
gives us concern, and that is the triggering device and its implications
for subsequent efforts to extradite the individual from third countries.
For example, you have a lot of countries who are signatories to these
multilaterals who would like nothing better than to have the opportu-
nity to prosecute pursuant to their obligation. Thereafter, the acquittal
or lenient treatment of that offense, in effect, may very well give the
offender an international bath and protect him or her from subsequent
extradition from third countries who would see the individual as having
already been prosecuted for the offense being sought for.
So we in the enforcement community have to be very careful
whether we wish to expose ourselves to this consequence depending on
which country is involved and the anticipated reaction of the country to
a prosecution. We have had difficulties in this area. We have gotten
burned in the past involving some very notorious offenders, and it is
something that I would suggest warrants a very cautious attitude on
our part.
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Mark. I hope no one in the
audience is being discouraged from making a comment by not having a
microphone in front of him or near him.
DR. MURPHY: Could I comment on his comment?
MR. LEIGH: Yes.
DR. MURPHY: The case of Hamadei is an interesting one in the
sense that this was not a situation where there wasn't a bilateral extra-
dition treaty. We had both the anti-hijacking convention and a bilateral
extradition treaty, and Germany refused to extradite Mr. Hamadei and
instead submitted him to prosecution, and it had a perfect right to do
so. That is, under the multilateral convention the requirement is extra-
dite or prosecute, and so Germany fulfilled its obligations under the
multilateral convention, and there is an exception to the U.S.-German
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extradition treaty in a situation where the requested country deter-
mines it has jurisdiction to try the individual and exercises that
jurisdiction.
It's worth noting that Mr. Hamadei was convicted and sentenced
to a rather substantial sentence, despite all the hostags in Lebanon.
Moreover, with respect to possible difficulties of using the multilateral
conventions, my basic point is that it ought to be an option that's avail-
able. That is, the decision may be made that we shouldn't use a multi-
lateral convention, and indeed there is a lot to be said for using bilat-
eral extradition treaties instead. But as interpreted presently, U.S.
extradition law does not provide the option.
It seems to me that having the option available might be desirable
in certain circumstances. The decision whether to use it could be made
on a case by case basis.
MR. diGENOVA: May I address the issue of the Hamadei case,
please, because I think, Professor, while what you say has the ring of
truth to it, there is a problem with what you have said, and it's very
simple. The Germans had absolutely no equities whatsoever in the
Hamadei case, none. That crime was not committed on German soil.
No German citizens were involved. It was an American aircraft. An
American sailor was murdered on the Tarmac in Beirut. American citi-
zens were held hostage, and an American airline was involved. The
only reason the Germans got Mr. Hamadei was an accident by which
he was arrested upon entering their country.
The only reason the Germans did not extradite was because their
citizens were taken hostage in Beirut at the time of Mr. Hamadei's
arrest. Their conduct was absolutely and unequivocally modified with
regard to extradition conduct because their citizens were taken hostage.
You are absolutely correct that Mr. Hamadei was tried and convicted,
and I know a lot about the case because I went to Germany and tried
to convince the Germans to extradite Mr. Hamadei.
Indeed, there is a very wonderful story about the courage of a se-
ries of Americans who were asked to come to Germany in an unprece-
dented request by the Germans to appear in a line-up in an attempt to
identify Mr. Hamadei, which was an outrageous request, totally illegal,
not required by any extradition treaty. But the United States did it at
the request of the German government because the Germans feared
that if they extradited Mr. Hamadei to the United States and found
out later that he was not the right person, even though that is not the
law, that they might have lost two citizens in Beirut who might have
been murdered if he were extradited.
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We responded to that immediately and found three courageous
Americans who were willing to drop what they were doing, risked their
own lives by going to Germany with me and a number of other people,
appeared in a line-up and absolutely identified Mr. Hamadei on six
separate occasions with each one of them, unequivocally. Upon our re-
turn to the United States and landing in Dulles, we were told that not-
withstanding the identification, the Germans decided not to extradite.
And the reason was very simple: they modified their behavior because
of threats against their citizens who had purposely been taken hostage
in Beirut to prevent the extradition of Mr. Hamadei.
The Germans had no choice but to try Mr. Hamadei, and they did
live up to their legal obligation under the treaty. It is true, but it is also
true that they clearly and unequivocally modified their behavior, and
while he has been given a lengthy sentence, it remains to be seen
whether or not he serves it. There are many countries in Western Eu-
rope who have dealt for a long period of time in the undercurrents of
the Middle East, and made what can only be called, and I'll repeat it
again, faustian bargains, and it remains to be seen how iuch of his
sentence Mr. Hamadei will serve.
I have great respect for the prosecution authorities in Germany
who came to our country and my office and spent months working with
Mr. Richard and myself and others to get all of the evidence, which
was only in the United States to prosecute that case with only Ameri-
can witnesses and only American experts in a German court. It's very
important to realize that the Hamadei case, while it ended with Mr.
Hamadei being convicted properly in a German court, was a frustra-
tion of the extradition process because the Germans modified their be-
havior out of fear of the murder of their two citizens taken hostage.
Their two citizens were released, I might add, and there have long been
undercurrents of deals going on between the German government and
factions in the Middle East with regard to the release of Mr. Hamadei.
But whether or not those undercurrents are accurate, I do not
.know. But it's important to understand what happened in the Hamadei
case. And it was a fascinating display of the modification of behavior
by a country on the basis of threats by terrorists.
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Joe, for that intervention.
We have a question from the floor and another back there later.
DR. TARAZONA-SEVILLANO: I just wanted to recall some of
the remarks made by Luz. Actually they remind me of many exper-
iences back home, and I was shocked by our speaker at lunch, who
referred to the Peruvian case as a discrete case in the situation of
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narco-terrorism. Actually I didn't want to embarrass him in public, but
I think it essential to make the situation clear. Producing countries
such as Peru have these tremendous problems with infrastructure, as
Luz has mentioned. Our infrastructure is practically non-existent.
Funding for the judiciary is minimum. In Peru with a massive eco-
nomic crisis that can allocate the proper funds for law enforcement, the
judges are paid terribly and prosecutors are also not well compensated.
Well, anyhow, we can say that this is the sickness of the country in
general, but what I want to stress here is that what happens in the
capital sometimes does not receive the same attention by the media.
What happens, for example, in coca and cocaine growing regions that
are far away something that is too far away from the capital so that
people just do not care. At least it seems that neither the government
nor the international community has the knowledge of what happens in
this remote region.
Also, in rural Peru, in areas where the trafficking is high, such as
where I've been a prosecutor, in a sparsely populated province which is
at the border of Peru with Ecuador, you have to really be able to take
the law in your hands to make it work. And you have this problem of
not having an infrastructure to assist you, having to pay for the gaso-
line to go on raids, having to practically ask here and there, you know,
to be able to complete some assignment. And this cannot be something
that can continue forever if we want the rule of law in these producing
countries to be something that will be strengthened. I think something
also very important to consider is not just the military factor of it, but
also that the institutions of the state should be strengthened.
And one of these institutions is the judiciary. I have a friend who
was killed and blown up by dynamite with a special police force when
he went on a raid for cocaine. Myself, I had to change routes everyday
to go to work which was thirty kilometers away from the place that I
was living. And these remote areas are practically no-man's land. You
are exposed to a number of dangers so that you are fearing for your life
every single minute. So what Luz has said that she had to buy some of
her supplies and all of that, is something that seems to be a common
denominator in other countries such as Peru, too.
Actually, you know, to enforce the law, I had the good fortune,
compared to hers, of having protection. (You know I had protection.) I
had a body guard with me 24 hours a day. I had police in my office and
police in my home, but eventually that doesn't protect very much be-
cause the police sometimes are not very trustworthy. If you had to do
something very important, you had to do it in high secrecy, tremendous
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secrecy.
This secrecy had to be enforced practically by yourself. In my
case, I was the only prosecutor and I was on duty 24 hours a day. And
so the judiciary is there. The institutions are there. What is needed is
for these institutions to be strengthened, and the only things that might
ameliorate what is happening in these producing countries is for the
judiciary to have enough support to really fulfill its mandate. It's true
there are some members of the judiciary that have been bought by
drug money, but they are not the majority. There are a 'number of
people who are fighting this war on drugs that seem to have
no-anywhere. Okay. Thank you very much.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Ladies and gentlemen, we are somewhat over time.
We have time for only one more question, and I agreed to let Harry
Almond give the last question. Then we must adjourn to allow the next
panel to resume.
MR. ALMOND: Thank you, Monroe. This question is very brief.
It's raised in connection with a slightly hypothetical set of facts in the
Hamadei situation and addressed to John Murphy. Our treaties provide
for prosecute or extradite. Suppose that in this hypothetical case the
Germans go ahead and prosecute and then we bring up a claim for an
entirely different crime based on the same facts. I'm trying to get away
from double jeopardy. Do they then have an obligation under that par-
ticular clause to extradite?
DR. MURPHY: I assume that the hypothetical crime that you're
talking about is something other than aircraft hijacking?
MR. ALMOND: That's right.
DR. MURPHY: The question would arise under the bilateral ex-
tradition agreement. And the question would be whether this really was
another crime so there was no double jeopardy problem. As long as you
asked a question about Hamadei, I want to respond to Mr. diGenova's
comments, and I'll make it very brief.
First, you'll remember that when I talked about Mr. Hamadei, I
was not giving a general comment on the Hamadei case, but rather
pointing out that the Hamadei case involved both a bilateral extradi-
tion agreement and a multilateral extradition agreement. So the ques-
tion of using just the multilateral agreement did not arise. I suspect
that the German officials who made the decision to -prosecute Mr.
Hamadei would not agree with the evaluation that they were giving in
to pressure although to be sure they can speak for themselves. Perhaps
this particular case raises the issue of whether we can find a more dis-
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interested forum, which brings us back to the international criminal
court issue. Thank you.
MR. LEIGH: Ladies and gentlemen, I think-
MR. diGENOVA: Let me just respond because it's important to
respond to it. The prosecution authorities didn't make that decision.
MR. LEIGH: The prosecutor gets the last word.
MR. diGENOVA: The political authorities in Germany made that
decision. Secretary Shultz asked that Mr. Hamadei be extradited, and
Helmut Kohl, for reasons which are legally justifiable in one sense, de-
cided not to extradite in the interest of protecting his citizens who were
then hostages. The problem with the hypothetical is that given the facts
in Hamadei, if the United States were to come up with another crime
which had separate facts, the Germans would do the same thing again.
They would try to try him in Germany because presumably there
would still be hostages. And, in fact, their conduct was modified, and
we know that for a fact. They decided not to extradite because German
nationals had been taken hostage as a result of Mr. Hamadei's arrest.
There just isn't any question about that. It's a matter of record,
and while it is wonderful that the Germans spent all that time prepar-
ing that case with U.S. citizens as witnesses, U.S. physical evidence,
FBI agents, American experts, the truth is they had no connection with
that case whatsoever and no equities whatsoever except their citizens
who were hostages. It is the quintessential example of the modification
of a country's behavior because their citizens have been taken hostage
and threatened by terrorists. And it has nothing to do with multilateral
treaties.
MR. LEIGH: I think we have to adjourn in 6rder to allow the
next panel. So may I ask you all to thank our four panelists for their
contribution.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Please come back in about five minutes for the next
session.
(A short break was taken.)
III. SEIZURE OF NARCO-TERRORISTS ABROAD
MR. diGENOVA: Please be seated so that we can-some of our
panelists, this is the middle of their business day, and they need to get
back to their positions of employment, unlike the rest of us who are
lounging around here learning today. We'd like to get started on the
3:30 panel which is entitled "The Seizure of Narco-Terrorists Abroad,"
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an issue which has become current as a result of a number of recent
cases, most particularly the case currently pending in California
against Rafael Caroll Kentaro [sic] and a group of defendants in mat-
ters dealing with the seizure of a Mexican doctor and his rendition to
the United States. The moderator for today's panel was to be Victoria
Toensing. She is in trial in Boston, Massachusetts, and I am substitut-
ing for her today under orders from my wife, Victoria Toensing, to do
that.
(Laughter.)
Mr. diGENOVA: I'm going to introduce each of our panelists
right now, and then we'll just run through them in the order in which
they are on the panel. Our first speaker will be William P. Barr, who is
the Deputy Attorney General. Mr. Barr is a lawyer of great distinction
in this city. He has been the Deputy Attorney General since May of
1990. Prior to that time, he served as the Assistant Attorney General
for the Office of Legal Counsel, a very, very important job where legal
advice is rendered to the Attorney General, a position in which he used
to render some very significant legal advice in the subject matter of our
panel discussion today and about which he will speak. Mr. Barr has
served throughout the government in the Central Intelligence Agency,
and as a law clerk to a very respected member of our D.C. Circuit,
Malcolm Wilkey.
The next speaker will be someone who is known to all of you,
Judge Abraham D. Sofaer. He is currently with the law firm of
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, and is formerly the State Department of
Legal Advisor and was involved in many of the issues about which we
will speak on this panel and which were spoken of both earlier today
and in the previous panel. He has served as United States District
Judge in the Southern District of New York and has been a professor
of law at Columbia University. His resume is much longer than what I
have just given you but in the interest of time we will stop at that
point.
The final panelist will be Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, the
Charles L. Denison Professor of Law at New York University School
of Law. The professor specializes in public and private international
law, international economic transactions, aviation law as well as inter-
national litigation and arbitration. He is an author of books on interna-
tional legal process, conflicts, aviation and international economic law.
He has also written widely on various aspects of international trade,
investment, finance and dispute settlement, and perhaps most relevant,
has recently written a series of articles on U.S. law enforcement abroad
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in which he takes the position that constitutional restraints on govern-
mental action apply or should apply abroad as well. as within the
United States, a position which has recently been repudiated by the
United States Supreme Court. We will now begin our discussion.
(Laughter.)
[This is a report on Mr. Barr's comments:
The June 1989 OLC opinion addressed the legality, but not the
policy implications, of United States law enforcement agents making
arrests overseas without consent of the local government in contraven-
tion of customary international law. The Court held. that domestic
United States law grants such authority. In so doing, it overruled a
1980 opinion and its two arguments to the contrary: 1) that the United
States was powerless to take action that impinged on the sovereignty of
other nations; and 2) that statutes authorizing FBI action abroad were
to be construed to comport with customary international law.
The current position is that the President or Congress can, when
necessary, override customary international law, because what is "cus-
tomary" is not a static concept, but rather an evolving concept. By
making judgments which are sometimes out of bounds, the United
States plays an important role in shaping those rules. Our Constitution
demands that our political branches, and primarily Congress, not let
foreign ministries impose rules on the people of the United States with-
out their consent. If customary international law constrains our govern-
ment from what it considers to be an appropriate response to a situa-
tion, it must be rejected.]
JUDGE SOFAER: It's a pleasure to be here and to talk about this
very uncontroversial subject-
(Laughter.)
JUDGE SOFAER: -that one can always feel confident one is go-
ing to be quoted with impartiality and accuracy. Nonetheless, since
we're used to being bashed with pieces out of our own words repeatedly
after five years of Washington life, I'll plunge ahead. I completely con-
cur with Bill Barr that the 1980 opinion should have been overruled. In
fact, Joe and others in the Attorney General's office before this present
administration came in had reached that conclusion, and Bill came
along and did the work and implemented the policies that made a lot of
sense, it seemed to me, in reversing the earlier opinion, which I think
was extreme in the assertions it made.
On the other hand, I do think it's very important to say two things.
One, to confirm that Bill's opinion did not address the international law
and international relations aspects of such seizures abroad, non-consen-
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sual seizures abroad. The President and the Attorney General and the
Secretary of State made it crystal clear that there were important legal
and policy concerns in connection with any such seizure that had to be
addressed. There are always, in any of these situations where you don't
have a seizure in international waters, at least three laws, or sets of
laws involved. There is the U.S. law, there is international law, and
then there is the domestic law of the country in which the action is
taken. However authoritative the Office of Legal Counsel may be on
the U.S. law, and the Legal Adviser combined with the Attorney Gen-
eral may be on international.law, we are not authoritative with respect
to the meaning of the local law of the other state.
We cannot pretend to dictate to other states about their local au-
thorities and what steps they can take when a foreign state acts within
their borders in a manner that they have not authorized. Bill has been
emphatic in passing this on internally, as I have, that when an action of
this kind is taken in a foreign country, the individuals involved, acting
on behalf of the United States, might be considered kidnappers if
someone dies as a result of this kind of action.
So it's a very, very serious business and obviously the United
States keeps that in mind all the time in connection with these matters.
Now the second basic point I want to make is not anything new. I want
to emphasize this because people always jump on you, you know.
You're saying something new. You're out of the government. I have
always said that the issue of whether U.S. law has already authorita-
tively overridden customary international law, is undecided. The ad-
ministration has a position. There is undoubtedly going to be at some
point an interpretation of that issue, and I think it is incumbent on the
administration to consider the rule that statutes are construed very nar-
rowly when it is clear that to construe them otherwise would violate
established principles of international law.
That is a doctrine that the administration, any administration, is
going to have to come up against when it argues that a generally
worded statute combined with the direction of the Attorney General
overrides customary international law. It is crystal clear that if Con-
gress has clearly authorized an action in violation of international law,
and the President has joined in that and orders some action to be
taken, however, clearly it violates international law, the courts, our
courts, have repeatedly said that they will not intervene; that is a politi-
cal decision.
But the question is, is it clear that Congress has intended a viola-
tion of customary international law in this area? So I think those two
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conceptual issues are worth touching on, and then I'd like to talk about
some practical things that give me some concern. First of all, I have
defended the importance of international law repeatedly, both inside
the government and outside the government in connection with these
matters, not only because I believe in international law. Anyone who
doesn't believe in international law is just closing his eyes to reality.
And in that connection I might say that every now and then I hear how
there is no such thing as customary international law, and a head of
state who happens -to be visiting the country or is planning a visit to the
country can be arrested by the local U.S. Attorney, and I'm forced to
write a little memo over to the White House pointing out that some
idiot in the Department of Justice is claiming that he can arrest the
head of a friendly state because there is no such thing as customary
international law, and that person, that idiot, and I certainly feel he is
an idiot, hears from the White House about the fact that, well, we
don't care if there is no such thing as customary international law, you
will keep your hands off the head of state of this friendly country with-
out our particular approval.
Now, whether there is or isn't such a thing as customary interna-
tional law, I feel that message that goes from the White House to the
Attorney General's office is an important reflection of reality, and if
you want to call that reality customary international law, as I do, then
there is such a thing as customary international law. And it might well
be based not on something that happened early in our nation's foggy
childhood. I didn't think that John Marshall was particularly a foggy
thinker, but rather because our head of state wishes to go to other
friendly states and doesn't particularly want to be ar:rested by some
idiot in the Department of Justice over there.
So there are very real concerns that I think may be appropriate for
a certain degree of security that is helpful in the day to day operation
of government. But I want to go on from there and say, yes, I stand up
for international law and stood up for international law in the govern-
ment, but I am appalled when I read publicly over and over again ar-
guments about why it is so terrible and so outrageous that any for-
eigner ever gets grabbed overseas, brought to the United States, and
prosecuted for some heinous crime.
I would just like to say that I don't think it's so terrible. First of
all, it's been going on a long time, and we're not the only ones who do
it. Foreign countries have done it repeatedly in human history. Now I
would submit to you, having read every reported case of seizures
abroad and having heard about many non-reported cases that I could
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get my hands on, and I have some wonderful people working for me in
the Legal Adviser's Office, that almost always these seizures occur with
the consent of the state involved.
Now that consent doesn't have to be official. I'm not saying it oc-
curs with a signed, sealed and delivered body and an order and every-
thing else. It happens. Consent comes in all kinds of forms. And I don't
understand why people are so keen on ratcheting up the rules relating
to consent. Why do we have to have formalized consent of a foreign
government? What interest are we serving by demanding a rigid and
high degree of consent? It seems to me our law enforcement authorities
know what they're doing in this area. They work with other law en-
forcement authorities, particularly with respect to narco-issues today,
where narcotics violations are international crimes that almost every
nation has agreed to enforce. I don't understand what interest we're
serving by ratcheting up the requirements relating to consent.
If a colorable case of consent and good faith is present, why does a
court have to even examine the issue? It seems to me that if the Attor-
ney General's office in some kind of an affidavit makes it clear that a
colorable basis for consensual action existed in the cooperation of the
two law enforcement agencies involved, or even with some higher level
official, that ought to be the end of that as far as any law is con-
cerned--domestic, international or even the law of that foreign state.
Now, with respect to those situations where the foreign country really
is offended, and, in fact, no one in authority consented, I am also puz-
zled there as to why the issue is made an issue for our criminal law.
Why is it in our interest, in any nation's interest or in the public
interest, to convert what is a very, very sensitive and extremely impor-
tant issue of international relations into an issue of criminal defense
procedure? It is a massive, it seems to me, expansion of the exclusion-
ary rule at a time when we have learned after years of practice of all
the lying, of all the corruption, and of all the injustice and cost and
delay that the exclusionary rule generates, why apply such a failure of
a rule in this area where the remedies, my God, can hardly be said to
be inadequate.
I'm looking at my friend from Canada who happens to be here in
the audience, and I'm sure there are many other foreign lawyers
around who represent their countries so ably here, when we took an
action (I take the rap in the sense that I was the Legal Adviser here)
when some American goon takes the action of grabbing a foreigner in a
foreign country and bringing him here, the roof caves in if there was no
consent, in fact. The roof caves in, and we're not going to get into a
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war with Canada, for God's sake. The issue here is friendship. Our
friendship with our neighbor is threatened. We have hundreds of legal
issues with Canada.
We don't need this kind of a garbage issue to deal with on top of
all those other important questions. And so we go into action, and we
go looking for that guy, and the Attorney General generally gets right
along with us, and we go and we try to catch that person and punish
him. These individuals, in fact, were prosecuted and sent to prison, and
the Canadian was released and sent back. I think the remedies are ade-
quate, the political remedies and all that flows from them are adequate
in this area.
Finally, one more point: the issue of extraordinary circumstances
is something that must be touched upon. Because even in this area of
consent, I would submit to you we are in a world where international
law itself is changing. Ten years ago there wasn't an international law
relating to drugs that we have today. The international law relating to
drugs is different today than it was ten years ago. The international law
relating to terrorism is different today. The international law relating
to human rights is different today. And the international law relating to
self-defense is different today.
And if a bunch of narco-terrorists take the position that they're
going to kill my President, or that they're going to send someone here
to find him or catch him in Bogota when he's on a visit and kill him, I
can tell you as Legal Adviser, I would construe that as a threat to the
United States. Whether it amounts to an attack under Article 51 is
something that I will leave to others to finagle over.. Because in the
history of human relations an inherent right is not changed by adding a
few words after it, and the inherent right of self-defense has always
included the right of a state to protect its nationals and particularly its
head of state.
And finally, the issue beyond self-defense, in the human rights
area, if you're for international law, you better wake up. If you think
that international law is not going to support some of these seizures
some day a lot mere extensively than some people may want. While
some people are arguing for the rights of defendants, which I don't
think is going to go anywhere in terms of restraining states from seiz-
ing people abroad, the great trend-of international law is foclised on the
rights of decent human beings, people whose moral rights are outraged
by inhuman conduct, by monsters who kill innocents, who sell drugs
that ravage communities. That's the course of international law in this
world, and you better start planning for it because Adolf Eichmann
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was only the first of the line of cases in that course of human history.
When there was outrage over the seizure of Eichmann and the
state involved went to the United Nations and raised that, and clearly
it was a violation of law, what was the remedy ultimately issued and
accepted by the state involved? An apology. No payment, no request
for his rerendition, nothing. And history now has a precedent that no
one questions the propriety of. I mean certainly someone says, oh, well,
-it was a violation of law, but you go out in the world and ask, is what
happened to Adolf Eichmann morally improper?
Even the state involved, in its final statements in the Security
Council, made it clear that they were not going to seek more than an
apology. So I think we're living here in a world that's dynamic. There
are some uncertainties as to what's going on, and I've touched on what
I think they are. But the trend, I would submit to you, is one where the
courts of this nation and of all civilized nations, and the highest offi-
cials of those nations, are going to come back to what counts. And
what counts is justice in the great sense of the word.
That is going to either lead states to be more forthcoming in the
rendition of these criminals or to the development of international law
of external seizures that is far more robust than you can imagine today.
Thank you.
Mr. diGENOVA: Thank you, Abe.
(Applause.)
DR. LOWENFELD: I'm sort of debating whether to depart to-
tally from my prepared remarks and respond to the not very subtle
accusations. I agree with Mr. Barr that he's not an international
lawyer.
(Applause.)
DR. LOWENFELD: I'm not sure I agree when by implication he
regards me as a member of a small fringe element. I did after all labor
for a good many years on the American Law Institute's Restatement,
and with minor exceptions, most of what my colleagues and I wrote
was adopted by what you might call the establishment, legal institu-
tions. And Mr. Sofaer, by implication, says you'd better wake up. He
did say it, and I think in part he meant me, and I hadn't thought that I
was asleep. But let me just start with a couple of propositions. One I
think is self-evident. The other, I regret to say, is controversial, though
when Mr. diGenova said it's old hat and eliminated, I'm not sure I'm
willing to concede that.
The first proposition is that kidnapping is a bad thing. It's a crime.
It's a crime of violence. It's an assault on human dignity, and there are
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no nice kidnappings. I'll come back to that in a minute. My second
proposition is that the Constitution, including in particular the Bill of
Rights, governs all conduct of officers of the United States in line of
duty. At least figuratively speaking, I think an officer of the United
States, wherever he is, carries the Constitution in his pocket as Hugo
Black and Sam Ervin, and I, at least today, do. I don't think you can
say it's like an overcoat, and when I cross the border I take it off.
It seems that the Supreme Court doesn't agree or at least doesn't
agree completely with that. In the Verdugo case, the court draws a
distinction between the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment. It
talks about beneficiaries, and it says, well, citizens are b -neficiaries and
aliens aren't unless they're resident aliens or have some other affilia-
tion. I find none of that very persuasive, and I think I can give you a
fairly simple example. Suppose, for example, the DEA has a program
in South America, and it says for that program we reject all blacks.
Don't want them. Doesn't matter because the Constitution doesn't ap-
ply. I can't believe anybody would support that.
Or suppose they say anybody who works for the DEA in Brazil
has to go to Church every Sunday whether he likes it or not. Nobody
would believe that. So the notion that somehow the Constitution isn't
relevant to American official conduct seems to me really quite unper-
suasive. As I wrote in my article in the American Law Journal, I would
not have been upset in the Verdugo Urquidez case if the Supreme
Court-remember that was the case, partly of kidnapping, although
that's not what went to the Supreme Court. The part that went to the
Supreme Court was that while he was already in American custody
north of the Mexican border, some guys, in a joint cooperative venture,
and I'll come back to that, too, went to his two houses and conducted a
search, a search that apparently would not have passed rauster, at least
the argument was it wouldn't.
I would not have been upset if the Supreme Court had said what
Justice Stevens did, which is to say, well, the fourth amendment pro-
hibits unreasonable searches, and in this context it wasn't unreasona-
ble. I suggested that in my article, and then I had the P.S. in galley. I
added something to it at the risk of writing for journals. But the notion
that somehow the Constitution becomes irrelevant, I think, is unpersua-
sive. I think the historical argument induced by Justice Rehnquist is
really just not there. I mean he quotes a page from Madison's state-
ment when he introduces the Bill of Rights, and you read it and it just
doesn't say what the Chief Justice said it did.
The notion that people is different from persons, I can never even
[Vol. 15
396
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Proceedings
restate it. It just, I think, is unpersuasive, and I think we'll see that
over time they'll take that back. We have a case now, you know, which
is technically statutory construction about discrimination and employ-
ment, but I think you'll see that those issues just don't come up. But
my main purpose here isn't to argue about or reargue the constitutional
question. Perhaps I'm too late for that. I don't know. But my point is I
think the United States government ought to learn to behave better. I
don't think you win the war against thugs by behaving like thugs.
My friend Judge Sofaer says, well, these days things are different.
I put in my article-forgive me for repeating for those of you who read
it-I put the example of the killers of Mr. Herrhausen. Herrhausen
was the most important banker in Germany. He was the chairman of
the board of the Deutsche Bank. He was assassinated by terrorists in
one of those sophisticated operations where his car apparently broke a
beam of light, and that set off a bomb. Now suppose suspects in that
terrorist operation show up in the United States. There's no doubt the
German government would demand their extradition, and let us sup-
pose they come with probable cause sufficient to arrest the person.
Well, then the suspects go before the courts. We have a variety of
defenses. I agree with John Murphy and others that the political of-
fense exception ought to be narrowed. I don't agree with Judge
Sprizzo, for example, the way he defines it. But it is certainly possible
that a judge might have problems with the political offense exception
that there are habeas corpus proceedings. You can appeal from a de-
nial of habeas corpus.
Suppose at some point along the way, the German government
gets a couple of agents and puts them on and grabs the guy who, let us
say, is out on bail and they find him in Philadelphia and take him back
to Germany. I can't believe that the United States wouldn't be totally
outraged, would regard such an act as a violation, yes, of the domestic
law, Abe, as you say, but also of international law. But now comes the
next point: suppose it isn't quite that simple. Suppose the law enforce-
ment officials of the Federal Republic have friends in, say, the FBI or
the local police force, and they make a deal. And it is the local officials
or the FBI or the police in Philadelphia who put the guy on a Luf-
thansa plane, and then he's taken back, and when the American gov-
ernment protests, the German government says, oh, -there was consent.
I can't believe that that's the kind of behavior that we would ac-
cept. This, of course, is a hypothetical case, and it's doubly hypotheti-
cal, first, because we haven't seen it, and second because it's with Eu-
rope, whereas everything we've been talking about here tends to be
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with Latin America. But I'm suggesting that the notion that these are
not shared values is just wrong. Now I want to talk for a minute about
the Toscanino [sic] case. Most of you know the Toscanino case in
which the Second Circuit said that if allegations of kidnapping and
brutality and torture in bringing a guy back from South America were
correct, then the U.S. court would have no jurisdiction to try him. In
the actual case, as some of you know, he was not able to prove those
allegations. And I don't really know the details of that.
Toscanino alleged that he had been blindfolded for seventeen days,
and whether he was lying or whether he just couldn't prove them, I
really don't know. I don't believe anybody in any of these cases, as I've
written. But what I want to talk about is the follow-up of the Tos-
canino case. There were two cases almost immediately afterwards
which involved apparently the same alleged conspiracy. One was a fel-
low called Lujan [sic], and Lujan was lured from Argentina to Bolivia.
He was there seized by Bolivians Working for the United States. That
is, they were some kind of law enforcement officers, but they were act-
ing as agents of the U.S. He was put on a plane for the: United States,
and he said I'm like Toscanino, and the Second Circuit said, well, what
happened to you wasn't so bad, you weren't brutalized and tortured.
You were merely kidnapped.
I started out, if you remember, my proposition was there are no
nice kidnappings. Then, the second fellow, Lira, all these three cases
within a very short time, he was arrested in Chile. He said he was
tortured. There were electric prongs on his bed of steel. HFIe had all kind
of horrible disgusting things that happened to him, and then after sev-
eral weeks he was put on a plane with a couple of D EA agents and
taken once more to New York, and he made the same argument, and
the court held, well, it's true you were tortured, or at least you made
credible assertions of torture, but you haven't proved that the United
States officials did it. They may have just been bystanders.
Well, I think both of these cases are wrong. As I say, I think Lu-
jan is wrong because it suggests that there are acceptable kidnappings,
and I reject that. And Lira is wrong because I think we'll never know
who did what. I think I've read most of the cases of the so-called joint
ventures or cooperations. If some of you want to look at the citations,
they're in the notes to section 413 of the Foreign Relations Restate-
ment. And whenever you read a case like that you wonder what really
did happen.
For instance, just to take a not very political case, a case called
Marzano, the decision says the FBI agents accompanied the local po-
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lice superintendent while the latter made the arrest, put the suspect on
the plane, seated between two American agents and took him away.
Well, who did what? I don't know, and I'm not sure that we'll ever
know. We had this problem in the United States in the period between
the Weeks case in 1914 which essentially developed the exclusionary
rule for federal officials, and Mapp in the 1960s which applied it to the
states. There were lots and lots of cases, if you read LeFevere [sic], he
spells them out in great detail where federal officials take evidence and
take a person who was arrested by state officials, and the holdings are,
if it was truly a joint venture, then you suppress.
And on the other hand, if the government, federal government, got
the evidence on a silver platter, then it's okay. It can use it. I think
those cases were all unpersuasive, and I think the cases say that the
foreign guys did it, and the Americans just watched are equally unper-
suasive. Whether it's in a technical sense a partnership, an agency, a
joint venture or whatever, I don't know. But I do know one thing. The
foreign officials acting in their own country act with much less restraint
than they would if they had to bring the suspect before their own
courts or their own police authorities. They know that what they do
won't ever be tested in front of their own authorities or courts because
the guy is going to go on a plane to America.
Well, that brings me-if I can have just a couple of more min-
utes-to the famous Ker-Frisbee doctrine. The Ker case, which hap-
pened in 1883 in Bolivia, of course, well before our due process revolu-
tion, well before the intervention of the international law of human
rights, but also interestingly enough, it happened when there was no
Peruvian government. Chile was occupying Peru. There was a rump
Peruvian government somewhere in the hills. The lady from Peru who's
here will know the details of this much better than I do.
But the notion, the Supreme Court suddenly said, well, a claim of
violation of international law can only be made by the duly constituted
government, has a kind of ironic twist about it, and even if there is a
firm government, you get really the classical catch-22 situation. Some
of you may remember the Argaud case. Argaud was a former colonel
or maybe brigadier general in the French Army who defected and
joined the OAS, not the Organization of American States. I forgot
what the initials stand for. It was the group that was against de Gaulle
because they thought de Gaulle was giving Algeria independence, and
he was hunted for awhile, and he was found in Germany and brought
in some kind of a bundle in a van, and then guess what, he showed up
in Paris, and they picked him up.
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And he challenged the way that he was kidnapped, and the court
said, the lower court said, well, if you think there is international law
violated, that would have to be a protest by the German government.
Well, the German Parliament read about this, passed a resolution. The
lower court said you're out of time. The pleading-it's too late for the
pleading. The Supreme Court in France said, well, the lower court
should not have done that. They should have accepted a late pleading
in these circumstances, but after all, if the German Parliament is
claiming a violation of international law, that can be settled on an in-
tergovernmental basis. Too bad for Col. Argaud.
So I think the notion of relying on the foreign government protest
tends to be not meaningful. I think it's also obsolete or Et least obsoles-
cent, and maybe here, Mr. Sofaer and I have differing views about the
trend of international law. I think we are in a period of ascendant indi-
vidual rights to international law. We no longer think that international
law doesn't care when a country tortures its own citizens, for instance.
And so I think to simply say that a suspect has no basis for asserting a
violation of international law is, or at least ought to be, wrong.
And third, I think-you say be practical-I think there are lots of
reasons why a state may not want to raise the issue of violation of
international law or violation of the treaty. Sometimes there's actual
consent. Often there is consent at some level, and you don't know at
which level. I wasn't here this morning. I just came at lunchtime from
New York, but I understand there was talk about the Alvarez Machain
case. Well, the interesting thing about that case is that the American
officials involved in the Alvarez Machain case thought they were deal-
ing with Mexican officials. And then the high officials said, no, you
weren't. Who will ever know?
I don't know that anybody, that anybody can tell when somebody
says we're going to do it, but off the record, and don't tell somebody
else. I'm really, I'm suspicious about all those things. I think when we
have consent, joint operations should be done by the political branches
of the government. I was going to say something about the shortcom-
ings of extradition. You heard that already today. I certainly would
like to see extradition strengthened, and I don't need to go over the
details of that. I Just think extradition has three purposes: it is to pro-
tect the interest of the requesting state, the requested state, and indi-
viduals, and I don't think you should forget that.
I'm far from being on the side of criminals. Since I wrote my arti-
cles, several people have called me up and said would you help us with
our brief and so on. And I've said no. And I continue to say no. That's
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not my purpose. My purpose is to have my government-it's been
twenty odd years since I've been a part of it, but I'm a citizen-to have
my government behave properly, and I think in the long-run, it's those
values that are the best, that are really the best remedy. I was very
moved by the speeches of the two brave ladies from Colombia and
Peru. And I think it's no accident that they come to America because
America is the country with the lasting values.
I think it's more important to preserve those values than to grab a
few thugs who will be replaced by other thugs the next month. Thank
you.
Mr. diGENOVA: Thank you very much, Professor. I want to open
up a bit of discussion in the time remaining between our panelists, but
I want to underscore something that's very important here, particularly
in light of the Professor's last remarks. And that is that frequently in
our hemisphere, particularly in Central America and South America,
the American government receives requests not to extradite people and
to use other means of an extraditable nature for political reasons of
that host country. It is a very common practice for internal political
reasons for those countries that wish that there not be extradition be-
cause they don't want to deal with that, and they prefer the rendition
method, and they are fully consenting in that process.
And there are recent cases to that effect, which I'm not going to
discuss, but they're there, and they're well-known. Bill, you wanted to
respond to some comments?
DR. LOWENFELD: What are those?
MR. diGENOVA: I'm not going to talk about the cases that I
know about, but the truth is that they are legion.
MR. BARR: I think there are two ways, you know there are two
perspectives of looking at renditions. One is from an international law
perspective, and the other is from the perspective of domestic law, basi-
cally U.S. criminal law. And I think from the perspective of interna-
tional law, there is very little disagreement, and I agree with Abe's
remarks about the importance of adhering to international norms. The
United States has a strong interest in developing a just set of interna-
tional norms that promote peace and stability in the world, and it is a
very serious matter with potentially grave consequences whenever the
United States chooses to ignore those aspects of customary interna-
tional law.
Now, let's look at it, however, from the standpoint of domestic
law. If the President directs the arrest of someone overseas without the
consent of the host government, there are a number of legal challenges
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that can be interposed, and that have been interposed. One challenge
relates to the legality of the arrest under U.S. law or under interna-
tional law. And it has been advanced that the United States cannot,
officers of the United States cannot arrest people overseas. They lack
the power. Therefore, you should throw out the case. It's also been ad-
vanced that while they may have the power as a matter of domestic
law, they violated customary international law, and a violation of cus-
tomary international law should be made an exception to Ker-Frisbee,
and you should throw out the case on that basis.
There have been other constitutional arguments interposed that
the arrest is a violation of the fourth amendment, the principal argu-
ment being that if it violates the law of the host country or if it violates
international law, it is, therefore, unreasonable, and therefore a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. I don't think that line of argument is
going to get yery far in the wake of Verdugo. And then there is the
argument that the arrest overseas is a violation of the fifth amendment,
and I think Toscanino has been greatly narrowed, and basically stands
for the proposition that absent extremely cruel treatment by the arrest-
ing authority such as torture of the arrestee, that there will be no viola-
tion of the fifth amendment.
And what we basically have being played out in the criminal
courts of the United States are these attempts to interpose irregulari-
ties in the arrests or the apprehension of those people, as a way of
escaping trial and ultimately punishment. And what we have in-and
I'm not going to comment extensively on Machain because it's on ap-
peal right now, but the rendition opinion of June of '89 basically says
that the United States does have the authority to violate customary
international law, and therefore an arrest in violation of customary in-
ternational law is lawful under U.S. law, and therefore, t does not pro-
vide a basis for the defendant to challenge the jurisdiction of the U.S.
court.
I think also the rule of law that is in the United States and will
continue to develop is that a violation of customary international law
will not provide a basis for escaping Ker-Frisbee. That once he had
been apprehended, even though there is a violation of customary inter-
national law, that's a matter between the states-it doesn't create indi-
vidual rights in the defendant. The defendant must stand trial. If we
have offended the sovereignty of another country, that's a matter be-
tween the United States and that country. And that was basically ap-
proached in the Eichmann case.
In Machain, what you have is an attempt to get around Ker-Fris-
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bee by suggesting that the rendition violated the extradition law, the
extradition treaty. And I think basically the position of the United
States is that we didn't violate the extradition treaty. We operated
outside the extradition treaty. We ignored the extradition treaty. We
did not go under the extradition treaty. It was obtained by other
means. The second basis of Judge Raffertie's opinion in Machain is
that you violated the treaty, and the violation of a treaty provides some
kind of special exception to Ker-Frisbee. That you can violate the Con-
stitution, you can violate federal statutes, but you can't violate a treaty.
If you violate a treaty, Ker-Frisbee must fold. Now we disagree with
that. We don't see a special exception for treaties under the Ker-Fris-
bee doctrine. In fact, it's counter-intuitive.
One would think that violations of the Constitution, the fundamen-
tal law of the land, would be more severe, and if anything-
DR. LOWENFELD: But you said it doesn't apply.
MR. BARR: Well-a violation of someone's constitutional rights
is more serious, and if anything would give rise to the Ker-Frisbee ex-
ception. It would be a violation of an individual's constitutional rights,
which hasn't been the doctrine under Ker-Frisbee, not the violation of a
treaty, which basically derives its authoritative nature from the Consti-
tution itself.
One thing that's interesting is to think about our own experience
as a federal republic. The United States has had a lot of experience
with extradition because of our early experience with extradition was
among the colonies, and then among the states. And we do have an
extradition treaty in our Constitution, as part of our compact as a Con-
stitution. I think it's Article IV, and we have the procedures whereby
one state governor can request another state to extradite somebody
back for punishment, trial and punishment. So that's our extradition
treaty built right into the Constitution. And let's not forget, while we're
dumping on Ker-Frisbee, we have a lot more current case law dealing
with snatches within the United States, where state governors have
filed protests against people being kidnapped from their states, and yet
the Ker-Frisbee rule has been applied, and that is that even though
there is a violation arguably of Article IV of the Constitution, our built
in extradition treaty in the Constitution, that's not enough to defeat the
jurisdiction of the court.
Just very briefly I want to say two things about points Abe raised.
And one is I think Abe is right that-and I think one of the great
services he performed in his capacity as Legal Adviser is focusing inter-
national law on where it should be focused, the basis of law, all law,
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including international law, should be protecting the innocent from
predators. And I see all too often among international publicists and
international journals and so forth a tendency to treat international law
as sort of the strands by which you tie down Gulliver so that the inter-
national predators and thugs can use it as a shield and go about the
world willy-nilly, and not enough attention paid to how the rule of law
must be made to protect the innocent against the predators. And that
leads to the other point that I think Abe adverted to, which is the con-
cept of self-defense. Many of the situations where the United States
might be tempted-I would not say it would ultimately be the deci-
sion-but many of the circumstances where renditions are talked about
are situations where we should think about the scope of the right to
self-defense and perhaps help the law evolve in a direction where the
right to self-defense is understood to permit some of the activities that
we're talking about.
Massive narcotics trafficking, sometimes with the complicity of the
government or the tolerance of the government, is a threat to our na-
tional security, and perhaps, you know, actions of self-defense that are
focused on apprehending the wrongdoer and then providing some due
process, are a better form of self-defense than more indiscriminate
ways of retaliating against that kind of conduct. And the same thing
can be said for terrorist activities whereby if you can bomb Qadhafi,
then why can't you arrest a terrorist as an act of self-defense.
Arresting a terrorist is far more focused with less collateral dam-
age and more due process than retaliatory measures. That's my
response.
JUDGE SOFAER: I think that it's interesting to me that Andy,
who I deeply respect and obviously I agree with most of what he says
in his articles, that Andy takes exception to the Supreme Court repeat-
edly, and so do so many people in this field who want to restrain these
seizures overseas. It isn't-the notion that people who are opposed to
these kinds of seizures want to convey to the world, and the press, of
course, joins them in trying to convey this notion-that "the government
is some kind of a monster that's going out there and acting illegally
repeatedly and in every way. Well, the fact of the matter is that the
Supreme Court has made clear that certain things are the law, and
people are very unhappy with that law, and to the extent that interna-
tional law is relevant, and it certainly is, the principle of consent is a
principle that relates to the state of mind of two states. It isn't a matter
that they should have to convince Andy Lowenfeld or judge anybody
about. It is a sovereign matter, and I don't understand why Andy needs
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to know all these things. Why are you so curious?
DR. LOWENFELD: You told me I should wake up, didn't you?
JUDGE SOFAER: Yeah, wake up.
(Laughter.)
JUDGE SOFAER: Wake up to what I think is a reality that is
behind this kind of instinctual notion in American lawyers that the only
way to deal with a problem is to give some criminal the right to com-
plain about it in a federal court. That is not the only way to deal with
the problem. If we are doing something wrong as a government, as a
society, my God, there are plenty of ways of stopping us, and every one
of us who serves in the government as a lawyer, who has any guts, and
we all do, and certainly the people at this table do because I've seen
memos from Joe and Bill, we'll complain and we'll stop things from
happening that shouldn't happen.
Isn't that the first test? And if there isn't a lot of complaining, my
goodness, why are we letting this guy who maybe watched somebody
get cut up in pieces, vicious human being, have some rights that we
don't need to give him? Why are we doing it? It's ridiculous. Now, if
the state did complain, well, then let's go and deal with that problem
because that's a serious problem. In fact, some officials violated the
sovereignty of a state and did not have any consent, well, I think that
remedies are appropriate and there are plenty of them. Look at the
historical record.
Sure, in Eichmann, they did not get Eichmann back. I don't think
they really wanted him. And I would tell you, though, that very often
people are given back, very often, historically. The record is quite ex-
traordinary that when there, in fact, is no consent, these people are
frequently given back politically, not because some federal district
judge decided that a murderer or someone who participated in a mur-
der, should be given some kind of human rights treatment.'
I just want to accept the hypothetical and let's face it right in the
eye. I was the one who raised with Senator Specter this hypothetical of
the British coming and taking an IRA suspect because Sprizzo
wouldn't extradite him, and Herrhausen's killers would be another one,
but not as fair because there we don't have in international treaty, and
it isn't clear that they violated an international criminal law. And I
think that's a very important thing that when some person who has
violated international law concerning which the state involved a duty to
extradite that adds a very important international legal dimension, but
let's take that hypothetical and I would stand by my position.
I would think the Attorney General would join me, and Bill would
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join me in saying we would not seek the exclusion of evidence in the
case of a murderer in a foreign court to enable a person to be acquitted
in a criminal prosecution for the murder of the banker Herrhausen,
whose wife I met at dinner once in my travels around the world, who I
sat with and heard her talk about their only child, and had to remem-
ber that for the rest of my life that this man was murdered like he was,
as viciously and as mindlessly. I would not seek in any way, shape or
form any alleviation of his problems even if he were picked up in the
United States.
I would protest to the German government, and I would insist on
something being worked out that was acceptable to the United States
relating to him, but I would think that if he were punished criminally
for a crime of that kind of seriousness, it would be perfectly acceptable.
DR. LOWENFELD: May I get in a quick word? Just a couple of
quick remarks. I'm really anxious to feel how the parliament feels here.
Bill Barr keeps using the word "customary" in front of international
law as if that somehow weakens international law. I don't think that's
right. I think traditionally customary international law has, if anything,
a higher standing than treaty law, and I think without digressing too
much, we've got 200,000 troops in the Persian Gulf right now to defend
that principle of international law so I think it's a mistake to just de-
preciate it.
Now Judge Sofaer says, well, I don't like what the Supreme Court
does. Of course, it's interesting that the Supreme Court has not heard a
kidnapping case as this kind of a kidnapping case since Frisbee was a
domestic case, and it came to the Supreme Court in 1952 before Earl
Warren and before that whole revolution. It's interesting also that the
Judge Rafeedie, a Reagan appointee, and as far as I kiow a conserva-
tive Southern California judge, looked at this whole controversy-I
mean the whole conspiracy in the Camarena case which was certainly a
brutal-and said I've had enough. This is the third or the fourth guy
they've snatched and stop a minute. And finally Abe's plea about these
terrible killers, that, of course, is the whole argument against the exclu-
sionary rule in any case. We can deter the police by punishing them.
Mr. Miranda and Mr. Escobedo were not lovely people either.
Somewhere along the line-I'm not a criminal law specialist, and
maybe it was a mistake-but somewhere along the line over the last
twenty, thirty years, we developed the position that it's better-that we
have no other way to make the police behave properly than to say if
you misbehave, the suspect walks no matter how evil he is. And I re-
gret to say that I would like to have if Mr. Barr were able to say I'm
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going to issue an order that this kind of thing stops, that's fine. I don't
make this great plea for the exclusionary rule. My plea is that the
United States government ought not to behave in a way that fights
crime with crime.
MR. diGENOVA: Let's open it up to some questions from the
floor in the little bit of time we have remaining. Perhaps we have gen-
erated some interest with this rather lively discussion. Can we speed it
up here and ask as quickly as you can?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Mr. Barr, I believe you also au-
thored an opinion earlier last year that the Posse Comitatus Act doesn't
apply outside the United States. Can you l'ut together that opinion
with the opinion that you spent so much time talking about here, and I
guess the question would be if the President has the authority to order
the FBI to act outside the territorial borders of the United States in
violation of customary international law, can he do the same thing with
the 82nd Airborne? This is self-serving, I realize.
MR. BARR: Yes. The Posse Comitatus opinion dealt with the ex-
traterritorial effect of the post-Civil War, the Reconstruction Era re-
striction on use of military for law enforcement purposes. And the con-
clusion of the opinion was that it was meant to be restricted to the
territorial United States. That it really was intended to prevent federal
troops from interfering in state law enforcement activity. It was never
intended to have extraterritorial effect. That opinion was consistent
with the only circuit court case that has been decided on the issue is
well as a number of Defense Department opinions on the issue.
So under the Posse Comitatus opinion, the military overseas can
be used for law enforcement purposes, if they are directed by the Presi-
dent to undertake law enforcement activities. Under our view of it, the
President does have the authority to authorize military personnel to en-
gage in law enforcement activities including arrests outside the United
States, and, in fact, in the operation in Panama, the President did au-
thorize the military to apprehend people who were indicted, members
of the PDF who were indicted in the United States. Now those appre-
hensions were not made by military personnel, but they did have the
authority at the time of the operation to do that.
JUDGE SOFAER: And the government, the legitimate govern-
ment of Panama, accepted that, agreed to it.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: But the rest of that question was
based on that second question. Sir, could the President use the United
States military as he could use the FBI in violating customary interna-
tional law outside the United States?
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MR. BARR: Well, strictly speaking, as a matter of law as opposed
to whether that's good policy or appropriate from an international law
standpoint, you could use as a matter of domestic law, it would be our
view that you could use the military then in the same way you use the
FBI.
Mr. diGENOVA: Yes, Sir. Please.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: My name is Professor Abraham Abramov-
sky from Fordham Law School and I would like to ask you, Mr. Barr,
let's assume-let's forget about Germany and England, for a second.
Let's assume that you had an Iraqi unofficial delegation coming over to
the United States saying that we don't like Aramco people because
they have divested our soil against Iraqi law of natural resources, and
consequently we're taking four of them with us as guests. Would you
say that international law has no part to play over here, and would you
rely strictly on the Ker-Frisbee doctrine?
MR. BARR: Well, obviously, you haven't been listening to what I
said. I think it's clear that under customary international law, that
would be a problem for the United States. That would be a violation of
customary international law. So, yes, it does have international implica-
tions. It's violating international law. It's a serious business.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: What would you say to the Iraqis when
they said to you, and I believe they would, we're relying on Ker-Frisbee
doctrine?
MR. BARR: Well, see, Ker-Frisbee is not a doctrine of interna-
tional law. It's a doctrine of whether there should be an exclusionary
rule in the U.S. courts for violations of law that bring about, you know,
where the body has been produced before the court because of a viola-
tion of law. It's a domestic rule of law. I don't know whether the Iraqis
have a Ker-Frisbee or not.
MR. diGENOVA: It would not apply, for example, in Iraqi
courts, which I understand don't exist anymore.
(Laughter.)
MR. diGENOVA: It would not apply in Iraqi courts, if that's your
question. There's also a secondary question.
JUDGE SOFAER: Ker-Frisbee is universally followed.
MR. diGENOVA: There's a secondary question which is that
under the conditions which attend in the world today and have for the
last decade at least, various terrorist groups from all kinds of countries,
Arab and otherwise, have essentially declared war on the United
States, in essence, without formal declaration of war, have acted as if
they were at war with the United States, and have issued religious gen-
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eral warrants of arrest for American citizens all over the world and
have taken them into custody, have tortured them, have killed them,
have denied them their rights and privileges as citizens of the world.
The United States has acted with exceeding restraint during that
period of time, and has seen allies succumb to pressures, deal with ter-
rorists, cut side deals, think they were insulated and subsequently find
themselves the victims of terrorist activities notwithstanding their se-
cret faustian arrangements.
JUDGE SOFAER: Our record is not perfect, Joe.
MR. diGENOVA: Indeed, I alluded to that during my own re-
marks with the regrettable reference to the Iran-Contra affair. The
United States, however, retains the right of any free nation to defend
its citizens wherever they may be even if, even if it violates the sover-
eign law of a nation which is, in turn, violating the sovereign rights of
American citizens. It is regrettable, for example, that the United States
has had in some instances to resort to rendition, but the truth is there
are some countries which have purposely acted in violation of all inter-
national norms of conduct, and, in fact, if people had a little guts in the
1930s we might not have had the Holocaust.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Well, I would agree with you to a certain
extent, and you're sort of preaching to the choir a little bit because I'm
of Israeli background myself. But the thing is, what I'm trying to ask is
this. In this particular situation, Kerr, would you agree was a fluke
case?
MR. BARR: No, it's been followed repeatedly in the courts.
JUDGE SOFAER: You can look at the domestic law of every for-
eign country.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: I know that it was followed by the Ameri-
can courts.
MR. BARR: It was also followed by foreign courts.
JUDGE SOFAER: I don't know of any foreign court that doesn't
follow the same rule.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Well, I could think of a couple who don't,
but the thing is, you know, let's get away from that for a second.
Would you say that the Toscanino exception-
JUDGE SOFAER: It comes out of the Roman system. I mean it's
not just something that was made up in the 1930s.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: I understand. I just wanted-
JUDGE SOFAER: It's an old thing, you know.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Let's go one step at a time. You say that
the Toscanino exception, although well meant, has never been applied
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in any case in the United States, even when medical records have been
presented-
MR. BARR: Well, as I said, the Toscanino case, I think, has been
substantially narrowed, and now requires egregious conduct, and to the
extent, and basically the United States has a good record. We don't
engage in that kind of conduct.
JUDGE SOFAER: You know the reason all those people keep
calling Andy to help him with their cases is because they figure Andy's
only motive must be to be going in the business of criminal defense law.
They can't understand any other purpose in his taking the position he
takes.
(Laughter.)
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: I would believe that, and believe me that
I'm not a spokesman for the Guadalahara cartel or any other. But the
notion that I'm getting at is I think that there's a substantial difference
when you're talking about the regular rendition, which is this sub rosa
agreement on the bottom between two law enforcement agencies, which
is either affirmatively supported by the asylum state or acquiesced to
by the asylum state, or in the case of Alvarez, we're into Mexicans,
who said, hey, this one is out. Now the question is, the next question
that I have, do we have a little bit of a double standard over here say-
ing, well, when it comes to Canadians and Jaffe, the Canadians are
little bit more cultured? They're a little bit more humane? They're a
little bit more trustworthy? They're a little bit more whatever?
Are we saying that, okay, but in the case of Mexicans, right, even
though they feel that their sovereignty and their territorial integrity has
been violated and they're saying-and I have no reason not to believe
them-that they will prosecute Machain to the full extent of the law,
here we're not going to repatriate a la Jaffe. Is there or do you feel that
there is a sort of-and I'll ask Abe Sofaer the same thing at the same
time--is there a little difference over here? Is there a double standard?
MR. BARR: Well, as I said, I'm not sure there's a double stan-
dard and I don't want to get into Mexico, but let me say generally that
Abe raises a good question. Why should the consent of the state or
whether in fact there was consent bear upon the jurisdiction in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding? That's really a matter for the sovereign
states to deal with, and, you know, unfortunately we live in a world
where sometimes it's very difficult to ascertain whether we have consent
or not. We may hear: and that's why I wonder why that should be the
pivotal rule for an exclusionary doctrine.
Suppose we're told by a country, look, you can have this guy, but
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as a matter of, but publicly, we have to complain because we're going
to get zapped by these terrorists? Our Arab brethren out there aren't
going to like it if we're playing footsie with you. So you can take them
but don't ask us. We may have to protest it just to cover ourselves on
that. What are we supposed to do? Or you may have a situation where,
in fact, we do get consent from an element of the government, and then
there is a subsequent debate in the government and there is political
embarrassment, and although they, in fact, legitimate officials con-
sented, and we thought we were operating with consent, they changed
their mind. Or in some cases you could have bribery of foreign officials,
because in the drug area there's a lot of money washing around.
So it's very hard to go back and reconstruct exactly what the state
of mind was. I think Abe's point was that as a matter of international
law, if a country ultimately determines or wants to take a public posi-
tion that its sovereignty has been violated, the remedy is between the
states. That's what international law is all about.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: So you think that Mexico should-
MR. BARR: There should not be an exclusionary rule in criminal
law.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: So you think that Mexico-rather than to
the Justice Department, the courts, et cetera? Is that the answer?
MR. BARR: Excuse me. I didn't hear what you said.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: What I'm saying is did Mexico do wrong
or err?
MR. BARR: I didn't say anything about Mexico. I didn't say any-
thing about Mexico.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: No, but I'm talking about Mexico. Insofar
as Alvarez is concerned, should they have gone directly to Baker and
forgotten about supeivisory powers of federal courts, forgotten about
the fact that there is a right, you know, for an individual, albeit he's
accused of nefarious offenses? I'm sure this is not a great human being.
Is there some sort of a problem of going through the judicial system
concomitant-
MR. BARR: Well, the issue is whether-I'm saying there should
not be an exclusionary rule for the body of a criminal to enforce inter-
national obligations between states. Customary international law does
not create individual rights. It deals with the rights between states.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Precisely. But the individual derivative
right-
JUDGE SOFAER: Could I just say-
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Just one second--derivative right, okay,
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which is then followed by his government. Here you have the govern-
ment saying-I'm sorry-but here it's not just Alvarez just like it was
in Toscanino, like it was in all the other cases, here it is the Mexican
government itself saying you violated our territorial integrity and sover-
eignty. We are not going to bring this guy and throw a bachelor's party
for him. We are going to incarcerate the man. We're going to prose-
cute him to the fullest length of our laws. And now they're under the
magnifying glass.
MR. BARR: Well, I'm not going to talk about the Mexico situa-
tion. As I say, again, there are two ways. I think Abe's point was cor-
rect that if there are violations of international law, there are remedies.
We should not adopt an exclusionary, some exception to the Ker-Fris-
bee doctrine.
JUDGE SOFAER: And incidentally, we have given back people
that were seized in Mexico several times in the last hundred years, sev-
eral times.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Okay.
JUDGE SOFAER: In fact, generally we have given them back.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Thank you.
MR. diGENOVA: Thank you. Thank you very much, ladies and
gentlemen. We appreciate it.
(Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the meeting adjourned, to reconvene at
9:00 a.m., Friday, October 12, 1990.)
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I. PARAMETERS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
MR. SPURLOCK: It's a great pleasure for me to chair this panel,
which I think is an extraordinarily significant one. Our hemispheric
partners perception of our commitment to the rule of law will to a sig-
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nificant extent be governed by the way in which we use our military
forces in the hemisphere. And what complicates that issue for us is that
we're dealing in our country with a multiplicity of agencies performing
a multiplicity of functions under multiple legislative mandates, and
we've heard some comments in previous panels about the lack of over-
sight or coordination in terms of those multiple functions and agencies.
And added to the equation as far as the use of military force is
concerned is the fact that we've created some extraordinary capabilities
within the Department of Defense which are capable of being used in
the drug war and against narco-terrorism. Most specifically I'm refer-
ring to the new special operations command, which now has its internal
intelligence or organic intelligence capabilities, and which has the ca-
pability of operating covertly.
Additionally complicating application of rule of law are the new
technical means which have been developed during and in response to
the Soviet threat and which are now capable of being used in these
efforts. But U.S. persons are so intimately involved in hemispheric com-
merce and normal relationships that our intelligence capabilities can
come under the same kind of scrutiny encountered during the late '60s
and early '70s. The credibility of our commitment to the rule of law, I
think, will be significantly determined at least in the eyes of our hemi-
spheric partners by the way in which we use these military structures.
The seriousness and meaning of this issue as it relates to the overall
topic of this conference is exemplified by the responsibilities and the
scholarship of the members of this panel.
Terrence O'Donnell is the Department of Defense (DOD) General
Counsel. He's coming up on his anniversary, which I believe is October
30, in that position. He's a graduate of the United St:ates Air Force
Academy, Georgetown Law School. He served in Vietnam where he
was honored as a recipient of the Bronze Star. He was a special assis-
tant to President Ford and from- 1977 to assuming his position in the
Department of Defense he was a partner in Williams &. Connolly. Mr.
O'Donnell.
MR. O'DONNELL: Del, thank you. I was asked to address the
program now in place at the Department of Defense with respect to the
counter-narcotics mission, and to briefly address the legal parameters
and limitations under which we operate on a day to day basis. Last
month, as many of you know, the Department marked the first anniver-
sary of its enhanced commitment to international counter-drug effort
and counter-narcotics mission. The Secretary of Defense, Secretary
Cheney, on September 18 of last year described the effort as a "high
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priority national security mission."
Those words in the department are extremely significant because,
for the very first time, the leadership of the Department have identified
and described this counter-narcotics effort as a national security mis-
sion. As all of you know, the military has been involved in counter-
narcotics efforts for quite some time. But it's fair to say that involve-
ment did not represent a full departmental commitment with the bless-
ing of the Secretary and the President, as a national security mission.
I think we have made significant progress within the limitations
that we must live with over the period of the year in attempting to
define and pursue this mission assignment. Actual Department expend-
itures for counter-drug activities have increased from roughly 425 mil-
lion in FY '89 to 875 million in FY '90, and DOD expects its budget
for '91 counter-narcotics activities will exceed a billion dollars. The ac-
tual expenditures of the department in support of those activities in '91
will probably approach two billion when all training activities and re-
lated activities are taken into account.
The increase in the DOD counter-narcotics budget has been ac-
companied by a drastic increase in the level of DOD support to the
counter-drug effort. The Department has placed particular emphasis on
assisting the Andean nations of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, the source
of virtually the entire world's supply of cocaine. While much of the
support currently being provided by the armed forces is classified, I can
tell you, for example, that the Southern Command has sent some 49
mobile training teams to train South American counter-narcotics policy
and military forces in such areas as air intercept, operations, riverline
operations, the use of radar, communications, and intelligence.
Logistic support to various joint U.S.-host country operations has
also increased significantly. The Department has emphasized its human
intelligence and analytical intelligence capabilities in support of the
U.S. counter-narcotics activities. In addition, DOD has provided ap-
proximately $65 million in draw down of equipment, training and re-
lated services to Colombia under the Foreign Assistance Act, including
C-130, A-37, and UH-1 aircraft, assault boats, fuel trucks, sidearms,
ammunition and the like. The President recently directed delivery of
another $53 million in similar support to Colombia and five other na-
tions in the region. During the past year, the United States armed
forces have steadily increased their effort in the fight to intercept drugs
in transit to the U.S., as well.
The Department has applied a wide array of technical assets in
this mission including Airborne Early Warning and Control System
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(AWACS), aerostat radar balloons, and an expanded interagency com-
munications network. DOD reconnaissance activity since '89 has in-
creased to over 3,800 ship steaming days and 40,000 flying hours in
1990, increases of approximately eighty percent and 100 percent re-
spectively. AWACS flying hours dedicated to the counter-narcotics
mission have grown from 38 percent to a high at one point during last
year of approximately fifty-one percent of the total AWACS flying
hours available to the Department of Defense.
A particularly important need of the many law enforcement agen-
cies has been the challenge to find a way to communicate with each
other and to transmit up to the minute intelligence. DOD is now over
two-thirds of the way to completing a secure interoperable communica-
tions network called ADNET allowing federal law enforcement agen-
cies to talk with and send data to each other instantaneously. Origi-
nally, eighteen ADNET sites around the country were planned. Due to
the success of the system, 75 sites are now planned and 48 are cur-
rently operational.
Eventually, the system will be available to agents in the field who
will be able to communicate in secure fashion from lap-top computers
operating via cellular telephone. This communications ability is an area
where the military has been able to help significantly. The agencies, I
think it is fair to say, simply were not wired together in the past.
Translating intelligence into operations and action quickly is essential
in successful counter-narcotics operations. Along the southwest border,
Joint Task Force Six was established in November, 1989 in El Paso,
Texas to spearhead DOD support to the law enforcement agencies in
this critical area of trafficking.
This is the third DOD Joint Task Force dedicated to counter-nar-
cotics. Working closely with Operation Alliance, a consortium of fed-
eral, state, and local border state law enforcement agencies, the mili-
tary has supported numerous requests by law enforcement agencies for
assistance along the southwest border. DOD missions have included
long-range border patrols, tunnel detection, surveillance, cross-training
of military and law enforcement personnel, and improvements of bor-
der access roads. In May of this year, with the help of the tunnel detec-
tion equipment provided by DOD, a joint Customs-military mission un-
covered a football field long concrete tunnel under the Mexican-
American border: a major artery for transport of drugs :from south and
central America to the United States.
I visited Joint Task Force Six, and saw that they operate under
significant problems. For example, on the inside of the Texas-Mexico
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border, approximately ninety percent of the land immediately contigu-
ous to the border is private property. The Immigration Service and bor-
der patrol can cross and access that property. The military cannot.
The question of whether Congress will provide legislation to per-
mit the military to carry out its mission, which Congress has directed,
to train to the maximum extent possible in border areas, is a difficult
one. Should the military transgress private property? It's a difficult is-
sue. Fifty percent of the entire border between Mexico and the United
States is private property. So while DOD is permitted to conduct train-
ing missions and other activities on the border, we cannot access that
property without permission of the landowners. And there is reasonable
basis to believe and good intelligence to support the notion that private
land is being used to receive narcotics that are being run through a
very porous border.
If you ask a landowner for permission, and if that landowner is
engaged in illegal activities, you can be sure that either the answer will
be no, or if the answer is yes, he's not going to be running any opera-
tions during the period of time that the military is training with night
vision capability on his property.
In addition to the operations conducted on the border, the Atlantic
Command in the Caribbean, the Forces Command on the Southern
Border and the Pacific Command in the Pacific have also been actively
engaged in counter-narcotics activities. Those commands have been di-
rected by the Secretary of Defense that counter-narcotics support is a
mission-not an activity-that will be persued. It is a high priority
mission. These activities are indicative of the changing role of the De-
partment in the fight against drugs. In recent years, we have witnessed
as well a gradual expansion of DOD's legal authority to assist in the
fight, both at home and abroad.
In 1982, Congress began to loosen the nineteenth century stric-
tures of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of the Army
or the Air Force to execute the law except where expressly authorized
by the Constitution or by statute. Specifically, in the area of drug en-
forcement, it authorized a "slight narrow departure" by permitting
DOD personnel to operate equipment in support of drug law enforce-
ment operations. It also authorized the transportation of law enforce-
ment personnel outside the United States to enforce the drug laws, but
only in conditions determined by the Secretary of Defense and the At-
torney General. However, the 1982 law prohibited military equipment
from being used to interdict or interrupt the passage of vessels or air-
craft and specifically prohibited military personnel from participating
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directly in the interdiction of such traffic, or from participating in
search, seizure, arrest or similar activity unless otherwise authorized by
law.
DOD was further prohibited from providing assistance if it would
adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. From
this cautious beginning, the opening in the Posse Comi;tatus wall and
the principles behind it has increased, and has slowly widened as com-
peting factions in Congress have struggled over the proper role of the
military in the war on drugs. In the 1989 National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act, Congress continued to expand the Department's role by mak-
ing it the lead agency of the federal government for the aerial and
maritime detection and monitoring of the transit of illegal drugs, rather
than interception, interdiction, arrest, search and seizure.
Congress also established a requirement that the Department, to
the maximum extent practical, as I mentioned before, take into account
the needs of civilian law enforcement officials when planning and exe-
cuting military training exercises. So we are attempting wherever possi-
ble to schedule training exercises using night vision devices and the like
in border areas and to conduct reconnaissance training missions in a
manner that serves the needs of the civilian law enforcement
authorities.
The congressional conferees, however, rejected proposals that
DOD directly participate in domestic law enforcement activities and
termed that proposal a radical break with the historical separation be-
tween the military and civilian functions. The conferees noted that "the
American experience has been marked by a traditional and strong re-
sistance to any military intrusion into civilian affairs." Thus, the De-
partment of Defense was instructed to continue providing indirect sup-
port in the form of intelligence, equipment, expertise, training, and the
like. As international drug cartels gained prominence, and as countries
in the Andean region were further subverted by their activities, we
have received some additional authority in the international arena. As
you know, in 1989 the Department of Justice issued a. legal opinion
which concluded that neither the Posse Comitatus Act nor the prohibi-
tions of section 375 of Title 10 apply outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.
The significance of this opinion is that the criminal proscriptions
against the use of the Army and Air Force to enforce criminal laws
does not necessarily apply outside the United States. There are many
other implications to military action outside the United States which
were addressed by Mike Matheson. I'm going to skip over these so we
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have time for questions and a discussion of domestic law as it pertains
to some of our international operations. But note that the Department
of Defense in the last year has taken so seriously the mission assign-
ment from the Secretary of Defense that it is beginning to organize the
effort as if it were a war effort; with intelligence communications cells
within the Joint Staff and within the unified commands.
But make no mistake about it, the Department labors both domes-
tically and internationally under numerous policy and legal restraints,
which in significant ways undermine the type of assistance we can per-
form. We also operate with respect for the sovereignty and the expres-
sions of that sovereignty of the countries in the region and with respect
for their air space. We operate under limitations that have been negoti-
ated and placed on the nautical mile standoff under which our ships
can approach the land mass and perform intelligence, tracking, board-
ing operations and the like. These are very significant factors. The an-
swer is one of continued pressure, negotiation, training, and working
with these countries to make the effort more effective.
I think intelligence capabilities of the military are enormous and
can perhaps be the single factor that can make the difference in this
war on drugs. But intelligence has to be able to be translated into oper-
ational action, and we are not, we are precluded from going out and
participating in specific operations in these countries to interdict labo-
ratories and to interfere with the cartels' activities which are carried on
with impunity in these countries. But we can train and support-and
that training and support is much needed in those countries if they are
going to effectively deal with the internal power and growth of the
counter-narcotics activities within their borders. Thank you, Del.
MR. SPURLOCK: Thank you, Terry.
II. RouND TABLE DISCUSSION: TOWARD NEW LEGAL
INITIATIVES
DR. MOORE: Let's begin this panel. The important objective of
this conference is to begin to focus more specifically on what it is that
we might do by way of new initiative that could make a difference.,
How can we have changes, either in policy or new articulations of pol-
icy, or changes in the legal structure and suggestions for such change,
that might make a difference in this struggle against narco-terrorism?
We have a particularly distinguished and experienced panel with
us today. I'm going to follow the order as they are appearing here on
the program, and we'll start with my colleague on the Government and
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Foreign Affairs faculty at the University of Virginia, Ambassador
David C. Jordan. Ambassador Jordan was the United States Ambassa-
dor to Peru in March 1984 to July 1986. So obviously he has hands-on
experience in this whole subject matter.
Long before he became an ambassador, he was a colleague that
many of us in Virginia working in international affairs depended on
particularly. He was, for example, the chairman of the Department of
Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia from
September 1, 1969 to August 31, 1977. He is certainly one of the na-
tion's top experts in Latin American affairs. He was a member of the
Founding Committee of the Latin American Studies Association. He
has written extensively in the area of Latin American a-ad national se-
curity affairs and international relations. I could go on and on as to all
of his extensive qualifications, but I think it would be more appropriate
to hear directly from one of the nation's top Latin American experts,
Ambassador David Jordan.
AMBASSADOR JORD5AN: Thank you, John. The more I looked
into the problem of coming up with solutions, the more frightened I
became at the magnitude of that problem. I thought what I might do
briefly for you is to give you a very straightforward assessment of what
I think is the scope of the problem and the problem of the United
States government's political culture, the organizational deficiency in
our government, the lack of political will, and our society's overall
responsibility.
First of all, looking at the scope of the problem, everybody talks
about this over and over again in the context of the supply and the
demand sides of it. We all have seen from the discussions thus far in
these various panels how many different agencies in the U.S. govern-
ment are involved, and how many different aspects of the problems
they face. Let me give you briefly, for example, the situation in one
country such as Peru.
The United States historically had both a crop eradication pro-
gram and an enforcement program. It was also trying to assist the
country's economy, which was increasingly collapsing. It had a demo-
cratic problem trying to stabilize the nation's democracy. It was deal-
ing with a country that might lead a debt cartel in terms of the United
States in the context of a growing problem in terms of the payments of
overseas debts. The United Stafes faced all of these kinds of problems
and, in effect, had multiple objectives with respect to its drug agenda
and its other substantive policies without a way of absolutely working
out a coordination between them.
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My instructions, for example, included breaking the Soviet connec-
tion, which had over a $3 billion military investment which required a
whole series of purposes and policies on the part of th United States
government. At the same time, we were supposed to stabilize the gov-
ernment and have it pay its debts and destroy its largest earning crop
for the government, where you obviously were recognizing less than full
desire to do that on the part of the government, even though it provided
lip service to it.
Now that's just to briefly give you a sense of the problem of multi-
ple objectives and multiple agencies. I would like to talk to you briefly
about what I would call the U.S. government's political culture. The
first acronym that I encountered when I went into the United States
government was CIA. I like to put it this way: The greatest myth was
the sign that was placed on President Truman's desk which says "the
buck stops here." The whole objective that I encountered in the United
States government is what I would call "destruction of the buck."
If there can be any problem, you will become a problem if you
pass the buck. Buck is the main thing that has to be destroyed. For
example, anyone who has had some experience probably watched with
great interest the latest and probably one of the more recent public
examples of buck I have seen. The buck suddenly seemed to fall for
Saddam Hussein on the American ambassador. Then the buck went to
the Assistant Secretary of State. That pretty well got passed up almost
immediately to the Secretary of State and the President, which got
sabotaged by an article in The Wall Street Journal. Then it got shifted
to Congress, which got its transcripts published with respect to its visit,
and the buck finally got destroyed by passing it on to the U.S. farmers.
What we have, in effect, is that you want to be part of the action,
but you don't want to be responsible for it. And that requires knowing
how to handle the buck. So our first issue here is the whole question of
being able to have some responsibility, to have some action, but not
being able to have responsibility for any of the adverse consequences.
That's why State can make progress, but the problem gets worse.
DEA can make progress, but the problem gets worse. Every agency can
report progress, but it gets worse. Another example for us was in terms
of our crop eradication program. What I couldn't figure out was how
we ever got to the figure of 60,000 hectares to eradicate. The target
was 6,000 a year, and then obviously the problem would be over in ten
years.
The problem, of course, was we would eradicate. We'd get 5,000,
but the next estimate we had was 120,000, and, of course, then the
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problem was how do you figure this out. So it was intelligence that
became the problem because they haven't told us what the proper num-
ber of hectares was. So we passed this stuff around and around and
around. So my first sort of general statement for you is that the govern-
ment, in terms of the straight foreign policy line of the thing, has to
have some idea of what its objectives are and someone has to get the
buck. Ambassadors don't want it.
Now, the next aspect of the scope of this problem is the retreat or
the flight to multinational issues. They say, well, we'll give it to the
U.N. Don't hold your breath. The U.N. will take what it wants to take,
which is what I would call the soft target. What we found the U.N.
wanted to do was to get only involved a little bit with some kind of
experimental program with alternative crops, but it didn't want to be
linked in any way with enforcement or anything that might make it a
target for anything else. So your problem is if you're going to rely on
the U.N. for initiative, I am afraid you're in for a slight
disappointment.
Also, in terms of the international dimension, I think one of the
more promising areas is clearly the international financial regime. But
if you look at that, and you go through and you look at :Kerry Amend-
ments and you look at Vienna Conventions, and you look bilaterally,
the essential motivation behind it is some sort*of coercive punishment
pattern. Now the problem with the coercive punishment pattern, you
can always see in the ABA reports is the bankers are saying, look, just
when we're getting into the system of freer transactions and all the
rest, along comes the government and wants to squeeze down on us and
find and impute to us all kinds of motivations for why we're committing
offenses to get around it.
Some of them will tell you it looks to them like a lawyers' employ-
ment act; that they will find out and have to be trying to protect them-
selves for how they are transmitting funds. I suggest, and this will be
the general idea here for you, that what you've probably got to do with
respect to greed is fight it with greed, and try to find some kind of
incentives in there for them to get a piece of the money that they're
going after to make sure that they would find, kind of a push to pick it
up or track it.
Within this, there's also an enormous aspect that involves Ameri-
can domestic responsibility. I'm convinced that the American public
does not know, for example, the full implications of what the Marion
Barry trial had for our standing with respect to going out there and
pushing on governments to curtail economic activities and crack down
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on people when they basically look at the United States' attitudes on
the drug consumption situation as barely ludicrous.
So we have there, in terms of the spectrum of the problem, some-
thing that encompasses an enormously complex implementation side in
the foreign field, a number of false starts probably in the multinational
regime field, and a clearly inadequate domestic attitude toward the
consumption and use of drugs. Now, the second area on this that I'd be
talking about is in terms of taking some kind of initiative, since clearly
this thing is organizationally fundamentally inadequate.
I do not mean to impugn individuals' or groups' efforts or atti-
tudes. But the position that's been allocated for coordinating this effort
does not even have Cabinet status. It has a primitive staff, and if you
really look at the efforts that are going to be involved, they've got to
have assets from everything from Education and Agriculture to De-
fense, Justice, State and the rest. So what you're really looking at here,
from an organizational structure, is no clear indication that the United
States is serious whatsoever in having some kind of a structure that
would coordinate and provide a forum for discussing all these extraor-
dinarily complex problems.
Thirdly on this-which is linked to my area-is the lack of politi-
cal will. This is a very complicated problem. I suspect that what you
really have when you determine will is budget allocation. It's sort of a
standard political science measure to say that you've really allocated
values in your political system when you fund them. Recently, we have
had an opportunity to see what we do when we do go to war, or what
we think we are about to get in the Middle East. Command and control
is centralized. Assets are moved and mobilized, and in terms even of
the conflict area, if you know the way the structure is, usually the am-
bassador would have overall command with respect to the problem of,
let's say, Saudi Arabia. You put in a military operation. He doesn't run
it. It's now directed in terms of the operations designed to meet that
war or conflict, and it is something that is outside of the normal way
you do things.
So you have some idea of what it is you do with respect to waging
a war when you have political will and you go about deciding to do
something about it. Now, normally what I think is the case when you
have something like this-and you don't have the budget allocation-is
that one month of Desert Shield is more than the entire budget for the
war on drugs. You ask what's going on, and you say, well, obviously
the issue is still a rhetorical one for your political leadership rather
than one of fundamental commitment. So if you don't have the alloca-
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tions that are made to the conflict that demonstrate the allocation of
values, you do not have a full commitment. You are managing the
problem, not attacking it.
Now in that regard, you get to the fourth area of where I see the
responsibility lies. I suspect that most of us agree that politicians and
leadership react to heat from below, and if there is not enough heat
there, they're not going to do the things that they think are necessary
for the policy agenda. So ultimately in this, if we are becoming serious
about what this problem is all about, there is a societal responsibility, a
responsibility for the elements of society to begin to address what this
is all about.
Now let me just give you some ideas of how devastatingly danger-
ous this thing is to the United States. One of the things the Americans
are still relatively unaware of, although Bennett has been putting this
stuff out now increasingly, is what this is doing to American children.
We are looking at better than ten percent of the American live births
that are now addicted. When you start adding that up in terms of the
cost to society, it is going to become absolutely astronomical.
If you look at the other aspects of it, one of the things in terms of
education, and I'm just going to touch on this briefly because obviously
I don't have a great deal of time for you, but if you're going to be
serious about this, you've got to realize that the United States as a
society has got to be supporting those values in the American popula-
tion that are self-restraining. If you continue to support, and if the
United States and if massive amounts of money and the popular cul-
ture continues to move towards self-indulgence, then the social struc-
ture, the social value system, and the rest, reinforce the problem that
drug activity is exacerbating. And the society is failing in providing the
moral structure whereby its own people are going to be able to provide
the milieu to resist it.
And therefore, whether you realize it or not, you will also be un-
dermining the pressure you're going to be generating on Congress be-
cause the more it sees its own society disintegrating, the less there will
be a coherent expression of outrage and protest to what is happening in
the culture at large. In addition to this, you have to stress the problem
of what is occurring with respect to the security involvement. People
are now aware, for example, of the Bloods and the Crips in Los Ange-
les. The Bloods and the Crips type problems are eme:rging into the
smaller cities and towns of the United States and we are going to have
an increasingly massive security problems inside as more and more
groups move into this type of activity throughout our societal structure.
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Very briefly, my sort of five categories of recommendations are as
follows: one, there must be an organization to coordinate the complex
interaction of the domestic and international anti-drug fronts. In other
words, you have to have a system that coordinates the problems of mul-
tiplicities of objectives inside the program itself as well as with respect
to the other agendas of the United States government. This structure
must be able to use all the agencies, departments, and other U.S. assets
in the coordinated way with direct support and accountability to the
President and Congress. So I've been talking, and I'm really thinking
here, in the context of a new type of National Security Council struc-
ture. The head of this, however, would not be someone like the NSC
chief, who is not approved by Congress. You want to give him the same
status in terms of his coordinating arrangements as you give an ambas-
sador or you give a Cabinet head. It's a presidential appointment ap-
proved by Congress so everybody is on it. It's got to be a special or-
ganizing structure, and it's got to be the plug into and have access to
every single one of these kinds of assets that impact in terms of the
United States' domestic and international structures.
Two, the policy with respect to producing countries must have a
coherent consensus on attacking the full range of producing problems.
If the relative priorities, for example, the United States government
vis-a-vis debt, democracy and development of drugs are not thrashed
out, then each country's problems will be approached in terms of purely
ad hoc settings of priorities. Most of you will see that this stuff is not
done-and you don't have, in terms of the U.S. government, anybody
to say, look, how do you handle the problem. I've got a government
here. I know this guy is trying to stay, but he can't go after his growers
right now, he's running for elections. What do you want me to do? So,
it's got to be discussed. It can't be sort of hidden underneath so that
the buck system works.
Three, we need as a promising area a coherent international finan-
cial regime. This has to be constructed. Most of what I've suggested of
the existing net regime are based on penalties and punishments. What I
think here is a necessity is to move this in terms of an incentive pattern
or incentive system of some sort that will involve these guys in going
after this stuff because of greed, not because of fear that you're going
to haul them into court. Then they'll become increasingly, by abstrac-
tion, part of your problem because they're going to always be scared
and they're not going to cooperate. It's sort of my view of the human
nature of these things.
It's a sort of CIA in the State Department. These guys aren't cyn-
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ics. They're scared. That's what they are. They don't want to have their
throats cut, and they want to go up. You know, narcotics is a dead end.
When we were in there, we tried to make it so that we were able to get
one guy in INM to get an ambassadorship because most of them say if
we get in there and nothing works, we're going to die.
Four, we've got a huge responsibility in our domestic sector where
we've got to start networking all those groups in our society that are
concerned about this. They can't keep operating alone. For example,
we started worrying about kids in junior high school and watching the
druggies and all of the crazy attitudes that were in there. It was creat-
ing an environment in terms of the way the teachers behaved and the
students behaved in which you had to consciously fight drug value cul-
ture. Look what the UN is promoting. This whole John Lennon thing is
part of the drug culture of our society. So we have got to get serious
about this. In that context, we should start talking about drug testing.
But when you have got all this permissiveness out there, you can't go
anywhere with it because everybody says, God, my rights.
Five, we've got to recognize that our constitutional legal-political
system cannot undergird the society to destroy the predominant value
system in the United States of self-restraining activity. To the degree
our system is increasingly encouraging a domestic social environment
that is self-regarding and selfish, we are in trouble. Thank you.
(Applause.)
DR. MOORE: Our next panelist is Pat Renee Shapiro. Ms. Sha-
piro is a graduate of the Yale Law School where she served as the
editor of the Yale Law Journal from 1982 to 1983. She has been in
private practice in both the United States and Japan, and. currently she
is the attorney adviser in the Office of General Counsel for AID, and
one particular area of responsibility of hers is narcotics-related legisla-
tion and policy issues. Pat Renee Shapiro.
[The following is a summary of Ms. Shapiro's comments:
Ms. Shapiro is with the Agency for International Development
which is a foreign affairs agency of the U.S. government, involved in
administering economic assistance programs overseas to developing
countries. She spoke of the importance of dealing with the drug supply,
since most of the illicit drugs consumed in the U.S. are coming from
foreign countries, more specifically developing countries. These devel-
oping countries have very low per capita income and GNPs where eco-
nomic production and sale of narcotics represents a major part of their
income.
In order to deal with the narcotics problem the United States must
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do two things: first, it must provide economic and financial assistance to
these countries in order to free them from their dependence upon nar-
cotic production. This may be done by reducing the restrictions that we
traditionally have placed on promoting crops which would compete
with the United States, and providing these countries with diversified
crop alternatives as well as other economic income substitutes. Second,
the United States must educate these countries as to how narcotic pro-
duction adversely affects their own countries.]
DR. MOORE: Our next speaker is Kenneth Bleakley. Ken
Bleakley is a senior Foreign Service officer now serving as the Senior
Deputy Coordinator and Director for International Communications
and Information Policy. Previously, he served as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Refugee Assistance and Deputy
Director of the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff. He was the
Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador from
1981 until 1984. Mr. Bleakley served in Washington as the Deputy
Director of the State Department's Operations Center, as the Special
Assistant for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Other overseas assignments that he has had in-
clude Panama, Bolivia, Spain, and the Dominican Republic.
I will not go into a lot of the other very impressive background in
his career. Let me just say that he has also served as a former Presi-
dent of the American Foreign Service Association, and is certainly one
of the most highly thought of members of the Foreign Service of the
United States. It is a great pleasure to introduce Mr. Kenneth
Bleakley.
MR. BLEAKLEY: "A pound of gold, Sefior, or an ounce of lead."
That's the choice that many of the participants in criminal justice sys-
tems around the world face when they're dealing with narco-terrorism.
It's not surprising that to a greater or lesser degree many systems fail
when they're presented with that sort .of a challenge, and we're seeing
the results of it today in ways that Ambassador Jordan has outlined, I
think, fairly impressively, as to what the impacts are on our own soci-
ety and the societies around the world.
Meeting the challenge of the pound of gold offered to impover-
ished people everywhere is the type of work in which the Agency for
International Development has been engaged. Ms. Shapiro, I think, has
outlined very nicely some of the attempts we're making there. What I'd
like to address today is this question of criminal justice systems of
other nations. What happens when they fail? What can we do to sup-
port other nation's' efforts to restore those systems to health? What can
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they do for themselves?
My experience in El Salvador, where every element of the system
failed with disastrous results for the people in El Salvador and for the
rest of the world, demonstrates that when a system collapses it's not
easily repaired. It's an enormous job. Even with the dedication of a
government committed to reform, with the dedication of attorneys and
other concerted citizens, with the support of friendly nations, attorney
generals of the United States prepared to commit themselves to the
effort and participate in it, and the United States to back it up with our
own assistance funds-even then the system is hard to :estore.
And so when we face nations around the world today who have to
address the challenge of narcotics and terrorism, intertwined as they
are, you face a problem that is, indeed, daunting, and that does require
the sort of coordinated, integrated approach that was outlined by Am-
bassador Jordan a few minutes ago. Let's take it step by step and see
what goes into this. These are my recommendations as to where we
begin our initiatives.
First, the training and equipping of police and investigative units.
We can't know that there's a problem of laboratories, of production of
raw materials, of transit and trafficking unless law enforcement author-
ities are aware of it themselves and prepared to do something about it.
We can help. Drug enforcement agencies and other agencies of the
U.S. government participate directly in this effort. But ultimately, if
we're going to succeed in knowing what's happening, it's going to re-
quire better training and better equipping of police investigative units
in the host countries themselves. They have to be committed to it. We
have to help them develop that commitment. We also have to supply
the expertise and some of the background if it's necessary in order for
those efforts to be achieved. And here we are legislatively constrained.
Because legislative constraints were put in for good reason, they have
to be looked at with care. When circumstances require, exceptions can
be made as they were in El Salvador and have been done in other areas
with respect to the narcotics process.
But that is step one. Step two, when you find there is a crime, how
do you enforce putting a stop to the crime itself, detaining those who
are responsible? I know that an earlier session addressed the role of the
military in this. And indeed, we are dealing with a crisis of such broad
proportions that the role of our military and that of other nations be-
comes essential, if there is to be enforcement against that ounce or sev-
eral ounces fired from an automatic rifle of lead against those who
would attempt to bring this about.
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But enforcement has to take many forms. We've referred to this
problem of buck passing, and indeed it is one. But let's not undervalue
the impressive nature of this buck. In Bolivia, for example, to which
we've heard some earlier reference, a new government comes into
power, a government which indicates its intent to, for the first time,
make illegal the production of coca anywhere in its national territory,
except for a small amount for their traditional medicinal uses.
How do you go about enforcing that when you have over 300,000
people in your population who are solely dependent on it for their liveli-
hood? We talk of programs like crop substitution. A hardy crop like
coca is not going to substitute in terms of revenues. The best you can
hope to do is to show people that they will not starve if they obey the
law and leave that crop. How do you do that in the short run? Cash
payments are what they were offered by the narco-traficantes. Can we
match that?
I'll tell you it sticks in the craw of a lot of bureaucrats in Wash-
ington and a lot of concerned citizen taxpayers to talk about handing
out piles of money to people not to produce coca. And yet if you're
going to deal with the problem of enforcement and deal with the reality
of a national government having to confront its own citizens, frequently
in remote areas and frequently armed, you're going to have to offer
them some alternative. It's got to be an alternative that is meaningful
when compared to Jose going by and being able to put pesos in their
hand before they ever plant the crop that might yield these kind of
results. In El Salvador the problem was different. There you had an
active insurgency going on, and it required direct military support in
terms of training and assistance by the United States.
Step three in this process. Let's say we found out about the crime,
we've captured the criminals. They then go into a criminal justice sys-
tem, a criminal justice system which is suffering from a lack of funds
and from the kind of threats to which we alluded before. Many of you
are familiar with it. The justices of the peace trying to operate their
offices on budgets of maybe ten dollars or so a month without typewrit-
ers, lacking skills and education themselves, lacking support staff or
protection.
This can reach chronic proportions, as it does in many of the starv-
ing nations of the world. In the Caribbean, you just begin to see some
of this deterioration taking place. AID did a study a couple of years
ago. A fine criminal justice system in place left by some of the former
powers in the area, but now beginning to crumble as books disappear
from the library or grow out of date and national law libraries begin no
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longer to be able to provide the support for attorneys. You see the same
sort of deterioration of the justice of the peace system. Arid so the third
element that has to be addressed is how you're going to go about
strengthening the far reaches of the criminal justice system, the attor-
neys, the judges, who are responsible for making it work on a day to
day basis.
Having taken that step, you then have the problem of evi-
dence--of presenting convincing material that can be seen in courts. In
many cases, the producing nations that we're talking about lack any
sort of way of developing criminal tracing, being able to examine the
materials that were involved, to determine that, in fact, an illegal con-
trolled substance was involved. Fingerprinting, ballistics tests, all of
those things require criminal laboratories. Nations that are lacking
these techniques need help in developing them. They also need to be
prepared to devote their own resources to this element of the process.
The next step is in many ways the toughest of all because it's
where we require the real commitment of citizens. Amazingly, in my
experience of over 25 years in the Foreign Service, mostly in areas in
great conflict, developing nations, I've seen time and again that the
people are always there. The courageous lawyers and prosecutors, indi-
vidual citizens, who are willing to take jobs in government, willing to
volunteer their own efforts frequently at tremendous cost! to their own
practices and their own time, in order to reform systems and make
them work.
It's the nature of human beings that the good will always be there
along with the bad and will react to it, and that's probably the greatest
strength that we have in this battle overall. They have to be supported
internationally: supported not just with money and with technical train-
ing, but equally important, with the kind of moral support that we have
brought to so many of these conflicts. And their efforts have to be rec-
ognized, even when the efforts fail. We heard the example even within
the United States government, that fighting this battle may not be ca-
reer enhancing. It certainly isn't for those who are out on the front
lines and risking their lives at it, and with very little in return.
The international community can recognize this, that it is to those
people that falls the job of trying to reform their criminal laws, trying
to reform the system in ways that makes it possible to put narco-trafi-
cantes behind bars, and not simply to find that the system that can be
used and manipulated to their advantage. Having gotten 'this far in the
process, and we've made a lot of steps to get this far, from enforcement
through criminal systems that work to having the buildings and so on,
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it then becomes necessary to answer that direct threat of the bullet.
And that means judicial protection units such as they have in
Costa Rica, such as we tried to develop in El Salvador, so that the
judges, the witnesses, those who participate in the process, can, in fact,
exercise their integrity and bring criminals, whether they be in the nar-
cotics field or in other areas, to justice without having to fear for their
lives as they walk out the courtroom door.
If we've gotten this far, and if we've gotten the conviction, you
then have the prison system. And we've seen in Colombia and else-
where the problems that come up in trying to keep people in jail even
when they have been convicted, and the lengths to which the narcotics
business particularly with its bankroll, with its alliances, with .the ter-
rorists around the world, are prepared to go in order to break their
cohorts out of prison.
And so the prison system needs to be strengthened, protected, en-
hanced, but also kept as something which is a legitimate instrument of
national authority and not itself a part of a system of human rights
abuses. Human rights abuses we approach usually from the point of
view of what it means to our moral integrity as a country. But it also
means something to the moral integrity of those countries which are
affected, and countries which abuse human rights as a consistent pat-
tern are not going to be able to enforce their laws against criminals in
an effective and consistent manner.
If we can do all of those things, putting together the various steps
that would go into an effective system, we must also recognize that
above all else this must be an effort by the nations concerned, and not
just an effort that's supported by the United States and the rest of the
industrialized world. This has to be not just a concerted U.S. effort, it
must be an international effort. If the U.N. can't play that role, then
other organizations are going to have to play it. But we can't go it
alone. We don't have the resources. We don't have all of the skills that
are going to be necessary to make this work, nor do we have all of the
solutions.
Europe and Asia are equally affected by this plague. And they,
too, have to play their role in it. But together we can help to put these
steps together for a criminal justice system. And so if we can have
nations committed to the process, if we can take this step by step, then
there are, indeed, legal initiatives that can work to begin to turn this
program around. It is going to have to be coordinated.
Let me make one final pitch which is related to this in one way.
When we talk about coordination, communications, my present job,
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strikes me as being particularly important in the international control
of narcotics. When we're dealing particularly in our north-south com-
munication links, they're weak. They're particularly weak when it
comes to transfer of data and large amounts of data.
Fiberoptic networks which are now going pretty much east to west
around the world have not yet developed in north-south ways that make
it possible to transmit pictures of terrorists, narcotic offenders, the mas-
sive amounts of data that are necessary in order to trace their move-
ments, or to assist nations in integrating the effort between the rural
areas where the crops are grown, where their laboratories and where
the transit routes are, and the national capitals where they're trying to
control this movement.
And so we are, in addition to the types of steps that I have pro-
posed on a bilateral basis, also going to have to address, and we are
trying to address this in association with our colleagues from AID and
the multilateral institutions, what more we can do in order to develop
better communications ties between north and south, between devel-
oped and developing nations so that the gap doesn't grow and the kind
of circumstances that give rise to narcotics in the first place increase. I
think everyone has probably said time and time again it won't be a
process that's done overnight. That's obvious. It needs to be integrated.
That's obvious.
It's multi-dimensional. That's obvious. We know a lot of the obvi-
ous things. The question is are we prepared to use the kinds of sophisti-
cated strategies rather than simplified solutions that are necessary to
bring this problem back under control? Thank you.
(Applause.)
DR. MOORE: Our final panelist is John 0. McGinnis who is
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Council.
John McGinnis is a graduate of the Harvard College and Harvard Law
School, where he was a member of the Harvard Law Review. He was
also a M.A. degree in Philosophy and Theology from Balliol College,
Oxford. He was a law clerk to Judge Kenneth Starr, and an associate
at Sullivan and Cromwell in New York before joining the Justice De-
partment in 1985.
I first met Mr. McGinnis at a conference that the ABA Standing
Committee ran several years ago on the issue of treaty interpretation,
and it is one of the clearest and most forceful presentations on the issue
that I have heard to date. It was obvious that some of his training had
been at Oxford, and indeed, it brought to my mind the famous com-
ment that Lon Fuller made in his debate with H.L.A. Hart, which was
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the one that was the English tradition: the clarity and the Oxford and
the debating style and speaking was such that whether right or wrong,
they were always clear. It seems to me that while John McGinnis from
what I can tell was strongly right on that occasion, I have never had an
occasion to disagree with him. He is also clearly right on those
occasions.
So, John, we look forward to hearing from you.
MR. McGINNIS: Thank you. Today I want to begin by disclaim-
ing that what I am going to say is not in any way an official Depart-
ment of Justice position. I've discussed it with no one at the depart-
ment. It represents largely my own thoughts, and it is really a series of
speculations, not a program of actions, but a prolegomenon to a pro-
gram of actions.
My subject today will be essentially new legal initiatives to combat
narcotics and narco-terrorism and the way that the United States can
take these initiatives through shaping international law in what seems
to me to promise to be a new age of international law. And before
giving examples of such initiatives, it seems to me necessary to defend
two theoretical propositions, which are both disputed by different
groups.
First, that customary international law may be an effective weapon
in any area, particularly in the war against drugs, and second, that the
United States government is in a position to wield and shape it. As to
the first issue, in the past decades, international law has correctly, in
my view, been viewed as largely worse than ineffective. When the world
was divided into two competing power blocks divided by fundamentally
different ideologies, there was necessarily little space for fashioning
rules of conduct.
Indeed, given that communist states while ostensibly expressing
adherence to norms of international law systematically violated them,
international law came to be seen, correctly in my view, as a one set of
constraints on the West, a set of constraints which actually hampered
its struggle against totalitarianism. Moreover, because of these divi-
sions between East and West, there was little opportunity for effective
enforcement even of shared norms. For instance, the U.N. acts as an
enforcer only through its security council where the USSR had a right
to a resounding "nyet." Even most regional blocs were themselves
driven by the split between communists and the west.
With the demise of the Eastern bloc, it is perhaps not too much to
say, however, that an opportunity for a new age of international law
may be upon us. There no longer seem to be the irreconcilable differ-
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ences between the two huge blocs that create inseparable obstacles to
construction of orders and institutions to combat international
problems. Moreover, as we have witnessed recently, there is dramati-
cally an increased willingness on the part of the U.N. to play a useful
enforcement role as well as an increase in the authority of regional
associations.
Thus, I think we should look towards international law generally
as a source of area for initiatives, and in particular, it seems to me an
area of initiatives in the war against drugs and narco-terrorism where
there is such a community of interest between East and West. Indeed, I
think there may be no greater agreement on any proposition in the East
and West today than that opiate is in danger of becoming the religion
of the masses unless action is taken, dramatic action, to stop the
growth in drug trade and narco-terrorism. In short, I think while we've
long been used to watching international law being used as a shield to
protect wrongdoing, we should think of it now as a sword to attack
wrongdoers.
The second reason for turning to international law is that the exec-
utive branch-the branch which the framers created to act with, in the
words of John Jay, "dispatch," may take initiatives without, in many
instances, waiting for authorization from Congress. As Curtis-Wright
reminds us, "in the vast external realm of foreign affairs, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the na-
tion." This vast external realm certainly includes international law, and
thus, the President, through his agents in the executive branch, is the
chief exponent of the United States' view of international law before
the world.
Moreover, the President's exposition is not static but dynamic, i.e.,
the President and his agents do not simply discover and follow norms of
international law, but in large measure participate in their creation.
The creative aspect of his role stems from the nature of international
law itself. Customary international law is not a rigid canon or rules,
but an evolving set of principles founded on common practices and un-
derstanding of many nations. It is understood that this evolution can
occur by a state reshaping international law and creating rules that
take account of new realities or even occasionally by departing from
prevailing customary international law principles. Thus, a state may
seek to promote a new understanding of an old rule or even a new rule
of international custom or practice.
Thus, in essence, we should think of the President acting through
the executive branch perhaps as a judge in a new golden age of the
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common law of international norms with the power to create as well as
to discover. Indeed, given the importance of the United States in shap-
ing international law, the importance we have from being the most
powerful country in the world, it is not too much to see the President as
the Master of the rolls in international law.
The rest of this talk will be devoted to a brief discussion of the
possible examples of the creativity that may be used in the struggle
against drugs and narco-terrorism. I think there are already public ex-
amples of it. It may not have been noticed widely, however, but one of
the justifications formerly given in both presidential statements and in
legal briefs for the United States intervention in Panama was to restore
a government that would be able to carry out its obligations under the
Single Convention on Narcotics.
There is an obligation on countries to prevent their territories from
being used as a haven for smuggling drugs into the United States. To
be sure, this was not the only or the primary justification for United
States intervention in Panama, but it serves as a precedent, at least in
an extreme case, and a warning that willful failure to abide by the
terms of the convention or other international norms can justify a pro-
portionate response by the United States. In this regard, the doctrine of
self-defense should be considered as also authorizing proportionate re-
sponses to territories where the government is failing in its obligation to
prevent drugs from flooding into neighborhood countries.
This result, I think, can be derived directly from international law.
The duty to use diligence in preventing attacks on neighboring nations
from a country has been clearly established in international arbitral
decisions for many years. As the arbiter recently stated in the Island of
Palnus case:
territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right to display the ac-
tivities of a state. This right has a corollary duty, the obligation to
protect within its territory the rights of other states and in particu-
lar their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and war to-
gether with the rights with which each state may claim for its na-
tionals and foreign territories.
Now, prevention of the importation of drugs, which may cause
much greater social damage than isolated terrorist attacks seems,
should be evaluated under the same principle. As Judge Gee said in
rejecting a claim that a drug pusher could not be punished more
harshly than a murderer,
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except in rare cases the murderer's red hand falls on one victim
only, however grim the blow. But the foul hand of the drug dealer
blights life after life, and like the vampire of the fable creates
others in its owner's evil image, others who create others still,
across our land and down our generations, sparing not even the
unborn.
I think Judge Gee's remarks pungently show that a failure to curb
drug trafficking in a state can be in many ways as damaging as failure
to control terrorist attacks and have to be evaluated under the princi-
ples of self-defense and proportionality. Of course, I want to emphasize
here that in considering proportionality and self-defense, I am not sug-
gesting that the United States will be justified and certainly not pru-
dent in declaring war against countries that do not control their drug
trafficking problems. But once, however, it is recognized that self-de-
fense and principles of proportionality are triggered in looking at drug
trafficking and narco-terrorism, I think it becomes clear that sover-
eignty can be seen in a different perspective, and that perhaps the ex-
traordinary efforts of the United States or the sort of multinational in-
stitutions that we may need to attack this program can be understood
in a new perspective.
If nations that cannot control drug exportation are seen as having
complete sovereign rights, which cannot be infringed upon at all, it
may be much harder to create these multilateral institutions that may
lessen the autonomy of such nations in order to control this problem.
However, I think we see that in a new perspective when we understand
that really drug trafficking can be understood as a threat to other na-
tions to invoke the rights to self-defense, whether individual or collec-
tive, and thus create the foundation for the restructuring of interna-
tional organizations to delimit sovereignty in a way that will perhaps
effectively combat this problem.
Before discussing what sort of organizations they may be, I want
to give a practical example of something short of war in which the
principle of self-defense, I think, is important. For instance, there are
instances in which Country A may consider assistance to another coun-
try's air interdiction program against drug trafficking. And in so doing,
Country A must consider whether Country B's interdiction program
complies with the relevant international agreements, such as the Chi-
cago Convention on International Civil Aviation.
One of the salient principles of this convention is that its proce-
dures entail warning and request to land and does not authorize the
downing of civil aircraft. Indeed, you may recall this convention was at
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issue in the KAL 007 dispute. And I think these principles are, of
course, very sound. But the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation does not in any way trump the principles of self-defense, and
when a country, Columbia for instance, is faced with essentially an in-
surrection from drug traffickers which have, we've heard on this panel,
so much money that they essentially create an imperio in the country, I
think there may well be justification for treating these not as civil air-
craft but military aircraft or seeing drug traffickers as essentially an
equivalent to a Barbary pirate state, and so essentially being able to
treat these as military objectives, and so not having the Convention of
International Civil Aviation apply at all. That's important because it
then frees up a Country A, a country like the United States, to give aid
to these countries even if they are undertaking a more vigorous and
military response to such activities.
Finally, I'd like to just end with my point about legal institutions.
Once it is seen that sovereignty has to be bound around by notions of
self-defense against narcotics and narco-terrorism, greater authority for
international organizations and institutions can be considered.
For instance, an international drug police force seems to me a real
possibility under an international organization that would be at least
the equivalent in power and size something like the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization in which the UN nations would bring together and
have access to a variety of funds. The organization would have interna-
tional police that would go into various countries. I think this could
have several advantages because it would not make the United States,
which particularly in Latin America is not viewed in a favorable light,
the central focus of enforcement. This would be seen as an interna-
tional effort. The response to those who complained that this interna-
tional police force infringed on their sovereignty would be the response
that, yes, it does take away some sovereignty to some respect, but that
only proportionately to the damage this is doing to other countries.
So I think this is an area in which we have to consider quite care-
fully the growth of new international organizations to take advantage
of the growth of the new international enforcement norms that should
be seen as arising out of the right of countries to not only individual
but to collective self-defense. In other words, the collective self-defense
under international law in the drug area, in the narco-terrorism area,
should be reflected in a new structure of international organizations to
implement that defense. Thank you.
(Applause.)
DR. MOORE: Thank you, John. Let me summarize a few of the
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issues presented in this panel before opening the floor for questions or
comments. One was a question as to Whether we have in the United
States an adequate mechanism to coordinate between the domestic and
the international side and to coordinate all of the international compo-
nents. I don't know the answer to that, but I can certainly say as one
who chaired in the past an NSC task force that did exactly that for
Law of the Sea, and Myron Nordquist who was the office director of
that is here, currently the Deputy General Counsel of the Air Force, as
he well knows also, that was an indispensable mechanism for carrying
out United States Law of the Sea policy. Had we not had something
like that, to do a good job we would have had to have invented it. So I
don't know the answer to that, but surely that's one set: of issues that
ought to be open for .discussion. Ambassador Jordan had raised that, I
think he presented the issue very, very clearly.
Secondly, we've had a great deal of discussion particularly on the
demand side in looking at the importance of education. One always
looks at a complex system in terms of cost-benefit effectiveness, and my
own instinct is, and this was certainly a recommendation of one panel-
ist, that education may be one of the most cost-benefit effective things
that we can do in this overall setting. To what extent do we have in
place a program of education that every single American child in
school will at some point encounter a very high level, high grade pro-
gram explaining what the costs are to society, what the costs are to
them, what personal use would mean, what the legal dimensions and
what the moral dimensions of these kinds of decisions are. Again, I
don't know the answer, but are these things that we ought to be looking
at.
The third set of issues that have been raised concern public educa-
tion. To what extent have we adequately informed the American people
of the overall cost of this problem, of the continuing trends, of whether
those trends are getting better or worse, and whether we are adding to
the Just Say No campaigns information that enables people to really
understand why at a personal level and at a community level decisions
to use drugs are extremely harmful and damaging.
Fourth, we've had a series of suggestions that we ought to look
much more carefully at a fuller use of United States intelligence assets
and capabilities that are already in place and that are used in the na-
tional security side in general. Again, I don't know the answer to what
extent those assets are currently being used. There may well be a series
of policy issues that need to be carefully looked at, but surely if they
are not being fully used, this an area that we ought to, at least, be
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raising questions with respect to the use of such assets.
Fifth, we've had a whole series of suggestions made with respect to
creating private incentives to deal with some of this. Could we, for ex-
ample, involve the very helpful involvement one already sees at a com-
munity level? Could we enhance it by a much more effective program
of rewards? Would that turn out to be quite cost effective, for example,
to really create very substantial incentives in the private sector to turn
in drug dealers and to turn in drug activities? With respect to the use
of the law on that, all of us as lawyers have seen the use of treble
damages in antitrust cases. Should we have a network of civil suits
based on treble damages against drug dealers?
Should we be able to create something that operates across inter-
national boundaries that enables one to go after assets even internation-
ally with respect to the involvement of drug dealers and any damage
that may be done? Maybe there are other proposals, but to what extent
might new civil litigation possibilities that would mobilize the private
bar be something that would be possible here?
Sixth, there's been very strong arguments for assistance from a
number of speakers for foreign assistance programs targeted on the ju-
diciary and the rule of law, particularly strengthening the judiciary
branch that is the one out on the front line and told to wear tennis
shoes literally to run away, as we heard in terms of the degree of pro-
tection that can be offered in some of the front line countries on this. Is
this an area that would be particularly fruitful for a country that sup-
ports the rule of law to have a greater rule of law engagement effort,
and to support enhancement of the judiciary and other assistance in
these countries.
To the extent that there is involvement of a nation such as Cuba,
questions have been raised as to the extent to which the United States
has sent protest notes, has lodged claims with respect to monetary dam-
ages under traditional international law, whether or not the claims are
paid, and to publicize those claims and those activities so that the inter-
national community would know what they were. Issues have been
raised in discussions with respect to synergy between the use of auto-
matic weapons and drug dealing. Are we ending up with a series of
these gangs all over the United States with access to automatic weap-
ons that are beholden to a variety of foreign groups? To what extent
does that have serious implications for U.S. national security over the
years?
Is there right now some kind of particularized and very serious
penalty for a combination of automatic weapons or semi-automatic
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weapons and drug dealing? Nine points have been made about placing
emphasis on training of police. And here Ken Bleakley has indicated, I
think correctly from what I have seen, that there are a variety of legis-
lative restraints that grew up in a different era, and it may well be time
to, indeed, may well be past time to reassess those constraints, as yet
another set of issues.
Tenth, we've had questions raised as to whether there are any le-
gal constraints here that may be in place that would prohibit the use of
highly sophisticated infrared radar or other military technologies, mili-
tary intelligence or surveillance technologies that may be in existence
now that might be brought to bear on the drug war.
One point might be raised with respect to ABA involvement.
Given the potential for creation of new legal initiatives and use of the
law creatively, should the ABA set up a task force of governmental and
non-governmental legal experts to try to come up with new ways of
placing legal constraints in the road of drug dealers and those involved
in these operations, both at the international and at the national level?
To what extent could such a task force identify areas, for example,
of current legal constraints that might be modified appropriately that
are otherwise standing in the way of problems? John McGinnis has
raised in a very provocative and thoughtful way simply the extension of
the concept of self-defense to settings of intense threat from drug en-
gagement activities in the territory of nations that are not fulfilling
their obligations to make every effort to stop those activities. He has
raised the issue as to whether we ought not to use the collective defense
analogy, indeed the individual self-defense analogy in this case.
I might add that there is a rich body of literature on this applying
it to the economic area, growing out of the first and second oil embar-
goes. This is not something that ought to be regarded as entirely new
interpretation of the charter. Professor McDougal and others, for ex-
ample, for many years have argued exactly this, that the level of in-
tense threat, if it rises to a level that's sufficiently great, the attack does
not necessarily have to be armed aggression as such. So that's a very
interesting suggestion that John has made. I think it ought to be taken
seriously in triggering an interesting discussion.
John made a suggestion for an international drug police force. Fi-
nally, we heard a superb presentation from Irving Tragen, the Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission, and one asked, given the
importance of the OAS in all of this, whether the United States is do-
ing enough to support the OAS; whether the OAS is doing enough in
terms of what might be done and in a setting in which we have a very
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strong national interest in supporting an organization that has been one
of the most important historically of all regional organizations, the ear-
liest one to be formed, and of great historical interest to the United
States and importance to it over the years. Is this something we ought
to do to continue to work cooperatively and to enhance that relation-
ship in every way possible?
Those are a few of the things, it seems to me, that have been dis-
cussed so far as an agenda, and I will open it up for this point for
question and answer. Yes, Sir?
MR. ANDERSON: John Anderson, a former member of Con-
gress, now with the Nova Law Center. I was wondering, in connection
with the suggestion that Mr. McGinnis just made, about the possibility
of an international police force under the aegis of the U.N. Professor
Jordan was a little bit dubious about inviting a great deal of hope and
confidence in the ability of the international body to deal with that
problem. It occurred to me, and particularly in line with the summary
just given us, a very excellent summary by Professor Moore, about
whether or not we are adequately deploying intelligence assets that are
already in place, would it be possible at a time when we are very much
thinking about a reconfiguration of the role of NATO to use perhaps
NATO in some imaginative way? Even though it's the Andean coun-
tries that are the primary source of cocaine we do have the Sicilian
connection. We have the French connection through Marseilles. We
have, I suppose, the Dutch connection with the port of Rotterdam, all
members of NATO. I wondered whether or not some thought could be
given to the possibility of finding some role, particularly in the deploy-
ment of intelligence assets, of some new definition of a role for NATO
in this area?
DR. MOORE: Who would like to answer that?
MR. McGINNIS: Obviously, I don't know a great deal about
NATO. But I think the resources that NATO has to use have to be
turned into problems that are more pressing than the threat of aggres-
sion from the Soviet Union, which has disappeared. I think that this is
a useful suggestion. I think, however, what is more crucial is that any
initiatives involve the Andean countries in any international approach
to the problem because, again, my concern is that in the past, it has
been seen as simply gringos, I think, versus the Andean countries. And
I'm not sure that simply greater public participation of NATO will
help combat that perception.
AMBASSADOR JORDAN: Let me just make a brief comment.
The problem with multilateral activity is that multilateral activity re-
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quires leadership, and if the United States doesn't know what it's pre-
cisely out to do or to accomplish, it's very hard to get the multilateral
organization to follow. We've had a particularly, I suppose, encourag-
ing example for a lot of people in terms of the changing international
environment, but it took an enormous amount of clear direction as to
what the United States wanted to do in terms of the Desert Shield, the
whole Saudi Arabia, Iraq thing. And you could mobilize people on this.
What I'm saying is that as a precondition for using multilateral
and all of the rest, or hoping for them to pick up the slack, is that we
know what we're doing ourselves. We've got that worked out. With re-
spect, and in that context, the U.N. is far better than NATO is for
Latin America, and the OAS, in my judgment, if it could be revital-
ized. It would be hard to use it to some degree, say, in Peru and Bolivia
and perhaps less so for Colombia. But you would certainly not want to
involve NATO in it. If you didn't use the OAS or U.N., you wouldn't
have a multilateral arm that I think would-
MR. ANDERSON: Well, I thought I made it clear that I was
saying that with respect to the Andean countries, I realized that this
would not be the appropriate organization. We do have a hard drug
problem involving heroin and other drugs that certainly are coming in
from other parts of the world, through NATO countries.
DR. MOORE: We have time for one short question. At this point,
I'm going to call on Irving Tragen of the OAS.
MR. TRAGEN: Thank you, Dr. Moore. I would like to make a
comment at this point as well as a question. And it has to do with some
of the recent comments about multilateralization. I think the most diffi-
cult problem that we face is not clearly identifying what it is that coun-
tries want to do. As the executive secretary of an inter-American or-
ganization, we've spent what appears to be an inordinate amount of
time getting the issues framed. It's terribly important we get the issues
framed. And I can take it almost item by item.
As Mr. Bleakley knows, in the area of law enforcement, one of the
most difficult issues is defining what kind of law enforcement training
you're talking about. What kind of organizations can be involved? Who
does the training? What kind of training, and then once you've done
that, how do you deal with issues like corruption and
professionalization?
Now, unless you phrase the issues and define them precisely, we
end up doing a series of repetitive efforts without being able to evaluate
what we're doing or where we're going. I think in the course of our
discussions over these two days, we dealt with a large number of issues,
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extradition being a very important one. And extradition is in the eyes
of many Latin American countries a cop-out because it isn't facing up
to the legitimate questions of the strengthening and consolidation of
their own law enforcement processes. In my first assignment in Latin
America almost forty years ago, the first judge I dealt with was a fifth
year law student who was assigned to what we would call a municipal
court.
His one year of service, public service, before he received his law
degree, was to be a judge. I don't want to go further than that. El
Salvador has the same system. We're talking about strengthening legal
systems. We have to strengthen them in terms that are meaningful to
Latin Americans, not to us.
What I'd like to suggest is that some marvelous ideas have
emerged, and I think part of what.we need to do now is to engage the
Andean countries in a dialogue. I think what's far better than the
ABA, the bar associations of Latin America or the bar associations of
the U.S., is that we have a good instrument we have in the inter-Amer-
ican bar, which will be meeting here in a couple of weeks. Maybe we
could begin to focus some longer term questions .through dialogue be-
tween these various institutions which can help us then to more pre-
cisely define how you apply these various instruments that you've been
discussing. Thank you.
DR. MOORE: Thank you, Dr. Tragen. Those are, I think, cer-
tainly very pertinent and important comments, and I hope they will be
taken to heart. We are now out of time, but let me just add two brief
points. One is a point that Joe Douglass had made earlier that this
latest discussion has reminded me of. I think it was an excellent sug-
gestion that we try to have some effort, hopefully governmental. But
one would also imagine even the private sector being useful in this, to
go through the records of the fallen regimes in Eastern Europe and to
put together, in fact, the trail and the story of the massive governmen-
tal involvement, because I think that is something that is very impor-
tant for the public record to know as we move beyond governmental
involvement.
So, Joe, I personally think that's an excellent idea. Here's an area
that where our government can work with NATO. In fact, the German
government is going to be in an excellent position to have all the access
to the files of the East German Intelligence Service. It seems to me
that this is an area that for the health of that new German union and
for the health of all the new Eastern European governments, it would
be useful for them to come clean, and to get this on the public record.
1991]
443
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
It would also help in such things as Cuban involvemen:, for example.
So I think that's an excellent idea.
(Applause.)
(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the meeting recessed)
III. GENERAL CONFERENCE SESSION/AUDIENCE DISCUSSION
DR. MOORE: We are trying at this conference something a little
different, which is an opportunity for audience discussion and participa-
tion that would be a little more focused; not simply a question and
answer format, but an opportunity for a real discussion, a real genera-
tion of ideas, an opportunity to say here's an idea, what do we do about
it. Have three people shoot it down if it's got weak parts, and on the
other hand, if things are really good, get them picked up and widely
disseminated around the government or in different areas where people
have been participating. So this is really in your hands. I'm simply here
to field the questions and to try to encourage the interaction among
you.
DR. OLIVER: I'm Philip Oliver with the University of Arkansas
at Little Rock Law School. I was interested, Professor Moore, in your
listing of fourteen things. I think that the one that had at least been
touched on that I think is worthy of greater consideration is that of
legalization. I have thought for a great number of years that as desira-
ble as it would be we were not going to win the war on drugs, and
nothing that I've heard in the last couple of days has made me more
hopeful that we will.
The war is an extremely expensive, costly war, costly for our insti-
tutions, costly for friendly governments, costly in resources. Certainly
there seems to be little hope of winning greatly increased resource allo-
cation. I think that the realities of the American political, situation are
that we're in a time of shrinking resource allocations from government
and not increasing allocations. So I think we're ultimately going to lose
the war anyway, and the costs of continuing it are quite high. I am not
persuaded that legalization is the best course. Particularly, I'm dis-
turbed about all of the emphasis on the approach with the Andean
countries, when just yesterday I learned of developments with respect
to developing synthetic drugs in this country, which seem to me make it
largely irrelevant as to whether we can block production in foreign
countries if people can go into a laboratory here and produce drugs.
DR. MOORE: Could I just clarify before you leave the
microphone exactly what you are proposing, because legalization or
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decriminalization can come in many different proposals. We heard one
proposal the first day of decriminalizing marijuana, and a sharp rebut-
tal by a number from the audience on that. Are you proposing
decriminalization solely of marijuana or of all substance abuse includ-
ing cocaine, crack, heroin, PCP, all hard drugs, et cetera?
DR. OlIVER: Well, I do not have a fully developed comprehensive
plan, but my idea would be full decriminalization. It's been my think-
ing that the most addictive drugs are the ones that most need to be
decriminalized because they are perhaps going to be the most resistant
to other kinds of restraints. I would envision a situation in which we
would perhaps consider some sort of registration of drug addicts, which
I think, while taking the profit element out, would also perhaps make it
somewhat unlikely that people would find it worthwhile to go down and
register as addicts in order to try out a new drug. We could then move
toward a system of providing drugs at cost, which would leave, if in-
deed it is the highest and best use of certain lands, the Andean region's
production of coca. I think this is not at all inconsistent with what I
think I've been hearing: that one of the major things we need to do in
fighting drugs anyway, is education of the American public. We could
simply say we're going to deal with this as basically an American de-
mand problem. And we're going to deal with this by trying to influence
people into thinking that it's not a very good idea to take drugs. But,
yes, it would be what I would envision across the board.
DR. MOORE: Let's open the floor for discussion at this point.
Anyone else care to discuss the issue or raise it? Obviously, this issue
has been joined in the public debate before by a number of people in-
cluding Milton Friedman and George Shultz. We have one comment
from David Martin. Yes, David?
MR. MARTIN: This, of course as you have pointed out, is not a
new proposal. Bill Buckley, who is a very good friend, has been pushing
this idea for a long time. There is a body of scientific literature which
has direct bearing on this. In 1972, they had what they called, I think,
the free access experiment. They took one body of students without any
separate body for comparison. And they gave them free access to
marijuana.
In short, you weren't persecuted. You were not taking forbidden
fruit when you helped yourself to marijuana. Students who had used
marijuana once a week, very occasionally, or twice a week, went up to
one cigarette a day. Students who had used one cigarette a day went up
to three or four cigarettes a day, all in the period of one month's time.
Now, it's deducible from this, if you make drugs more available, more
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easily available, they're going to be used more. And you have to then
ask yourself what is going to be the effect of this greatly increased use
of the quality of human life and the quality of society?
And there is absolutely no question that human beings are reduced
to far less than their potential by abuse of drugs, and that the increase
in drug use would have a disastrous effect on the quality of society as a
whole.
DR. MOORE: Thank you, David. Yes, the gentleman from the
OAS, Mr. Tragen.
MR. TRAGEN: I think we have a very difficult problem here. We
have a difficult problem because I don't think we have yet in this coun-
try faced up to what the drug problem is, particularly in our cities.
Now we have some experiences in the world with legalization. Britain,
for example, ran through the experience of allowing those who were
addicted -to register with the health service and to receive heroin on
demand. That has not, in any way, eliminated the black market in her-
oin in Britain.
We need a lot more analysis of what did happen ina Britain. The
Dutch, as we know, basically allowed the open use of marijuana, and
you can get everything in coffee houses in Amsterdam from cakes made
with marijuana to marijuana tea to the joints themselves. That was on
the supposition that if you had marijuana, you would not go into the
harder drugs. Anyone who has been in Europe recently knows that in
cities like Arnhem which have a policy of acceptance of use, not legali-
zation, you have rioting in the cities because the Germans and the
French are coming up to buy their drugs and, they not only have
brought with them the problem of drugs, but also all sorts of other
criminal activity, including prostitution.
You have city councils all over the Netherlands facing revolt by
citizens because of it. What I do think we need in all honesty is a much
harder look at what we mean by legalization. As Congressman Rangel
asked, are we going to legalize it for kids under the age of sixteen? Are
we going to do it for kids under eighteen? Who's going to distribute it?
Are we going to let Coca-Cola have a patent, or are we going to set up,
as in the state of Virginia, state agencies where you're going to sell it?
What are the conditions under which you're going to sell it? What
degree of purity? What are the standards you're going to apply? I
think our major problem, and I've done a lot of reading of the articles
by Mr. Friedman and Ethan Nadelman and so many very eloquent
advocates who are as concerned as we are about the disorder in the
streets, but they really haven't come to grips with either what the expe-
896 [Vol. 15
446
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Proceedings
rience has been abroad or what the implications of legalization are.
Now we can look at this in two or three different ways. If we want
to really make and have an impact on the use of drugs, maybe the
answer isn't decriminalization. Maybe the answer is in the kind of pen-
alties we impose for first use or second use or third use or the penalties
and sanctions we use for the dealers. We haven't really thought much
of this out.
That's one of the areas where as an inter-American community,
shortly we're going to have to sit down and begin to think it through,
because obviously if it is true that we have 25 million of our citizens,
ten percent of our population, who are now regular, drug users, whether
they're marijuana or cocaine or heroin, we haven't got enough jails.
And I wonder if the best use of our money is to build more jails when
our real answer, our real challenge, is how do we rehabilitate and how
do we eliminate the attraction of drugs? I think we made a lot of mis-
takes in social programs in the past. Maybe we've got to think through
what we do in the inner city. Maybe we've got to go to some of the
things Jack Kemp has talked about. Maybe we've got to go to some of
the things that members of the Congress are talking about in reestab-
lishing inner city programs. But I wonder if the answer is as easy as
legalization because I don't think any of the experiences anywhere in
the world indicate that legalization has eliminated the problem.
DR. MOORE: Thank you, Mr. Tragen, for as always an excellent
statement. Others on this? Yes, yes, sir. And then if you would like an
opportunity at rebuttal or further discussion, you're most welcome.
MR. MIKUS: I am Joseph A. Mikus, a professor emeritus, mem-
ber of the American Society of International Law. I'd like to make
some comments on this conference. Conference on narco-terrorism cer-
tainly is a highly specialized conference and deals only with one aspect
of the public interest in the world. When we spoke about consumption
and certain people tried to put the whole responsibility for the develop-
ment of this traffic on our consumption in the United States. I believe
this is a very false approach because this is not a private, I would say,
law transaction like buying something in a drug store. This is a public
interest issue.
And, of course, it's not the only one. There are many other issues.
I found in the book published just now by Professor Moore, National
Security Law, an item called "global anarchy". We are living in a
world really dominated by global anarchy. Narco-terrorism is only one
aspect. Other aspects are arms, ecology, hunger, drought, refugees and
so on, and wars. We are even now in the middle of an evolution which
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may lead to war. So I believe these all are public interests and we
should pay attention to the whole problem as such.
DR. MOORE: Could I just make an intervention far a moment?
Are you suggesting that we can't take these to some extent one at a
time and have to solve all the world's problems at one conference, or
would it be enough to solve narco-terrorism in one conference?
MR. MIKUS: No, it means we have to come to a kind of global
approach to the problem because this is only one section of it. I believe
that treaties are simply agreements among private parties. There is no
enforcement for it. There is no, for example, judicial enforcdment of
treaties. If somebody is not satisfied with the treaty, he would simply
denounce it. And there is no way of enforcing the treaty. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice is practically not international. It"s not a court.
It's an opportunity for arbitration, and we know all that. The decision
of the court depends on the consent of the parties, and certainly this
institution doesn't have very much to do with the justice in the world.
So I believe that we have to organize probably another global confer-
ence about these aspects.
I believe that the International Court of Justice and the United
Nations, as voluntary organizations, don't really have great meaning.
These are social conferences, permanent conferences. As lawyers, we
know that in our country, which has a constitution which controls, for
example, every state and every citizen, that states are not any more
voluntary members of this country. If we speak about law, law is a
pyramid, not an institution having simply a kind of horizontal
dimension.
DR. MOORE: Can I interrupt a moment?
MR. MIKUS: Law is something with vertical dimensions.
DR. MOORE: And perhaps unfairly. Tell me if I'm being thor-
oughly unfair. I frequently am as a chairman. But the problem is I
would like to try to-and indeed, I've been accused of being able to cut
off speakers like Mr. Justice Holmes in the middle of the word "if,"
but as happened here, I really would like to focus precisely on the drug
issue. I think your point is a very good one about the importance of a
whole variety of problems. And I think you would find the audience
very sympathetic to that.
But I've got several others that would like to get in, and we ha-
ven't really perhaps concluded the discussion on the decriminalization.
You go ahead if you want to just wind up.
MR. MIKUS: I would like simply to bring in a new idea. Now we
are really in the middle of a kind of a development which may lead to a
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war in the Persian Gulf. I have published a book about world public
order. There is a reality in this world, and that's the existence of the
five nuclear powers. These powers really may become a kind of a world
authority. I believe that as you know there is a dispute between Mr.
Buchanan and Mr. Safire about that war, I believe that we just cannot
be a policeman of the whole world. But these five nuclear powers which
have absolute power, they should somehow come together, close a kind
of closed circle and decide things by majority.
For example, in our Supreme Court some decisions are made by
five members against four. So something like that should be used in, as
I say, a closed circle of this pentarchy of five nuclear powers. I would
like to propose this for discussion now.
DR. MOORE: Thank you very much. Let me add is there anyone
else on the legalization issue before we close that off? Yes, go ahead.
Did you want another chance at this?
DR. OLIVER: I would like, yes.
DR. MOORE: All right. Go ahead.
DR. OLIVER: I would just like to make clear that I am not advo-
cating legalization in any sense. Assuredly, these drugs are terribly
harmful, and I think that it is probable that we would have some de-
gree of increase.
I think that we cannot gauge at all because we are sailing in com-
pletely unchartered waters. The world has unprecedented problems. In
particular, the United States has unprecedented problems in these ar-
eas, but the comparison is not whether we want a drug-free world or a
world with legal drugs. The question is between the comparison with
the actual world and perhaps a world that we maybe can achieve
through an outpouring of enormous resources, a continued destabiliza-
tion of friendly governments and so forth, that possibly we can obtain a
significant decrease, but very likely we will sustain all those costs with-
out getting a significant decrease.
So it is between two highly imperfect worlds, and as long as we
are dealing with a situation in which ten percent of our population, and
probably something greater than ten percent of Peru's population, is
engaging in this sort of activity, I think that it's going to be a rather
intractable problem as this conference has demonstrated.
I don't think that it is necessary, at least to have a realistic debate,
that all the details of legalization be worked out. Certainly not all the
details of maintaining the present system have been worked out in ad-
vance, and I certainly do not think that this would be a panacea, but I
do think that it would be quite an improvement.
1991]
449
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
DR. MOORE: Before we shift, anyone else on this subject? If not,
let me, again, perhaps unfairly, but as the only one up here at this
point, just add one additional word on this. We had one other person
who wrote to me before this conference saying that they felt there was
not an adequate opportunity to debate this issue, and they didn't see
any advocate of legalization on the program. So I think it is certainly a
fair set of issues given the range of people that have raised it. The last
thing we want to do with our most serious problem is to cut off serious
discussion about the options for dealing with it, and that is a serious
option for dealing with it. And it seems to me it needs to be looked at
very, very carefully.
My own view of it, as a non-expert in this area, and as a person
who is normally very attracted to free market solutions, is unalterably
opposed to legalization. I have personally not seen any legalization pro-
posal that deals with, I think, the two major problems that seem to me
to be left. One is, from what I can tell of legalization, it is highly likely
that consumption would go up in a legalization setting. If we take as
the starting point your concession that these are highly dangerous, and
we live in a world that now understands that as opposed to the 1960s
flower assumptions about the whole world and the taking of drugs, then
it seems to me that is a very, very damning admission to any legaliza-
tion program. I have two little daughters and I suppose I'm representa-
tive of all fathers in that respect. I do not want my daughters to be
living in a world in which they get drawn into that, and my own view is
if we had a setting of legalization, their chances of that would go up. I
don't know by how much, but I suspect by significant amount. My sec-
ond point is that I have never seen a program of legalization which
would eliminate law enforcement problems and any law enforcement
role in the process.
It seems to me that the points made by Mr. Trager. on behalf of
his committee, and the OAS has looked at this very carefully, and
David Martin and others, are really absolutely correct. So I'm inclined
to think that the cost of that solution does, in fact, outweigh the things
you get on the other side. Now having said that, let me say that one of
my closest associates, Robert F. Turner, who is now sitting with me on
the table up here may have entirely different views on this issue. I've
talked to him privately from time to time on it. I don't know what his
own views are, but I can tell you where I stand which is unalterably
opposed to legalization.
And I guess the last thing that concerns me is that I think it's a
completely false solution to the problem. One of the reasons I didn't
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feature it at this conference is because I am personally concerned that
the debate and the discussion about legalization is leading us to spend
our energy on solutions that I suspect will not be helpful in dealing
with something that is going to be very imperfect, that's going to be a
perfectly miserable social fight against this thing for many, many years
to come. But those are just very personal views. Robert F. Turner does
want to express his personal views also.
DR. TURNER: I didn't until you said that. Can I join you?
DR. MOORE: Yes, please do, Bob.
DR. TURNER: Some of you know, last Sunday I came out in
favor in the eyes of many to assassinating Saddam Hussein so why
shouldn't I come out for legalizing drugs today just to be consistent. I
don't favor legalizing drugs, and indeed I don't favor assassinating Sad-
dam Hussein. What I do favor in both cases is not ruling out options
without thinking them through.
One of the pluses to the legalization approach is that it may solve
one of the biggest problems we have today; that is, crime caused by
people who are trying to raise the money it takes to buy drugs at a
price far above their cost because it's illegal. If legalization could get
organized crime and disorganized crime out of the business of trying to
hook kids on drugs for a profit, that would be a plus.
Another concern of mine is one I raised at lunch, and that is, I
don't see us making much of a dent in this problem by attacking the
supply because it's so easy to smuggle. The profits are so great that if
we paved over all of Latin America, the Swiss would start doing it, and
if we shot the Swiss, the Swedes would do it, and pretty soon there
would be somebody down in the basement of the White House doing it
because there is so much money in it. We have to deal with the
demand.
I don't think we're doing enough to deal with demand, and I think
one of the reasons is because the political forces that have responsibility
for these decisions don't want to take the heat of angering the Ameri-
can people. There are too many Americans that want to have drugs,
and there are too many other Americans that don't want to have to
urinate in a bottle, if you'll pardon the crassness of that. But it seems
to me that if we were to legalize, one of the things that we might ac-
company it with is the libertarian argument. I come at this as a liberta-
rian by philosophy, not as an extreme, but as a moderate libertarian, of
limited government, maximum individual freedom of choice within cer-
tain constraints.
It seems to me that one of the problems with normal libertarian
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approach is that somebody has got to pay the cost of treating and sup-
porting all these people. In a libertarian society, you suffer the conse-
quences of your own wrongs. If you refuse to work, you go hungry un-
less somebody else wants to support you. But one of the things I've
been thinking about at this conference is that if we were to take that
approach and to combine it with an approach that says, however, in
order to receive any government benefit which includes a job, which
includes welfare benefits, which includes public housing and so forth,
you have to take a urinalysis and if you flunk that, or some other better
less intrusive test, you are ineligible unless you are engaged in a reha-
bilitation program.
So that at least the people that were on drugs would not be forcing
the rest of us to support them, and then, of course, if engaged in drugs
while in a crime, you would not make that a defense to the crime. The
act of voluntarily taking drugs would be interpreted hopefully as
wrongful conduct and not as-you know, you can't-it's like you're
killing your parents and throwing yourself on the mercy of the court as
an orphan at some point. And the other side of it would be a tremen-
dous educational program aimed at educating school children, voters,
everybody, of the horrible consequences of drugs. But even having said
that, I'm not at this point prepared to come out in favor of legalization.
John and I have some fun debates among ourselves and on the CB
radio to and from Charlottesville, and I have on occasion taken that as
an advocate. But I continue to think the best approach is not that, but
the best approach, if it's going to work, has to deal with the demand
side.
Indeed, one more last point. I teach international law, and I like to
get my students to think, and I was teaching a class on state responsi-
bility right after a class on the use of force. And I said, let me give you
a hypothetical: what if we learned that the Soviet government was pay-
ing billions of dollars to American citizens to kill our government offi-
cials and violate our laws, would that create state responsibility? Well,
of course, it would. And would that allow us to use force in self-de-
fense? Well, most of them thought it would. And I said, well, let's
change it. What if a group of Soviet citizens with the knowledge of
their government were doing the same thing, and their government was
not acting effectively to stop it, would that create state responsibility?
Everybody, virtually everybody agreed. Could we use force? Well, they
were sort of split. They wanted to look at the book again.
And then I said, okay, now reverse it. Now we're a bunch of
Colombians, and we find that private American citizens are offering
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billions of dollars in bribes to our citizens to kill our judges, kill our
president, violate our laws, so they can have this narcotic they want. Is
that a violation of international behavior? Does it create state responsi-
bility, and their eyes got real big, and they said wait a minute. We
know the Colombians are the bad guys in this, but maybe this is more
complex than it looks. I think we have a duty to the rest of the world,
and I think one of the problems right now is our citizens are bribing
the world to violate their laws and give us drugs.
There are a lot of politicians that want to portray that we have a
problem here, that these horrible Colombians are up here and forcing
our people to use drugs. That's now that's happening. It may be con-
venient to get reelected as a politician, but our people are begging them
to give them those drugs, and are offering them billions of dollars in
bribes. We're the problem. Sure, there are evil people down south mak-
ing a buck on this, but until we face the fact that the United States is
the primary market on this and start doing something to get control of
that, I don't think we're going to win this thing. I think we're going to
spend billions of dollars.
We have got drug people out there that have an incentive to hook
children on drugs, and I've not heard all the conference. I've been in
and out trying to defend my unfortunate assassination remarks, and let
me stress I don't believe in assassination. I believe that a lawful exer-
cise of self-defense may be a different situation. From what I've heard,
and I've heard some wonderful material, it's been a great conference.
But I've not heard an answer that makes me think we're going to win
this fight, and that leaves me frightened. I'll not stay and participate in
the debate. f apologize. I've tried to stay out of this one, but when John
dragged me in by saying, by the way, he believes in legalizing this
stuff, I thought I ought to say something.
DR. MOORE: I have two others on the list here, but I can't resist
one comment, Bob, before doing that. That I think it's a very easy
target in my judgment to say that the real problem is nothing but de-
mand, and it is really the evil American people who are taking drugs. I
think the reality, Bob, is that there is a double-barreled problem on
this. It requires someone to supply it. It requires someone to take it. It's
both sides. Any effort to deal seriously with drugs has to have a supply
side component and a demand side component.
DR. TURNER: I think that you're right.
DR. MOORE: There is no magic bullet. I think it is an enormous
mistake to try to focus the whole thing either on demand side or on
supply side or try to allocate blame. The only blame in terms of the
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setting, in terms of governmental setting, is when you get governments
that are, in fact, not committed to the fight against this, and are, in
fact, abetting it. The Cuban government involvement is one we ought
to talk about in the worst kind of blame. The Colombian government is
doing its damnedest to fight this thing. The United States government
is doing its damnedest to fight this thing.
DR. TURNER: I'm not sure that's true.
DR. MOORE: Well, there's a lot more, I think, we can do, and I
think all of us are in agreement of that at this conference. But there is
not some kind of total moral lapse on the part of the American people,
etcetera, in trying to deal with this issue. But I would argue very
strongly that the effort simply to deal with it on either the demand side
or the supply side alone is a major mistake. You've got to deal with it
on both sides.
DR. TURNER: Let me concede on that, John, and say you're
right, but we're neglecting the demand side, and that's important, too.
DR. MOORE: Well, I don't know that we are. This whole confer-
ence focused on it, and we have never, for example, decided that organ-
ized crime on the supply side should be something we would not focus
on. All we would do is work on the demand side, for example, of other
kinds of organized crime issues in this setting.
DR. MOORE: This gentleman here.
MR. APPLE: My name is James Apple. I'm counsel with the Fed-
eral Judicial Center here in Washington. I want to maybe focus away
from the cultural aspects of the problem and discuss briefly one idea
that was thrown out by you, Professor Moore, and perhaps some others,
and that is one method of control using our civil liability system. I was
just speculating as you made those remarks about what would happen,
for instance, if we made corporations and banking institutions liable,
imposed civil liability on them if it was disclosed through the imagina-
tive discovery by our trial lawyers of America that they were engaged
in some kind of drug activities or that the banking institutions were
engaged in money laundering?
That kind of statute would send shivers through the general coun-
sels of the corporations and banking institutions of this country. I think
that statutes like that or ideas like that would begin to focus the corpo-
rate power of this country on this problem because it would be affect-
ing their wallets and their pocketbooks and their profits. To carry that
one step further, I could imagine some kind of system where even coun-
tries who are engaging in drug activities or not controlling them suffi-
ciently would expose their assets in the United States to seizure by
904 [Vol. 15
454
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Proceedings
some civil litigation process.
I think those kinds of legislation, if it were possible, would begin to
focus on the problem in such a way that the corporate powers of this
country would soon realize that it's a problem worth discussing.
DR. MOORE: Let's just build on that for a moment, if I could,
and I'm going to draft someone for a moment from the audience, too,
who has, I think, some unique information about this. I'm wondering,
David Brink, as our past president of the ABA, has the ABA really
looked into a way in which we could mobilize the considerable talents
of lawyers in the United States in trying to devise innovative national
and international laws that can try to combat some of this. Has the
ABA, and there is no reason to pick on the ABA, but the ABA is one
that has the potential here, I think, to mobilize this in a unique way
that I think almost no other organization in the country does, at any
time had some kind of blue ribbon presidential task force on the drug
problem? Do you think that it might be useful if something of that sort
were to be put together that would really innovatively look at new
ideas, et cetera?
MR. BRINK: I think it would be very useful. I do not think that
we have had a task force to design a total program. President Shovan
[sic], the outgoing president of this last year, did have a program
which, I think, was quite helpful in the schools. He went into the
schools in company with the president of the AMA and they pointed
out known consequences from a medical point of view and known
problems from a legal point of view.
While that did not deal with these international problems of in-
terdiction and the like, it certainly served some educational function on
the primary level in the demand side, which I think is so important
however you come out on the issue of drugs on demand or any of these
other issues. The demand side, they're both important, but the demand
side is the most important. If there were no demands, then we would
have no supply problem. And conversely, as this gentleman has pointed
out, if we expend all of our efforts and are able to shut off the Andean
connection completely, some chemist will come up with something that
comes from Minneapolis or somewhere else because there will always
be an answer to the supply as long as there is a demand.
However, back to your original point, I do think that the ABA
could tackle this. I'm not sure everyone would then be-satisfied with the
result, but I think maybe the precedent started by President Shovan
would be pretty good because the involvement of the medical profession
to quantify whatever tests, remedies, chemistry, if you will, may be in-
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volved and to put that into the solutions, might well be helpful. Perhaps
a joint project.
DR. MOORE: Very helpful. I must say I'm very intrigued with
the possibility of some of our best legal minds being brought together
to look at innovative new proposals to try to make it more difficult for
this trafficking to go forward. I had this gentleman and this one back
here, then the lady.
MAJOR PREGENT: Sir, I'm Dick Pregent from the Office of the
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army. One comment I would like to
hear is your response to the idea that Mr. McGinnis proposed, but
before getting there, the title of the conference is "Strengthening the
Rule of Law in the War Against Drugs and Narco-Terrorism." And it
seems that the majority of the speakers have focused on the importance
of international cooperation. At the same time, I've heard some ex-
tremely powerful people express ideas about unilateral action which are
confusing and to some extent disquieting.
The idea of Mr. Barr's opinion and to some extent what Judge
Sofaer had to say, but specifically with regard to Mr. McGinnis, do
you buy off on the concept, Sir, of expanding the definition of attack to
include justifying self-defense or collective self-defense to include the
failure of the state, which is not supporting narco-terrorism or drug
trafficking, but is simply failing in its effort to suppress it? Do you
support that expanded definition of attacks, or do you think the inter-
national community would buy off on it? I would be amazed to hear
how South American countries and Latin American countries would
perceive this authority of the United States to reach out and touch?
DR. MOORE: Let me respond to that, not because. this is some-
thing I proposed or have my heart in, by saying initially I think it's an
incredibly peripheral issue. This is not the core of how we're going to
deal effectively in my judgment with international narcotics trafficking.
What I can talk about a little bit is something I spent a lot of time on
which is the whole theoretical basis of individual and collective defense
and aggression under the United Nations Charter. The starting point is
that there is a debate among scholars in interpreting the scope of the
defensive right in international law.
There is a large group, indeed by far the largest, that would in-
clude most scholars, most foreign offices, from virtually every country
in the world other than the United States, that would take the view
that the kind of attack which is contemplated for a response is the use
of military force, the use of the military instrument. There is, however,
in the United States at least a group of scholars, Professor Myres Mc-
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Dougal would certainly be among them, who would take the position
that what is really at stake here and what one really looks to in the
scope of aggression is coercion from the territory of a state that is suffi-
ciently intense as to give rise to expectations that in the absence of the
use of the military instrument in response, that there is a very severe
encroachment on territorial integrity and sovereignty, etcetera.
He has taken the position that economic coercion, for example, if
intensive and extreme, and he doesn't mean peripheral kinds of things
that are modest, but the degree of economic coercion that, in fact, is
let's say ending the ability of a whole people to operate and threatening
the starvation of the peoples of a country. That gives right to the rise of
use of the military instrument in response.
I think that there is, and there have been a number of scholars
that have written in support of that position, for example, in relation to
the Arab embargo, the double oil shocks of the 1970s. I think there is a
considerable policy argument in favor of that under the Charter of the
United Nations if you take a purposive and functional approach. The
thing that it's easy to be, that one has to be very careful about here,
though, is shifting from a theoretical basis in saying, yes, it is possible
to have certain kinds of things rise to an intensity that is sufficient, that
the military force can be used in response, and then shifting to a con-
clusion that the ordinary setting in which a government is trying to
some extent to stop drug trafficking from its territory and is not able to
do it gives rise automatically to the use of military force.
I'm not sure of a single setting in the real world-I personally
would not be able to find one that would justify the use of military
force even if you accept the broader theoretical proposition in the case
today. I would find it highly unusual, certainly that it would ever be
applied in a setting where a country, the government itself is commit-
ted in the war against drugs. By the way, as a theoretical proposition,
though, as you well know, in a setting even if a government were theo-
retically opposed to the use of its territory for attacks from insurgent
groups, if it's the use of military force, and they're not effectively able
to stop the insurgence groups from using their territory, you have a
right of collective defense even against their consent to do it.
So it really does go back to that broader question. And I think
that's just a debate, but after having gone into this whole theoretical
discussion, let me just say when you really look at this, in the light of
the reality and the facts in the world, I don't see a single case where
that, it seems to me, is a serious issue in the real world. And for that
reason, I can't find this a particularly important way of trying to re-
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spond to this issue.
JUDGE DONOHUE: Just a response to somebody about the le-
galization of marijuana. Up in my area, the remark came out that they
better legalize marijuana. Otherwise, we won't be able to get a judge, a
federal Supreme Court judge or a state Supreme Court judge or any
federal judge or state judge in about the next five to ten years when
they ask them the question have you ever used drugs. Anid if they an-
swer it, one of the law school deans told me, if they ever ask the stu-
dents in his school, they'd all have to answer yes. So there won't be any
judges if they use that question.
But going back to the real problem. For twenty-five years I was a
judge, and I first met the drug situation back in 1965, and it emanated
from the military. We have a military base next door to our place, and
a corporal started the drug situation back there with codeine, codeine
cough syrup. He started it in the high schools, passing it around to the
kids, and they used to get codeine for a quick high for fifty cents. And
that gradually escalated all the way up so we eventually became a ma-
jor drug center, shall I say, in my area.
Thoughts started coming about how we should try to stall this or
stop this. Judges originally started out sentencing people to jail for use
of drugs, first offender. And the libertarians came out and thought that
was too cruel, too hard. So they came out with what they call the rehab
centers and that we should try rehabilitation and put people on proba-
tion. I remember a fellow, a strong drug user, who became a probation
officer. He told me that the only reason he stopped using drugs was
because he ran into a judge in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who said to
him, I'm going to give you a fifteen year suspended sentence for fifteen
years. If you get caught using drugs again, you're going to do the fif-
teen years.
He said he got rehabilitated. He rehabilitated himself. I hate to
say, I tried all sorts of programs, about everybody around, to try to find
what the results were and what happened, and I came to one conclu-
sion which is this. First of all, we have to start a program in the
schools. We're trying to say no, the DARE program, just say no to
drugs, but you have got to go a little further than just that. The kids
now are changing from drugs. They're going back to cigarettes and
tobacco. I hope you notice that. You notice we're finding eight and nine
year old kids smoking. And back to that bad habit.
Now, we're going back to alcohol. Somebody said w-. legalized al-
cohol and that solved our problem. It didn't. All we did was create
another problem. I mean what the hell? What's worse than an alco-
[Vol. 15
458
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/14
Proceedings
holic, and how tough it is for an alcoholic to get off the program? How
tough it is for anybody to get away from cigarettes or smoking. It takes
a lot of courage and a lot of gumption to do this. So we have got to
start with the program, going back to the children in schools all the
way through, either through using the medium, the television, and
things like that and programs, and put them right in school with the
best people we can get, the best teachers we can get, the best convinc-
ers we can get, to get out and start telling these students right in the
classrooms that this is not good for you, you shouldn't use it, or at least
weigh it before you do it.
Then we have got to start going back to the old property which
some of you earlier alluded to in factors, we have got to start going
back to respect, respect for people and property. We've forgotten that.
Somebody said we're self-indulgent. We just want me. It's the me rule,
the me rule. I'm going to take care of me first, and the hell with you.
We have got to go back and start teaching some respect for people and
property, and it's got to go back to the schools, and it's got to go back
right into the families.
After I retired as a judge, I started a newspaper, and all I'm doing
in my hometown is this thing, respect. I have what I call the empty
game. I call it "excuse me, may I, please, thank you, you're welcome."
Now simple little words, but let me tell you what's happened in one
year in my community. I've got people saying those words. I've got
people holding doors. I'm impressed down here in Washington. I
walked around the streets. People say hello to me. I say hello back to
them. My daughters tell me, I said to them it's amazing how Washing-
ton is so friendly. And she said, well, they're all people from out of
town, they have no friends.
(Laughter.)
JUDGE DONOHUE: Now that's what my children tell me. But
there's a lot to it, but we have got to go back to that. But now let me
go back to the immediate past, which I think we have got to do about
enforcement. We've been sitting on our duffs thinking rehabilitation is
going to work, and it isn't. You can't pat people on the head and say,
get on your way and go out to court, or if we send you to jail, we're
going to send you in the front door and let you out the back door. You
can push this down any way you want-but you have got to establish a
national federal drug court, and basically we go out and if you want to
do it, you have got to go out and staff it with a lot of retired judges.
(Laughter.)
JUDGE DONOHUE: They know how to put people in jail. They
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don't want to come back and work because most judges, once you get
away from the job, you say I don't want to go back and make decisions
again. But bring them back in for a month, two months, -three months,
put them out in those-somebody mentioned using military camps. Put
the courts in the military camps. And you got a jail right next to them
that you can turn into a jail, and the jail is simple. People always say
you have to put up big walls. All you've got to do is put up a fence.
That's a jail. And most drug offenders are not violent people. They're
drug users. They aren't violent people. All you've got to do is lock them
up and say you get out of the habit and make it a drug-free environ-
ment, that's going to be your biggest problem.
But staff if with retired people, with retired judges and retired law
men, so they work three months. For example, in Massachusetts we
have a law for trafficking. It's a mandatory ten year jaiL sentence for
trafficking in cocaine. In 1987, we had 800 arrests for trafficking in
cocaine. We have eighty judges on the Superior Court to try the cases.
Now to try a trafficking, with a mandatory case a lawyer has got to try
it. He can't plea it unless they can make a deal to knock: it down to a
lower case, and if they try the mandatory drug case it's a ten year
sentence. A lawyer has got to try the case. Otherwise, he's got a mal-
practice suit when the guy goes away for ten years.
But to try a trafficking in cocaine case takes on the average of
three to four weeks, and that's when everybody is working. So in Mas-
sachusetts, we have to take every one of our Superior Court judges for
a whole year to try the 800 cases, and we still would have cases left
over. They wouldn't do another bit of work. And that's vhy we've got
to set up a special court, just handling drug cases. Now you could back
it off if you want. The federal courts are backlogged the same way.
They're horrible. All the courts all over the country are backlogged the
same way. We put down hard sentences but you can't do that.
If you don't have the jails, they're going in the front door and out
the back door. That's why I say take these military bases-somebody
said Fort Dix is going to be closed-hell, you could turn that place and
house 10,000 prisoners. You could keep them in company areas, small
areas. You don't have to put them all in one big building. I went down
to South Africa and watched how they ran a jail. All they do down
there is they put three fences around a building. And they put dogs in
between.
DR. MOORE: You're not citing this as a model for the United
States now necessarily in how we set up our judicial system.
JUDGE DONOHUE: Well, I'll tell you what they said. They tell
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me down in South Africa that crime dropped.
DR. MOORE: Well, we do have certain constitutional principles
that are of fundamental importance in our system also--the whole ques-
tion of how we treat people and some standards in doing that.
JUDGE DONOHUE: Oh, no question about it. I'm all for this.
DR. MOORE: I know that, Judge.
JUDGE DONOHUE: But I'm saying this thing here-I'm just
saying how they run a jail. But the part I was going to go back and
finish off with is this thing, and I'm done, and I've had enough to say,
is if we don't establish a central federal drug court, a special federal
drug court, forget the drug problem. We're never going to win if you're
going to use the enforcement method. And I thank you kindly.
DR. MOORE: Judge, thank you very much, from the heart and
very provocative.
(Applause.)
MS. BECKER: I'd like to make a comment, but not in regards to
what he said.
DR. MOORE: Okay. Is there anyone that would like to respond to
that? Go ahead.
MS. BECKER: My name is Donna Becker, and I'm a private at-
torney here in Washington, and I've been here for both days and lis-
tened to most of the speakers, and the first comment I'd like to direct is
to the judge back there. He does have a hope of getting a judge who's
never taken drugs. I've never taken drugs. I don't smoke. I don't drink.
And I'm probably one of the younger people here. But there is some
comments I would like to make, and it seems to me that a lot of the
speakers don't seem to put the rule of law as the most important part
of this conference.
I have heard a number of people who seem to feel that trampling
the Constitution, shredding the Bill of Rights, is something that we
should do without blinking. I don't agree. One person has suggested
that he thinks that widespread drug testing is a good idea. I do not
agree. If I applied for a job at any company that tried to submit me to
drug tests, I would get up and leave, not because I'm a drug user be-
cause I'm not, but because it's a matter of dignity. And the same goes
for protecting our rights and protecting international law.
If you treat people with dignity and maintain the value of our soci-
ety and the rule of law, then you'll get it a lot faster than if you turn
the place into a police state, and I thought that it was very important
to make this point. Thanks.
DR. MOORE: Thank you very much. I think that's a very impor-
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tant point indeed to remind us that one of the critical dimensions of the
problem we're dealing with is, in fact, the full protection of something
we as lawyers and we, more importantly in the democratic process hold
as extraordinarily important, which are a set of guarantees relating to
who we are and what we are and constitutionalism and the rule of law
and the Bill of Rights. Those are things that are of great significance,
great importance to us. They do interact with these problems.
Reasonable men and women may differ in the intersection of how
some of these things interface and what the appropriate balance is, but
we must never forget that those are very critical issues in front of us.
Let me just make a comment. There really are a number of different
ways in which the rule of law is relevant to this issue. One is precisely
that. That on the one hand, we must not forget in the things we try to
do that we set aside the basic guarantees of our own system and in any
way be harmful and set a tradition that's harmful to thatt.
The second is in trying to mobilize the legal profession, to really
get lawyers, as a group, to focus on this, and to say let's use our best
legal brains, our best legal talent, to examine this problem, to expose
them to the best experts on the nature of the problem from the supply
side on one side all the way to the demand on the other, and say where
are the pressure points in this system, in which new laws that are care-
fully crafted with appropriate processes might make a difference in the
process.
Another is to call attention to how the rule of law itself is targeted
in a very damaging, sinister way the kind of targeting, for example,
that's going on against the rule of law in Colombia and Peru and Bo-
livia, to some extent, I suppose at this point. I'm less familiar with that.
But that we learned from our luncheon speaker yesterday has already
begun to creep over into the United States with the killing of judges
and lawyers and prosecutors. That's something also that strikes at the
very core of who we are and what we are in the overall process. So
there are a number of respects where it seems to me the rule of law is
very relevant as it intersects this subject matter.
Yes, the lady back here. And then Mr. Tragen again.
MS. NAGLE: Now, that we are talking about the rule of law, it
struck me-last year I was talking with some of my professors down in
Colombia, and the comment was that some lawyers up here from the
United States have been going down to Colombia to learn a little bit
about the culture, Spanish, and to learn about the rule of law, to be
able to come back here and be able to defend those that are breaking
the rule of law here in the United States by trafficking in drugs.
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Now the whole purpose of this is trying to move lawyers to be
aware of what is happening, and I think the whole purpose of this is to
try to use the rule of law to corner those that are breaking it.
DR. MOORE: That's exactly right.
Ms. NAGLE: So why don't we as lawyers try to have a whole
movement around the United States, for the lawyers to be aware and
say no, I'm not going to defend those that are breaking this rule of law
that is threatening the future of the United States and to the whole
world?
MS. BECKER: How do you know they're breaking it if they ha-
ven't been convicted? In this country, we're presumed innocent until
proven guilty. You can't just point the finger and say that person is a
drug dealer and then everybody abandons ship and leaves the person to
their fate. That doesn't work.
MS. NAGLE: I'm talking about those Colombians, my fellow
Colombians, that are caught in flagrante.
MS. BECKER: If they're caught in flagrante-
MS. NAGLE: I'm talking about those lawyers that already know
and are aware of those that broke the law-
MS. BECKER: If they're caught in flagrante, there should be no
trouble in convicting them according to the rule of law, but that's the
whole point of what I was trying to say. You can't abandon the rule of
law. The whole thing is the rule of law and drug addiction. If you
abandon the Constitution, if you abandon international law, then what
have you got left? Nothing. And if you abandon the rights of the ac-
cused, if you shred the sixth amendment, as Mr. Ratliff suggested, un-
fortunately yesterday, then you've got nothing.
(Laughter.)
MS. BECKER: You've got nothing. We do not have a leg to stand
on, and then it becomes anarchy. So if you want to convict people, fine,
convict them according to evidence, convict them according to rule of
law. If they're caught in flagrante, it should be no problem to put them
away. The fact that we have overcrowded jails would suggest that most
people don't get off so easily. The fact that people want to turn all the
abandoned military based into 10,000 person prisons-First of all, I
don't think turning the United States into one big prison is a very good
idea. Second of all, I don't think it is so easy for defendants to get off.
It just simply is not.
If you abandon that, if you say, for example, that lawyers cannot
accept money because it might be tainted with drugs, then you effec-
tively eliminate the assistance of counsel to the accused. The whole
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point of our legal system is to make sure that everyone's rights are
protected, even the most venal people as well as innocent people. You
can't say only innocent people deserve legal defense. Once you do,
you've abandoned everything that any lawyer should ever believe in,
and in this country, all lawyers are required to say that they will pro-
tect and defend the Constitution. If you do what you're suggesting,
then that is to violate your oath as a lawyer.
MS. NAGLE: So get better prosecutors. But I do indeed know for
a fact that in L.A. I have talked with many a police person, and they
said we have caught people in flagrante, and they have been released.
MS. BECKER: It won't happen every time. It might happen here
or there, but that's part of the imperfection of the systera. I mean you
just have to accept that.
DR. MOORE: Okay. Could I intervene for a moment because, in
a sense, you're debating what I happen to agree with you is an impor-
tant part, but a smaller part of the message that our judge from Peru
was trying to give to us, which was to welcome the importance of try-
ing to educate the bar in general about the nature of this problem. I
think that she's absolutely right. I would share that. Someone from
Peru knows uniquely how judges themselves and the rule of law is
targeted in this overall process. But let me say the only point where I
think for those of us that are lawyers in this that we would differ, and I
would share this difference, is we cannot say that lawyers do not and
that people don't have a right to defend and the lawyers can't do it.
What we're really trying to do in mobilizing the bar is to get the
bar to look at new legal initiatives and ways of dealing with this prob-
lem effectively that will be able to get it under control. [ mean unless
we have the absolute perfect legal system by some kind of accident in
dealing with this problem, most new problems that arise: need laws to
be tailored to deal with the setting. All we're proposing is that this is a
setting where we really need to assemble some of the country's best
experts to get them fully briefed from the experts on the nature of the
problem, and to begin to look at innovative solutions in which law can
fight back at what we have a lot of experience now in knowing can
ultimately become targeting itself, an attack itself, terrorism itself, di-
rected against the rule of law. But I would share your very important
point again about the Bill of Rights protection that everyone has a
right in such a case to be represented by counsel. Any other?
DR. MOORE: Thank you, Bill. David. Irving Tragen and then
David Martin.
MR. TRAGEN: I would merely like to comment on this last dis-
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cussion. I think, it is typical and symptomatic of the problem. We're
dealing with a transnational criminal activity. We talked about supply
and demand, and what makes this different. Both ends of the equation
are controlled by the same people. When we begin dealing with the
characteristics of this problem, whether you're dealing with the cartel
in Medellin or the Mafia in New York or the Mafia in Italy, we get
down to a basic characteristic: seventy to eighty percent of the cocaine
trade is controlled by four or five cartels in Colombia.
We're not talking about free enterprise. We're talking about a
controlled market. We're talking about interlocking directorates that
go across national boundaries. We're dealing with something that looks
like some of the James Bond movies. You remember Goldfinger. They
were sitting around the table. There is every bit of evidence from
materials we've got, we have enough evidence to show the degree of
interrelationship. You sit down and talk to the people from Interpol,
and they tell us that the Italian Mafia controls seventy to eighty per-
cent of the worldwide traffic in heroin including much of the production -
in Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala.
What we've really got is something very atypical under our penal
law. We're dealing with something that is a mixture of the Sherman
Antitrust type case and normal criminal activity. What I was trying to
point out before is if you're talking about law enforcement, what are
we really talking about? In a country like Peru, we're talking about
how the police effectively deal with the problem of controlling produc-
tion. And here I suggest that if anybody wants to analyze this phase of
the police problem, there is an excellent book by Dr. Edmundo Morales
called, "Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru," published in 1989 by the
University of Arizona Press. It's a fascinating book.
On the cover is a PL-480 bag filled with coca leaf. It explains the
sociological environment in which illicit trafficking occurs. Now the
role of the police in that setting is very different from what it has to be,
say, on the streets of Lima where on most street corners you can get a
joint of bazuka, which is the first stage of manufacturing cocaine, for
less than you pay for a normal cigarette. Then, there is a different po-
lice role in interdicting, the movement of the cocaine under the control
of the Medellin or Cali cartels from Peru to Colombia.
Now I think it's true that almost all of the shipment from Peru
and Bolivia are controlled by the cartels of Medellin. There is very
little indigenous control of the second stage of movement that is after
the initial production by anyone but the Colombian organizations. So
we've got an integrated monopoly. Then we get down, they move into
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Colombia, and you've got another question then. You've got the ques-
tion of the control of chemicals that are required to o:nvert the co-
caine, the coca leaf into cocaine. You've got another whole area of
criminology that has to be dealt with. Then you get into interdiction
again, Then you're into money laundering, and then you get into a
whole range of highly sophisticated police techniques, and finally you're
into what our colleague over here mentioned, getting the evidence,
together.
I'm sure the judge from Colombia can verify that the most diffi-
cult problem she had as a judge was getting her hands on the evidence,
partly because the police aren't trained to collect the evidence and
partly because they're afraid to keep the evidence. In other words, what
I'm trying to say is we're dealing with a transnational criminal activity
controlled by an interlocking directorate. So it really isn't supply and
demand in traditional terms. We have the same people controlling sup-
ply and promoting demand. And under those circumstances, the chal-
lenge, I think, to us as lawyers is to begin to look at the problem in
different terms, analyze the dimensions, and then see to what degree we
can begin, not working with ourselves alone, but with all the other
countries in this chain.
Let's take a country like Bahamas which started out merely as a
transient point, and probably today has the highest incidence of drug
abuse, of drug use, cocaine use, in the world. Why is that? Because
when they identify a corruptible official, they pay him ornce or twice in
cash, and then they pay him in kind, and once you've established he's
an SOB, who the hell cares? He isn't concerned about what he's doing.
He's interested in the money. So you get these sociological human con-
sequences coming out of this activity. What I'm suggesting really is
we've got a package that in international penal law offers us one of the
unique opportunities to be pioneers in examining a whole range of
issues.
That's what I'd like to end with as my contribution because I
think it ties together this last debate that we had because we don't
want to violate the rules of law, but what we've got to do is understand
the nature of the crime, the felony, that we're dealing with.
DR. MOORE: What I would like to ask you as perhaps our best
expert on the real facts of this syndrome and problem, is what would be
the most helpful way for lawyer groups in the United States and Latin
America to be working together on this? Because I also personally
share your sense that notions of blame or anything else are useless.
We're in this thing together, and what we really need is for the top
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levels of the bar and from Latin America and the OAS and top levels
in the United States to be working very closely together to see how we
mutually handle the problem. Are there possibilities here that the In-
ter-American Bar Association might take the lead or the OAS? Should
the American Bar Association take the lead? Should private organiza-
tions seek to bring the two groups together and promote discussions
that might be fruitful in this area? What do you think would be most
helpful?
MR. TRAGEN: I want to start by saying I don't think the answer
is exclusively one thing or another. I think we have different levels. At
the OAS in the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CI-
CAD), as I explained yesterday, we have taken what we have called
legal development one of our two or three top priorities. What we have
done is we've brought together representatives of attorney generals,
ministers of justice, from all of the member countries at that point. We
had eleven member countries in CICAD, and we brought three or four
more. Other countries were also represented. Now we have 22 countries
that participate actively in CICAD, ranging from Canada to
Argentina.
What we did was to bring them together and we said, look, what is
it, how is it that we ought to focus on the problem, and obviously we
can't do everything. They said the first thing we need to do is begin to
get some legal standards common to all of us. What are the five or six
areas that you gentlemen consider to be the most important? The first
one they mentioned was the precursor chemicals because if we can cut
that off, you stop the manufacture of coca leaf into cocaine, etcetera,
and you stop the production of poppy into heroin, and you can stop the
production of cannabis into marijuana.
Now this is very important because the U.S. is the largest pro-
ducer of the chemicals. Mexico produces some. Canada produces some.
Brazil produces some. CICAD convened a group of eleven inter-Ameri-
can experts from Canada to Argentina to develop rules and regulations.
They took as their judicial framework, as I pointed out before, Articles
twelve and thirteen, of the 1988 U.N. convention, and we designed a
model regulation, which we are now working with countries to try to
get applied. This is one level.
Now we are going through a similar exercise in money laundering
and bank secrecy. These have to be dealt with by representatives of
governments. That's one area in which government to government, in
the OAS, really is the best inter-American instrument for this process.
Then we have another whole area that we haven't really looked at
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which is judicial cooperation. As I think Judge Luz Nagle knows very
well, Latin American and U.S. legal systems are very different. I grad-
uated from Boalt in 1945, and I went to Chile to get my master's, and
the first thing I had to do was unlearn much of the way in. which courts
proceed, many of the principles of our law go back to code law as dis-
tinct from, I remember I studied under Max Radin, when we were
dealing with Roman law, and to go back to a whole new mind-set.
We've got to get judges talking to judges. We've got to begin to
understand how their systems work, and we've got to begin to under-
stand how we can begin to work together. If I were a judge in Colom-
bia, not understanding the U.S. system, and I received a request for
extradition, my instinct would be to say that doesn't look like an order
that would come out of my court. It isn't done the same way. So I
think one of the great things that the Inter-American Bar and the
American Bar can do working with our Latin American colleagues is
begin a dialogue outside of government among the principal leaders in
jurisprudential thinking in the hemisphere and see how we can focus on
these issues.
Fortunately, we have a great ally in the Italians, and they have a
great school at Syracuse dealing with penal law, and I think we might
find a way of building this tripartite relationship, Europe, the United
States, Latin America, to begin to open up some dialogue. I think this
is a very important part of this equation and not merely limited to the
drug problem, but it would probably have a favorable impact on other
elements of penal law as well as civil law.
I think a third party that we need to do is in terms of a different
kind of exchange among legislators. We now have the inter-parliamen-
tary fora and we have parliamentary groups from the U.S. that go to
Latin America. They have the Latin American parliamentary forum.
They have the Andean parliament forum. But we really haven't struc-
tured many of these things to get legislators to begin to talk to legisla-
tors with a different kind of setting.
I remember that there is an AID program aimed at--I don't know
what they're calling it now-modernizing the judicial system or mod-
ernizing legislation. You can't use those words. We aren't modernizing.
We're helping them to examine, as maybe we need to examine, some of
the systems and processes we use. I think we could go on, but what I
really believe is once again you disaggregate and you begin to identify
different instruments for different purposes. I think you know from
your many years of experience within the U.S. executive branch,
there's a tendency to want simple, general answers, and they want to
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put it all on one sheet of paper, and that doesn't really lend itself to the
kind of thinking that we need to do.
I think if you start disaggregating what the issues are, then I think
you can find a lot of different tools to use and maybe it ought to be the
ABA that takes the lead in creating that kind of consortium view of the
resources that we have available to do it.
Let me close by referring to an experience I had. As the AID Di-
rector in Bolivia in 1966 when Chief Justice Warren came to Bolivia,
my first political experience had been ringing doorbells for him when
he was running for governor in the mid-'40s. I was quite overwhelmed
to have the Chief Justice of the United States as my charge in Bolivia.
What I found was that by introducing a question here and a question
there, a debate could be started, a discussion could be started, between
the Chief Justice of the Bolivian Supreme Court and the Chief Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court, and they began to see how totally different
their systems were. And that's part of what we have to do. But, if we're
going to bridge the gap in this interdependent world dealing with this
transnational kind of problem, then we've got to begin to understand
what it is we're talking about.
DR. MOORE: Thank you. That was very helpful indeed.
(Applause.)
DR. MOORE: I'm going to take David Martin as the last question
here. Yes, Sir. This gentleman will be the real last question. I tell you
that. We'll take you now, and then I'll take David as the last question.
MR. WHITLOCK: Thank you, Professor Moore. I'm Bill Whit-
lock. Two things. I wanted to make an observation just to underscore
what Mr. Tragen was saying. At lunch, Congressman Smith observed
that he did not think that we were quite turning the corner, and I
agree. In order to turn the corner we must get to a situation where we
experience control. I think intrinsic to everything you were saying and
some of the other observations is we cannot be too specific. When we
want to get control, we get very specific in all your points which is
whatever circle we're in, whatever opportunities we may have to ad-
dress the problems, if we can be very specific when we address them
and those fourteen points that you observed or set out as a challenge or
suggestion to us earlier today, Professor Moore, every one of those ele-
ments gave us an opportunity to be very specific in our circle, and to
say how best can we deal with it.
Once we get specific, we have control. Once we get a sense of con-
trol we start to be able to turn the corner, and that's, I think, what
we're trying to do. If I may, just a brief report. Earlier I mentioned to
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Professor Moore that I was down at the FIPSE, the Fund for the Im-
provement of Post-Secondary Education, and I thought it might be of
interest to the conferees to know that the Department of1 Education is
seeking proposals for a program entitled "Approaches to Accountabil-
ity in Prevention Programs, Drug Prevention Programs al: Higher Edu-
cation," and they are seeking proposals. Their focus is on promising
new theoretical approaches to the individual and institutional leader-
ship and responsibility and encouraging the formulation of new theoret-
ical ideas.
It's about fourteen or fifteen small grants, but it's an effort on the
Department of Education-there are other projects that they have in
the works-and back home or with some of your educational institu-
tions, if it was something that you thought you wanted to pass on, you
might want to suggest that they contact the Fund for Improvement of
Post-Secondary Education, the Department of Education. Thank you
very much.
DR. MOORE: Thank you very much. David Martin is our final
speaker, final participant.
MR. MARTIN: I have one comment I want to make. and one pro-
posal. The comment has to do with Bob Turner's definition of the liber-
tarian attitude. If people want to smoke, let them smoke. Well, I al-
ways believed that the heart of libertarian philosophy had to do with
the right of the individual to decide for himself. This is the situation
where you run into certain contradictions. You give people the right to
decide whether they will indulge in narcotics or not, and in effect, if
they decide the wrong way, you are denying them of the :right to make
a free choice, a choice of their own for the rest of their lives.
They become slaves thereafter of the particular drug they imbibed
when they made this faulty decision. Certainly if they realized what
would happen, they would not have done it. So I don't think freedom of
choice can be considered as an absolute value in covering all cases,
certainly not where the freedom of choice may be stripped from the
individual for the rest of his intellectual life.
Then I spoke yesterday about the hearings on marijuana which I
organized and conducted. And about the almost universal opinion of
the experts who testified that one of the effects. of marijuana was that it
interfered with the process of maturation so that it affected young ad-
dicts who had been marijuana addicts perhaps more than two or three
years. These were the critical years of their adolescence. They never
matured. The doctor who headed up the Phoenix House in New York,
which was the biggest national rehabilitation institute, Mitch Rosen-
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thai, told us that he was very afraid that if we failed to stem the mari-
juana epidemic, we would find ourselves confronted not in the far dis-
tant future, but in the very near future, with a large population of
young adults who had never matured and who would have to be in the
society one way or another for the rest of their lives.
This evidence, as I say, was confirmed by the other experts who
testified. Now there is such a thing as the crime of genocide, and if one
believes that the punishment should bear some relationship to the grav-
ity or scope of the crime, then obviously the crime of genocide deserves
the maximum possible punishment. We have in the case of narcotic
trafficking a crime which I believe is equivalent to the crime of geno-
cide. It is a crime sui generis, as one might say, compared with other
crimes for which people are sentenced to long terms in prison. It quali-
fies as genocide because every year at least several thousand people,
possibly as many as 10,000, are killed in, the United States as a result
of narcotics overdoses, and much more important than that is it quali-
fies, in my opinion, as a crime of genocidal magnitude because it de-
stroys human capacities and human abilities to make free judgments,
judgments that reflect the personality, the true personality of the per-
son who is making them.
I believe that if the expression genocide has validity, then there
should be such a thing as narco-genocide as a crime punishable by
death. So in this one case, I am certainly in favor of the enactment of
legislation that would qualify narco-genocide, establish it as a crime,
punishable by the death sentence. That's my proposal.
DR. MOORE: David, thank you very much for a very interesting
proposal, and provocative new title to be attached to some of this be-
havior. I would like to thank all of our participants and experts who
participated in the whole program, joined in the discussion with us. We
are much indebted to you, and I certainly learned a great deal out of
this, and hope that we'll be able to distribute some of these materials
more widely, and if so, that it will make a contribution in dealing with
this problem. So we are dismissed, and thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the meeting adjourned.)
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